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A Comvarative Test o f Inglehart’s Theory o f  
Postm aterialism. 
Abstract
Ronald Inglehart’ s theory o f  postm aterialism  contends that since the late nineteen sixties, 
a new  type o f  politics is progressively taking over from the ‘ old p olitics’ system. 
Inglehart’ s case is built on steady changes in the postmaterialist index (PMI), where 
changes in  public values are regularly assessed. W hereas ‘old p olitics’ consisted o f  
debates over the place and scale o f  redistribution and pitted class-based parties o f  left and 
right against each other, the new  politics pivots on lifestyle issues, w hich  do not fit 
clearly into the left and right camps. This thesis looks at the political im plications o f  this 
detected value change, gathering new  and existing criticism s o f  Inglehart’ s model, and 
em pirically tests his claim s b y  means o f  a sm all-n case study w ith France and Ireland as 
comparators. W e test four hypotheses derived from his works: (i) that class is less 
predictive o f  vote choice; (ii) that voter discontent has been increasing; (iii) that new  
parties have prospered in response to the new  priorities, and (iv) that there has been a rise 
in unconventional political activity. W e find that there is at best, only partial support for 
Inglehart’ s m odel, and conclude b y  outlining what this test o f  posmaterialism tells us 
about the link betw een political values and political change.
Table o f Contents
1.1: Thesis structure 4
1.2: H istoriography 6
1.2.1 : The European project and intergenerational
value differences 7
1.2.2: Postm aterialism  and its political effects 13
1.2.3: Culture-specific political forms 41
1.3: Sum m ary and Conclusion 54
Chapter 2: Criticisms 56
2.1: Existing criticism s 56
2 .1 .1 : Flanagan’ s general criticisms 56
2.1.2: Specific points 60
2.2: N ew  criticism s 73
2.2.1 : Inglehart and Industrial S ocio logy  75
2.2.2: Inglehart and P sychology 78
2.2.3: Postm aterialism  as Postm odernism  88
2.2.4: Inglehart’ s research into political culture 91
2.2.5: Sum m ary o f  new  criticism s 94
2.3: Conclusion 95
Chapter 3: Methodology 97
3.1: Form ulating our hypotheses 96
3.2: The Theory-Inform ing M ethod and Com parative Political 
Science 100
3.3: The Sm all-n A spect 102
3.4: M axim ising value from  the choice o f  cases 104
3.5: The Tim efram e o f  the Thesis (1968-2002) 107
3.6: The case for aggregate data 108
3.7: Sum m ary 109
Chapter 1: Ronald Jnglehart and Postmaterialism 1
Chapter 4: Class Voting 110
4.1: Inglehart’ s m ain claim s 112
4.2: Testing the derived hypothesis 117
4.3: France 119
4.3.1: The votes o f  the w orking class 120
4.3.2: A dvances in m easuring the behaviour o f  all classes 124 
4.3.3: O verall sum m ary o f  the data for France 128
4.4: Ireland 128
4.4.1: Ireland as ‘ sui generis’ on class voting 129
4.4.2: A  reassessment o f  Ireland’ s position 134
4.4.3: Still som e social bases? 139
4.4.4: O verall sum mary o f  the data for Ireland 144
4.5: Conclusion 145
Chapter 5: Indicators o f disaffection 150
5.1: Inglehart’ s m ain claim s 151
5.2: Testing the derived hypothesis 154
5.3: France 157
5.3.1: C loseness to party 157
5.3.2: V olatility  and fragmentation 159
5.3.3: Party mem bership 164
5.3.4: Turnout 167
5.3.5: Spoilt ballots 171
5.3.6: O verall sum m ary o f  the data for France 174
5.4: Ireland 175
5.4.1: C loseness to party 175
5.4.2: V olatility  and fragmentation 177
5.4.3: Party mem bership 180
5.4.4: Turnout 183
5.4.5: Spoilt ballots 186
5.4.6: O verall sum mary o f  the evidence for Ireland 187
5.5: Conclusion 188
6.1 : Inglehart’ s main claim s 191
6.2: Testing the derived hypothesis 193
6.3: France 199
6.3.1: L eve l One change -  the Parti Socialiste 199
6.3.2: L eve l T w o change -  the Parti Socialiste U nifié 218
6.3.3: L eve l Three change -  Les Verts 228
6.3.4: Sum m ary o f  the evidence for France 242
6.4: Ireland 243
6.4.1: L eve l T w o change -  Dem ocratic L eft 242
6.4.2: L eve l Three change -  The Green Party 250
6.4.3: Sum m ary o f  the evidence for Ireland 257
6.5: Conclusion 258
Chapter 7: Unconventional political behaviour and New Social Movements 264
7 .1: Inglehart’ s m ain claim s 265
7.2: Testing the derived hypothesis 267
7.3: France 269
7.3.1: Issues and tactics o f  N SM s 269
7.3.2: The profile o f  an N S M  supporter/activist 275
7.3.3: Has the relative im pact o f  N SM s increased over time? 276 
7.3.4: Sum m ary o f  the evidence for France 281
7.4: Ireland 281
7.4.1 : Issues and tactics o f  N SM s 282
7.4.2: The profile o f  an N S M  supporter/activist 291
7.4.3: Has the relative impact o f  N SM s increased over time? 292 
7.4.4: Sum m ary o f  the evidence for Ireland 295
7.5: Conclusion 296
Chapter 8: Conclusion 302
8.1: W hat this thesis tells us about P M  303
8.2: W hat this thesis tells us about P M  in Politics 307
8.3: W hat this thesis tells us about P M  in Political Science 313
8.4: Suggested research directions 315
Chapter 6: New Parties 190
Bibliography 317
List o f  tables
Table 4.1: The destination o f  the w hite- and blue-collar votes, 1965-2002. 122
Table 4.2: The strength o f  the link betw een class and voting in France over 125
five  legislative elections.
Table 4.3: C lass voting odds-ratios in France for the left/right split, 127
first round o f  legislative and presidential elections, 1967-2002.
Table 4.4: The political distinctiveness o f  social classes in G alw ay  W est 136
at N ovem ber 1986.
Table 4.5: M athem atical differences in voting behaviour betw een the unskilled 138
manual class and the five  other Erikson-Goldthorpe classes at five  general 
elections, 1981-90.
Table 4.6: Percentage o f  first preference votes obtained b y  leftist parties, 140
D ail elections, 1987-92.
Table 4.7: The effect on party support o f  class and trade union membership. 143
Table 5.1: French partisanship versus the European Com m unity average 158
as collated in  the Eurobarometer series, 1978-94.
Table 5.2: The negative v ie w  o f  French parties - tim e series data collated 159
b y  SO F R E S.
Table 5.3: Total net volatility  in French legislative elections, 1958-1997. 161
Table 5.4: Total net volatility  in the first ballot French presidential 162
elections, 1965-95.
Table 5.5: Rate o f  decline o f  membership o f  French parties. 165
Table 5.6: Estim ated party mem bership in France since 1945 165
in numbers and as a percentage o f  the registered electorate.
Table 1.1: Cohort differences and post-bourgeois value type classification. 17
Table 5.7: Abstention rates for the first and second round o f  
the French Presidential elections.
168
Table 5.8: Fifth  R epublic first round abstention rates for the 170
Assem blée N ationale elections.
Table 5.9: Spoiled ballots as a percentage o f  votes cast at the 172
first round o f  legislative elections in the Fifth Republic.
Table 5.10: Spoiled ballots as a percentage o f  votes cast at the 173
first round o f  presidential elections in the Fifth Republic.
Table 5.11: A  longitudinal summary o f  trends in party 176
identification in Ireland, 1978-2002.
Table 5.12: Percentage volatility  in Irish general elections, 1961-1997. 178
Table 5.13: M ean electoral volatility  for each decade from the 1960s to the 1990s. 179
Table 5.14: Leakage figures for the three largest Irish parties at the 2002 election. 179
Table 5.15: Irish party membership m easured using the M/E ratio, 1986-1998. 182
Table 5.16: M ean turnout levels as a function o f  different electoral systems. 183
Table 5.17: Turnout variations in Irish general elections, 1961-2002. 184
Table 5.18: Percentage o f  spoiled ballots in eleven general elections. 187
Table 6.1: Changes in the class base o f  the PS, 1967-78. 212
Table 6.2: The occupational status o f  the PS electorate at 213
legislative and presidential elections, 1978-2002.
Table 6.3: The age profile o f  the PS voter at legislative 214
and presidential elections, 1981-2002.
Table 6.4: Second round run-offs at three presidential elections 215
and the percentage o f  the 18-25 vote.
Table 6.5: The occupational status o f  the P S U  electorate at the 225
1978 legislative elections.
Table 6.6: The secular nature o f  the P S U  voter in 1977. 226
Table 6.7: The P S U ’ s percentage share o f  the vote at five elections, 1968-1981. 227
Table 6.8: The occupational profile o f  the G reen electorate 235
at five  legislative and presidential elections, 1988-2002.
Table 6.9: The age profile o f  the Green electorate, 1988-2002. 235
Table 6.10: The values and attitudes o f  M am ere’ s supporters at the 239
first round o f  the 2002 presidential election.
Table 6.11: The percentage share o f  the eco lo gy  parties at tw elve 240
first-order elections, 1974-2002.
Table 6.12: The profile o f  the G reen voter at the 2002 general election. 254
Table 6.13: The G reens’ perform ance in D ail elections, 1982-2002. 255
Table 6.14: H ow  P M  relates to new  politics -  structures, attitudes and 260
behaviours.
Table 7.1: Com paring the fractiousness o f  the Fourth and Fifth  Republics. 274
Table 7.2: E C  12 sample in A p ril 1986 o f  percentage mem bership 276
or likelihood o f  a respondent becom ing a m em ber o f  any or all 
o f  the ecology, anti-nuclear pow er and anti-war m ovem ents (France).
Table 7.3: N um ber o f  fulltim e students in Ireland aged 20-24. 282
Table 7.4: A s  for 7 .1  (Ireland). 291
Table 8.1: Sum m ary o f  h ow  each hypothesis perform ed in the 303
cases o f  Ireland and France.
large and varied implications for the nature o f politics (see, inter alia, his 1996 
article, Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change1, and his 1999 
chapter, Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies). Inglehart has 
collaborated w ith  Dalton and h is early work, including h is PhD, drew heavily on 
ideas prevalent in Deutsch’s work. The work o f Deutsch and Dalton may be viewed 
as variations on the postmaterialist theme, while other scholars, notably Crepaz 
(1990) and Castles (2000), offer testable hypotheses that draw on the concept o f  PM. 
In this thesis, however, we test hypotheses drawn solely from Inglehart’s research, as 
his work embodies PM and forms the most continuous argument over a protracted 
period o f  time.
This thesis tests the claims made by PM by performing a comparative mid­
level analysis o f  Inglehart's theory o f  new politics. In Blondel's view  (1995), a mid­
level approach is a nation-specific setting whereby one assesses the goodness o f  fit 
between a grand level theory and its manifestation in an actual nation-state or states. 
This thesis intends to evaluate the theory's claims that any and a 11 affluent states 
should exhibit postmaterialist politics in applying Inglehart's model to two such 
states, Ireland and France. The timeframe is 1968 to 2002. The choice o f starting 
point is simple - Inglehart's own ideas were heavily influenced by the M ay riots o f 
1968 in Paris and the general sense o f  upheaval across the western world at that 
time. If one closes the timeframe at 1997, then only one cohort has been bom and 
fully socialised (taking cohort birth dates as 1950, 1960 and 1970) since the 
beginning o f the period examined. The year 2002 provides a good end point, as there 
were first-order elections in both states.
1 www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/dahon.htm
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Inglehart has written extensively on how the existence o f  the welfare state, 
the rise in education levels a cross the population, a nd the altered nature o f work 
combine to yield a new type o f  electorate. In cases where there has been a 
reasonably prolonged dealignment, there then arises a series o f  political movements 
aiming to capitalise on the disaffected. This leads to the diminishing importance o f 
the economy in first-order electoral politics and its gradual replacement by: 
‘environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to 
nuclear power’ (Inglehart, 1984: 28).
The rationale for testing PM in this way is twofold - it is novel and it offers a 
more authoritative evaluation o f  the theory than those studies that have been 
previously carried out. Quite simply, there is a lack o f  similar work in the field. The 
thesis offers a theoretical and empirical critique o f  Inglehart’ s argument, which, to 
this author’s knowledge, has not been done on a small-n comparative basis 
beforehand. P revious studies that h ave b een c oncemed w ith  1 arge-n, fo r example, 
Castles (op. cit.) and Crepaz (op. cit.), have taken one aspect o f PM -  the relative 
importance o f  economic versus n on-economic i ssue v  oting i n t he f  ormer, a nd t he 
impact o f PM on turnout in the latter - and thus offer only a partial test. A  recent 
study by Todosijevic and Enyedi (2003) advances on these by looking at how new 
politics manifest itself in  a large-n sample: its drawback is  that it  juxtaposes one 
overarching concept (PM) with another (corporatism). This thesis focuses on PM by 
itself. Todosijevic and Enyedi’ s article is a valuable one because in addition to the 
empirical testing o f parts o f  Inglehart’s theory, they go on to describe it as a social- 
psychological theory (op. cit. 631), thus allowing one to gain a theoretical insight as 
well.
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It would be o f  marginal interest to the political scientist i f  value change was 
all that was involved -  what is o f  significance is the political consequences o f  such 
value and attitudinal shift. Inglehart uses survey data to build his case for political 
change; we test to see how good a fit actually obtains.
A s for small-n studies, aspects o f  new politics have indeed been looked at on 
a comparative small-n basis, with Ireland and France as the cases. For example, 
Regan and Wilson (1986) looked at the phenomenon o f interest groups and 
corporatism in both states, while Royall (2000) examined NSM-type protest politics 
in the case o f  the collective actions o f groups representing the unemployed. These 
are useful, but they only address one aspect o f  Inglehart’ s work and were not 
expressly designed to test PM.
Direct tests o f  PM on a small-n basis are few in number. Chamock and Ellis 
(2004) apply I nglehart’ s four-item measure o f  P M  to graph the value base o f  the 
manifesto o f the One Nation Party in Australia. Apart from the fact that their study is 
evidently not comparative, their focus is on party values, which I feel is too distal 
from Inglehart’s work. The same lack o f a comparative basis is found in Curry and 
O ’Connell (2000) attempt to test how the theoiy can be used to explain the value 
profile o f a Northern Irish sample. They bring a substantial amount o f  psychological 
knowledge to bear on the profiles o f voters as distinct from parties. This thesis 
incorporates a thorough assessment o f how competently Inglehart’ s use o f 
psychology is, but stays within the discipline o f political science in looking at the 
political consequences o f  putative value change.
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1.1: Thesis structure
The rest o f this chapter is taken up with Historiography. This is essential, as 
Inglehart has written consistently and extensively on PM. Chapter Two covers 
Criticisms both established and new. We present the Methodology, including a 
justification o f  the sample size and additional points about how the approach chosen 
hopes to test the theory, in Chapter Three. As his theory subtly and inevitably 
undergoes slight modifications over the years, it is good practice to use the four 
hypotheses derived from Inglehart and Abramson (1994) list given in the 
Introduction. Each hypothesis is fu lly  fleshed out by its thorough grounding in a 
‘Main Claims’ section and this is done for all four o f  the empirical chapters (Four to 
Seven) and then alternative understandings o f  the phenomena are detailed to 
ascertain how well Inglehart’s broad approach factors in existing accounts o f the 
phenomena he discusses and claims to explain. These chapters follow the process 
tracing (Przeworski, 1987) structure, whereby as full an account as possible o f 
within-comparator description is provided to test i f  the theory is applicable in  all 
areas, or only some.
Chapter Four examines i f  the there has been a progressive decline in class 
voting. Chapter Five discusses whether the indicators of system dissatisfaction 
amount to a dealignment as defined by Inglehart. In many o f  his writings, Inglehart 
points to falling turnout and survey data that point to a disaffection with 
parliamentary politics and a weakening o f party loyalty, respectively. A  more 
authoritative view on the merits o f  this is presented on the basis o f  the above plus 
supplementary evidence in the form o f  three observable implications: (i) trends in 
electoral volatility, (ii) spoiled ballots and (iii) party membership figures. Chapter 
Six tries to find if  there is a correspondence between the perceived voter demands
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and the system responses to these in the form o f 'new politics ’ parties a nd their 
impact on politics in  both states. In  Chapter Seven, we test Inglehart's claim  that 
there has been a secular increase in extraparliamentary activity as people drift away 
from the established political channels. The Conclusion aims to distil the findings 
and demonstrate that a mid-level approach is much more parsimonious than a grand 
theory (Blondel, 1995) such as Inglehart's, in accounting for how the above 
indicators may be tracked and understood.
1.2: Historiography
Ronald Inglehart's work on values and their effect on political cognition and 
behaviour has been ongoing for over 35 years. In the following synopsis o f  his major 
writings, no attempt is made to be all-inclusive: only the works deemed more 
relevant to this thesis are the subject o f  comment. A s o f  2003, Inglehart's own 
website2 details 140 articles and eleven books, o f which six are co-authored works 
and two edited. Although Inglehart's corpus is not seamless, it is cogent and thus 
demands description. Core concepts and terminology recur throughout. Where 
Inglehart collates his own pre-existing ideas and data, the reader will be shown from 
where the insight arose. This is essential, as Inglehart's books often recapitulate an 
earlier exposition. The reader should therefore not be surprised i f  the books' 
summaries are not more extensive than that for journal articles or chapters. The 
books are an interesting c ase: there i s n othing n ovel in them that has n ot a Iready 
been presented beforehand; instead one has lengthened examples coupled with 
larger, more diverse data sets, but still a restatement o f a hypothesis he has already 
aired in a journal.
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This chapter thematically divides Inglehart's oeuvre into three parts. These 
are: (1) The European Project and intergenerational value differences, (2) -  
Postmaterialism and its political effects, and (3) Culture-specific political forms. 
These three themes are accompanied by a corresponding chronological shift. Broadly 
speaking, Part One covers the first five years o f  his career (1967-71/2) and is 
concerned in the main with the derivations o f  his doctoral research on country-level 
surveys regarding the creation o f  the European Economic Community (EEC). Part 
Two figures prominently from 1971/2 to the mid-1990s. Here, Inglehart introduces 
the postmaterialist index (PMI), his classic four-item instrument for classifying 
respondents’ values. Much o f  his work here looks at how these values map on to the 
political preferences o f citizens in Europe and America. Part Three goes up to the 
present day, with Inglehart’ s most recent work marking an explicit linking up o f  Parts 
Two and Three. This period i s marked b y  Inglehart's attempt to  delineate culture- 
specific value systems and their accompanying political perspectives. It continues 
with the survey m ethod, but i s added t o b y  incorporating m ore questions then the 
PMI and includes a large number o f non-European countries. There is inevitably 
some chronological overlap b etween the discrete strands o f  his w ork - this results 
from Inglehart's inclination to take up earlier developed themes. It is hoped that the 
reader will note the contiguity o f  ideas in much o f Inglehart's research. Within each 
theme, the work is presented in order o f year o f publication.
2 http://wvs.isr.um ich.edu/ringlehart/
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1.2.1: The European Project and intergenerational value 
differences
Inglehart’s academic career commenced with his unpublished PhD obtained from the 
University o f  Chicago in 1967. Entitled The Socialization of 'Europeans', it was the 
culmination o f  his investigation into factors promoting the support for European 
integration (1967b: 91, footnote 3). Drawing on ideas first proposed in Karl 
Deutsch’ s The Nerves of Government (1963), lnglehart probed how the strength o f  
the ability o f  individual citizens to process information allows one to infer the 
probability that they will form communities o r  could b e b rought together to  form 
new ones. One could assess the minimum ‘ cultural compatibility’ which would 
allow new federations to be formed (op. cit. 177).
The dissertation's heart was an analysis o f  a four-nation (France, W. 
Germany, Holland and the UK) secondary schools' sample and their attitudes 
towards specified measures on the road to a politically constituted Europe. Questions 
in his survey centred on (1) the abolition o f tariffs, (2) the free movement o f  labour 
and business, (3) a common foreign policy and (4) subsidisation transfers. The 
material was collected in the period 1964-5 and a comparison made with an existing 
database o f  adults' responses from 1962-3. Age-based variation was marked. In 
finding that the y  ounger cohort presented as decidedly more 'European', lnglehart 
deduced that this non-nationalistic aspect was probably attributable to two factors:
(1) The absence o f antagonistic war memories and
(2) The experience o f living through a period where a common European 
project was underway (op. cit. 4).
These ingredients were responsible for a qualitatively different socialisation 
matrix for the school sample. The linkage between their embrace o f  the four policies 
and the sample's age was in contrast to the older groups' pronounced hesitancy 
regarding the means and the end o f the EEC.
In moving to the University o f  Michigan and publishing a paper based on his 
thesis, Inglehart established a continuing pattern. He would consistently write on the 
interface between values, opinions and the political implications thereof; periodically 
gather his ideas and reprocess them in book form, then set o ff on a related but new 
strand.
His 1967 paper drew on the same school sample as that for his PhD and 
intended to give a negative answer to the eponymous question, An End to European 
Integration? 11 c overs the same ground a s his PhD, but is worth summarising for 
three reasons. Firstly, it includes an emphasis on the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the development o f  values and preferences. I nglehart r efers t o Donald 
Hebb (1967b: 95), a neuropsychologist, and his comments that large-scale 
conceptual reorganisation is theoretically more difficult as one ages. The enthusiasm 
o f young Europeans, by Inglehart's extrapolation, is resistant to tempering. In much 
the same way, Europeans socialised in the Depression and the Second World War 
are much less ‘ flexible’ in their outlook.
A  second valuable addition found in this paper is that o f  the period effect - 
the first published reference to short-term opinion fluctuations in response to an 
event is to be found in the 1967 article. Firstly, phenomena that seem conducive to a 
burgeoning European sentiment include the Soviet invasion o f Hungary and the Suez 
Canal incident, both in 1956. In the case o f the former, the threat o f a monolithic 
Eastern enemy is very much palpable, whilst for the latter, the Egyptian operation
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had both British and French involvement. In both, the idea o f  a single nation-state as 
a powerful actor loses viability in the eyes o f the public. Joint European action gains 
in stature (notwithstanding the Suez dénouement). The negative period effect was the 
elite-level disagreement on further EEC membership enlargement (exemplified by de 
Gaulle's veto o f  British entry in  1 962; op. cit. 98) and the deepening o f  political 
powers delegated by the member states to Europe. Inglehart takes pains to illustrate 
that citizens interpret and store memories o f  such events which serve to modulate 
optimism or pessimism for a large political project; as may be seen in the earlier 
reference to Hebb, Inglehart's interest in psychology is never far from the surface o f 
his thinking. Another example o f  a tentative political psychology is to be found 
concerning the drop in the numbers ’for Europe’ and the lack o f a corresponding rise 
in the ’against1 column. Respondents abstain and in doing so 1 [avoid] the psychic 
"pain" of acknowledging that they were for what appeared to be a losing cause ’ (op. 
cit. 100). The de Gaulle decision had eroded support levels, but not boosted the 
profile o f those against integration generally. Thirdly, Inglehart suggests that 
Deutsch’s conclusions are shaky precisely because he focuses on the elite's attitudes, 
which are inevitably constrained by the socialisation history o f this group, and not 
enough on the mass public's thoughts. This predilection on Inglehart's part for large- 
scale survey research remains the main component o f his methodology for the 
duration o f his career.
In 1970, we note three journal articles from Inglehart, with two being relevant 
to this thesis. The New Europeans, Inward or Outward Looking? continues his 
emphasis on intergenerational value differences. Again drawing on information 
gathered for his doctorate, Inglehart presents a picture o f a young generation more in 
favour o f  the European endeavour and as a result, less nationalistic. Taking France,
10
Germany, the Netherlands and the U K  as his sample o f  nations, h e finds that age 
differences are at their lowest in the Dutch case. The socialisation argument is 
invoked, but this time it incorporates a longer view. According to Inglehart, the 
Netherlands has been more international in identity since the end o f  the Napoleonic 
Wars and this supranational factor w as boosted b y  the location o f  the then World 
Court in The Hague. In not being involved in W orld War One, the Dutch further 
deviate from the pattern for the other states. In their case, Europeanisation increases 
as the population gets younger; this is true for Holland, but to a less marked extent.
In conjunction with this greater European sentiment, reduced nationalism is 
also an aid to cross-Atlantic co-operation. French, German and British youth were 
strongly in favour o f  the above, whilst a follow-on question relating to the 
desirability o f  world government produced weaker support but nothing approaching 
ringing rejection.
One tangential dimension to this paper is its interest in the concept o f 
Authoritarianism. Older cohorts may be described as more authoritarian (and thus 
less likely to accept a departure from entrenched rules) but cross-national 
consistency was lacking. Internationalism tapped a libertarian factor, one assumed to 
be orthogonal to Authoritarianism. Inglehart sketches in an explanation. The more 
authoritarian citizen will have a heightened sense o f physical threat and so is certain 
to rely on the nation-state to fulfil its long-established protective function. 
Conversely, the more libertarian (and necessarily younger) individual sees nothing 
intrinsically dangerous in a potential partial loss o f sovereignty. In annotations, 
Inglehart addresses the question as to whether older citizens, generally having grown 
up poorer, are more authoritarian because o f  this lack o f felt security, or whether it is 
simply a case o f changing parental styles. This is something o f  huge significance to
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the idea o f  the Authoritarian Personality as outlined by the Adomo/Berkeley School. 
Inglehart devotes some time to an account o f  this idea’ s formation. The Adorno 
School picked out early-socialised authoritarianism (a function o f rigid parenting) as 
a key variable in explaining the political psychology o f  the Nazi Youth. Also in 
1970, the first Eurobarometer survey was undertaken. Its cross-sectional and cross­
national range was to prove o f  immense utility to Inglehart's concept formation. A  
more theoretical paper from this year, one less dependent on survey data, was 
Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity (1970b). This article is very much 
expository and sets out to link up increased education, consumer prosperity and the 
communications r evolution i n o rder t o e  xplain a n altered s ocialisation o f p olitical 
identity. Although we cannot cite Habermas’ s concept o f the public sphere (it post­
dates Inglehart's paper), the increases in urbanisation and amount o f information 
serve to lessen the number o f  'parochials' (op. cit. 45). The Europeans affected are 
more likely to have an opinion on non-local and even non-national events, and 
furthermore, would seem to be better disposed to pan-European integrating 
measures. Working from a large Reader's Digest database from 1963, he extended 
the sample in 1968 to individual nation polling. Again, intergenerational variation 
explains the extent o f cognitive mobilisation (for example - years o f  education) and 
its impact on political identity. Data include television and radio ownership figures 
and exposure to print media. A  shift in the construction o f political identity is 
underway and will have progressively greater influence on those socialised after the 
Second World War. An additive factor is stressed, in that future cohorts will be even 
more cognitively mobilised.
1 2
This early period o f  Inglehart’s w ork is marked by three things: the emphasis on 
comparativism; the use o f  the survey as the sole method; and its referral to a 
tentative explanation o f  political processes by means o f  a psychological perspective. 
He extends his doctoral work on attitudes towards European integration and attempts 
to link political attitudes with their underlying values. He delves into historical 
context when he deems it appropriate, including both the Second World War and the 
Napoleonic Wars as exerting an effect on contemporary European politics.
1.2.2: Postmaterialism and its political effects
The second period o f  Inglehart’ s work is distinctive in three ways. Firstly, Inglehart 
does some case study work in his books and articles, giving a greater degree o f detail 
in particular on contemporary politics in France, the US and Germany. This 
approach differs from his first period, which relied on historical context in order to 
explain the survey results. Secondly, he builds on the PMI, turning it into an 
instrument synonymous with this work. Extrapolating from the survey findings, he 
affirms that the trends picked up on here are the reasons for the political changes he 
describes. The nature o f political change is a prime subject for Inglehart in this 
second period. Whereas he had previously focused on what we can predict from 
surveys about the likelihood o f  the acceptance o f European integration, in this 
second phase he devotes considerable resources to explaining the reasons behind 
what he terms the new politics o f  protest. Thirdly, he often recapitulates his work, 
turning his main books (1977 and 1990) o f  this period into extended summaries o f 
his earlier findings. The extent o f  this reworking is such that many o f the articles are
1.2.1.1: Summary o f  Ing lehart’s f ir s t p erio d
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interchangeable in content if  not in phraseology; this applies to his co-authored work 
and publications where he is the sole author.
In 1970, Inglehart published a joint article for the first time with Paul 
Abramson, marking the beginning o f a durable collaboration. They had met at a 
conference on political socialisation held in the University o f  Michigan in 1967. 
Recognising that they shared similar points o f view, they joined forces to produce a 
paper based on the first Eurobarometer surveys o f  1970.3
In 1971, Inglehart published findings based in part on the French Election 
Study o f  1968. The paper, written in French, was titled Révolutionnarisme Post- 
Bourgeois en France, en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis. It was the French material 
that formed the thrust o f the article. M ay 1968 had been the crystallisation o f 
mounting campus tension across much o f Western Europe and America. A s a result, 
the corresponding French Election Study dealt extensively with the rebellion and 
strikes. Two hundred variables in total were used for the study, and included (among 
others) items assessing de Gaulle's performance and political party preference.
Contained within the article is the assertion that the nature o f  political 
engagement had begun to change drastically: the potential for class conflict was 
diminishing and the impetus for political upheaval was now seemingly sourced in 
the well-educated youth bom after World War Two. ‘Post-bourgeois’ implies that 
the demands o f the ‘revolutionaries’ were not property-based, but instead were more 
amorphous q uality o f  life i ssues. D iscontentment w ith the economic h ealth o f  the 
system was not fomenting unrest: the west had undergone massive and sustained 
rises in numbers at work and job opportunities for graduates were plentiful. 
Although the French workers went on strike, the initial acts were student-instigated
3 Abramson and Inglehart, 1995.
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and Inglehart uses the study results to show that heavy-handed policing roused the 
workers' ire. W hat w as significant was the simultaneity o f  the protests across the 
western world and that those who had apparently benefited most from the Golden 
Age o f capitalism (in terms o f education, welfare and health provision, and 
employment prospects) were the agitators for change. Inglehart furnishes the reader 
with the rudiments o f his later grande idée: that the motivations behind revolts and 
extraparliamentary action were less and less economic and more and more 'radical' 
or 'expressive'. The latter reasons were more likely to be cited by younger, better- 
educated citizens who had grown up in a middle-class environment. For the three 
states covered in the article, it was not labour that they had cause to fear, but the 
offspring o f the respectable bourgeoisie. Logically, in the post-war period where 
material gains had been near universal, the drive for altering the status quo ante 
would not emanate from those who had seen their standard o f  living rise. The older 
cohorts had undergone varying degrees o f  privation (most severely in Germany, least 
so in America) and would be reasonably content with their lot. The new list o f 
demands related to pacifism, nuclear disarmament, environmental protection and a 
greater say in daily decision-making, whether at work or in politics.
Inglehart's seminal article, The Silent Revolution in Europe: 
Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies (1971) is in many ways a 
microcosm o f his entire career, containing the essence o f his major books4 and 
should be seen as emblematic o f his arguments, methodology and conclusions. His 
first statement on the functional dependency o f  political priorities on economic 
security appeared here, and he continues in the same vein by referring back to 'post­
bourgeois' values (op. cit. 991). It is also an instructive paper in that we see the first
4 His most w idely known volume (1977) is named after this paper
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explicit reference to Abraham Maslow, the psychologist whose theory o f  personality 
Inglehart generalises to a political sphere. Inglehart's examples o f  this model's 
applications are simple: i f  a man is lost in a desert, he will first crave water; if  a 
water supply is available, he will soon be preoccupied with sating his hunger (ibid). 
Those generations who have grown up with war and economic hardship would 
accord a high priority to economic security and what M aslow terms the 'safety 
needs'. A  greater emphasis on post-bourgeois or 'non-acquisitive' values would have 
its first societal manifestation in the upper middle classes.
A s a political illustration o f  this, Inglehart makes a connection with his other 
1971 article on post-bourgeois revolutionary ideation. Stressing that such a 
phenomenon was largely the result o f middle-class disaffection with disparate 
policies, Inglehart tries to contextualise the May 1968 revolt in France as the 
exemplar o f  this new  impetus. Previously, political rumblings had emanated from 
the lower classes. This would no longer be the norm. Inglehart then looks at how 
post-bourgeois political preoccupations present themselves. Firstly, they could be 
described as anything that the (comparatively) recently embourgeoisified working 
class w ould endorse. In order to  operationalise this test, Inglehart drew up a now  
famous four-item measure (op. cit. 994). Respondents are required to pick their top 
two most important priorities from this quartet. T hey may then be classified into 
value pair types. Two o f these are noteworthy: acquisitive and post-bourgeois. 
Acquisitiveness is thus defined as an overriding interest in stable prices and a strong 
criminal justice system. Although Inglehart's terminology changes in 1977 (to 
materialist andpostmaterialist), the phrasing and the content o f  the measurement 
stayed the same and do so to the present day.
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Inglehart's sample was that o f the first Eurobarometer. Holland, Belgium, 
Italy, France, Germany and Britain. Recapitulating much o f his earlier work, notably 
his other main 1971 piece (three years in preparation), Inglehart expects to see that 
cohorts socialised after W orld War Two a re more likely to be classified as post­
bourgeois. The differences in percentage terms in the oldest and youngest cohorts on 
post-bourgeois values are given as follows in Table 1.1:
Country Percentage
difference
Holland 24
Belgium 24
Italy 24
France 18
Britain 9
W. Germany 21
Table 1.1: Cohort differences and post-bourgeois value type classification. After
Inglehart, 1971b: 1000.
A  second hypothesis is that one would find a greater proportion o f  people 
with post-bourgeois leanings in the mainland European countries. Inglehart’s 
argument hinges on Britain’s low ranking in numbers o f postmaterialists. He writes 
that Britain's outlying position is partly due to its great wealth prior to the recession 
o f  the 1930s and World War Two, and its slower rate o f economic growth after 
1945:
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To put it briefly, high absolute levels o f  wealth in  a given nation at a 
given time would predict relatively high proportions o f  post-bourgeois 
respondents among the cohorts socialised under these conditions; high 
rates o f  growth for a given country would predict relatively large 
increases in the proportion o f post-bourgeois respondents, across that 
nation's age-groups.
(ibid. 998-9)
Consequently, older British generations would not have as great a disparity in 
relative wealth terms than younger Britons. Germany would be a clear counterpoint - 
the older generations would have experienced the lacerating privations o f  Weimar 
Germany and then the devastation o f 1944-5, while the younger cohort would have 
grown up in the affluence o f the Wirtschaftwunder (ibid. 1006). The table above 
bears this hypothesis out, where it is shown that the gap is smallest in Britain.
An insightful remark on page 1000 highlights the primacy o f  early 
socialisation: 'Even among the 25-34 year old cohort, there is still a heavy plurality 
o f  acquisitive types over post-bourgeois types'. This is due to the fact that a large 
proportion o f  this group will have spent their first years in a wartime or (immediately 
afterwards) devastated nation. Inglehart points to the swift reversal for the youngest 
cohort, undeniably post-bourgeois in their value structure. This evidence allows 
Inglehart to attribute this to a generational cause rather than a life cycle one; people 
do become more acquisitive as they age, but not to the extent that such sizeable gaps 
between cohorts would exist. One pithy example o f  the contribution played by socio­
economics to this 'new values' direction is where Inglehart writes: ‘A  working class 
Frenchman 20 years old corresponds to a Frenchman in his 50s’ (ibid. 1002).
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Throughout the article, Inglehart underlines the socio-economic aspect - citizens
from wealthier backgrounds will be less acquisitive than those from poorer
environments - and t he generational element - younger p eople are i nvariably less 
acquisitive than their elders, i f  class is held constant ( ibid. 1005). Interesting pen 
pictures o f  the political ramifications o f value change pepper the article:
1. Time series data on Germans' priorities with respect to differing
conceptions o f freedom had been collected at five stages from 1949 to
1963. At the start, 'Freedom from Want' was cited as o f  greatest personal 
importance, outranking the others o f  Speech, Fear and Worship. Its 
margin over the second most valuable freedom was nine per cent. By 
1963, the percentage opting for 'Freedom from Want' fell to fifteen per 
cent, whilst 'Freedom o f Speech' rocketed to fifty-eight per cent and thus 
first choice.
The Wirtschaftwunder is deemed by Inglehart as a rare instance o f such telescoped 
change, both in economic conditions and the values stemming from these.
2. Political partisanship. Much o f the paper's worth is located here. If 
one had to summarise Inglehart, the above would be the closest 
possible approximation. In his view, the coming electoral struggle 
would see post-bourgeois voters moving en bloc to 'parties of 
movement' as against 'parties of order’. This is a point o f departure in 
party family typology. The former is essentially the kind o f party 
responsive to new values and what they may imply, and is less
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interested in appealing to a law and order or redistributive 
constituency. This is a 'new left' idea, as change is typically an 
emanation o f the left. Inglehart refers to the Dutch party, Demokraten 
66, the Italian PSIUP and the French PSU. The impulse to conserve 
may well become stronger in the face o f such considerable shifts; 
regionalism and ethnocentrism are reasonably certain o f  a boost, as 
the electorates attracted by these programmes feel disenfranchised by 
the supranational thrust o f  politics, a thrust that also effaces the class 
cleavage reference point. As this line o f  demarcation gradually 
becomes less defined and defining, Inglehart argues that separatism 
and tribalism gain in momentum. The Belgian data show that there is 
a four-to-one ratio o f  post-bourgeois types who support their own 
linguistic community's party, whether Flemish or Francophone. The 
new cleavage in Belgium would seem to have a prominent place for 
separatist representation (ibid. 1011). Inglehart does not delve into the 
complexities o f  Belgian affairs but instead contends that 
ethnocentrism is a predictable by-product o f  increased affluence. 
Separatists are motivated by an ethnic belongingness and this 
incentive: "According to M aslow...com es next on the individual-level 
hierarchy, after needs related to sustenance and safety have been 
fulfilled." Inglehart seemingly trusts psychology more than theories o f 
coalition building.
Inglehart co-authored a vital article in 1972 with Avram Hochstein. It merits 
presentation for three reasons: (a) it is the sole paper that utilises the method o f  a
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small-n comparative study and (b), it tests the survey findings by juxtaposing them 
with up-to-date political events in  both cases. Their piece, entitled Alignment and 
Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States, argued that the new 
values had collided with the old in the most recent national elections o f the countries 
concerned and had resulted in a quantum leap in electoral cleavage dimensions. 
Picking up from the main suggested political consequences o f the emergence o f a 
new values trend (as per Inglehart's 1971 papers), the authors compare the French 
Assembly Election o f  1968 with the American Presidential contest o f  1972. In the 
French instance, the data come from the French National Election Study o f  1968, 
carried out by Inglehart himself. The findings o f  this survey, in conjunction with the 
actual electoral lie o f  the land, were sufficient to support the idea that an alignment 
had occurred in French politics. Inglehart contends that until the Fifth republic o f 
1958, French parties had failed in their core functions as political machines that co­
ordinate the ruled with the levers o f  power. Too many parties, incoherently 
organised, were competing for the electorate. Charles de Gaulle brought about a 
functional division - Gaullists and non-Gaullists. A  united left was not to the fore 
and consequently, one axis did not explain maximal variance. The authors make 
significant derivations from the M ay 1968 disturbances and the subsequent elections. 
The core argument is that a polarisation occurred at the National election in the 
summer o f  that year (23 June). The left had split into two camps, one (led by the 
PSU) identified as being the soixante-huitards p arty, whilst the Communists had 
come out strongly against the civil unrest o f  the insurrection. The PSU were 
punished at the polls in that their vote was only four per cent nationally. However, 
they received 29 per cent o f  the post-bourgeois vote. The other leftist parties 
obtained nine per cent more votes in  this constituency as against their acquisitive
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base. It is plain that Roeard's PSU is deemed by both Inglehart and Hochstein as the 
party for the post-bourgeois cohort, but not for the nation at large. The clear victory 
for De Gaulle may be explained as the result o f  a clash between new and old values. 
A  heightened sense o f  threat repelled the majority o f  the electorate, acquisitive in 
value type, away from the left to the Gaullists. The authors sound a note o f  caution 
regarding the future o f  the PSU -  it would not be in a position to be the majority left- 
wing party, let alone form a government, until a large number o f  post-bourgeois 
youth, socialised in a time o f ever increasing plenty, attained the right to vote. This 
would have to be repeated successively until the effect was sufficiently cumulative 
to swing the pendulum in the N ew  Left's direction.
The 1972 American Presidential contest between the Republican incumbent, 
Richard Nixon, and the Democrat George M cG ovem , was in point o f  fact, a n o ­
contest. Referring to the classic survey data in The American Voter, Inglehart 
acknowledges the durability and clarity o f  the cleavages structuring American 
voting, but deem this election as the force that brings about a new cleavage. 
Inglehart and Hochstein claim that the post-bourgeois voter was more likely to 
plump for McGovern, but this group was too small to prevent a crushing Nixon 
victory. The Democrats were in danger o f  becoming a niche postmaterialist party.
In choosing France and America, Inglehart and Hochstein propose a testing 
ground o f  two industrialised nations but with significantly contradicting cleavages. 
The challenge to inveterately held values and political identities contained in the 
emergent issue agenda provokes alarm. To seek reassurance and straight answers to 
the political and civic puzzles, the electorate in each country rotates away from its 
existing lines o f  demarcation. Bearing in mind the muddled state o f  party 
orientations in early Fifth Republic France, there develops a cogency; de Gaulle
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consolidates his position as fulcrum. Conversely, a solid socio-economic and racial 
cleavage in American life, dividing Democrat and Republican, substantially 
atrophies. In sum, Inglehart and Hochstein propose that an alignment occurs in 
France and a dealignment in the US.
Inglehart builds on to this scaffold in another 1972 article, co-authored with 
Lindberg. Entitled Political Cleavages in Post-Industrial Society - The May Revolt, 
they extend the French case study and add more detail, in the main on the structure 
o f  the left and the relative position o f  the Communists. He reaffirms the explanation 
that the Gaullists maximised their vote in June 1968 due to their underlining the 
importance o f  a strong law and order policy and their aim to strengthen centralised 
rule. The result o f  this for Inglehart is a splitting o f  the left. On the left, the PSU and 
its supporters would spin o ff  to form the 'New Left'. Gaullism would assimilate 
many o f  the economic and criminal justice concerns o f  much o f  the SFIO's working 
class core vote, plus a significant part o f  the PCF's weakly identifying constituency.
The impact o f value shift on parties is taken up again by Inglehart and Barnes 
(1974) in a paper titled Affluence, Individual Values and Social Change. They 
acknowledge that for much o f  the twentieth century, the most important cleavage in 
the affluent West was the class-based one. Political parties from the two major 
antagonistic factions, left and right, oversaw the expansion and eventual ubiquity o f 
the welfare state. In this case, it can be shown that rightist parties felt themselves 
constrained to (at the least) maintain social provision and not knock down the edifice 
o f  the welfare state. In proposing that there will be a progressive effacement o f the 
left/ right divide, Inglehart is developing a theme that will reach its fullest expression 
from 1977 on -  that new politics is replacing the mid-century compromise (Crouch, 
1999: passim) and so left/right materialist politics w ill gradually fade away.
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Inglehart's most widely known work, The Silent Revolution, was published in 
1977. It is a direct follow-on in content to his 1971 article o f the same name. The 
socialisation and scarcity hypotheses are re-emphasised, but Inglehart does not add 
much that is conceptually new. It is reasonable to view  the book as a collation o f his 
extant ideas. The method o f  assessing one’ s value preferences is by means o f the 
Postmaterialist Index (PMI). It is obtained by asking respondents to pick what they 
believe should be their country’ s top two aims from a list o f  four items; a twelve- 
item assessment has been harnessed by Inglehart (see pp. 22-23). For the purpose o f 
clarity, the four-item breakdown is given here:
1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom o f speech
A  combined score allows for the following classifications where a person picks 
the following combinations as their top two priorities:
(a) 1 &  3: Materialist.
(b) 2 &  4: Postmaterialist.
(c) A n y o f  the other four possible combinations: Mixed.
B y  subtracting the percentage o f  people in category (b) from those in 
category (a), the P M I is  obtained. Since the full socialisation o f  those bom post- 
1945,5 Inglehart argues that the good economic conditions have served to boost the 
PMI. He draws up a partial regression model and then a 'tighter' multivariate beta 
analysis6 and finds that education and age are by far the most important variables in 
predicting postmaterialist values (from a US sample). The third-ranked factor,
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political party, is decidedly ambiguous, according to Inglehart: does one's party 
choice mould one's values or vice versa? (ibid. 93-94). In any case, it accounts for 
just over 50 per cent o f  the variance due to either o f  the first two. After extensive 
examples o f  postmaterialist politics in action - Inglehart returns at length to France 
1968 and the Nixon - M cGovern presidential contest o f  1972 (see the summary o f 
his 1971 paper, this chapter). Inglehart's summary is a carbon copy o f  his 1971 
article: the younger, more educated generations have entirely different political 
priorities when compared with their older fellow citizens and: ‘Western governments 
have only begun to learn how to cope with the types o f  demands which are most 
salient to the Post-Materialist types, and it is not clear that they w ill eventually 
master these problems’ (ibid. 71).
This era o f  a 'new politics' shopping basket is not without end; however, it 
w ill take big drops in population levels o f education and income to regress the 
people's concerns to materialist ones. Deep and durable recessions which may occur 
would overlay the postmaterialist stratum o f those fully socialised in the abundance 
o f  the post - World W ar II environment; the demands o f  any cohorts who grow up in 
periods o f  penury would clash with those o f  the postmaterialist generation:
Or we might witness a renaissance o f  prosperity that endured a few 
more decades and were then followed by economic collapse (the basic 
forecast of The Limits to Growth). In that case, we w ould eventually 
find the opposite relationship between age and value type from that 
which prevails today: the older cohorts would manifest vestiges o f a
5 This w ou ld  have occurred b y  the m id - to late 1960s.
6 This excludes factors that contribute to each other.
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bygone Post-materialist era, while the younger cohorts would begin to 
emerge as materialistic, money-grabbing barbarians.
1977: 115.
An aspect o f Inglehart's style o f thinking that recurs again most notably in his 
current work is the link between a person's social background and life satisfaction. 
This is a leitmotif o f  his research and is something from which he rarely strays. 
Citing a study by Campbell, Converse and Rogers and their weakly established link 
between socio-economic status and satisfaction, Inglehart points to the importance o f 
stability - the person's aspiration to leave behind their current position in life is 
attenuated as the life pattern is reinforced over time. People's subjective well-being 
m ay well oscillate wildly i f  their standard o f living shuttles up and down, but a long­
term placement serves to dampen dissatisfaction - the habituation effect. It is here 
that one sees the extent o f  Inglehart's ambition - to apply a psychological model o f 
the individual to a psychosocial analysis o f  the state and what traits it is likely to 
imprint on its citizens. The wealthy European publics have one contradictory aspect; 
happy with their lives generally, but unhappy with the political side o f  things in their 
states. On an individual level, the professional worker in such states has the highest 
satisfaction scores in toto but the lowest satisfaction self-ratings o f  all job 
classifications for the political state o f  affairs in their country.
The utility o f  The Silent Revolution is its in-depth coverage: Inglehart more 
fully outlines the causes and effects o f  PM. It draws on diverse literature outside 
political science and comments on broader societal changes likely to flow from value 
shift. For example, one non-party political implication is a move away from the 
priority o f  maximising growth to instead pursue social equality. The communal
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aspect o f  the worker's life is more emergent; this may be gauged by Inglehart's 
reference to ‘workers' demands for reorganization o f  the assembly line into smaller, 
more autonomous groups in which each member has a voice in how the job is done.’ 
(1977: 69). This is clearly a sociotechnical7 idea, and as such, is not directly 
political. Inglehart further connects the workplace to the political arena, citing the 
importance o f  theorists such as Bell, Lipset, Mannheim and Weber. Inglehart rows in 
with them and states that professional workers are more likely to be postmaterialist 
in their values than the other job classification members. The sociological bent to 
Inglehart's work is brought out by such wide-ranging inclusions. A  diffuse societal 
push for greater démocratisation in all domains is instanced again a few paragraphs 
later - more horizontal styles o f  decision-making are predicted to gain in popularity 
in schools, businesses and local government.
A  1981 article, Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity, tries to 
explain what happens to postmaterialist values in a defined period o f economic 
retrenchment. Period effects, first mentioned in his 1967 paper are invoked. These 
press down on the levels o f  PM, but not to the extent that the general post-war 
upward trend is reversed. More valuably, Inglehart proposes further concrete political 
results o f  PM. Whereas in 1971 and 1977, he relies on two individual elections in 
France and the US as in vivo experimental settings, in this article he provides a list o f 
political effects. He speculates that the membership o f  new protest movements will 
be disproportionately postmaterialist. The postmaterialists, having graduated from 
college, '...furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero- 
growth and antinuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top
7 The sociotechnics side o f Inglehart's w riting  w ill be taken up in  the 'Criticisms' chapter.
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priority to reindustrialization and rearmament constitutes a distinctive and persisting 
dimension o f  political cleavage.' (1981: 880).
It is arguable that Inglehart's fullest statement on how value transformation 
affects politics may be found in his chapter, The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages in Western Society (1984), part o f the classic Electoral Change in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies. The research flowed from Inglehart's involvement 
in the Political Action Study group (1979), which had as its remit the assessment o f 
all conceivable acts o f  political participation. The value o f  this paper lies in how 
Inglehart links the rise o f  new protest movements to the electoral fortunes o f 
established left-wing parties. In one o f  his rare inclusions o f  an institutionalist 
perspective, he claims the new leftist parties in Holland, Scandinavia and Italy are 
likely to remain ‘ fringe' because such groups cannot aspire to claiming the mass 
working class support as a consequence o f  their advocacy o f  postmaterialist issues. 
Instead, they draw on a middle class base. The overriding emphasis, though, is on the 
main left parties in the US, Britain and Germany.
It was Inglehart's view  that the incremental effects o f  postmaterialist 
politicisation had already had a sizable effect on established left-wing parties. He lists 
the defeat o f  M cGovern in his presidential challenge to Nixon in 1972, and argues 
that the divided British Labour Party o f  the early 1980s bears has more than a 
superficial resemblance to the internecine combat within the US Democrats. In 
describing the B  ritish 1 eft a s consisting o f  a ' neo-Marxist and neutralist left wing" 
(ibid) and a much more centrist Social Democratic Party. In Germany, he refers to 
the postmaterialist 'Young Socialist' faction being at odds with the SPD leadership. 
Further fragmentation in the 'old politics' monolith in Germany and also in France 
came in the form o f the emergence o f  the ecological parties.
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Y et another 'new politics' phenomenon is the rise in extraparliamentary 
activity, which has shot up since the end o f  the 1960s:
...the m ost m assive political demonstrations that have taken place in 
recent years have not been directed against unemployment or declining 
real income - on the contrary, the largest and most intense ones have 
been aimed at preventing the construction o f  nuclear power plants, 
highways, airports, military installations, hydroelectric dams, and other 
projects that might reduce unemployment. Now, as earlier, labor is 
concerned with unemployment, wages, and inflation, but political 
activism continues to reflect mainly postmaterialist concerns.
1984: 29.
Inglehart proposes that there is an Issue polarization and a Group polarization 
in action. The former concerns the diminishing importance o f  the economy in first- 
order electoral politics and what has filled the gap (postmaterialist topics), while the 
latter depicts which groups are still more materialist in their priorities and which are 
not. He also foresees a backlash against PM, one which would centre on the working 
class moving to the right to counter demands regarding the following: 
‘environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to 
nuclear power’ (1984: 28); note how these items resemble his earlier hypothesised 
bones o f  contention as per his 1981 paper.
Having discussed some distinctive features o f  contemporary politics in 
Britain, Franee and the U S , he then tries to  predict what will happen to  the class
B Inglehart interchanges this term  and 'PM' throughout his writings.
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cleavage in these countries and by extension, in the advanced democracies. 
According to Inglehart, the left/right axis acted as a heuristic: ‘a higher-level 
abstraction used to summarize one's stand on the important political issues o f  the day. 
It serves the function o f  organizing and sim plifying.. .providing an overall orientation 
toward a potentially limitless number o f  issues, political parties, and social groups.’ 
(ibid. 37). He argues that the postmaterialist left differs from the old left primarily in 
terms o f  how they view  the state. The class-based left parties o f  old favoured using 
government to bring about far-reaching social and industrial changes, whereas 
Keynesianism and big government did not chime w ell with the new left. They instead 
view  the state as oppressive and too unwieldy to be responsive to citizens' needs. The 
left/right definition is now one o f  supporting or opposing change that is egalitarian in 
intent. It is supplanting the class antagonism o f the past and leads to a present and 
future where ‘The specific kinds o f change may vary, but the question o f  more or less 
equality is usually involved, whether it be between social classes, nationalities, races, 
or sexes.’ (ibid). Where this becomes highly germane for 'new politics' lies in the fact 
that whereas the public can easily identify state ownership and industrial 
management, say, as falling within set ranges on a left/right spectrum, the 'new' 
issues do not fit so neatly into the mass-moulded receptacles. There may well be an 
elite conception o f  which items are logically left and right, but as Inglehart pithily 
points out, 'the mass public has not read the classic literature.' (ibid. 40). The public 
has a different interpretation o f  where a specific problem should be located. It is in 
this article that we read Inglehart at his most precise, dealing with the minutiae o f an 
individual party's policies and how redistribution measures are differentially 
construed by materialist and postmaterialist alike. Divergence between elite and 
public conceptions o f issue importance and how to resolve the difficulties involved is
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most apparent for two 'new polities' items - nuclear power and terrorism. The sheer 
range o f  the piece is impressive, with tables on contrasting support bases for 
government regulation, environmental protection, internationalism and parochialism. 
He draws out the link between the economic wealth o f a country and its voters' 
support for classic left-wing policies.
In 1987, Inglehart wrote a paper that was accompanied by a response from 
Flanagan. Entitled Value change in Industrial Societies, the article is once more a 
restatement o f his application o f Maslovian ideas to the political sphere. It deals with 
two concerns -  (i) the interaction between wealth levels and political goals across 
nations and (ii) how new left parties fare in the affluent west.
The article begins with a curve illustrating the interaction between economic 
development and life expectancy. A s wealth rises, so does life expectancy up until 
the level o f  $2,000 GNP per capita - it then flattens out, due, Inglehart claims, to the 
increasing importance o f  lifestyle and associated factors such as health behaviours 
and pollution. Another curve follows immediately after this (1987: 1291), this time 
tracing the connection between economic development and income equality; poorer 
countries were less equal than richer ones. Once more the curve levels off, but now at 
a higher level: $3,500 GNP per capita. Inglehart attributes this to the law o f 
diminishing returns; the then Communist countries were already at a very equal 
spread o f distribution. Western democracies, on the other hand, had differential pay 
structures to motivate their workforces. Due to the ubiquitous post-war construction 
o f  the welfarist safety net, 'the political base for further development o f the welfare 
state is simply not there.' Any impetus for extending the equalising measures would 
not flow from arguments based on economic efficacy, but on ‘nonmateriar appeals to 
social solidarity and justice. The conclusion o f  this is simple, in Inglehart’s view :
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both "savage laissez-faire policies" and left "fundamentalists" (ibid. 1295) are 
anachronistic. Inglehart sets the stage for a new centrism. He does not deny that 
economics is likely to remain a prime political concern, but foresees that its 
continued presence as an electoral issue w ill be as a sociotropic feature (solidarity 
and justice), rather than as an effect o f class antagonism.
In Inglehart's view, 'new politics' parties have taken two main forms - New 
Left and Green. The N ew Left forces have not capitalised on their late 1960s good 
electoral performances due to their inability to secure voter loyalty (see Inglehart, 
1984 and pp. 28-29, this thesis). There has, however, been an overall rising trend for 
the 'progressive' groupings, with the Green parties amassing m ost o f  the electoral 
gains from the 1970s onwards. The short-term fluctuations in the upward 
postmaterialist trend are compensated for by the upswing following a downturn; for 
example, the inflationary spell o f  the early 1980s ends in 1985 and this is 
accompanied by a return to the PMI scores predicted by the model (Inglehart and 
Flanagan, 1987). The remainder o f  the article is an extended critique o f  PM, written 
by Flanagan; as such, it w ill be discussed in the 'Criticisms' chapter.
Having considered entire national cultures9 as the unit o f  analysis in his 
assessment o f  the interface between values and politics, Inglehart tries to give more 
grounded instances in his paper co-authored with Michael Minkenberg, 
Neoconservatism and Value Change in the USA: Tendencies in the Mass Public of a 
Postindustrial Society (1989). Inglehart aims to contextualise the 1980s electoral 
victories o f  Thatcher, Kohl, Reagan and Chirac. A ll, as Inglehart sees it, were based 
on a willingness to be neoconservative and respond to populist opinion on the classic 
public debates - tax, welfare, jobs. Inglehart classes neoconservatism as diverging
9 A  focus w h ich  becomes the un ify ing  aspect o f  his th ird  period.
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from the old form in its message, tools and support. It has subsumed those who feel 
threatened by the postmaterialist agenda and thus would incorporate parts o f  the 'old 
left' and traditionally conservative constituencies.
It is not just economic policy that unifies neoconservatives, but also 
commonly held values tapping the family, religion and the nation. Inglehart is keen to 
get down to fine detail and begins the analysis with the three-nation 'Generation and 
Politics' study o f the US (1981), West Germany (1980) and Holland (1981). The 
authors construct both a neoconservatism and a conservatism index. Conservatism is 
defined by Minkenberg and Inglehart ‘not simply as an antimodem movement but as 
the dialectical counterpart to political modernization (democratization, emancipation, 
self-government, etc.) which becomes mobilized in processes o f differentiation and 
accelerated change.’ (1989: 86). They are convinced by the evidence that 
neoconservatism is a feature o f both the new elites and the masses in these countries.
What is most interesting is how again, Inglehart treats an entity as an instance 
o f  a larger class; in 1988, he classified the Reformation as a subset o f economic 
modernism and here, conservatism is altered according to ‘historical conflict 
constellations’ (ibid. 87). In practice, this means that it (conservatism) defended the 
Church and oligarchy in the nineteenth century nationalist tumult; in the Industrial 
Revolution, it set the bourgeois against the worker. With the end o f  World War II, the 
wealthier class, historically conservative, was socialised in an environment o f 
egalitarianism and social cohesiveness.10 The rebellious 1960s and 1970s tilted 
against this comparatively pacific political modus vivendi and in turn provoked a 
backlash: ‘Neoconservatism, then, is bourgeois modernism becoming conservative 
itself in the face o f  this radical attack’ (ibid. 88). Its composition is contradictory:
10 This is the negotiated outcome that Crouch (1999) terms the 'mid-century compromise'; it marked the 
end o f the most severe clashes between labour and capital.
‘ ...east coast intellectuals with a liberal or even radical biographical background...’ 
(ibid). What motivated them was an attempt to repulse the attacks on ‘authority, 
family, community, religion and American political tradition’ (ibid.). They distrust 
interventionist government and lament any further extension o f  the welfare state's 
coverage. In favour o f  a strong capitalist market, robust defence and inveterate anti- 
Communism, they are in the position o f  sharing such an outlook with the old left's 
working class core. The populist conservatism strand has similarly convergent views 
on family, state and schooling; strongly patriotic but also wary o f  what they see as 
excessive Washington interference. In these attitudes, the public and the elite are 
startlingly similar. Minkenberg and Inglehart acknowledge the difficulty o f framing a 
public's ideology. And refer to work by theorists such as Campbell, Converse, and 
M cClosky on issue constraint and ideological conceptualisation. Nevertheless, the 
authors cite an extensive list o f  issue positions and how they tap the 'old conflict' and 
'new conflict' headings.
In terms o f  party politics, the authors use party identification and ideological 
orientation measures. F or neoconservatist groupmembership, religiosity and value 
orientation explain more than twice the variance than party identification or social 
class; the structural variables are diminishing in strength. This is in contradistinction 
to the old politics orientation - social status has twice the impact on old conservatism 
than it has on party identification. I f  one only had a voter's social structural profile, it 
would b e m ore d ifficult t o p  redict t heir party p reference t han their v  alues outlook 
(ibid. 101). They conclude that the US Republican party is sufficiently broad to house 
both the traditionally affluent old conservatives and the new, lower socio-economic,
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populist neoconservatives.11 B y  comparison, the Democrat identity is decidedly 
amorphous.
Inglehart's second major book on PM, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial 
Society (1990a), is mainly a reaffirmation o f  his preoccupations.12 One plausible 
reason for why Inglehart adds nothing o f  new significance to his research is the 
timing o f  the book's writing and publication: he was co-ordinator o f  the World 
Values Survey o f  1990-91.
The 1981-83 had assessed 22 societies, whereas this one covered 43 societies 
and represented more than 70 per cent o f  the world population.13 It is thus no real 
surprise that in this book, Inglehart takes stock and again disseminates his major lines 
o f  inquiry. The theory is that culture, economic development and political structure 
mutually interpenetrate, and that once a culture is established, it can go on to exert 
durable effects o f  its own in the moulding o f  values. Inglehart specifically contrasts 
cultural Weltanschauungen with political attitudes, acknowledging the comparative 
mutability o f  the latter (this is something that Inglehart does not address in his 
methodology throughout his work - see 'Criticisms').
The empirical part consists o f  reams o f  data that indicate covariance among 
happiness, trust, political discussion and endorsement o f existing political 
institutions. A  series o f  complicated analyses control for Gross National Product and 
percentage o f  service sector workforce, and still reveal a 'cultural' factor in the 
stability o f  democracy from 1900-86. Inglehart duly defers to Weber regarding the 
origins o f  his idea - culture is not as intangible as economists would have it. Growth
11 Inglehart neglects to m ention protectionism, something both Pat Buchanan and the Poujadists 
w ou ld  have in common.
12 A  s im ila r function is expedited by  his co-authored 1994 paper - see this chapter, pp. 43-44.
13 Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 346.
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can slow down within a society due to the high levels o f  PM  that mitigate the wealth 
generation imperative.
A  substantial part o f  the book examines cognitive mobilisation;14 political 
acts necessitate a m atrix o f  institutions, knowledge resources and social networks. 
The value system or ideology15 can only come into play once the cognitive 
mobilisation o f the polity is a given. The materialist/postmaterialist distinction is, as 
Inglehart has it, the best explanatory factor for tracing ecological participation and 
anti-war protest activity. It outranks both leftyright self-placement and income in its 
predictive worth. However, there is a possible pollutant to the theory in the form of 
the life-cycle variable, as Inglehart admits - older people may simply be less likely to 
participate in any non-traditional political measures and so the PM input is less valid 
in the first place. For Inglehart, the upward curve in value shift is not monotonic - 
slight blips do occur due to ‘ short-term forces’ (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 337), 
such as rising unemployment or bouts o f high inflation. Economic activity is 
dampened and the citizen’ s optimistic outlook is  attenuated. There is a downward 
readjustment as the person retreats to a defensive mindset, a real-time response to a 
less auspicious environment. Significantly, such falls are neither durable nor drastic - 
for those bom after 1945 who do suffer a recession or live through a time o f  high 
unemployment, the tail-off is not sufficient to move them down to the same 
background level o f  materialism as those who were socialised before the War 
(Inglehart, 1977). For a dramatic example o f period effects, Inglehart refers to the 
survey results for the former U SSR  and Germany after reunification, where material 
issues are in the ascendant (Inglehart, 1998: 74).
14 See pp. 6-7, this chapter, fo r comment on Inglehart's firs t treatment o f this concept.
15 Inglehart points to the public's interchangeable usage o f these.
36
Inglehart has always had a keen interest in the related topics o f party 
identification and spacing. His joint 1995 paper, Expert Interpretations of Party 
Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies, is a continuation o f  the line o f work 
dating from his analysis o f  the Swiss party system (1974) and more generic papers in 
the mid-1970s on policy space judgments. Inglehart and Huber begin with a brief but 
detailed sketch o f  the history o f  how left/right ideology content has drawn scholarly 
attention. This article's findings were culled from data collated for the World Values 
Surveys and follow-ups. The strong cross-cultural contrast is the meat o f  this paper; 
left/right conflict still taps the macroeconomy in the wealthy West, but whereas 
nationalisation and control o f  industry had been the foci o f the debate, it has now 
moved on to privatisation and deregulation. For the bulk o f the stable western 
democracies, 'new politics' was in the process o f  supplanting the 'industry' question. 
For non-democratic or recently democratising states, left/right was best understood as 
a polarisation o f  authoritarian and democratising forces, with national identity also 
loading heavily onto this factor.
In 1998, Inglehart c o-authored a chapter with Terry Nichols Clark entitled 
The New Political Culture: Changing Dynamics of Support for the Welfare State and 
Other Policies in Postindustrial Societies. The Marxian tinge to some o f Inglehart's 
theories is drawn out at the beginning o f  the piece: 'A  specter is haunting Advanced 
Industrial Society - a specter o f  new political fault lines and a new political culture' 
(1998a: 9). Arguing that the axes in modem or advanced industrial states are harder 
to separate out from each other, Inglehart and Clark restate the seven aspects o f 
postmaterialist politics as already given in Inglehart (1987) and Inglehart and 
Abramson (1995). The fourth, fifth and sixth elements evoke Inglehart's political 
topography o f  the N ew  Right in America as described by him in 1989. This chapter is
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the first to specify what the new political culture would be, both for left and right; 
whereas in  1 989, although h e underscores the American new  right in  some detail, 
there had not been a conjoined account o f  both new wings. These factions would 
result in a new political centrism. Harking further back to his elite analysis o f 
European parliament candidates and the question o f  more powers for said institution 
(1980), Inglehart and Clark draw extensively from a comparative study o f  the broad 
political mindsets o f  US and French mayors. Challenges from the American sample 
to a centralising authority are less feasible than for the French, simply because the 
etatiste and dirigiste forces in the American polity are in no w ay o f  the same 
magnitude as for France. They sum up the absence o f any concerted push for further 
decentralisation epigrammatically as: ‘To Americanise Hegel: no antithesis for want 
o f  a thesis’ (ibid. 41).
Inglehart moves his propositions onto a more abstract level in his usage o f  the 
concepts o f  rationality, postmodemisation, and religion in his chapter, 
Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for 
Democracy (1999), which again draws from the relevant W V S data sets. Whereas 
modernisation effected a change from  traditional-religious-to rational-bureaucratic 
authority (and thus expedites the advent o f  the state); postmodemisation instigates 
movement away from both traditional and state authority (1999: 240). Another 
interesting point is the proposition that authoritarian values vary as a function o f 
economic development, with a 0.62 correlation between g reater reverence t owards 
authority and Gross Domestic Product. This picks up from Inglehart's first expressed 
interest in the psychology o f  authority as per his 1967 doctoral thesis. Exceptions to 
this covariance exist, though, and Inglehart relies on a cultural variable to explain the 
dual characteristics o f  wealth and high authoritarianism in  say, Taiwan and South
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Korea. Confucianism is common to both and it is this value system that bolsters 
deference towards authority, even after the sustained enrichment o f  both states.
Due to the successes o f  the welfare state and industrialisation, plus the 
comparative peace o f  the past fifty years, the need to rely on the state as protector 
against insecurity (either perceived or actual), has inexorably lessened. Inglehart cites 
how poverty induces a craving for strong leadership: the Great Depression in Europe 
yielded the fascist powers. Too rapid rates o f  change only serve to promote anxiety, 
so even in affluent states, postmodemisation may w ell entrain an ‘Authoritarian 
Reflex that may bring fundamentalist or xenophobic reactions or adulation o f strong 
leaders’ 16 (ibid. 242). Generally, though, wealthier and more educated publics are 
much more sceptical than their older counterparts o f  their existing governments' bona 
fldes. The doubts do not extend to democracy as a principle, but do serve to attenuate
• • 17
the publics' confidence in the church, police and military.
A  political implication o f the above is Inglehart's explanation for why George 
Bush did not win re-election to the US presidency in 1992. On the face o f  it, Bush's 
G ulf W ar victory and second-half stewardship o f  the economy (it had entered its 
second year o f  growth) should have swung the contest his way. The Cold war was 
over, and it had ended while Bush was in office. Precedence in the form o f 
Eisenhower's 1952 victory placed the emphasis on, as Inglehart puts it 'a grateful 
nation' recognising the general's war effort. But as Clinton was to discover
16 A  comment that seems most apposite for this thesis in  light o f  Le Pen's qualification for the French 
presidential run-off, A p ril,2002.
For the firs t psychological account o f the similarities between the agents o f state and canon authority, see 
Freud's The Church and the Arm y  (1921).
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'Postmodern publics evaluate their leaders by different, and more demanding, 
standards than were those applied throughout most o f  the modem e ra '18 (ibid. 254).
Inglehart's 2000 paper, Globalization and Postmodern Values, is another 
repeat o f his W V S project, subtly tweaking the same data. There are loud echoes o f 
his very first writings. He gives a verbatim restatement o f  his scarcity and 
socialisation hypotheses; (2000: 219) and reaffirms his claim that a postmaterialist 
politics had damaged trust in government and turnout rates, but ‘elite-challenging 
political actions were steadily rising’ (2000: 224), such as in the US. This paper may 
be viewed as a brief summary and update o f his comprehensive 1984 paper (see pp. 
35-38, this chapter).
1.2.2.1: Summary o f Inglehart’s second period
In this second period, we note Inglehart’ s usage o f  contemporary political detail and 
how he uses it as support for the trends detected by the PMI. W e commented at the 
beginning o f  this section that prior to this timeframe, he had primarily been using the 
survey in  conjunction w ith  an  historical overview  in order to understand attitudes 
towards European integration. In the earlier years o f  this second period, up to 1989, 
he adopts a modified case study approach, usually referring to the US, France and 
Germany, and occasionally to Britain, Italy, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Once 
he finishes with Culture Shift (1990), he moves on to make large-n analyses o f  the 
correlations between nations’ wealth and their political goals. Throughout this 
period, he continues to draw on other social sciences as he did in the first phase. For 
psychology, he stops r eferring to specific w  ork by p eople s uch as H ebb, u tilising
18 See the 2002 BBC2 television documentary, The Century o f  the Self, fo r an excellent historical account 
o f how such ideas attracted po litica l campaign teams throughout the 1980s and on; the Stanford Research 
Institute collated reams o f data on this new politica l appeal.
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instead a more ‘ common sense’ view based mainly on Abraham Maslow. Inglehart 
dips into sociology and is not content to graph the political effects o f value shift, but 
rather also wants to predict a broader societal impact. A  new feature is his 
collaborations, especially with Abramson, and his use o f  the ever-growing body o f  
Eurobarometer data. From 1990 onwards, he has already begun to construct a cross- 
cultural view o f political phenomena, including types o f  rule in societies as a 
function o f  their wealth and the political aims o f  citizens in such societies. The third 
period extends this line o f  enquiry.
1.2.3: Culture-specific political forms
In 1988, Inglehart paused the 'value change' stream o f publications and switches 
focus to  write on the hitherto neglected area o f  cultural differences and how they 
structure politics in an article titled The Renaissance of Political Culture}9 He 
recapitulates earlier work on life satisfaction and again illustrates the people o f 
wealthier nations tend to be more satisfied with their lives than those from poorer 
ones. It is essential, Inglehart argues, to look at both overall life satisfaction and 
political satisfaction (a subset) o f  a nation's citizens in  order to account for stable 
democracies. A  regime that cannot sustain its people is unlikely to retain a committed 
support base; nor is a polity deemed unresponsive or corrupt similarly able to bank 
on the continued endorsement (or even acquiescence) o f  its citizens. Political 
satisfaction is weakly correlated (r = 0.21) with continuous years o f  established 
democracy, whereas life satisfaction has a much stronger link (r = 0.85) (1997: 79) 
with democratic stability. Inglehart proposes that the long-term survival o f  a 
democracy hinges more on ‘ enduring cultural traits such as life satisfaction and
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interpersonal trust’ (ibid). It is the political satisfaction score which is more prone to 
being erratic.
This paper is valuable for its cogently delivered message on the links between 
interpersonal trust, economic development and democracy; it is an area that excites 
Inglehart to this day and is his first sustained foray into the topic. Low  levels o f 
interpersonal trust are recorded for Europeans' views on the Greeks, Italians and 
French (excluding self-assessment). Inglehart builds on the work o f  Almond and 
Verba (1965), which demonstrates that Italy and France score minimally on attitude 
clusters tapping the 'civic culture'.20 Another thread in the tapestry is Inglehart's 
assertion that both Italy and France possess strong 'antisystem' parties in the form o f 
the Italian MSI, and for France, the Poujadists o f the 1950s and Le Pen's Front 
National. Inglehart writes that cross-nationally and cross-temporally: ‘Life 
satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing 
order tend to go together. They constitute a syndrome o f positive attitudes toward the 
world one lives in. And this syndrome goes with enduring democratic institutions.’ 
(ibid. 80-81).
The rest o f  the paper is very much derivative, entailing a retelling o f  the rise 
o f  the Protestant work ethic; this would be irrelevant were it not for Inglehart's claim 
that it is those countries in which the Reformation occurred that are more likely to be 
postmaterialist. Inglehart treats the Reformation as ‘one case o f  a more general 
phenomenon: the breakdown o f traditional cultural barriers to economic
modernization’ (ibid. 83). These states have had a head start in affluence (the most 
economically dynamic states at the start o f  the twentieth century were Protestant) and 
in innovation in wealth creation and are thus more likely to be in the vanguard o f  any
19 The edition cited fo r this paper is a 1997 reprint; it  appears as a chapter in  Zahariadis's Theory, Case and 
Method in Comparative Politics. A l l  references in m y chapter w ill refer to this reprint's pagination.
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subsequent pervasive economic/cultural shift. The emphasis on achieving high 
economic growth levels has now been diffused globally and in regions where it has 
always been to the fore, an anti-growth movement has emerged. Societally, 
postmaterialists are more preoccupied with a definitively new political issue like the 
environment; individually, they espouse this view while earning less than their 
materialist peers.21 In Inglehart's opinion, the new 'high growth' culture is the 
resurgent Confucian tradition. The economic profile o f  Confucian and Buddhist 
nations such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan22 are exemplary o f  this.
Although Inglehart does not explicitly select states as subject matter on the 
basis o f membership o f  the OECD or not, the durable bias towards a wealthy western 
sample is clear. In moving on to 1994, one sees the first comprehensive coverage by 
Inglehart o f  non-western states in his co-authored article, Economic Security and 
Value Change. It is his major paper o f  the 1990s and is the first o f  two important 
joint publications with Paul Abramson over two years. Inglehart repackages all his 
core arguments from the 1970s: a new politics axis, falling turnout, right-wing 
backlash parties, the rising prominence o f  ecological issues, and the scope o f  period 
effects. Interestingly, Inglehart departs from his habitual sample and extends the 
cases to include former CO M ECO N  and poorer states including Nigeria, India and 
the South-East Asian countries.
In the rapidly growing economies o f China, South Korea and Taiwan, for 
example, Abramson and Inglehart argue it cannot be claimed that the young cohorts, 
even though socialised in times o f  comparative strong growth, are postmaterialist. 
What is strongly indicative o f  a move towards PM, is, however, the size o f  the gaps 
between young and old cohorts in South Korea versus, say, the US. The authors are
20 Inglehart omits Greece due to its non-democratic rule for a sizable part o f his research timeframe.
21 Controlling for education and fam ily  background.
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eager to point out that the US has consistently been wealthy for all o f  the twentieth 
century (1994: 139) and consequently, relative disparities between young and old are 
not o f  great moment. In South Korea, by contrast, the economic drive has been quite 
recent and so one can make a c omparative ( temporal) t est o f how t he d ifferential 
socialisation o f  young and old South Koreans has affected their value structure. 
Younger citizens are markedly less materialist than their older compatriots, but as the 
baseline o f P M  is  at a n egative 1 evel, i t follows that their value profile c ould n ot 
equate to that o f  a western sample. The authors provide clear mathematical support 
for the outlined link between postmaterialist values and comparatively high degrees 
o f  economic development: ‘ ...the regression coefficient indicates that every 
thousand-dollar increase in per capita gross national product contributes to a 1.7 point 
gain on the materialist / postmaterialist value index’ (ibid. 347). One can thus arrange 
countries according to G N P  and assume a linear relationship between their wealth 
ranking and extent o f  PM. Notably, Inglehart and Abramson cite an interpolation o f 
this model, in the form o f  Diez-Nicolas' study o f  Spanish regions and their varying 
levels o f  PM: the poorest regions have the lowest scores. There is one further point o f 
significance in the paper, concerning how inflation and unemployment affect value 
scores, but as this was written in response to a long-standing criticism o f Inglehart's 
theories, it is included in the 'Criticisms' chapter.
Inglehart then pauses in his theoretical work to compile an overview o f values 
and their interactions with culture in his third major relevant23 book, Value Change in 
Global Perspective, written with Paul Abramson (1995). Inglehart had been the 
global co-ordinator for the 1990-93 World Values Survey (W VS) and this book 
covers the main findings o f  same in conjunction with the appropriate National
22 Inglehart does not feel the need to distinguish between Shinto Buddhism (Japan) and other variants.
23 For the purposes o f answering this research question.
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Election Studies (NES). Chapter One re-summarises what ‘political values’ have 
been construed to be by Inglehart, referring to his overriding interest in the area since 
1971. In Chapter Two, general upward trends in values and the rate o f  change would 
appear to bear out what Inglehart had predicted as far back as 1971; intergenerational 
replacement is slow but steady, entraining a one-point rise in the value index per 
year. The American data generate more robust conclusions, as the value survey had 
been carried out in every presidential contest since 1972; such comprehensiveness is 
not a given for each European state. There is a tight fit between each American W V S 
and the corresponding NES. Chapter Three is a microscopic examination o f  the 
magnitude o f  period effects; earlier criticisms, especially by Clarke and Dutt (1991), 
had questioned the validity o f  Inglehart's conclusions as the mid-1970s through to the 
mid-1980s had produced sharp negative spikes in the PM Index (PMI). Inglehart duly 
accepts that period effects actually outweighed the intergenerational effect24 from the 
years 1970-82 (1995: 2). However, multiple hypothetical models are constructed that 
allow for the separation o f  cohort and period effects they undoubtedly corroborate 
Inglehart's hypothesis o f  an overall upward shift.
Chapters One to Six deal solely with the affluent West. One aspect o f  this 
sample o f  wealthy states is the weakening o f  the intergenerational effect over time; 
lower birth rates and increased longevity were partially effacing the extent o f 
replacement's changes. From 1970-82, Western Europe recorded a 19-point gain on 
the values index, 90 per cent o f  which Inglehart and Abramson attribute to 
replacement. With a wealthy Europe as constant, the authors hypothesise that the 
general European population w ill attain the postmaterialist score applicable to that o f 
the 1966-75 cohort, and the mass publics are likely to stay at this level (ibid. 96). The
24 Is also be termed the cohort effect.
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continuous operation o f  a welfare state and the avoidance o f  prolonged deep 
recession/depression are sufficient to ensure that the difference between future 
cohorts and the current youngest ones w ill be less drastic than that between the 1936- 
45 and 1946-55 cohorts.25
Chapters Seven to Nine include non-western states, whether rich like Japan or 
poor like Nigeria. The authors are able to demonstrate that the same materialist / 
postmaterialist operates outside the West - the same five items top and tail the value 
priorities list. Recently developing societies with strong annual growth have the 
largest differences in scores for young and old (something commented on by the 
authors in 1994, even at low absolute levels o f PM). This does not apply to more 
stagnant economies: ‘In preindustrial societies, conversely, there are few
Postmaterialists and there is little difference between the values o f  young and old: 
intergenerational value differences reflect a society's rate o f  economic growth.’ (ibid. 
136). The Conclusion illustrates the strength o f  PM as a cross-cultural force. 
Inglehart and Abramson contend that with increased globalisation, the non-western 
states w ill also produce gains on the PMI and such rises are likely be very steep due 
to the large proportion o f  the developing w  orld's population below  the age o f  15. 
Sizeable numbers o f  citizens, socialised in a safer26 and affluent time when compared 
to their older compatriots, will serve to yield gains in the values index.
Inglehart's 1998 chapter, Political Values, further serves to disseminate his 
research on the W V S. After a technical opening concerning the international 
comprehensibility o f  survey questions, Inglehart delves into analyses o f  countries 
exhibiting steep rises in their values indices. One illustration o f  the need for a
25 Even though the age difference is only ten years, the absence o f wholescale war and the presence o f a 
ubiquitous welfare state is enough to alter the Maslovian value matrix for the younger cohort.
26 The authors make no reference to the prevalence o f internecine or other types o f conflict, present or 
future.
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political context to interpret the underlying meaning o f  values is the case o f 
privatisation and socialist and ex-socialist states. In 28 non-socialist states surveyed, 
there is no link between one's stance on privatisation and a postmaterialist outlook. In 
the socialist and ex-socialist states, there is a robust connection: 70 per cent o f 
postmaterialists are in favour o f  privatisation. The explanation lies in the history o f 
the respondent's nation (1998b: 70). People in poorly performing planned or ex­
socialist states reject government involvement in business due to the connotations of 
sluggishness and excessive control. For western respondents, government 
management can serve to dilute the worst excesses o f  pure market capitalism (ibid. 
73). The difference in response type and outlook is national-political history. 
Inglehart (op. cit. 75) repeats the point made in 1994 and 1995 that
Even the oldest birth cohorts in these advanced industrial societies rank 
higher than the younger cohorts in most other countries. But an upward 
slope, reflecting a rising proportion o f  postmaterialists to materialists as 
one moves from old to young cohorts, is also found in Eastern Europe 
and East Asia.
Inglehart's biggest project o f  1998 was his co-authorship o f  the massive 
Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook (Inglehart, Basanez and 
Moreno). This is a truly exhaustive undertaking, assessing 'people's values and goals 
concerning politics, economics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family 
values, and ecological concerns' (1998c: 1). The authors are not shy to boast at what 
they try to do - assess everything meaningful by asking questions o f  people in nations 
‘ covering the full spectrum o f economic, political, and cultural variation’ (ibid).
47
The book, although huge, is little more than a set o f  tables. Appended 
commentary is slight as to how such variables w  ould direct the policy p aths o f  a 
nation's government or an opposition party's platform within that nation and it does 
not provide cross-references to available NES information.27 A ll in all, it is a book o f 
‘more than 100,000 cross-tabulations’ (ibid. 3). Indeed, it is only within the laconic 
Introduction that Inglehart supplies anything extra to the PM thesis.
The book's premise is that norms differ across cultures and the core ‘claim o f 
modernization theory is largely correct: economic change, cultural change, and 
political change are closely linked’ (ibid. 8). Inglehart goes on to sketch in some o f 
the influences on his ideas: Lemer (1958) and Inkeles and Smith (1974), who 
believed that mass communication would gird the impact o f  formal education to 
mould a modem Weltanschauung. Bell's 'post-industrial society' is similarly 
recognised, with Inglehart's theory o f economic security as a promoter o f value 
change presented as a kind o f by-product o f  theses concepts. Value changes ratchet 
varying political priorities up or down in salience. Inglehart is keen to emphasise that 
economic development pushes societies along two different paths: modernisation and 
postmodemisation; only the already 'modem' states can be shifted to 'postmodemise'.
Further references to Calvinism and Weber's Protestant ethic are o f  a piece 
with Inglehart's ambitiously constructed grand design: economics and culture are 
mutually influencing. Inglehart explicitly refers to intrasocietal value systems' 
differentiation (ibid. 7) - a rarity, as most o f  his work is on international and/or cross- 
cultural differences. He restates his scarcity and socialisation hypotheses verbatim 
and outlines the increased worth o f  'belonging, esteem, and intellectual and esthetic 
satisfaction' (ibid. 10). Postmaterialists are further described as being more tolerant o f
27 This is not a criticism  - many states featured do not have any electoral study at all.
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not having a cohesive worldview and so can thus adapt to yet more changes more 
easily (ibid. 11). Within the space o f three pages, Inglehart encapsulates his research 
project as one that tries to combine changes in religious, social and familial 
structures, culminating in  a shift o f  political cleavages (as runs through his earlier 
work).
The two major dimensions o f  cross-cultural variation are Traditional 
authority vs. Secular-Rational authority and Survival values vs. well-being values 
(ibid. 14). The latter is definitively postmaterialist in nature. Cultural differences 
between polities are the fruits o f  a considerably prolonged gestation: the basic value 
'gaps' between former East and West Germans are o f  the same order as those between 
Canadians and Americans, even though from 1945 to 1990, an attempt was made to 
remake the East German citizenry along socialist28 lines. What Inglehart takes as 
remarkable is the absence o f  meaningful differences in the value profiles o f  East and 
West Germans on the two central dimensions outlined earlier. Generally, ‘ socialist or 
ex-socialist societies fall in to the upper left-hand quadrant: these societies are 
characterised by ( 1) survival values, and (2) a strong emphasis on state authority, 
rather than traditional authority’ (ibid. 18).
This Introduction also contains Inglehart's first examination o f  institutional 
determinism, albeit a brief one. He dismissed what he calls 'extreme' institutionalism, 
whereby a society’ s values are the unalloyed product o f  its institutions; the whole 
historical experience is the determining force. Holland and Germany's Protestants and 
Catholics are more or less located on the same space on the two-dimensional map, 
and Dutch Catholics are more similar to Northern European Protestants than their 
Southern European co-religionists. Poland and Ireland fall as outliers: Inglehart
28 Inglehart also occasionally uses the term 'state capitalist', but not Stalinist.
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categorises them as 'hyper catholic', and consequently Ireland does not fit the 
Northern European dimension. America's religious attitudes do not follow the 
classical modernist bureaucratic rationalist path; Inglehart asserts that the high US 
religiosity as reported in surveys is a hangover from the 'frontier mentality', or maybe 
it acts as a bulwark for the baby boomers who seek solace not available in their 
secular world (Washington Post, January 12, 1998). A s may be gleaned from above, 
the history is essential to allow for a more comprehensive explanation than the 
institutional one. Another direct link-up with the 'whole history' argument is made in 
the repeated theme: 'Almost without exception, stable democracies rank high on 
subjective w ell being and interpersonal trust, and authoritarian societies rank low on 
them. These linkages persist when we control for economic level and social structure' 
(ibid. 23).
Inglehart published again in 1999 on the same W V S data in the chapter Trust, 
well-being and democracy. The chapter's thrust is once more a cultural argument (in 
three parts):
(1) ‘Protestant and Confucian-influenced societies consistently show higher levels o f 
interpersonal trust than do historically Catholic or Islamic societies’ (1999b: 92);
(2) There is a link, albeit weaker than for the above, between viable democratic 
institutions and interpersonal trust, and
(3) Economic development gives rise to cultural changes that help stabilise 
democracies.
Polities benefit when people feel good about their lives overall. In a strong 
reference to a psychology o f  cultural politics, Inglehart claims that contented people's 
‘ .. .political institutions gain legitimacy by association’ and additionally,
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When people are dissatisfied with politics, they may change the parties in 
office. When the people o f  a given society become dissatisfied with their 
lives, they may reject the regime - or even the political community, as in 
the case o f  the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
1999b: 107
Overall, a series o f  correlations reveals that subjective well-being, interpersonal 
trust and postmaterialist values go together. This applies at the societal but not the 
individual level and Inglehart is persuaded that this yet again vindicates his choice o f 
mass publics as his subject matter. There is again the notion o f  Diminishing Marginal 
Utility in Europe and the US:
.. .more than two decades o f  living under democratic institutions produced 
no clear trend toward rising life satisfaction among the publics o f  the 
European Union countries. In some countries it rose gradually, and in 
others it fell. Nor did the past four decades o f democracy produce any rise 
in interpersonal trust in the US.
Op. cit. 118.
In 2002, Inglehart addressed the highly topical question o f  the distinctiveness 
o f  political values among Muslims in states where Islam is the major religion (Norris 
and Inglehart, 2002a). The authors test Huntington’s notion o f  a clash between two 
civilisations regarding the place o f  democracy by referring to the 1995-2001 waves 
o f  World and European Values Surveys. They find that a robust ‘value difference’ 
exists, but disagree with Huntington that it is based on the acceptance o f  democracy. 
Instead, they argue that the point o f  divergence is on views o f  the role o f women in 
society; in  their words, the ‘cultural gu lf separating Islam from  the W est involves
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Eros far more than Demos.’ (op. cit. 235). In another paper in the same issue o f the 
journal Comparative Sociology, Inglehart, Norris and W elzel link support in poorer 
states for increased démocratisation with support for an increased role for women in 
public life, with both driven by modernization. They look at the spread o f  institutions 
and compare this process with indicators o f  cultural change.
His most recent work harks back to the constant theme o f value shift and what 
he deems to be its political correlates, as a quote from an Autumn 2003 paper 
illustrates:
Membership in mainline political parties and civic organisations has 
been dropping around the w orld...But people in most established 
democracies are more active than they have been in the last quarter 
century in forms o f  civic engagement that used to be considered 
unconventional but have now become more or less normal forms o f 
political activity.
2003:1.29
Inglehart goes on to write that hitherto poorer states are beginning the shift 
towards a postmaterialist politics as their standard o f  living rises. One key outcome 
o f  this shift w ill be a rise in unconventional political behaviour across the new 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002c).
In a co-authored paper (Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003), Inglehart 
defines ‘human development’ as a syndrome composed o f  three things — socio­
economic development; emancipative cultural change; and démocratisation. It is a 
very broad concept, and again, Inglehart argues that the cause is changes in people’s
29 ww w.isr.um ich.edu/news/isrupdate-2003-l l.h tm l
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views o f  freedom, which in turn forces elites to initiate appropriate policy-level 
responses. Based on the W V S results, Inglehart argues that such a process currently 
affects all states, irrespective o f  income or level o f  industrialisation. Inglehart 
argues for a greater extent o f  convergence due to modernisation and 
postmodemisation for poorer and wealthier states respectively. The end result o f  
this convergence is the primacy o f  choice in how citizens live within their societies 
(op. cit. 341), with states having to  b e  m uch more responsive to the n ew  sets o f  
demands made by their publics.
1.2.3.1: Summary o f Inglehart’s third period
In the 1990s and currently, Inglehart carries the postmaterialist theory onto a more 
expansive plain; cultural upheavals such as the Reformation are harnessed as 
illustrations o f  a broader construct - that laws o f  production will serve to effect 
cultural changes. In his view, publics living in such resulting cultural climes have 
qualitatively different demands than their forebears. A  type o f  'picopolitical science' 
is embarked upon by Inglehart, wherein people's levels o f  contentment may be 
taken as a reliable gauge o f  their society's democratic profiles, past, present and 
future. In going on to claim that a ‘new axis o f polarization’ has developed, based 
on cultural and quality-of-life issues, Inglehart returns to the key theme o f his work. 
He uses survey data to construct a model which he affirms is sufficiently robust to 
allow one to infer that the major political markers o f  the post-1960s affluent states 
are attributable to value change. He adopts a cross-cultural and historical 
perspective, allied to a p sychological construct, to interpret the survey results. It 
may be seen from this historiography that Inglehart has developed this core 
argument and disseminated it repeatedly.
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The aim o f this chapter is to highlight the continuities and changes within Inglehart’ s 
work and thus enable the reader to better understand the rationale for the testing 
process carried out in the rest o f  this thesis. W e have seen that on certain crucial 
points, Inglehart has been remarkably consistent. He has stressed the primacy o f  the 
survey instrument throughout, and most o f  his work relies heavily on the PMI. As 
his work matures, he moved away from invoking historical context, instead adducing 
details from  contemporary politics in  specific states. Interestingly, it m ay b e  seen 
that his work has now moved back to drawing in historical pen-pictures o f  events 
such as the Reformation in order to explain political traits which he argues are 
culture-specific. He has continued to bring in psychology to account for the 
mechanisms underlying value shift and political change. Without explaining his 
reasoning, he uses the same Maslovian model to explain value change at a societal 
and individual level. His middle period sets out to chart how issue polarisation and 
group polarisation are necessarily intertwined and how both will have a 
progressively greater impact on politics.
It is Inglehart’s linkage o f putative value shift with direct political effects that 
is problematic and which we set out to test in the remainder o f  the thesis. In the first 
period, Inglehart tabulates attitudinal surveys and makes tentative predictions based 
on such the findings. He moves on through the 1970s and 1980s to claim that the 
PMI is picking up a shift that has clear and unidirectional consequences on politics, 
whether it is in the form o f  new parties or the withering away o f  the class cleavage. 
In his third period, he invokes unfalsifiable claims on the continuing impact o f 
entities such as Confucianism and the Reformation.
1.3: Summary and Conclusion
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In this chapter, we stated the aim o f  our thesis and provided a historiography 
o f  Inglehart’s work. W e traced three distinct periods in his work, and emphasised 
where the periods both diverged from each other and also converged in terms o f 
collaborations, methods, content and implications. A s Inglehart’s theory has been in 
constant circulation for such a long time, it is not surprising that Inglehart’ s work 
has attracted a sizable volume o f criticism. The next chapter details the most 
important criticisms and the responses Inglehart has made. It also contains new 
criticisms o f  m y own which advance our understanding o f  Inglehart’ s theory and 
how w e should appraise it.
55
Chgjrter 2: Criticisms
Inglehart's theory of PM has inevitably attracted some criticism - for such a long- 
established concept, this is unsurprising. The contribution of this chapter, then, is to 
thoroughly cover existing criticisms and to add to the store of knowledge on 
Inglehart’s theory. Its aim is twofold -  to present established criticisms of Inglehart’s 
ideas and methodology; and to outline a new set of criticisms. Through coverage of 
previously neglected areas such as Inglehart’s borrowings from industrial sociology 
and psychology, this chapter accomplishes a novel and valuable aim.
There are two parts in this chapter: firstly, it gathers together several key 
criticisms of Inglehart's research, something never previously done in a major 
publication (Section One). Secondly, it introduces criticisms based on this author’s 
study that have never been articulated before (Section Two). For Section One, the 
established criticisms are organised according to whether they are general or 
specific, with the general being considered first. We then go on to new criticisms I 
make. In this last section, we assess the theorising that informs the whole of 
Inglehart's conceptualisation of the new politics; a lot of his core ideas can be traced 
back to other social science research. In doing so, we endeavour to show that the 
transfer of knowledge from one domain to another is not as easily accomplished as 
Inglehart would have the reader believe.
2.1: Existing criticisms
This section is divided in two; the first part looks at the general level criticism made 
by Flanagan of Inglehart’s theory of PM. There is a substantial body of work (cf.
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Callaghan, 2000; Esman, 2002; Evans, 1993; Green, 1972; Sassoon, 1997: 670-674; 
Wilensky, 2002: 186-208; and Weil, 1994, among others) that critiques the notion of 
a ‘new politics’, but as this is a conglomerate term, the debate around it is 
necessarily short on direct references to Inglehart. We do not discuss the more 
tangential works listed above. All the points in both general and specific criticisms 
are drawn from authors who explicitly set out to respond to Inglehart’s body of 
work. With regard to specific criticisms, we find a set of investigators who 
purposefully take Inglehart to task on a range of points, usually methodological. 
These major criticisms question whether the Eurobarometer is internally and 
externally valid. The reader will note that there is an element of overlap; for 
example, Flanagan’s challenge to the construction of the PMI is taken up later by 
Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), and Clarke (1999) respectively.
2.1.1 Flanagan’s general criticisms
The most wide-ranging critique is made by Scott Flanagan, who wrote the now 
classic second half of the journal article Value Change in Industrial Societies. 
Flanagan's contention i s that there are two related but different political changes 
occurring which Inglehart has mistakenly collapsed into one. Where Flanagan 
departs from Inglehart is in the application of the term 'libertarian'. This is a broad 
concept, covering personal and political freedom, greater say in all types of 
hierarchical structures, be they governmental or work-based; in addition to a basket 
of issues such as equality, tolerance of minorities, openness to new ideas, 
environmental concerns, actualisation and self-indulgence.30 The list is irrefutably 
similar to Inglehart's description of postmaterialist concerns (1977, 1984, 1990a and
30 Flanagan does not deride the last tw o; he is im partia l and is m erely prov id ing  a list.
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passim). Flanagan returns to Inglehart's breakthrough Silent Revolution (1977) and 
is more rigorous in his definition of materialism. Essentially, he thinks that Inglehart 
is confused as to what constitutes materialism: strong defence and a prominent law 
and order agenda are not materialist, but instead form part of an authoritarian 
cluster. This would neatly explain the predilection of 'materialists' for hierarchical 
institutions and stronger religiosity. To Flanagan, materialism is nothing more than 
the economics of self and society and so manifests itself in concerns with 
maintaining low inflation and high growth on the one hand and holding down a 
well-paid job; living in good housing and leading a comfortable life on the other.
Flanagan also points out that Inglehart is quite neglectful of the 'New Right'; 
this is less true for Inglehart's later work, most notably his 1989 co-authored chapter 
with Minkenberg on the new monetarist realism of the regimes of Chirac and Kohl, 
in addition to the established supply-side emphasis in the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations. Notwithstanding this, Inglehart does not give a comprehensive 
account of the political forms of the New Right, especially the far right.
Flanagan also dissects the 'new voter' more assiduously than Inglehart. 
Whereas PM as a theory does not specify how economic classes will change as a
function of increased affluence, Flanagan a rgues t hat embourgeoisement is really
• • ■ ^ 1 only valid when it is tagged on to the wealthier sections of the working class.
Put simply, Flanagan's axis is more detailed and takes account of more 
phenomena than Inglehart's; Axis I depicts economics and how importantly one 
views it. This is the New/Old Politics (NP/OP) split and New Left and New right are 
located here. The NP line has a libertarian/authoritarian split (Axis II). The result is
31 He writes that the 'New Tory ' voters are emblematic o f this process; the im p lica tion  being that the 
marginalised are as lik e ly  to vote Labour as they ever have. See the section on industria l sociology, 
this chapter.
58
cross-pressured voters, something which explains features such as working-class 
authoritarianism; backlash New Right parties capitalise on the responses to the 
magnitude of the New Left's impact. Level o f  education accounts for why the middle 
class is (more recently) leftist inclined and the working class, right-wing.
Entities as diverse as an anti-immigrant tendency; the debate over nuclear 
power; the deservingness of the unemployed; the idea o f patriotic sacrifice and 
belief in God are deemed (wrongly, according to Flanagan) by Inglehart to be all 
instances of a materialist orientation. Flanagan also reinterprets the Diminishing 
Marginal Utility (DMU) argument more strictly than Inglehart: acquired affluence 
does entail a move away from materialism, but not necessarily all the way to PM. 
Instead, a halfway stage of non-materialism is arrived at, and as and when the 
economy declines, people's orientations shift back towards materialism. Pure PM, a 
positive embrace of egalitarian and libertarian ideals, is a much rarer beast. As is 
evident, Flanagan's model subsumes Inglehart's concept of period effects.
In another attack on the foundations of the theory, Flanagan detects a fatal 
flaw in the construction of the PMI; instead of the four items being divided equally 
into two divisions of materialist and postmaterialist measures, Flanagan gives a new 
breakdown of each measure:
(a) 'Free speech' and 'More say in government' as 
libertarian measures.
(b) 'Defence' as an authoritarian concern and
(c) 'Fight rising prices' as a materialist issue.
There is a dilemma o f  constrained choice, as Flanagan puts it (1987: 1311): 
non-materialist libertarians will pick the two items in (a); while materialist
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libertarians will pick (c) and one from (a).32 As a result, inferring that there has been 
a drop in the number of materialists based on more people choosing (b) and (c) is a 
mistake. In Flanagan’s view, materialists are not that concerned with defence issues, 
and any rise in the numbers choosing (b) should instead be viewed as due to a rise in 
authoritarianism among the population.
2.1.1.1: Summary o f Flanagan’s critique
To sum up, Flanagan's model has more components than Inglehart's and to its credit, 
attempts to tackle the knotty problem of extremist parties and their core voting base. 
It is fair-minded in that it acknowledges the useful insights that flow from the 
original 1977 schema and addresses, unlike the work of Clarke or Davis and 
Davenport, (see below) more than one category of problem in the formulation of the 
PMI and the theory itself.
2.1.2 Specific points
There are two areas where critics have given direct criticisms of Inglehart’s work. 
These are (i) that PM explains changes in voting patterns, and (ii) measurement 
issues relating to the PMI. There are other assorted criticisms, but they mention 
Inglehart only briefly and so are excluded. The coverage of voting patterns is 
restricted to only two studies, and the rest of this section looks solely at 
measurement issues.
32 Flanagan pa rtly  defines these classifications by  re ferring to a survey o f young Japanese - a sizeable 
proportion being libera l in  p o litica l outlook, bu t s till very much concerned w ith  accruing possessions 
and leading a com fortable life .
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Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992) performed a 16-country study on how 
PM may be used to model changes in electoral volatility from the 1960s through to 
the 1980s. They found it made no contribution. The notion of volatility is an 
important one with regard to Inglehart (see Chapter Five), as its fluctuations may be 
indicative of a growing sense of disillusionment with established parties at election 
time, thus suggesting that new politics could find much support. The authors also 
could not find any evidence that PM explains either changes in the share of the 
leftist vote nor that of new parties. These three negative findings in this large-n 
study impair Inglehart’s case. Similarly, Jackman and Miller (1995) found that PM 
did not explain turnout changes in the industrial democracies from 1981-1990. 
Falling turnout would again support Inglehart’s claim that old parties are less 
reliably able to attract votes, while new parties entering elections would be 
accompanied by rising turnout. This twin effect was not found in the Jackman and 
Miller study.
Having described the literature that looks at PM and voting, the rest of this 
section is now devoted to measurement issues. The studies here address the validity 
and reliability of the PMI, and there is a considerable amount of research that we 
may use. Clarke’s’ work is more concerned with order effects in and psychometric 
properties of the PMI, while the other studies look at the expected political 
corollaries of given PMI scores in specific populations.
2.1.2.1: Clarke and the validity o f the PMI
The most persistent critic of Inglehart is Harold Clarke. He has co-written five 
journal articles (one in 1991; two in 1997; and two in 1999) that question the 
validity o f  the Eurobarometer Values Index. The most recent paper serves as an
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adequate summation of his case. Clarke contends that the four-item index is a poor 
measure of value change per se and should instead be viewed as a series of 
cumulative gauges of immediate responses to prevailing politico-economic 
conditions. Homing in on the 'fight rising prices' component, he stresses that this is 
only one of two co-ordinates of a materialist orientation. The core problem that 
faced western governments for much of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century 
was unemployment. Therein lies the difficulty - if  someone is motivated by a 
pressing (and undeniably materialist) concern about joblessness, they have no 
suitable endorsement option in the four-item index (note how this relates to 
Flanagan’s argument of the dilemma of constrained choice). By dint of a lack of any 
genuine choice, the 'worried' respondent opts for 'fight rising prices', as this is at 
least one item that has fiscal and thus survival implications. How this affects the 
resultant classification breakdown is summed up by Clarke et al. as follows:
When inflation is not a salient economic problem, 
respondents eschew the rising prices item but are forced by 
the format to choose one of the remaining three, none of 
which deals with other economic concerns they have. 
Respondents who do not select the prices item have a zero 
probability of being classified as a materialist.
op. cit. 2.
In the 1991 and the first o f the 1997 articles, Clarke, Dutt and Rapkin33 re­
examined the Eurobarometer data on eight Western European countries from 1976-
33 The tr io  on ly  combined on the second paper here - Clarke and D u tt co-authored the firs t one.
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1982 and found a surprising correlation: the percentage of postmaterialists was 
positively associated with rising unemployment which itself was negatively 
associated with the percentage of materialists. If one accepts Inglehart's index as a 
valid measure of value change, then one must logically accept that these 
relationships suggest that joblessness and resulting economic insecurity helped fuel 
the value shift in Western countries in the 1980s and early 1990s.’ (Clarke et al., 
1999: 3). The correlations reinforce the challenge to the entire socialisation / 
scarcity foundation of PM by departing from Inglehart's approach in explicitly 
tracing the Eurobarometer trends against the backdrop of the actual politico- 
economic setting of the 1980s on. This is a valuable contribution to the appraisal of 
PM precisely because Inglehart more often than not neglects to directly cite how in 
vivo political circumstances can mould postmaterialist trends. Clarke et al. presume 
that as inflation tended towards a low and stable level for this period overall, 
citizens were quite correctly not according much importance to rising prices as a 
perceived political priority. This 'realistic' and 'appropriate' response to the 
economic background led to a fall in the number of people picking 'fight rising 
prices ’ as their top priority so that there was an artificial rise in postmaterialists and 
a similarly deceptive fall in materialists.
However, Clarke and his collaborators acknowledged the circumstantial 
aspect of the evidence and so decided to explicitly test how an altered index affects 
the percentage of recorded postmaterialists and materialists. Replacing the inflation 
measure with a joblessness one,34 they surveyed a Canadian sample in 1995. They 
kept the original measure in addition to their revised one and randomly distributed 
both sets of the questionnaire. The response rate was approximately equal. For the
34 'create more jo b s ' in  place o f  'figh t r is in g  p rice s ’.
35 7 09 fo r the orig ina l measure and 696 fo r the revised one.
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half-sample that received the original measure, 15 per cent selected 'fight rising 
prices ' a s their m ost i mportant p riority, w hereas 5 2 p er cent p icked ' create m ore 
jobs' as the crucial concern in the revised index. The difference was significant at 
the p =0.001 level and was not eroded by a follow-up question as to the second most 
pressing concern. As an adjunct to the new index, the authors included a Likert-type 
question gauging the extent of concern with eleven issues: 0 (not at all concerned) to 
100 (extremely concerned): 54 per cent of the sample were more worried about jobs, 
whereas only 12 per cent emphasised price control.
To pre-empt any criticism that they should have tested in a c ountry where 
Eurobarometer had already been running, the investigators then repeated the 
procedure in Germany. Recognising that the responses of former East and West 
Germans were likely to be different, they break down the results accordingly. In 
1996, 30 per cent of the western Germans responding to the standard battery were 
classified materialists, with 16 per cent postmaterialists. With the modified battery, 
however, the percentage of materialists rises to 42 and that for postmaterialists 
drops to 7. The PMI balance measure in the former is -14, but -35 in the second 
half-sample. A  similar picture emerges from the eastern German survey in 1996 and 
for both politico-geographical groups in 1997. The modification to the methodology 
used in Canada was subtle yet illuminating: there were two sampling points (1996 
and 1997). The 1996 test mirrored the Canadian procedure as already described, 
whilst the 1997 test entailed administering both the old and new batteries to the 
same respondents at different stages in the interview. Even more disturbingly for 
Inglehart, t here a ppear t o h ave been strong o rder e jfects . 3 6  F or w estem G ermans 
taking the new battery first, 28 per cent opted for 'maintain order in the nation' as
64
their second ranked priority; this is a 16 per cent drop when compared with western 
Germans taking the old battery first. The corresponding figures for 'more say' and 
'free speech' (the postmaterialist concerns) are 13 per cent versus 21 per cent and 7 
per cent versus 14 per cent. This validity infirming factor is accompanied by a test- 
retest37 problem: for western Germans answering the new battery first, 53 per cent 
chose unemployment as their number one concern - yet when they took the old 
battery 15 minutes later, only 21 per cent picked rising prices as the top priority. 
With both items being materialist, there should not be this degree of discrepancy. 
The challenge is more graphically depicted in the following: for the western 
Germans asked the old before the new version, 69 per cent of those categorised as 
postmaterialist move to the mixed or materialist groups. The shift is even greater for 
the eastern Germans (79 per cent). The authors conclude that whenever an economy 
exhibits high unemployment and low inflation, the standard battery misinforms 
through making it appear that a postmaterialist trend is ongoing. The closing 
argument of Clarke et al. is that Eurobarometer responses are context-bound and 
thus do not reflect underlying value shift. At a stroke, the socialisation part of 
Inglehart's structure is cut away.
2.1.2.2: The construction and corollaries o f the PMI 
It is this context-bound or situational interpretation of the Eurobarometer archive 
that serves as the entry point for further challenges to the generalisability of 
Inglehart's findings. Curry and O'Connell (2000) found that Postmaterialist Values
36 Reber (1995) w rites that these can confound an experiment and must be accounted fo r by  
counterbalancing, whereby Sample 1 perform s tests X and Y in  that order, and a matched Sample 2 
performs Y  and X  in  that order. Inglehart com plete ly om its to do this.
37 A nother term  fo r R e lia b ility  o f  a test.
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(PMVs) rose in Northern Ireland Nationalists and Republicans, which would 
contradict Inglehart's assertions. The authors' opposition rests on the timeframe in 
which the Eurobarometer data were collated. Curry and O'Connell looked at the 
figures for 1982-1991 and found the rising PMVs in a time of high physical 
(terrorist-based) and economic (damaged economy due to bombings and a 
precarious environment for business investment) insecurity.
A  problem of heightened resonance exists for Nationalists and Republicans 
with the 'free speech' measure; this could act as a proxy for the right to challenge 
authority, while 'greater say in government' may well tap the desire for a change in 
the status of UK dominion over the region and/or power sharing. Curry and 
O ’Connell buttress their claim by referring to Smith and Gaskell (1990), who found 
that black British males were less likely than their white counterparts to emphasise 
'maintain order'. Should one attribute this to greater levels of PM in blacks or 
instead to the reasonable assumption that they associate 'order' with a police force 
infected by racism? With these possible oversights - the Canadian data; the 
breakdown of the German results; the Northern Ireland nationalists' postmaterialist 
values, and those of young black Britons, there arises a real doubt as to the 
applicability of the traditional reading of the Eurobarometer when one has a context 
against which to check the assessment.
Davis and Davenport (1999) question the worth of Inglehart's Eurobarometer 
at a nuts- and-bolts level. Instead of looking at the PM balance figures, they set out 
to define how individual item responses measure up against the claim of a diffuse 
value transformation. They acknowledge from the beginning that the aggregate level 
(across states and periods) scenario does indeed corroborate Inglehart's generational
38 A s gauged b y  the ir vote choice o f  SDLP (Nationalist) or Sinn Fein (Republican).
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replacement hypothesis, but do not discern a constraining logic at the individual 
level - there appears to be a randomness to their choices. In dissenting from 
Inglehart as to the validity of the Eurobarometer as an indicator of value change, the 
authors are motivated by a scepticism concerning both the four- and twelve-item 
batteries. Their analysis is laid out in three sections: (i) a restatement that PM, if it 
exists at all on a national or cultural plane, must have its homologue at the level of 
the individual; (ii) the statistical significance of response patterns to both four- and 
twelve-item batteries, and (iii) a broader look at the concomitant validity of PM as a 
predictor of sociopolitical values and attitudes as a whole. A large databank, 
collected from the 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 National Election 
Studies (NES) for the United States; the General Social Surveys (GSS) of 1993 and 
1994, and the American part of the 1991 World Values Survey, is deployed. This is 
evidently a fairly based attempt to see if  the batteries work well across different time 
and interview contexts for an American sample. All the surveys listed used the four- 
item measure, while the WVS also included the 12-item battery. We take each of 
their points in turn.
Firstly, they highlight the likelihood that individual responses may well suffer 
from cognitive factors such as ease of retrievability (the item being placed at the end 
of the list would be such a feature). They tested this by means of a 1997 survey of 
more than 1,000 adults in Michigan and found strong response order effects: ‘Giving 
people m ore s a y ’ was chosen as most important b y 50 per cent of people when it 
appeared last on the list, but by 48.2; 34.2 and 33.9 per cent when placed second, 
third or fourth respectively. This militates against Inglehart's proposal of an 
undergirding value consistency in choosing goals.
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Secondly, basing their research question on classical probability theory, the 
authors highlight the appropriate statistical point - there is a 0.50 chance of selecting a 
postmaterialist or materialist value (two items from four) and there is by extension a
0.333 chance of selecting a matching value item (one from three remaining items). 
There are 12 possible response combinations. Randomness allows for eight of these 
(66.6 per cent) to be classified as mixed; two (16.6 per cent) as postmaterialist and 
two (16.6 per cent) as materialist. Taking these probability values as given, Davis and 
Davenport pose two questions - is the overall response pattern suggestive of 
randomness (are the ratios the same as probability theory could predict)? Secondly, is 
the conditional probability of picking a second item that matches the first in value 
type is greater than chance (one in three)? The challenge has been mooted before by 
Brooks and Manza (1994:547), who question whether postmaterialist and materialist 
values are mutually exclusive above the chance benchmark. For the entire databank 
(nine pooled data sets), in only three cases - the NESs of 1988 and 1992 and the WVS 
of 1991 - did selection of postmaterialist values exceed chance and only one of these 
(the last) fell within the range of sampling error. For the NES sets of 1972, 1976 and 
1980, the figures are sizeably smaller than the randomness margin, whilst the 
remaining cases approximate chance values. Davis and Davenport detect a tendency 
for Americans to become less materialist but not necessarily more postmaterialist. In 
fact, the figures for the more recent data sets follow a random pattem. There i s a 
small but steady fall-off in selection of the two materialist items and furthermore, the 
percentage of those who chose a second materialist item exceeded chance in six of the 
nine years. This statistically probable response set was at its highest level of 
significance in 1972, 1976 and 1980, years of high inflation. In times of low inflation 
(the late 1980s and early 1990s sampling points), there is no corollary of a PM trend -
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only in 1991 is the figure greater than chance. The conclusion of Davis and 
Davenport is that the situational context may well mask the true picture, inflating any 
putative underlying generational shift. In this case, the particularity is inflation: Davis 
and Davenport note the volatility of inflation in the 1970s and its peak value of 13.5 
per cent in 1980. It would appear logical for citizens to opt for this real-world concern 
as and when they were surveyed.
Inglehart addresses the criticisms of both Davis and Davenport and Clarke et 
al. in the one article (all three pieces were published in the one issue of the 
American Political Science Review). Taking up from where Davis and Davenport 
leave off, Inglehart affirms that he carried out validation procedures for each of the 
four index items and how they related to the larger item list. He reports that he was 
able on the basis of this to split the 12 concerns into two six-item clusters, 
expressing materialist and postmaterialist goals respectively. There then follows a 
very intricate defence against Davis and Davenport's accusation that there is no 
probability-based reason for accepting that people choose any two goals according 
to consistent ideological preference. Davis and Davenport cavil that a factor analysis 
of the items and choice consistency cannot be carried out as the items are ranked, 
and factor analysis is thus inappropriate. In his defence, Inglehart cites work by 
Rokeach, and Jackson and Alwin, where they demonstrate that factor analysis is 
applicable.
Inglehart then invokes the 1995 WVS, where the four goals are divided into 
the appropriate postmaterialist / materialist cluster in all 40 societies polled. This is, 
however, tantamount to changing the rules of the game. Inglehart seems to be 
asserting that in practice, people classify goals according to how he has conceived 
they would classify - but Davis and Davenport are motivated by an individual-level
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analysis, and not by the cross-cultural view. To shield his work from criticism about 
internal validity,39 Inglehart draws on a second, unrelated case of in situ findings. 
He presents aggregated data to back up his case and perhaps his most persuasive 
piece of evidence is where Inglehart goes back to the Davis and Davenport samples 
and finds that responses fall together 'appropriately' or consistently in three out of 
four comparisons: all to a statistically significant degree. A  percentage breakdown 
better illustrates the point:
...66% of those classified as materialist chose economic 
growth as the most important goal in the second four-item 
battery, while only 41% of the materialists selected that 
option; conversely, only 14% of the materialists chose giving 
people more say in their jobs as the most important goal, 
while 41% of the postmaterialists gave it top priority. In 
every case, persons in the mixed category occupy an 
intermediate position between materialists and 
postmaterialists. Contrary to Davis and Davenport's claims, 
these choices are far from random: They are significant at 
lower than the .001 level.
Inglehart, 1999c: 6.
Inglehart's second response to Davis and Davenport's claims centres on the 
strength of correlation between the materialist and postmaterialist indices according 
to the three batteries (of four items each) that compose the extended test. Correlations
39 This refers to the a b ility  o f  any one element o f  a test to adequately measure what i t  purports to 
measure (Kerlinger, 1986).
in each case do not reach 0.30, but Inglehart contends that these are still robust 
findings for individual items, as there is no booster effect, often found with response 
sets. A s a result, Inglehart would have the reader believe that these are more than 
adequate correlations. He moves away from individual-level statistics and examines 
the broader setting. If we take this point as one related to that made in the Davis and 
Davenport paper, their case is made more compelling. Inglehart also tries to cast 
doubt on the merits of Clarke et al.'s criticisms; interestingly, the two protagonists had 
by this stage been involved in a debate on PM that had been ongoing since the mid- 
1980s. To reiterate: Clarke's point (1999) is that the index measures situationally- 
speciflc political responses, namely the comparative unimportance of inflation in the 
fourth quarter of the twentieth century. Inglehart rejects this, underlining the extended 
temporal length of the Eurobarometer survey in contrast to Clarke et al.'s 
circumscribed samples. In order to do justice to the concept of PM, Inglehart 
proposes that one has to test over the whole course of the time series. He is eager to 
allude to his prediction of (roughly) a one point rise per year in the PMI balance - as 
this prediction was made as far back as 1970, he is apparently safe with this defence.
Clarke and other colleagues have elsewhere focused on unemployment as a 
substitute measure, but Inglehart is not content with this switch. He argues that the 
three separate batteries complement each other, allowing investigators to more 
accurately measure similar value objects. This, then, excuses the fact that Clarke et al. 
find different results precisely because they use different batteries (inflation replaced 
by unemployment). Inglehart is wary of including an unemployment measure in the 
values survey; he writes that he already ran a test with this in 1970, but found it to be 
‘less effective than most of the materialist factors tested’ (1999: 13). The reason for 
this is because of its ambiguous location on the materialist / postmaterialist
I
dimension. Materialists, according to Inglehart, may well prioritise it because it 
actively threatens their financial security, while postmaterialists may endorse it out of 
a sense of solidarity with poorer citizens. He does not deny that unemployment can 
have a depressive effect on the PMI - it, like inflation, serves to act as the two period 
effects that counter the upward trend. What Inglehart nevertheless does think crucial 
is the overall rising trajectory due to intergenerational replacement. He also notes that 
the overall pattern of unemployment and inflation serves to cancel out the effect due 
to each; inflation has been generally low whilst unemployment has been high since 
the late 1970s. Skilfully deploying economic data, Inglehart is able to demonstrate 
that the 1990 weighted average inflation rate in the original six European states 
surveyed was the same as in 1970, thus controlling for inflation. The PMI went up in 
this period, from -29 to -6. This rate of change amounts to the 1.15 points per annum 
increase that Inglehart (Inglehart and Abramson, 1995) had stated would occur solely 
due to intergenerational replacement.
Inglehart uses the same nation-specific example as found in the second half of 
the Clarke et al. paper. As unemployment in the former East Germany was higher 
(twice as much, approximately) then in the old West, Inglehart c ontinues on from 
Clarke et al's assertion that high unemployment is negatively correlated with 
materialism - the opposite would appear to hold. In the former East Germany, the 
materialists outweigh the West German equivalents (34 per cent versus 29 per cent), 
while the number of postmaterialists is considerably lower (9 per cent versus 16 per 
cent).
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The large-n quantitative work by Franklin, Mackie and Yalen (1992) weakens 
Inglehart’s case that PM is a useful model for understanding vote change in three 
areas - volatility; turnout; and relative party share distributed between ‘new politics’ 
parties and the established left. The survey analyses variously carried out by Clarke; 
Dutt and Rapkin; Davis and Davenport; and O ’Connell and Curry, amount to a strong 
attack on the validity and reliability of the PMI. Specifically, we learn that situational 
factors amount to a confounding variable, which Inglehart neither accepts nor refutes; 
that the PMI has low test-retest reliability, and that the materialist / postmaterialist 
ranking is prone to order effects.
2.2 New criticisms
This section presents this author’s own general and specific criticisms on Inglehart’s 
theory. It sets out to appraise Inglehart’s work in a new way. The bulk of the existing 
criticisms are invariably very specific, looking at the construction of the surveys and 
what we may reliably know from them. My aim was to critically evaluate his work 
in two different areas -  his assumptions about the applicability of concepts from 
other fields of social-scientific inquiry, and his line of research in political culture. 
This section of the chapter serves as a new set of theoretical criticisms of his work in 
PM. The rest of the thesis does not aim to test these criticisms; instead it aims to 
empirically test a set of hypotheses we derive from Inglehart’s claims about PM.
This section is divided in four parts. In the first and second, Inglehart’s usage 
of industrial sociology and psychology is critically assessed; we bring in other 
psychology findings in order to better appreciate how prone to untested assumptions
2.1.2.1: Summary o f  the specific criticisms
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much of his value shift argument is. Thirdly, his integration of the concept of 
postmodernism in to his work is discussed. Finally, existing concepts relating to the 
problems of researching culture are applied to criticise his third period of work.
Inglehart’s research is interdisciplinary, not in terms of its methods, but in his 
borrowing of concepts in order to explain value change and then to link it up with 
political outcomes. His grasp of the concepts he utilises from industrial sociology 
and psychology and his understanding of their implications has not been discussed in 
the political science literature.40 Industrial sociology merits discussion as Inglehart’s 
work relies implicitly on the concept of embourgeoisement, which was developed by 
industrial sociologists. The psychology part is particularly relevant and it is 
surprising that it has not been addressed before. As Todosijevic and Enyedi 
(2003:631) describe PM as a social-psychological theory, I devote some time to 
looking at how social psychology is inextricably linked up with any evaluation of 
Inglehart’s claims. I advance on Todosijevic and Enyedi’s discussion by also 
drawing in work from the field of developmental psychology in order to judge the 
soundness of Inglehart’s claims on political socialisation, and psychometrics so that 
his design of the PMI may be evaluated. Finally, we examine Inglehart’s recent 
practice of interchanging postmodernism and PM. In so doing, we have a further 
demonstration of Inglehart’s lack of rigour in explaining political phenomena 
through inappropriate referrals to other areas of social inquiry.
40 A lthough the reader is directed to W ilensky (2002: 186-208), where a critica l account is given o f 
how the social sciences qu a lify  and depict socio-politica l change; there is also a good overview o f 
Ing lehart’ s w o rk  and some o f  its flaws.
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There is much to contest in Inglehart's understanding of the profile of the 'new 
politics' voter - he extrapolates from theories41 produced elsewhere in the social 
sciences, but does not rigorously specify how and where the transfer from one 
domain of knowledge to the other may be expedited. It is Inglehart's usage of 
variegated theoretical inputs that causes a problem for the student; more often than 
not, he does not explicitly refer to a corroborating framework in the system of 
thought from which he borrows. The above accusation is certainly valid in 
Inglehart's proclamation of a new society where 'working-class' is a notion that 
structures less and less voting and political values. All through his research, 
Inglehart underlines the changed priorities evinced by the non-manual worker; this 
term, as is explained here, derives from industrial sociology. What we find when we 
read Inglehart (especially 1970 and 1977) is that he gives a very selective view of 
the concept of how work changes may come to affect politics. His referencing is 
sparse, not drawing on the debates around all of the points he deems important, 
suggesting a desire to make the reader believe that his view is correct or that there is 
in fact no disagreement. This is apparent, for example, in his presentation of 
workplace change, from increased pay to job role variation, as having nothing to do 
with the activities of trade unions. His views of the political and societal by­
products of a reduced scale of manual labour are simplistic, as evidenced by his lack 
of insight that automation results in deskilling and often higher unemployment. This 
in turn would affect both the standard of living and the negotiating power of trade 
unions.
2.2.1: Inglehart and Industrial Sociology
41 Interestingly, Inglehart is much less keen to  use em pirical find ings from  other disciplines; he 
c learly favours gra fting theories instead.
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Scholarly work on the consequences of a diffuse raise in the standard of 
living abounded in America and Europe in the 1960s.42 Many view Friedmann's 
(1946) research as the foundation of this new area of industrial sociology; he 
speculated as to the dual effects of greater automation - rising frustration at 
deskilling and more leisure time. In the early 1960s, Komhauser noted in a paper the 
likely psychological results of industrialisation and increased affluence. This in turn 
followed on from Sayles' (1958) article, The Behavior o f  Industrial Work Groups. 
The theorists were all interested in the culture of work within the factory and the 
concomitant micropolitical activity: the propensity to strike or disobey management. 
It is stressed that with regard to the political c onsequences of automation, a 11 of 
these authors were either silent or tentative.
In 1969, Goldthorpe et al. took the first steps in changing this by bringing 
the term 'embourgeoisement' into the arena of social science enquiry. This classic 
study took as its sample a 'Luton car worker', a skilled working-class male whose 
aspirations ands attitudes marked him out as different from the inveterate working- 
class. Goldthorpe's idea was simple: that a wealthier class of worker, with more 
leisure time and middle-class aims, was emerging in certain sectors of British 
industry that were undergoing a boom. The hypothesis was part of a series of 
British, American and French studies that took 'embourgeoisement' as a new and 
critical sociological development. What is noteworthy, however, is that the profile 
was constructed by sociologists, and the prime concern in each study was not the 
resulting new political orientation of this type of worker. In fact, only Mallet (1965) 
provided a reasonably thorough political exegesis, in the analysis of how this altered 
section of the working-class population was not attracted by the platform of a
42 See Rose (1988) fo r an authoritative in troduction to this fie ld.
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classical class-based party (in this case, the French Communists). For the other key 
studies (cf. Blauner, 1964, and Gallie, 1978), the political implications of working- 
class affluence are expressed in the form of codas. It was not until 1974 that 
MacKenzie moved the concept on to a broader level of analysis by looking at the 
political p rofile o f  the newly- c onstituted, materially-satisfied w orking class. 11 i s 
Inglehart who takes the c oncept o f  the affluent worker from one field (industrial 
sociology) and grafts it directly onto another (political behaviour). But where 
Inglehart errs is in his omission of bridging points - how easy it is to transfer the 
concept and where do the necessary changes need to be made and contexts adduced. 
This is most apparent in his most representative works, The Silent Revolution (1977) 
and The Changing Structure o f  Political Cleavages in Western Society (1984). 
Inglehart does not even refer by name to the original research field that first 
proposed the notion of the affluent worker. In reading Inglehart, one would think 
that the link between the nature of work and political orientation has been an 
unbroken one. That is simply not that case. The methodology deployed by the 
industrial sociologists could not capture the range of implications that Inglehart 
would appear to think it has. Reading Rose (1988) strengthens the sense of 
confusion - the individual reader is left to decide how best to view the aggregated 
information on embourgeoisement.
2.2.1.1: Summary o f  Inglehart and Industrial Sociology 
There has been much debate within industrial sociology on as to whether the 
concept of the affluent worker explains more about workplace, societal, or electoral 
change. Inglehart presents an argument based in part on industrial sociology that 
people in that field would be wary of making. He assumes that certain changes in
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the nature of work are automatically accompanied by a weakening of the links 
between the working-class and old leftist politics. No such unambiguous claim is 
made within the specific literature. He also assumes that certain changes in the 
aspirations of workers in the service sector have pressing political implications. 
Again, this has not been shown to be the case by the competent authorities in the 
field.
2.2.2: Inglehart and Psychology
In the above, we saw how Inglehart’s usage o f embourgeoisement does not square 
with its base domain of industrial sociology. We now move on to how he treats 
psychology, another building block of his theory. Inglehart’s utilisation of 
psychological concepts is marked by an incoherency that affects his theory based on 
a less than solid understanding of (i) the mental durability of pre-adult experience 
and how this may be measured; (ii) how education affects political thinking; (iii) the 
nature of identity and how changeable it is; and (iv) how values, attitudes, opinions 
and behaviours link up to each other. The material is arranged in the foregoing 
structure as it then follows the natural course of ipsative development -  from 
childhood experience through identity acquisition and education, on to political 
behaviour in adulthood. Taking each of the four aspects in turn, it will be seen that 
he misapprehends much of the concepts he borrows from psychology and it is 
proposed that this seriously infirms his theorising. He does not give a balanced 
account of the literature cited, nor does he acknowledge debates within psychology 
as to the contestability of the psychological material he uses.
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2.2.2.1: The mental durability o f pre-adult experience and how this may 
be measured
One of the two conceptual pillars of PM is the socialisation hypothesis (Inglehart, 
1977; 1999b) - that one's political values are in large part determined by one's pre­
adult exposure to political phenomena. In his 1967 paper, Inglehart delves into the 
topic of when political orientations are acquired:
The central element...is something which we might call 
"structural inertia" in concept formation. Taking this view, we 
would regard the socialisation process as one in which 
perceptions become altered into increasingly complex 
conceptual structures. Only a few of the infant's earliest 
perceptions - those related to basic needs - will give rise to 
subjectively important symbols...Subsequent perceptions 
which are regularly associated with these symbols may take 
on a derivative importance; these will tend to become 
relatively permanent...
Inglehart, 1967: 94-5.
Inglehart presents late childhood as the stage of maximal sensitivity to 
political information that will have a durable effect (ibid. 96). Anything encountered 
before the late childhood43 period is likely to be most influential. The missing 
information here are studies that back up Inglehart's hypothesis and also a clear 
reference to what psychological literature he has consulted; Maslow is not sufficient 
here.
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A  sample-related problem is the factor of class mobility; can resocialisation 
occur if, say, a child from a working-class background goes on to university and a 
professional career? Abramson (1972), a long-term collaborator of Inglehart, 
tentatively concludes that young adults do adapt somewhat and move closer to 
towards ‘the political norms of their destination class’ , as Sears (1983: 92) writes. 
How much of a modification takes place? Sears (1975) provides an overview of the 
relevant literature here and writes in a later paper ‘ ...the best current guess is that 
the lion's share of mobility -instigated resocialization is accomplished in late 
adolescence and early adulthood.’ (1983: 92-3). This is an important point - a long- 
running debate in developmental psychology is the idea of when a pattern is set up 
from which deviations are unlikely to occur. Some psychologists propose that there 
are crucial periods, which means that there are given timeframes for when an 
organism is maximally responsive to the laying down of psychological faculties. 
Whether perfect in form, flawed, or indeed absent, the resulting state is immutable. 
Inglehart's works are entirely neglectful o f  any of the evidently relevant research 
here. Additionally, he is seldom unequivocal as to the precise timeframe of the 
acquisition of political attitudes or values or identities.
With the above problem in mind, it is helpful to return to Inglehart's core 
model of socialisation and scarcity, one which contains two elements - the 
impressionable years and Maslovian principles. Alwin (1994) tells us that there are 
six models of stability over the course of the lifespan. To begin with, the models can 
only be applied to phenomena that are reasonably robust; tastes in clothing or music 
are inappropriate. The 'stable' entity should be psychologically meaningful, 
measurable and reasonably durable. Political values are eminently suitable for study
43 I t  is le ft to the reader to de lim it 'late childhood'; the developmental psychologists Rutter and Rutter 
(1992) take adolescence as staring at eleven or twelve, so i t  (late childhood) is thus prio r to this.
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here (see Kuklinski, 2000). Differences in stability reflect the relative composition 
of the phenomenon in question. If it is a trait, it is quite resistant to change; if a state, 
then as state alters as, say, a function of maturation, then so will the phenomenon. 
Inglehart's schema is an instance of the Model D category, as is clear from Alwin's 
taxonomy:
This model converges with what I take to be the most prominent 
view of the relationship between individual development and macro 
social change, which, as stated at the outset, contains three distinct 
elements: (a) the impressionable years hypothesis, which states that 
youth or young adulthood are periods of greatest mutability, (b) the 
stability hypothesis, which states that after some early point in adult 
life most human characteristics become relatively stable, remaining 
so throughout the adult life span, and (c) the hypothesis that social 
change occurs via the turnover in cohorts, with each cohort 
potentially bearing different traits and/or world views, and thus, 
changing the aggregate nature of society through cohort succession 
and replacement.
Alwin, 1994:144
Strikingly, Alwin's account of intergenerational change is more explicit and 
concise than anywhere in Inglehart's work. It is remiss of Inglehart not to be as 
unambiguous in presenting how his theory arose and where it fits in with extant 
knowledge. Psychologists are much more hesitant about giving a definite timeframe 
for the acquisition of durable values. In an authoritative review of the developmental
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psychology research on continuity and change in psychological phenomena, Roberts 
and Del Vecchio (2000) conclude that one cannot say with any certainty that values 
are held 'intact' from pre-adult years. In a study specifically designed to test the 
impact of generational replacement on cultural change, van den Broek (1999) 
concluded it to be, at best, limited. Furthermore, he found that psychometric 
instruments could not be reliably used to differentiate between different generations. 
We can infer the following from this -  Inglehart’s PMI may well be able to produce 
an age-differentiated profile, but it is at odds with purpose-built psychometric 
models in being able to do so. It would seem to be the case that Inglehart’s PMI, as a 
four-item measure, simply does not meet the level of rigour and sophistication 
required in its construction in order to qualify as a valid p sychological tool. This 
fault leads us to look at the sensitivity of the PMI and how well constructed it would 
need to be in order to fulfil Inglehart’s claims about it. We note two lacunae in the 
instrument. The first refers to repeated stimuli testing (where the sample changes but 
the test is purposely kept invariant as in the case of Eurobarometer) - the method 
cannot faithfully gauge pressure to change (Sears, 1983). Pressure on certain 
political issues may be heavy at one time and not another; Sears cites the waxing and 
waning in targets of xenophobia as exemplary. Due to a wartime situation, distrust of 
non-self nationalities usually rises (op. cit. 85) and is evidently most marked for the 
military opponents. The four items from Eurobarometer are constant throughout the 
length of Inglehart's research programme; a chronology of political events alongside 
the time-series data would allow the reader to (partially, at least) assess the impact 
of, say, a national strike or a political scandal on any one set of national responses. 
Such an adjunct is absent from the published work on PM. Of course, such an 
undertaking would add considerably to the burden of the country specialists.
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Inglehart's methodology does, however, benefit from the combined cross- 
sectional and panel approaches to surveys; the result is a type of sample known as 
the synthetic cohort. Essentially, as the same cohort is not followed over time, any 
fluctuations in responses are attributed to cohort differences. Again, Alwin is a 
useful resource here:
the problem [of using a synthetic cohort approach] is one of 
specifying a model that allows both instability and unreliability to 
vary as a function of age and obtaining estimates of age-specific 
stability that are unconfounded with measurement error.
op. cit. 154
Here is another flaw in the PMI - the shaky assumption on Inglehart's part is 
that any changes in attitudes are due solely to cohort change and not, for instance, to 
the topicality of a certain political entity as reported in the media. We see how these 
problems combine to skew how we interpret Inglehart’s reading of the survey data. 
Let us look again at the Clarke et al. criticisms of his work and Inglehart's lengthy 
defence. We see that his defence is itself flawed in two vital areas. The first is where 
Inglehart categorises postmaterialists as being concerned with unemployment 
because of its comparatively more damaging effect on the poor. A  perusal of a basic 
economics text would inform the reader that inflation also disproportionately injures 
the poorer members of a society. They are more quickly exposed to rising prices of 
necessities and their lack of assets leaves them more reliant on devalued money than 
more affluent citizens. As this is evidently the case, why should a postmaterialist not 
be as concerned about inflation for purely altruistic reasons as they are for 
unemployment? Secondly, Inglehart is disingenuous when citing levels of PM and
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materialism in the old East Germany with unemployment as the independent 
variable. He conveniently omits to incorporate the early socialisation aspect of his 
theory; indubitably, (East) Germans are likely to be materialist precisely because 
they were socialised in a state with a lower standard of living than (West) Germans. 
Without a regression model here, one which would allow for the separating out of 
early versus contemporary experience and how they differentially mould responses, 
Inglehart is not on steady ground.
2.2.2.2: How education affects political thinking
There are three obstacles to accepting Inglehart’s view of how education relates to 
political change at the individual level. Firstly, the glaring omission here is the lack 
of supporting evidence from other scholars. It is hard to conceive of how one could 
leave out the work of Sullivan et al. (1979), Jackman and Muha (1984) and Bobo 
and Licari (1989), all of which cover the ground on the links between education, 
political thinking and acting. Inglehart does not take time to consider that although 
people improve their communicative skills through education, it is important to note 
that ‘these skills, however, are of a purely technical nature. They concern a general 
ability to receive, process and discuss information. However, nothing can be said 
about the democratic substance of such skills’ (RoBteutscher, 2002: 521). Galston 
(2001) corroborates this; his comprehensive review of the link between 1 evels of 
education and political knowledge supports a view diametrically opposed to 
Inglehart (1971 and passim) that more education leads to greater knowledge, which 
in turn facilitates critical thinking and, eventually, more extraparliamentary activity. 
Galston concludes that the current US college graduates know as much about 
politics as high school graduates did 50 years ago. There has been no increase in
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‘cognitive mobilisation’. Warwick (1998) sets out to adjudicate between the effects 
of education versus early socialisation security. He finds that Inglehart is statistically 
naïve, not taking care to construct a model that considers the indirect effects early 
socialisation and education have on each other.
2.2.2.3: The nature o f identity and how changeable it is 
There is a marked imprecision in Inglehart’s usage of the concept of identity. Much 
of his basic work in this area has heavily influenced survey designers i n political 
science; Abramson and Inglehart (1998) are cognisant of this in their review of the 
Beliefs in Government series. The aim of this series was ambitious: to present the 
attitudinal co-ordinates of mass publics and specify how these interacted with 
politics. In Volume Two, the question is the stance of the citizen towards 
international governance and especially the European Union. Niedermayer and 
Westler found the following, as summarised by Abramson and Inglehart: ‘The data 
suggest an increase in European identity between 1982 and 1986, followed by a 
decline until 1990, a brief recovery in 1991, and a general decline in 1992’ (op. cit. 
186). As there is no criticism of the finding on the part of the reviewers, it can safely 
be assumed that the foregoing is not problematic for Abramson and Inglehart. 
However, even a passing familiarity with the concept of identity would show that it 
is much less mutable than as described above; if it were not, identity would not be 
the anchor that it has to be in order to count as a firmly definable constellation of 
psychological attributes. Reber's Dictionary o f  Psychology (1995: 355) takes it to be 
‘ ...a person's essential, continuous self, the internal, subjective concept of oneself as 
an individual; Baumeister (1991) is similarly stringent in setting the bar at a high 
level - identity is not prone to this frequency of fluctuation. Rosenberg's definition,
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as cited in Alwin (op. cit.) includes such identities as sexual and racial 
categorisations, which are evidently quite resistant if  not nigh-impervious to change. 
Next on the list in terms of resilience are family and work identities, while identities 
based on a geographic area, political party, or voluntary organisation are most likely 
to shift. Political attitudes on the European Union would seemingly rank even further 
down the list than this last grouping. Similarly, Inglehart does not look at 
intraindividual cognitive and value shifts which affect identity and thus lifestyle 
choices in any of his papers, with the possible exception of his 1989 reply to a paper 
by Reimer on the psychology of values in adolescents. Reimer focused on the 
political content of alternative lifestyles and tastes and Inglehart acknowledges that 
such an approach may be a useful adjunct, without being specific. This lack of detail 
works its way into his methodology. Inglehart does not have a clear rationale for 
disregarding membership of some lifestyle groups and not others, for example, the 
political content of being a skinhead or a new age traveller, as distinct from someone 
who is a member of Greenpeace. Inglehart's meaning has little to do with the 
psychologists' meaning; although there is a range of stringency in defining the term, 
not one psychological definition extends so far as to encompass Inglehart's reading. 
It amounts to slack research on which his entire theory stands.
2.2.2.4: How values, attitudes, opinions and behaviours link up to each 
other
Finally, and perhaps most damagingly of all, is Inglehart’s fundamental 
misapprehension of the set of relations between values, attitudes, opinions and 
behaviours. There is a rigorous body of work in social psychology that was begun by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1975, see Ajzen, 2001, for an update) which looks at the 
complexities underlying the consistencies between these four categories. Briefly,
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their work proposes that what a person says they will do does not mean they will do 
it. B y extension, it has been noted that people’s responses to surveys are often a 
weak indicator of consequent behaviours. This line of reasoning has featured in 
much political socialisation research, for example, some key works of Sears (1983), 
Billig (1982), Alwin (1994) and Rasinski (2001). As a result, Inglehart is hardly in a 
position to comment authoritatively on the nature of attitudinal-behavioural linkage 
as we have no indication he has consulted the canonical works. It is considered as 
good survey practice to recognise that great care must be taken when inferring likely 
behaviours from responses to general questions. Inglehart makes sweeping 
assumptions about respondent’s intentions and outlooks when the survey method just 
does not allow for this. When Inglehart assumes that he is tapping people’s values by 
means of a questionnaire, it is in fact quite likely that instead, he is accessing 
people’s attitudes, which are much more contextually-influenced and thus 
changeable.
2.2.2.5: Summary o f Inglehart and Psychology
Inglehart has no real evidence on which to base his claims that political values are 
acquired in pre-adolescence. His sampling does not enable him to draw the 
conclusions he makes, nor does he incorporate any modempsychology theory or 
experiments on the relative permanence of early-acquired mental content. Inglehart’s 
work is lacking in any exploration of how education interacts with a person’s 
developing political cognitions. He does not distinguish between the technical skills 
that years of education provide, versus the content of thought that results from 
formal tuition. Nor does he differentiate between types of acquired education and 
how they may or may not affect social thinking. The same problem in reverse affects
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this aspect of his theorising as affects his thinking on the durability of pre-adult 
experience -  he assumes identity is highly malleable, whereas all the psychological 
literature posits that it is in fact quite resistant to change. The study of values is 
acknowledged as being a remarkably complex activity, largely because we do not 
have sufficiently sensitive instruments that can pick up these underlying facets. As a 
result, Inglehart’s work on political values should be realistically relabelled as the 
study of political attitudes. This weakens the solidity of any claims he makes on 
value shift.
2.2.3: Postmaterialism as Postmodernism
Inglehart’s third period is much marked by his interchanging of the terms 
postmaterialism and postmodernism. He first uses it in response to Reimer's (1989) 
criticism of the postmaterialist and materialist labels. Reimer contends that the 
concepts described by the terms are too narrow and that the best way of explaining 
the weakened ties between social structural variables and voting is to invoke a 
postmodernist approach. Reimer 1 ooks at a Swedish sample of y oung people and 
notes their seemingly contradictory political choices. To clarify the admittedly 
blurred picture, Reimer deems the work of Pierre Bourdieu44 essential. Reimer 
believes that it is a misjudgment to argue that people are either postmaterialist or 
materialist (or an even mix of the two); people are confronted with by ever- 
increasing pluralism. As the hierarchical structures further loosen their grip on 
young people, then a confluence of lifestyle types emerges to form a patterned
44 Bourdieu's w o rk  is both philosophical and sociological in  nature; his m ajor works in  translation are 
a treatise on te levis ion values and 'lifesty le ' demarcations - a person's tastes m ay be plotted on the 
axes o f  cultura l and economic capital. The form er involves the enjoyment o f  the h igh arts, whereas 
the latter indicates a pleasure due to partaking in, in te r a lia , auctions and business meals (Bourdieu, 
1984).
identity (identities is probably preferable). Reimer underlines the point that politics 
is also a lifestyle choice and is continuously changing as are people's conceptions of 
it; the binary model of old and new is insufficient and one has to adopt a 
postmodernist interpretation.
Inglehart considers Reimer's argument to have some merit: ‘In his thought- 
provoking essay, Bo Reimer argues that the orientations of young people are too 
diverse to be contained inside a materialist/postmaterialist value conception. On this 
point he is clearly correct.’ (Inglehart, 1989: 251). So forceful is Reimer's parry that 
Inglehart's 1997 book is named Modernization and P  ostmodernization. Van Deth 
and Scarbrough (1995), summarise the revised Inglehart thesis as found in his third 
period. They state that a postmodernist society is one where there is a reduced 
influence of hierarchical institutions and rigid social norms; this is accompanied by 
an increase in the range of individual choice. It represents a move away the 
definition of the intrasocietally defined postmaterialist voter, the one who backs 
George McGovern in the 1972 US Presidential election against Richard Nixon and 
protests over quality of life issues, to an attempt to geographically pin down types of 
citizenship according to cultural inheritance. The 1997 book serves as a useful 
primer of Inglehart's analysis of cultures and differential value outcomes (his 
ongoing work). Van Deth records that Inglehart takes PM as an instance of 
postmodemisation. To quote Inglehart himself:
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The concept of postmodernism...is amorphous. Defined as 'a space 
where diverse social and intellectual tendencies converge and 
clash1, almost anything, including postmaterialism, could fit into 
this diffuse concept. Indeed, postmaterialism fits particularly well 
because one of its characteristics is the fact that it has raised new 
issues and a new axis of conflict.
Inglehart, 1989: 251
The original article by Reimer and the response set off alarm bells for the 
wary empiricist. It is salutary that in the above passage Inglehart feels he can 
adequately summarise postmodernism in eleven words, as countless others have 
tried and failed to be so economical. It is a term found in architecture and literature; 
laboratory science critiques and late-night 'talking heads' television programmes. 
Sokal and Bricmont (1998) caustically treat it as:
...an intellectual current characterised by the more-or-less 
explicit rejection o f the rationalist tradition of the 
Enlightenment, by theoretical discourses disconnected from any 
empirical test, and by a cognitive and cultural relativism that 
regards science as nothing more than a 'narration', a 'myth' or a 
social construction among many others.
Sokal and Bricmont, 1998:1.
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Practically everything is prima facie  traduceable to a postmodernist 
explanation. Once again, the student of political values is entitled to ask how the gap 
between the postmodernist vogue45 and the political scientist's theory is crossed.
2.2.3.1: Summary o f Postmaterialism as Postmodernism 
We may presume that postmodernism as an academic line of thinking is different 
from a postmodernist life or set of values, but Inglehart does not explain how the two 
are different. If he had written a paper where he patiently explained what parts of 
postmodernism were transferable to political science and operationalised the 
process; or if  he had taken the time to explain the tangent in his thoughts that led him 
from the 1989 response (a mere aside in terms of word count) on to the genesis of 
the 1997 book, then the reader would be more certain about just what Inglehart 
means when he uses the term. In short, his usage of the concept only serves to 
confuse the reader.
2.2.4: Inglehart’s research into political culture
Inglehart's work for most of the 1990s (and currently) has taken large cultural 
entities as the unit of analysis. This period is important because in his most recent 
paper cited here (Autumn 2003) he conjoins a political-cultural argument with a 
postmaterialist o ne in order to e xplain c urrent p olitical b ehaviours o f  Central and 
Eastern European citizens. In these later publications, he looks a range of 
phenomena from how the Protestant Reformation has affected levels of trust within a 
contemporary state; how Confucianism is related to subjective well-being in certain
45 Sokal and B ricm ont furn ish another apposite capsule judgm ent o f  postmodernism, calling i t  a 
'nebulous Zeitgeist' (1998: 4).
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Asian countries; on to his use of survey data to test Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ argument (Inglehart and Norris, 2002). Let us look at examine the 
plausibility of some of these political-cultural findings. Expressed within Inglehart's 
later work is the idea that in more educated and technologically advanced states, 
hierarchical institutions such as organised religion have less of a foothold in the 
outlook of people. Running counter to this, the 1997 WVS found that of the 
developed nations, the United States was the most religious. We have a conundrum - 
the most advanced society of all is marked by the highest levels of religiosity (in 
observance and beliefs) of all the wealthy states. Inglehart gives two explanations: 
the finding is attributable to a hangover from the frontier life in the American West, 
where faith in a higher order ‘gave pioneers the will to brave the challenges of the 
wilderness’ (Inglehart quoted in The Washington Post, January 12, 1998). A  second, 
entirely different explanation is provided by Inglehart in the same article - religion 
serves as an anchor for baby-boomers seeking meaning in a secular world.
The first account's premise presupposes the existence of a type of 'cultural 
memory whereas the second invokes a real-time response to the sense of 
worthlessness in an atomised, money-fuelled society. As Baumeister reminds us 
(1991), religion has always served as a force that bestows a sense of meaning to 
people's lives; this applies for animistic, polytheistic and monotheistic faiths. 
Crucially, one cannot really disconfirm what Inglehart proposes precisely because 
his explanation is post hoc. Additionally, Inglehart's claim that ‘ stable democracies 
rank high on subjective well-being and interpersonal trust, and authoritarian 
societies rank low on them...these linkages persist when we control for economic 
level and social structure.’ (op. cit. 23). This is confusing, as Inglehart wrote (1990) 
that culture was crucial in explaining economic development. This was first focused
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on by Inglehart in his 1988 article, The Renaissance o f Political Culture.46 Here, 
Inglehart follows on from Weber (1930) in claiming that the most economically 
innovative societies were Protestant (as exemplified in the places of origin of the 
Industrial Revolution). More recently, the work ethos and respect for authority of 
the Far Eastern states accounts for how these economies' performance has been so 
impressive (pp. 81-5). What Inglehart neglects to include is a methodological 
justification for how economic level can be controlled without self-selecting for 
cultural type; if economic expansion emanates from a cultural matrix, then logically 
any and all states that were either classifiable then as Protestant or now as 
Confucian should be the most innovative and entrepreneurial.
Inglehart's e mphasis on the c ausal n ature of p olitical culture c auses m any 
problems for the scholar. The scale of difficulty has been commented on by many 
scholars, but Przeworski’s work on the separability of culture and its effects is 
representative of the best scholarship in the field (Przeworski, 2000). Firstly, 
cultural explanations are unsound precisely because they are necessarily post hoc. 
the culture is in place first and so axiomatically, everything within a polity post­
dates the culture from which it has emerged. Secondly, precisely because it is a post 
hoc explanation it is impossible to falsify (Kerlinger, 1986). If an outcome is at odds 
with the given cultural cause, then the only solution is to examine the cause in 
greater detail. The political culture theorist, in discerning Calvinism or 
Confucianism as the progenitor of any and all political aspects of a culturally- 
defined state, must guess at how that culture was formed -  it is impossible to 
formulate or test an experimental model. Thirdly, the framework of political culture
46 As fo r the reference to th is  article in  Chapter Three, the pagination refers to a 1997 reprin t o f  the 
article.
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can serve as an all-purpose excuse rather than a scientific model: as Huntington 
remarks (1987), if  one finds something confounding within France, for example, 
then one can attribute this to the French being French (cited in Zahariadis, 1997: 
15). Inglehart’s neglect o f the key debates in this domain further infirms the set of 
arguments he makes in his third period.
2.2.5: Summary of the new criticisms
Inglehart is inclined not to adequately ground his supporting arguments; he rather 
disingenuously presents material from sociology and psychology to back up his 
points. As we have seen, there is a rich history of the socio-political correlates of 
increased affluence which Inglehart discounts as it leaves the reader with a more 
conflicting sense of how voting may be affected as a result of workplace change. 
His handling of psychology is remiss, omitting key counterarguments; on the issues 
of the nature of identity and how we measure durable psychological entities, as well 
as the durability of the experiences of early socialisation, he misleads the reader 
with an ill-founded air of certainty. Similarly, there is no evidence to back up his 
claim that education always has been and is positively correlated with sociotropic or 
postmaterialist views. He confuses the reader with enthusiastic but poorly explained 
reasons as to why we should attribute significance to a postmodernist turn, and he 
does not take the time to refer to the problem of endogeneity that affects cultural 
understandings of contemporary processes.
Flanagan apart, no scholars have tackled Inglehart's work on more than one front at 
any one time; for this reason, anyone reading the stand-alone critiques of Inglehart 
has no sense of how the theory bears up generally. It is to Inglehart's credit that he has 
consistently ploughed the same field for so long; however, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, he may well be compounding existing errors by not taking on board 
the diverse charges levelled against the theory of PM.
It may be seen from this chapter that Inglehart’s account of a new politics axis 
is flawed on three points. Firstly, he does not have a proper grasp on the underlying 
factors behind cross-pressured groups and voters. Secondly, his view of the new right 
is blurred and confusing. Thirdly, he has a blind spot relating to survey methods - for 
the political scientist, his repeated usage of instruments that do not take account of 
confounding variables is an overarching problem, which likewise affects his political- 
cultural work.
In terms of my new criticisms, it is arguable that his work is vulnerable in his 
tendency to misrepresent how humans think and act politically, as well as how their 
outlooks are formed. His keen interest the social sciences is not accompanied by 
diligent study in either psychology or sociology. Too often, we are expected to take 
his unsupported word on the nature of how values transform into actions.
This chapter has gathered together a wide range of existing criticisms and 
proffered a series of new points to bear in mind when appraising Inglehart’s model. 
Many of these individual criticisms and their surrounding debates are sufficient 
material for a thesis by themselves. This thesis, though, has a specific empirical task 
and so must leave these debates to one side. In the next chapter, we look at how one 
may carry out a fair test of Inglehart’s model while accepting that his theorising is
2.3: Conclusion
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contestable. As the reader has seen, Inglehart’s work and the related criticisms add up 
to a very considerable literature. Most of the literature covered in Chapter One 
(Historiography) and Chapter Two (Criticisms) is based on large-n quantitative work. 
Our task is to extract a set of clear hypotheses from all of this work, and test this 
series of derived hypotheses. We do this by means of a small-n comparative study, a 
testing process which has not previously been applied to Inglehart’s model of PM. In 
Chapter Three, we turn to how we accomplish this goal.
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Chapter 3:Methodolosv
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to provide an empirical test of Inglehart's PM theory by 
means of a comparative analysis of Ireland and France. We try to see if  Inglehart is 
right when he states that PM has affected politics in western states. We focus on his 
second period which looks at the political consequences of the supposed value shift. 
We take his second period as the basis for our thesis as it amounts to his largest body 
of research and established his reputation. His first period is very much timebound in 
that it looks at attitudes towards the first efforts to bring about European integration. 
His third period deals with ‘macro’ concepts such as the Reformation and culture- 
specific outlooks that are not amenable to small-n testing. It his middle period which 
is most specific on contemporary politics and how its features have been affected by 
value shift. In this context, our first task is to identify the hypotheses that capture 
Inglehart’s main claims. Our second task is to defend the method chosen by which 
we test our derived hypotheses. Let us begin by setting out our hypotheses.
3.1: Formulating our hypotheses
The article that sets out the effects of value shift on politics most succinctly is 
Inglehart and Abramson’s Economic Security and Value Change (1994). They write 
(op. cit.: 336) that the changes in the electoral landscape are due to parties’ 
unresponsiveness to the new type of voter and issue. They further comment that this 
lack of responsiveness has already resulted in the following and that these trends will 
progressively increase:
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1. A  drop in social class voting.
2. The rise of New Social Movements (NSMs).
3. The increased presence of the ecological movement and Green parties.
4. A  fall-off in turnout.
5. A  drop in party loyalty.
These symptoms of dealignment combine and eventually build up over time 
to yield a new political axis, that of the ‘new left’ and ‘new right’ . Unfortunately for 
the scholar, this straightforward list is not readily usable in formulating hypotheses 
to test. To start with, Inglehart does not state, either here or in other publications, 
which indicators come first and whether or not they manifest themselves 
incrementally and sequentially. Secondly, his later work is imprecise on whether 
green parties are the only new politics parties that have succeeded in establishing 
themselves electorally. Thirdly, he is not explicit enough on the causes o f  certain 
processes. In spite of this, the article still represents the best summary of Inglehart’s 
work on PM, as it gathers in one place more linked symptoms o f  postmaterialist 
politics than in any other publication. We now detail how we may better 
operationalise the test of the theory by justifying each of the hypotheses below:
Hi: That there has been a progressive decline in social 
class voting.
This is lifted directly from the article and has clear measures, so it does not 
need to be modified.
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H.2: That drops in party loyalty and turnout are
progressively increasing as voters become disaffected by 
what the established parties have to offer.
Symptoms 4 and 5 are conjoined and a cause hypothesized. The resulting single 
hypothesis is clearer than the two separate indicators as we work from an 
assumption that loyalty will weaken before turnout drops.
Hi; That the new issues and new voters have resulted in a 
greater prominence fo r  ‘new politics ’parties.
Symptoms Two and Three overlap, as, presumably, the ecological movement 
will exist as a group before it contests elections. Additionally, Inglehart refers to the 
rise of other electoral movements and parties, but often includes discussions of these 
in his work on NSMs. For the sake of clarity, we look at the impact of new politics 
parties. In so doing, we also consider the electoral significance of the Green parties 
for part of this hypothesis.
H 4: That due to system disaffection, there has been a rise 
in extraparliamentary activity, most notably in the form  o f  
increases in the profile o f  New Social Movement (NSMs).
As is the case with our second hypothesis, we set out to produce a clearer 
proposition of Inglehart’s claims by nominating a cause for any rise in NSM activity. 
We also take into account the possibility that unconventional political activity and 
NSMs are not synonymous with each other and so look for trends in both.
Above, the five indicators are recast as four hypotheses and form the 
organising theme of the thesis. An attempt is made to arrange the hypotheses in
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some type of hierarchy. While it is of course arguable that the resulting structure 
may be erroneous, at least we acknowledge the problem of knock-on effects and try 
to account for them by beginning with the first ‘symptom’ and moving through to 
the fourth. We devote a chapter to each of these hypotheses. Having established our 
hypotheses, we now move on to outline our methodology and its justification.
3.2: The Theory-Infirming Method and Comparative 
Political Science
Our primary goal is to test PM in a novel and fitting way. It is arguable that the 
previous criticisms and evaluations as collated in Chapter Two have only taken one 
or more parts of his theory in isolation from its broader empirical and theoretical 
context.
Using the PMI, Inglehart presents PM as a model applicable to the post­
industrial world generally. He affirms that any country with a per capita Gross 
domestic product (GDP) figure of $6,000 is certain to fit into this pattern. For 
countries where the GDP is lower, it is assumed that the pressing needs in life are at 
the ‘survival’ level and so the opportunity to emphasise ‘expressive’ concerns is 
absent (Inglehart, 1998, passim). The tenor of many of Inglehart's examples of 
postmaterialist politics is often American; he rarely gives concrete political 
instances of a 'new politics' morphology outside the US, even though his main data 
set47 is a European one. This is further justification for a comparative test. 
Inglehart's work is of interest to the comparativist as his theory is open to the charge 
of false universalism or the ecological fallacy (Rose, 1997) - an author assumes a 
theory drawn from the particularities of one setting or country can be generalised
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universally. To test a theory on the basis of the researcher's suspicions that the 
consequent predictions have not been firmly grounded is to adopt the theory- 
infirming method (Lijphart, 1971). It is worth noting that such a process cannot by 
itself disconfirm a theory; at best, it may challenge it (Collier, 1994). To question a 
model is a form of hypothesis testing (ibid.) - this thesis aims to see if PM is a useful 
theory for explaining the politics of two states that fit the Inglehart’s own eligibility 
criteria.
In this thesis, we attempt to test the predictions that flow from Inglehart’s 
model through the juxtaposition of another method, that of small-n comparative 
cases. We accept, ceteris paribus, the reliability of the survey data recorded by 
Inglehart, but question the political consequences he infers from them. Inglehart's 
design is exemplary o fth qparallel demonstration method ( Skocpol and Somers, 
1980). Parallel demonstration is where a theory is generated that is purported to 
apply to many individually different cases; as such, the model is often constructed 
without reference to any specific case. Rose could well have been referring 
specifically to the non-case nature of PM and the imperative to test when he wrote: 
‘In order to connect empirical materials horizontally across national boundaries, 
they must also be connected vertically; that is, capable of being related to concepts 
that are sufficiently abstract to travel across national boundaries’ (1997: 26). Testing 
on the level of the nation-state is an instance of middle-level analysis (Blondel, 
1995), a procedure that tells us more about the validity of the postmaterialist view of 
disaffection by more securely locating it within a nation’s borders. A  ‘Blondel’ test 
of PM is valid because of its landless aspect (Rose, 1997: 28). If Inglehart’s 
inferences from the survey data hold, we will able to make certain predictions about
47 Inglehart began with Eurobarometer data in the early 1970s and then went on to include European 
Values Survey material: his later, more general cultural work, entailed World Values Survey analysis.
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political features within a suitable case or cases. However, it would be wrong to see 
if PM explains the politics of one nation-state alone as this would not be a fair and 
valid method of testing for the effects o f  value change on contemporary p olitics. 
Previous tests of Inglehart’s model have not used a comparative cases methodology. 
As a result, the comparative approach is chosen. In opting for this approach, our 
next task is to select our cases. It would be foolhardy to present an overview o f  
western politics and then try to see if  PM is valid or not; in any case, several large-n 
studies have already interrogated key aspects of PM.48 The imperative in this thesis 
is to test using comparative cases and so obey Blondel's stricture:
Comparative government.. .needs both a concern for a detailed 
knowledge of countries and of their institutions and an ability to 
deal with general models; it needs an interest in concrete 
situations and a desire to bring these situations within a 
common mould.
Blondel, 1995: 391.
3.3: The Small-n Aspect
There are two points that must be argued to convince the reader that performing a 
small-n test of a large-n survey-based theory like Inglehart’s is an appropriate and 
feasible thing to do. Firstly, Inglehart and his defenders are entitled to claim that this 
test is not along the lines of Inglehart’s original work. Inglehart’s research is 
deductive in nature, extrapolating observations from one type of data, surveys, and
48 See Chapter Two.
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basing predictions on behavioural consequences in politics on these.49 Inglehart’s 
defenders could argue that focusing on the nation-state level is self-evidently likely 
to throw up anomalous details that Inglehart’s methods simply could not detect. This 
does not disqualify a small-ntest, though - Rose (1997) considers asmall-ncase 
study to be an adequate vehicle for research, largely because it allows for 'thick 
description' (Geertz, 1973). Additionally, Lieberson (1991) praises the contrastive 
powers of a narrow gauge comparative study, where again, extra detail is piled up to 
answer the research question - in avoiding large-n, one can give a fuller sketch of the 
polities to see how the dependent variable manifests itself. We assert that if  PM is to 
have any real scientific worth, its predicted consequences must be observable at the 
level of the individual polity.
Secondly, the number of cases to be studied is an age-old question in 
comparative enquiry (Blondel, 1995). In performing a two-case analysis, it is a 
trivial truth to remind the reader that we lose out on the degree of detail we would 
have had we chosen only one case. The most immediate problem with using only 
two cases is the danger of self-selection; essentially one may well have rigged the 
sample to one's liking (Macaridis, 1955). Anyone carrying out small-n comparative 
research has to bear in mind Geddes’s (1990: 132) caveat that selecting on the 
dependent variable is to work within a discipline where ‘ ...the deficiencies of the 
conventions’ are inevitable, albeit accepted. One additional and recurring problem is 
that it is not possible to cover the exact same ground in both cases, as Stinchcombe’s 
method of ‘deep analogy’ (1978) sets out to accomplish, as congruent phenomena, 
data, and literature do not exist for the two cases. Thus the reader will see that for 
some hypotheses, there is varying amount and type of evidence used to test it. This is
49 See Blondel (1999: 154-5) for a succinct account of the differences between deductive and 
inductive research in political science.
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true, for example, for the case of the new left in Ireland and France. France has had 
some strong contenders for the description of new left thinking and parties, whereas 
Ireland has not. It is likely that the reader will be able to produce other, possibly 
better examples of work or phenomena that are pertinent to this thesis. However, it 
must also be acknowledged that it is not necessary to carry out book-length 
expositions on each of the four hypotheses in order to test PM. As Collier (1993: 
108) would argue, the objective is to use the method of comparative cases to cast 
light on the theory in question, not to see if  Inglehart’s theory better explains 
contemporary politics in Ireland and France.
3.4: Maximising value from the choice o f cases
The exercise of small-n comparative research contains well-documented problems. 
It is outside the remit of this section to delineate every possible flaw and whether or 
not it can be controlled (see Ragin, Berg-Schlosser and de Meur, 1996, for a concise 
chapter on the epistemic and methodological aspects of this question). In the 
following, we note the main justifications and safeguards for carrying out small-n 
comparative hypothesis-testing. They are (a) using most similar / least similar cases;
(b) using deviant and crucial cases; and (c) longitudinal analysis of cases.
Firstly, one should maximise the data gains available in only having two cases 
by making them fulfil different functions. Precisely because Inglehart specifies that 
poor states will not exhibit markers of PM (1977: 150), the case selection is restricted 
to wealthy states, which poses a problem for ‘least similar’ analysis. Furthermore, in 
trying to perform a ‘most similar’ analysis, Inglehart does not specify if  the 
postmaterialist country set means all OECD members or not. Standard most / least 
similar case selection does not appear appropriate. W e get round this obstacle by
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following a modified version of Collier and Collier’s ‘mixed method’ of most- and 
least- similar (1991). They looked at the trade union movement in eight Latin 
American countries, with religion and language, among others, as the main 
similarities. Within this broad sample are markedly different states. We do the same 
to select two cases from the pool of wealthy democracies.
Secondly, a way of strengthening the case selection that complements the 
mixed most / least similar method is to apply the comparativist’s concepts of (1) 
deviance (Lijphart, 1971) and (2) cruciality (Eckstein, 1975). According to Lijphart, 
deviant case analysis attempts to better construct a theory's premise. Selecting a 
deviant case entails selecting a case that does not exhibit all the characteristics we 
deem important to fitting a model. For example, within the universe of wealthy 
democracies, we note discrepancies in how long they have been both wealthy and 
democratic. We select two cases that differ from each other in terms of how they 
have traditionally been viewed as wealthy or advanced industrial democracies. On a 
second dimension, we turn to Inglehart’s proposition that postmaterialist politics 
will replace the old politics of left and right; we select a state with a clear left right 
divide and one without. Eckstein depicts a crucial case as one that should follow the 
tested model’s predictions; if it does not, then the model is ipso facto  questioned. 
This is defined as a state that is frequently used as a first test of a model's 
predictions. Cases are defined in this way by how they measure on the dimensions 
of factors including size, history and political influence. Four habitual candidates for 
crucial cases are Germany, the US and Britain and France. In having only two cases, 
one can still derive maximum information as to the rigours of Inglehart's model by 
treating it according to these two separate manipulations.
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Thirdly, the lack of comparison points due to small-n can be minimised by 
increasing the number of references within each case; this approach, called process 
tracing (Campbell, 1975), entails successive temporal comparisons for each state. 
By looking at both cases over an extended time period, the test gains extra 
comparisons. A fuller picture of the implications of a research question is possible if 
one spends more time looking closely at each case, rather than hurtling through 
them superficially. It also serve to reduce the likelihood of bias, as the researcher 
has to faithfully follow the unfolding of events within each case, rather than 
choosing one point in time as the in vivo test (Lieberson, 1991).
We take Ireland and France as our cases because they match all the relevant 
criteria given above. This case selection satisfies Collier’s (1997) criteria regarding 
comparability and the most similar / least similar method and the modified mix of 
most / least similar cases. For this thesis, the main similarities of Ireland and France 
include EU and OECD membership, along with both states having been traditionally 
Catholic. The main dissimilarities are population size, scale of the economy and 
foreign policy power. On a different level of dissimilarity is the fact that Inglehart has 
written virtually nothing on Ireland whilst he has written extensively on France, 
especially in the ten years from 1967-77. Inglehart's early work incorporated much 
close-range analysis of France; his observations of the political upheavals there in the 
late 1 960s and early 1 970s were instrumental in his formulation of the Pm thesis, 
especially in the years 1 967-1977. However, he has not undertaken a French case 
study since the early 1970s and has never committed even one full paragraph to 
Ireland in his major works on the idea.50
50 Inglehart penned a couple of lines en passant in a 1987 paper on Ireland and again in 1997; the 
comments briefly referred to agriculture and Catholicism respectively. See Chapter Three.
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With regard to deviance and cruciality, Ireland is suitable as a deviant case for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is not always viewed as an established advanced industrial 
democracy. This may explain how Marsh et al. (2001) found that PM does not seem 
to play a structuring aspect in Irish voting or political identities. This corroborates 
Inglehart's assertion that Ireland did not fit the postmaterialist classification 
(Inglehart, 1987) even though it seemed that it should be a candidate. Secondly, of 
the four countries traditionally at the poorer end of the list of wealthy democracies -  
Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece, only Ireland has a continuous democratic 
regime. Regarding the crucial case, of the sample of four viable crucial cases given 
earlier, France is chosen as Inglehart has written virtually nothing on Britain; the US 
is evidently not assessed by the long time-series available in Eurobarometer; a nd 
Germany as it is currently constituted is not a durably established state.
3.5: The Timeframe o f the Thesis (1968-2002)
As Inglehart himself avers, PM is an ongoing, progressive phenomenon with a short 
history. The researcher is thus denied the opportunity to neatly parenthesise the 
subject in terms of chronology. However, Inglehart also recognises 1968 as the 
point of departure from 'old politics', so the beginning of the period may be agreed 
upon. In deciding when to end the study, some element of choice is involved. While 
1998 would allow for a round 30 year timeframe, one would lose the 1980 cohort 
for comparative purposes as by the date of the last preceding legislative elections 
(1997 in both France and Ireland), the age of this cohort's members would be 17, 
and they thus would be ineligible to vote. In opting to extend the study to 2002, we
107
gain an extra temporal reference increment and we are also allowed to examine the 
priorities of fully four post-war cohorts.51
In testing whether politics is marked by PM from the late 1960s onwards, we 
need to have some picture of how different this period is in contrast to the pre-1968 
setting for both France and Ireland. Consequently, where possible and where it is 
useful to do so, we look at pre-1968 data for both cases to check i f  there has indeed 
been a shift in the indicators linked to our four hypotheses.
3.6: The case for aggregate data
It is imperative that we operationalise what we should study when testing PM. This 
thesis is based on the modest proposition that statistical analysis of attitudinal data 
sets is not necessarily the most valid way of studying the politics of post-industrial 
states. Consequently, the research aimed to give a more contextualised account of 
political affairs in the test cases. Through the examination of aggregate data we look 
at the validity of each of the four hypotheses. This was done in order to gauge 
whether political values shifts as measured by surveys were linked with salient 
political events. Election results plus opinion and exit poll findings were also 
studied. For France, the relevant National Election Studies were accessed -  until the 
forthcoming study on the 2002 contest, Ireland did not have a systematic election 
study (Marsh et al., 2001). Inglehart omits an operationalised account of how parties 
mould their policies in response to perceived changes in the nature of political 
demands. These entirely political data facilitate a more coherent assessment of
51 Those bom in 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980. Eurobarometer classifies a cohort's membership as those 
bom in a year that ends in a zero.
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political outcomes and value change. The extra sources above serve to strengthen 
the validity of conclusions drawn in the thesis and meet the criteria of contextual 
material that is a valuable accompaniment to raw survey data (Brady, 2000). 
Chronological comparison here reveals a clear shift towards PM, or more 
parsimoniously, there is an irrefutable rise in the PMI for most western states. This 
thesis looks at the political-behavioural ramifications of the political changes that 
Inglehart claims are picked up by the PMI.
In tracing the political consequences of PM, we face the question of striking 
a balance between breadth and depth. PM is a very broad construct, and it is this 
very capaciousness that possibly explains why no small-n test of PM has been 
previously performed. It would be impossible to fully survey all the literature that 
pertains to each of these hypotheses in both of the cases in this thesis; the academic 
corpus on class voting in France, for example, could fill several theses. Similarly, 
there is a reasonably established tradition of studying the trends in the number of 
spoilt ballots in France -  this is not true for Ireland. Another example is that of 
NSMs -  their activity has been much more visible in France than in Ireland. 
Selectivity has to apply, in terms of data, events, and sources presented. In 
recognising that selection is a problem, all we can do is to try to ensure that a fair 
and valid test is of PM is performed.
3. 7: Summary
The aim of this thesis is to carry out a small-n comparative test of Inglehart’s PM 
theory. The theoretical aspect to testing PM has been dealt with in Chapter Two 
(Criticisms). In this chapter, we have looked at how we may go about performing the 
empirical part of the test, stressing that a small-n comparative method is a fair and
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valid way of testing PM. We have stipulated the procedures that must be followed to 
minimise selection bias and maximise data value. We have laid out the case for 
choosing France and Ireland, and have argued why we need to go beyond survey 
data to look at aggregate data. We have noted that some insight into the pre-1968 
picture for both countries is necessary to judge whether ‘new politics’ is indeed 
applicable to both. We now carry out the empirical testing in the in the next four 
chapters, each of which deals with a separate hypothesis.
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Chapter 4: Class Voting
Introduction
Inglehart's theory on class structure and voting is a recurrent theme in his PM 
research; Weakliem and Heath (1999) cite his 1990 work, Culture Shift in Advanced 
Industrial Societies, a s one representative of a whole s et o f  c lass v oting theories. 
They detect three separate groups of propositions, one of which is described as 
'General Class Voting', which is itself composed of four different hypotheses. 
Inglehart's research is classed as the 'AT hypothesis; he argues that there is a long­
term weakening of the class -  vote link in all wealthy democracies. Weakliem and 
Heath view the book as an instantiation of a model of long-term secular decline in 
class voting, occurring cross-nationally. As this decline is clearly a foundation of the 
postmaterialist research design, it is valuable to examine how such a feature has 
played a part in the cases of Ireland and France.
There are two ways of assessing the strength of the link between class and 
vote. The first is to take the defined class or classes as the dependent variable and 
parties as the independent variables. The second, less reliable method, is to look at 
class as the independent variable and parties as the dependent variable. Inglehart 
does both, giving us some class breakdowns for the 1967 and 1968 elections, and 
then referring to the decline of the established left in numerous publications (1984, 
1990, 1994). Our focus is on the first approach, with class behaviour as the 
dependent variable.
This chapter is organised as follows: in Part One, we detail Inglehart’s claims 
that are most relevant to class voting in Ireland and France. We then attempt to 
operationalise Inglehart’s claims by referring to other relevant work on class voting
and its post-war trajectory in Part Two. In Parts Three and Four, the evidence is 
examined and presented separately for France and Ireland.
4.1: Inglehart’s main claims
As noted in the Introduction of this chapter, Inglehart's hypothesis is that class has 
less of an organising effect on voting than it had in the past; the break is purported to 
be (in the French case, definitively so) in 1968. Prior to this year of unrest, Inglehart 
proposes that as in every other wealthy western state, the working class as a rule 
voted left and the middle and upper classes voted right. Contained within Inglehart's 
general assertion are two different claims (a) that class is currently o f  reduced utility 
in predicting voting patterns compared to the pre-1968 period and (b) that classes 
from  then on behave less as a unit when voting. We are in the fortunate position of 
being able to refer to Inglehart’s work on the broad level of the class - vote trajectory 
and what it now implies, as well as looking at more focused work on Ireland and 
France. Let us begin with the general claims.
Inglehart’s hypothesis that class would become less and less important as a 
structuring vote variable is found throughout his work from the late 1960s through to 
the 1990s (1968, 1971, 1977, 1984, 1987 (with Flanagan), 1990). The 1987 paper is 
the most succinct treatment of the topic. Referring to historical and contemporaneous 
data, Inglehart and Flanagan (1987) point to the drop in Alford index scores across 
Europe which was clearly discernible by the 1980s. The Alford Index is obtained by 
subtracting the number of middle-class voters who choose leftist parties from the 
number of working-class voters who do so. In 1948, the average Alford score for 
Scandinavia was 50; this had fallen to 31 by 1985. Even so, Sweden’s score was still 
the highest in the world at this time (Boore, 1984). Of a core group of four states
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with post-war Alford figures of 30 to 45 (America, France, Britain and Germany), 
there is a marked fall-off to the 8-18 per cent range for elections occurring within the 
period 1983-86. According to the postmaterialist thesis, such a fall-off is due to 
simultaneous trends:
(1) The more postmaterialist middle class is no longer voting for right-wing 
parties to the same extent as previously, but is instead switching to new left and 
ecological parties and
(2) The working-class voters can no longer be relied upon to automatically 
vote left; some sizeable shift of this support to right-wing parties has transpired as a 
backlash against what they see as inappropriate priorities on the ‘liberal agenda’.
(3) That, in any case, the size of the traditional working class has shrunk with 
the decline of manufacturing industries. Consequently, leftist parties can no longer 
hope to gain office by solely appealing to a reduced constituency of voters.
As a demonstration of this, Inglehart and Flanagan (1987:1299) examined, 
inter alia, voting choice and materialist / postmaterialist orientation for six European 
states: France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Holland and Belgium. Using voting intention 
data they themselves collated over the 1970-85 period, it was found that 61 per cent 
of materialists would vote right wing, while only 40 per cent of Postmaterialists 
would do so. By the 1982-85 election years, the ratio of Materialists to 
Postmaterialists and right/centre-right wing voting had risen from 1.5:1 in 1970 to 
2.3:1. In percentage terms, only 25 per cent of postmaterialists had voted for right- 
wing parties in 1982-85. Moving on to left-wing parties, it is apparent that that the 
postmaterialist migration is partly to their benefit. 48 per cent of postmaterialists 
would vote Socialist or Communist in 1970; by 1982-85, there was a five per cent
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upswing. The main beneficiary was the ‘New Party’ category, constituted mostly by 
Green parties: 13 per cent of postmaterialists would opt for these in 1970; by 1982- 
85, the figure was 22 per cent. These trends are ongoing (Inglehart, 1997) and will 
solidify through the process of intergenerational replacement. Consequently, 
Inglehart contends that the usefulness of the Alford Index progressively lessens. 
From these points, we derive our hypothesis:
Hf. That there is a secular decline in class voting in both Ireland and
France.
Having established our hypothesis, we now look in detail at Inglehart’s 
account of the class -  vote link in both France and Ireland.
Inglehart's fullest comment on voting patterns in France i s to be f  ound in 
Chapter Ten of The Silent Revolution (1977) and, interestingly, it focuses solely on 
the electoral landscape of 1967-8. He additionally looks in some detail at the 
performance of the PSU’s Michel Rocard in the 1969 presidential election, but we 
leave the examination of this to Chapter Six. Inglehart makes his first sustained 
examination of class voting in France in referring to the 1967 and 1968 legislative 
elections (1977). The big winner was the Gaullist coalition, moving from a position 
of precarious control of the Assemblée in 1967 to one of a comfortable majority one 
year later. Inglehart comments (op. cit. 270) that Goguel, among others, attributed 
the Gaullists' success to the shift by apprehensive Centrist voters towards Charles de 
Gaulle in order to unite against the masses in upheaval. Inglehart instead attributes 
the result to an alteration in the voting of both the middle and the working classes. 
Inglehart refers to survey data to challenge Goguel’s view. His argument is that 
whereas the middle class had in the past voted consistently for parties in the centre or
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on the right, in 1968, a significant proportion of them voted for a new left party, the 
Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU). The July 1968 Institut Français d'Opinion Publique 
(IFOP) survey in fact shows that eleven per cent of Centrists deserted and voted left, 
with almost half of these voting for the PSU and only 12 per cent quit the Centrists 
to vote for the Gaullists. According to Inglehart, what was also notable was that 
‘ .. .the 1968 election was the first in which Gaullist candidates won a larger number 
of working-class votes than did Communist candidates’ (ibid. 273). Using more 
survey data, Inglehart demonstrates that the class profile of the PSU alters from a 
50:50 working / middle class split to a 25:75 breakdown in these groups. To round 
off the picture, the Gaullists made gains across all socio-economic groups in the 
1968 election. The heuristic of ‘working-class goes left and middle-class goes right’ 
was no longer appropriate in Inglehart's view. Inglehart reproduces 1970 EEC survey 
data which further demonstrate that class was of less than prime importance in 
voting. Using multivariate analysis, Inglehart shows that the Occupation o f the head 
o f  the household (0.115) was ranked fourth behind Parents' Party (0.349), Value 
Priorities (0.265) and Church Attendance (0.133) in terms of predictive validity for 
party preference (ibid. 246).52 A  quick switch in the bases of party choice had 
occurred, Inglehart asserts, which exemplified the underlying changes to France's 
social structures.
Regrettably, Inglehart does not expound on Ireland and class voting. He 
comments several times on Ireland in his later political - cultural research from the 
mid-1990s on, but there is nothing more than a desultory reference to Ireland in 
papers or chapters on PM per se. I deem his 1987 paper to be the most pertinent, and
52 The foregoing values are the beta figures, which are a better indication of how one factor alone 
explains the dependent variable; the eta values include the effects of other independent variables.
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even then it is acknowledged that it is hard to adequately probe the implications of 
what Inglehart writes:
...everyone knows that Ireland is a largely rural nation, with a 
modest public sector and no significant Communist or Socialist 
movements. Clearly, Ireland must be a bastion of conservatism on the 
classic Left-Right issues. Instead...support for the classic economic 
policies of the Left tends to reflect a nation's level of economic 
development. As [the table] demonstrates, Greece is by far the 
poorest country among the 11 societies surveyed in 1979-83; and the 
Greek public has by far the highest level of support for 
nationalization of industry, more government management of the 
economy, and reducing income inequality. Ireland is the second 
poorest country and overall Ireland ranks second in support of these 
policies.
Inglehart, 1987: 1294.
Inglehart believes that the stereotype of countries remaining strongly leftist 
where there has been significant left-wing government is no longer true: the 
rationale for redistribution is lessened. Presumably, as these countries have 
undergone periods of leftist administration, it is probable that they have experienced 
some or all of the policy measures as listed by Inglehart in the above article. In 
Ireland (and Greece), conversely, the stage of industrialisation was such that people 
felt that the government could intervene, as it had not done in any significant way 
prior to the sampling timeframe. Notwithstanding this, his general theory stands -
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there is no exemption made by Inglehart here with respect to Ireland. As a result, 
one is obliged to look for general evidence of a secular decline outside of Inglehart's 
writings and see if  this is true in the case of Ireland. Unfortunately, that means that 
the case is addressed obliquely.
4.2: Testing the derived hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that there has been a secular decline in the strength of the class -  
vote link and we are taking class as the explanandum or dependent variable, with the 
performance of parties as the independent variable. In terms of how class voting is 
measured, we note that the method and subject matter do not fit together 
convincingly. Inglehart uses one tool (the Alford Index) for one socio-economic 
voting group (the working class) in a Time 1- Time 2 study (the overall change from 
pre- to post-mid century). There are four problems with the resulting reading of the 
class voting context in the late 1960s and onwards: (i) his use of outdated 
methodology; (ii) his narrow definition of class voting (iii) his lack of baseline data; 
(iv) his over-reliance on Eurobarometer survey data in place of other sources, such 
as national election studies (NES). As a result, we are unlikely to gain any real 
insight unless we make appropriate changes in each of these problematic areas. Let 
us now explain why we have to improve on Inglehart’s methods and outline how we 
do so.
Firstly, Inglehart relies on the now-superseded Alford Index for measuring 
class vote fluctuations. There are two significant problems with the Alford Index -  
that it is confounded by changes in the popularity of any one party and also by 
changes in the social structure of a nation-state (Evans, 1999: 13). It does not fit the
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Irish case, where there has been no major left-wing party . To better test the 
research question, this chapter uses the more differentiated Erikson - Goldthorpe 
class schema tables and odds ratio values. The rationale for examining more than 
just the Alford data is reinforced when one considers that Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 
(1999) begin their authoritative investigation by acknowledging that the Alford 
Index is nowhere near as informative as log odds ratios / log linear modelling -  
something Inglehart does not incorporate into his research.
Secondly, Inglehart's overriding preoccupation is his attempt to understand 
fluctuations in the vote of the working class - he contributes very little of rigour on 
the extent to which any and all classes act uniformly at the ballot box. He does not 
pay any heed to the possibility that a class splitting away from one bloc or party is 
less pertinent for voting scholars than i f  a class moves en masse towards another 
party - a realignment can still be categorised as class voting if the whole group (or a 
significant proportion of it) moves as one. By extension, if a wealthy professional 
stratum of voters continually opts for one part, niche or otherwise, then this is also 
class voting (Evans, 1999). Our way of negotiating around this problem is to include 
classes other than the working class in our analysis.
Thirdly, Inglehart 1 ooks only at the post-1968 electoral record alone. A sa 
result, it could reasonably be proposed that all of the claims made in The Silent 
Revolution merely demonstrate that the typical French class voting pattern was 
disrupted at the 1967 and 1968 legislative elections, and the 1969 presidential 
election. He does not demonstrate that there was an actual decline in the class -vote 
link as he does not delineate a pre-1968 baseline. Inglehart does not even look at the
53 The reader is rem inded that the A lfo rd  Index looks at d iffe rentia l support fo r the le ft-w ing  party and 
was designed w ith  a tw o-party  le ft / righ t system in  m ind.
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trends in support for the next two elections (one presidential, one legislative) that 
occurred between 1969 and 1977, the year o f publication o f the book. Where the 
data are of sufficient quality to permit, we include longitudinal data with a pre-1968 
baseline on the predictive value of class in voting for both cases.
Finally, Inglehart does not give multivariate analyses of the interaction 
between class and vote- what we have instead in his work is a snapshot of attitudinal 
data, not voting behaviour. The lack of a rigorous analysis of the voting record is a 
crucial omission. In this chapter, we add NES data and exit polls to get a better view 
of class voting.
Having described the inherent problems in Inglehart’s methods and argued 
for why four types of changes need to be made, we now move on to test the 
hypothesis by looking at the link between class and vote in both cases.
4.3: France
The analysis of the link between class and voting in France is a bigger task than for 
Ireland for the following reasons. Firstly, there is simply more scholarly work with 
France's class voting profile as the subject matter. Secondly, the fact that France has 
two first-order elections, legislative and presidential, makes available another 
dataset. There is the additional factor of a longer time series of systematically 
collated data from surveys, broad and narrow, for France.
The ‘canon’ may be sourced as far back as André Siegfried's Tableau des 
Partis en France (1913), which contains the first systematic treatment of class and 
its link to political behaviour. Unlike the Irish case, where the Whyte and Carty 
works dominated the field of inquiry until the mid-1980s, there are many general
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models ofvoting in France thathave waxed and waned over time. In the French 
case, the class or sociological model of voting has animated much academic 
discussion. As Elgie and Griggs (2000, Chapter Six), and Chariot (1994: 157-171) 
contain succinct accounts of the fluctuations with in French academia on the nature 
of class and voting, the reader is directed to these works to follow this specific 
debate. In this chapter, we discount the historiography of the debate to look at two 
aspects of electoral sociology -  Inglehart’s account’s reliance on the Alford Index to 
measure the link between the working-class and the left, and methodological 
advances on measuring class voting.
Our analysis is in two parts. Firstly, we examine Inglehart’s argument that the 
working-class is increasingly less leftist. Secondly, we trace the cohesiveness of vote 
patterns of all classes, using more methodologically advanced evidence than 
Inglehart. Within each part, we follow the trends over time.
4.3.1: The votes of the working class.
Inglehart’s broad case is supported by Bidou’s (1984) argument, which claims that 
increases in the middle-class population, allied to the fact that the offspring of the 
classic peasant and proletarian classes were increasingly more socially mobile, 
served to lessen the influence of typical voting anchors. Regarding social mobility, 
while the occupation and education of this new voter may be white-collar, their 
partisanship allegiance was towards the Gaullists or the PCF. The social semiotics of 
modem France offered little in the way of unequivocal voting cues - identity, 
candidates and platforms combined to constitute a 'brouillage de référentiels’, as 
Bidou puts it. The old equilibrium was destabilised by party adaptations and
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underlying shifts in social class c omposition. In summary, the left / right rule of 
thumb could no longer apply as felicitously as before in organising the class vote.
Cayrol's (1992) analysis o f  the 1 3 SOFRES surveys from 1 980 to 1 991 is 
illuminating: on self-placement scales at the end of the series, the ‘left’ total among 
workers was down ten per cent and ‘refusal to class’ in this sector rose by eleven per 
cent. The workers may well not have plainly changed allegiance to the right, but as 
Cayrol confirms, ‘ ...le socle s'estfait moins solide’.5A This is further support for 
Inglehart’s reliance on the Alford Index, as its focus, the working-class, are 
demonstrably less leftist when measured with a self-report instrument.
Over the course of political science inquiry, the most common mechanism 
for assessing the class - vote link is the Alford Index. The general trend of this datum 
for France is as per Inglehart's hypothesis. Weakliem and Heath's (1999) 
longitudinal study focuses on French legislative elections and systematic surveys 
where the appropriate NES was not carried out. Barring spikes in the late 1960s and 
late 1970s,55 the downward trend over the course of the post-war period is visible. 
Lane andErsson (1994: 94) disagree, contending that class voting in France was 
higher in the 1970s and 1980s than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, but as their 
study focuses on nine countries in total, the more focused work of Weakliem and 
Heath leads us to accept their analysis and thus Hi is supported on the basis of this 
point. We now trace in more detail the character of this apparent decline.
However, as Evans (1999) points out, the Alford Index misses out on two 
fundamental aspects of class and voting. Firstly, the working-class may not always 
have supported the left. He states that it is poor practice to only look at the vote share
54 . .the base has become less solid."
55 Interestingly, two peaks occur in  the late 1960s - Inglehart's description o f  1968 vs 1967 needs the 
context o f  previous elections in  order to support the argument fo r a secular decline.
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of the left among working-class voters. We take heed of this by checking how the 
working-class distributed their votes over time across all main parties from left to 
right. This will tell us if the drop in the Alford Index is paralleled by a genuine 
dispersal of working-class votes among different parties arranged on different 
cleavages. If, conversely, we find that the working-class switches from one bloc to 
another, then this is clearly class voting. Secondly, we need to have a view of how 
all classes behave at election time, which we simply cannot obtain by using the 
Alford Index. We deal with this problem by incorporating new mathematical 
methods which have replaced the Alford Index in political science research.
In Table 4.1, we assemble the electoral sociology for the different parties 
from 1965-2002, focusing solely on blue- and white-collar workers. Some of the 
cells are missing where the data are not systematically collected, or where there are 
strong doubts about their soundness:
Year Far Left Communist Left Gaul. Mod. R. Far R.
1965 (P) 81
1969 (P) 67
1978 10 54 56 73#
1981 (P) 48 62 28 35
1988 (P) 18 80 23 24 27
1993 5 24 35 63# 36
1995 (P) 13 20 46 39 24 47
1997 8 21 60 41# 41
2002 (L) 6 11 57 56 46.5*
2002 (P) 32® 8 25 31 27 28
Table 4.1: The destination o f the white- and blue-collar votes, 1965-2002. After 
Knapp, (2004) and Goldey, (1998). # = a combined RPR / U D F  vote; *  =  average o f  far righ t 
votes at both rounds; @ =  combined score fo r Lagu ille r and Besancenot.
What is apparent is that there are three distinct periods. From the mid- to late 
1960s, white- and blue-collar workers are more likely to vote for the right. From 
1978 on to the early 1990s onwards, the Gaullists and Moderate Right are matched
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by the fast-growing P S in the choices of the white-collar workers, but blue-collar 
workers are much more likely to vote for the leftist parties than for the right 
(Lancelot, 1994: 163). In 1981, the blue-collar workers still largely vote left, but the 
balance between their communist and socialist tendencies tilts in favour of the PS. 
By 1993, white-collar workers shift towards the right, dividing themselves nearly 
equally between the two poles. From 1995 onwards, a sizeable proportion of blue- 
collar votes go to the far right, with a lesser percentage going for far left parties and 
candidates. The blue-collar voters in particular desert the PS, but not to the same 
degree as they stop supporting the combined right. The movement of a sizeable bloc 
of disaffected manual workers towards the FN qualifies as a form of class voting as 
it follows Mair's (1999) prescription, but it is of a type that cannot be captured by the 
Alford Index.56
4.3.1.1: Summary o f the working-class voter
The working-class is less leftist now than it was in the late 1970s, but more leftist 
than it was in the first decade of the Fifth Republic. There has been no secular 
decline in class — vote linkage among the working class. White-and blue-collar 
workers moved from supporting Gaullists through Socialists, which is still class 
voting according to Evans (1999), and hardly follows the trajectory that Inglehart 
predicted. It is only from 1995 onwards that we see a genuine dispersal of working- 
class votes. Hi is not supported.
56 See Perrineau’ s Le Symptome Le Pen (1997) fo r details on the sociological base o f  the FN vote.
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4.3.2: Advances in measuring the behaviour of all classes
To better test Inglehart’s argument, however, we need to make three improvements 
to the quality of information discussed in the foregoing. It is easy to get bogged 
down in focusing either on the working-class or on the middle-class, looking at party 
performance scores and inferring class cohesion from party performance. This line 
of thinking is apparent, for example, in concluding the working-class are less leftist 
because the PCF has not performed well over the past 20 years.
Our first improvement is in terms of the instrument used: it is better practice 
to look at mathematical differences in how classes behave. We do this by adding in 
odds-ratios, a method with distinct advantages over the Alford Index. Secondly, we 
can draw on the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema of socio-economic class. This is more 
differentiated than the models used by Inglehart -  it typically covers six classes, 
although four- and five-member variants have been used. It is a more sensitive 
instrument than the binary system underlying Inglehart’s claims. Thirdly, it is useful 
to check if the longitudinal data support his assertion that the left / right traditional 
vote base has been weakening since the late 1960s. To do this, we need to go back 
before the supposed shift first appeared. As a result, the reader is not led to attaching 
too much importance to the outcome of any one election. Most of the relevant work 
incorporates both a longitudinal aspect with a pre-1968 baseline and goes beyond the 
Alford index.
Lewis-Beck's (1998) reporting of the class - vote correlation is helpful. 
According to the Eurobarometer 10 data of 1978, the French Alford Index was 20- 
plus; the class - vote correlation is 0.23, not a very high figure. In a series of
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correlations for five other legislative election surveys, the following figures are 
obtained and given in Table 4.2:
Survey year Class - vote R 
value
1958 0.13
1967 0.30
1973 0.14
1978 0.23
1981 0.20
Table 4.2: The strength o f the link between class and voting in France over five 
legislative elections. After Lewis -Beck, 1998: 44.
The mean over the five surveys is 0.20 and as may be seen, there is no trend 
of a rise or fall in the relationship. The secular decline hypothesis is not supported, 
partly because it seems that class and vote were not strongly correlated before the 
1968 election in the two available surveys; 1967 would thus seem an 'aberrant' year, 
as is illustrated by the near-identical low correlations for the 1958 and 1973 
surveys.57
Weakliem and Heath's (1999) comparative study of France, the US and 
Britain is a further indication of the lack of any solid foundation to Inglehart's 
argument. Their dataset covers all French Assemblée elections from November 1946 
to 1993. They discount presidential elections precisely because the franchise record 
is shorter and also because they suggest that party affiliation of the présidentiables is 
blurred when compared to the legislative contests. This makes it harder to gauge 
whether a class has a party political tendency as distinct to one for personality. Their 
chapter includes a test of Inglehart's hypothesis of long-term decline and the
57 There is a considerable debate on the ro le  o f  ‘heavy variables’ in  survey design and analysis; see 
Ysm al (1994) and Lew is-Beck, (1996) fo r one such example.
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resulting 'new politics' axis.58 Their Alford Index graph does show a fall-off, but not 
a monotonie one - interestingly, they speculate that social class compositional 
changes, which served to reduce the numbers of the more politically 'extreme', have 
taken place. Holding other variables constant, this 'one-dimensional' model of class 
voting accounts for the support base profile of the Communists, but leaves one to 
conclude that the Socialists are more heterogeneous. The graph of these figures 
shows no trend, with class voting actually higher in the late 1970s than in the mid- 
1940s. Concerning Inglehart's 'new politics' or embourgeoisement thesis, where 
professionals and skilled workers are pitted on the new left against the old middle 
class and manual workers on the new right, the level of detail derived from the data 
is ultimately disconfirming. The trend of embourgeoisement is significant, that is, 
the new axis is apparently emergent, but it is not at all significant if one excludes the 
farmers. Weakliem and Heath's fine-grained analysis proffers an explanation - it 
seems that the markedly rightward shift of the farmers causes the relatively static 
other sectors to appear more leftist; a numerically small59 class has become more 
right-wing, but that is all - one cannot extrapolate from movements within this sector 
to other socioeconomic groupings in France.
For log-odds data, the simplest way of illustrating its effectiveness may be 
found in Cautrès (2004), where he runs paired comparisons of Erikson-Goldthorpe 
schema socio-economic classifications. The findings are as follows (Table 4.3):
58 W eakliem  and Heath categories these theories as belonging to  tw o  separate divisions - A  and C 
respectively.
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Pairings 1967
(L)
1978
(L)
1988
(P)
1995
(P)
1997
(L)
2002
(P)
2002
(L)
Higher Sal./ P 
Bgsie
1.27 1.32 1.56 2.78 1.78 2.81 2.01
Lower Sal./P. 
Bgsie
1.65 2.47 2.45 3.13 2.96 4.06 2.92
Unsk. W./P. 
Bgsie
4.05 4.99 5.75 4.97 3.32 2.73 3.94
Unsk. W./ 
Higher Sal.
3.18 3.76 3.66 1.78 1.86 1.33 1.96
Unsk.
W./Lower Sal.
2.44 2.02 2.33 1.58 1.12 0.78 1.34
Routine/Higher
Sal.
1.96 2.02 1.89 0.92 1.54 0.95 1.23
Routine/Lower
Sal.
1.50 1.08 1.20 0.82 0.93 0.88 0.85
Table 4.3: Class voting odds-ratios in France for the left/right split, first round o f  
legislative (L) and presidential (P) elections, 1967-2002; after Cautres, 2004: 81.
Where the odds-ratios are around 1.0, then there is no significant difference 
in how the paired classes are voting. Interestingly, the ‘class effect’ is much stronger 
in the 2002 legislative election than in the presidential election of that year. We can 
see that in the 2002 legislative elections, the biggest differences were between the 
unskilled working-class and petty bourgeois voters (3.94) and the lower salariat and 
petty-bourgeois (2.92). Interestingly, in the former pairing, the odds-ratios have 
always been the highest and have remained stable. Based on these data, class voting 
is as real in 2002 as it has been since 1967. There has been a substantial increase in 
the odds-ratios between the self-employed and the higher salariat over the time 
period, which has been consistently high since 1995, suggesting that a new category 
of class politics is entrenching itself.. In the first round of the 2002 presidential 
election, the French Electoral Panel data show a ‘public -  private’ split: 55 per cent
59 Census data reveal that on ly  3.5 per cent o f  the population w o rk  in  either the m in ing or agricultural 
sectors (Crouch, 1999: 107) In  1978, farmers alone made up 6 per cent o f  the electorate (Capdevielle 
et a l,  1981.
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of public sector management and higher professionals voted left, while only 35 per 
cent of their peers in the private sector did so (Dargent, 2002: 55). Both of these 
trends run counter to Inglehart’s hypothesis of secular decline.
4.3.2.1: Summary o f the class -  vote link for all classes 
The odds-ratios studies show that clear class differences still apply, particularly for 
the self-employed, but the unskilled working class are also highly distinctive in how 
they vote in comparison with most other classes, although they show some 
convergence with the votes of the lower salariat from the 1990s to the present day. 
Hi is not supported.
4.3.3: Overall summary of the data for France
Using the Alford Index gives partial support to Inglehart’s claim of a weakened class
vote, but extending the analysis over time gives a different picture. There is less 
cohesiveness in the working-class vote, but it is notable that the most marginalized 
voters have been becoming increasingly likely to vote FN, which may be construed 
as a burgeoning form of class voting. When we use tools which measure the 
behaviour of all classes, we see that class voting has in no real way weakened since 
1967. We thus reject Hi, as class is quite strongly predictive of vote choice.
4.4: Ireland
Ireland poses problems for any class-voting comparativist. It is generally 
acknowledged that the left is markedly weak in comparison with any other European 
counterpart. So sound is this assertion that Sassoon (1997) omits Ireland from his
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historical study of the West European left in the twentieth century, thus making 
Ireland one of four states to be excluded; the others being Iceland, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland (ibid. xxv). Sassoon's sole criterion is the presence of a major or 
dominant role for the left in either government or opposition. The lack of a history 
conducive to strong social factors in voting is pointed out sharply by Mair (1992), 
who writes of ‘the striking electoral debility of class-based, left wing parties’ (ibid., 
385). Mair asserts that the only real match to the Irish scenario is America, where a 
left wing is ‘effectively non-existent’. More specifically for this thesis, Inglehart 
does not mention class voting in Ireland.
There is an organisational difficulty in presenting the evidence for Ireland. 
The structure we used for assessing the trend in class voting in France -  how the 
working class votes; and what new methods tell us about the link between class and 
vote -  is unsuitable for Ireland. As the reader will see, none of the academic work on 
voting in Ireland is classifiable in these ways. Instead, we have a body of work 
claiming that there was no class voting in Ireland, followed by another set of studies 
that asserts there has been a weak form of class voting, which brings us up to the 
1989 and possibly the 1992 elections. In terms of methods, there is not one work that 
focuses exclusively on using new methods to get a different picture of class voting; 
for example, the odds-ratios findings on Ireland given here are drawn from a large-n 
study by Weakliem and Heath (1999). For the third section, we look at the evidence 
from the 1990s to the present day. This period is much quieter in terms of the 
response of the academic community. The 2002 election is a good end-point for this 
subsection as it is the first election for which we have an NES, which allows us to 
introduce another form of data.
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As a result of this ‘exceptionalism’, the material follows a chronological line, 
both in terms of elections and academic work based around these contests. This 
simple structure is facilitated by the much-reduced number of studies that pertain to 
class voting in Ireland in comparison to France.
4.4.1: Ireland as ‘sui generis’ on class voting
One must go back to Lipsetand Rokkan’s (1967) concept o f  crystalline cleavage 
formation to contextualise class voting in Ireland. On a Western European 
comparative level of analysis, Ireland's political cleavage structure is anomalous. It 
does not express a marked materialist or class-antagonist division, which is 
attributable in the main to two factors - Ireland was predominantly rural and was a 
colony. Sinnott (1978), Girvin (1997) and Farrell (1999) all deem Ireland to be best 
positioned on nationalist and clerical axes, with the political activity located at the 
upper range of nationalist and traditional Catholic thought. Sinnott goes on to aver 
that while cleavages in Europe were being built around class at the time of 
enfranchisement, Ireland was undergoing an ‘aligning electoral decade’ (ibid. 38) 
which stretched from 1918-27. These years were book ended by the first all-Ireland 
election and the acceptance by Fianna Fail of a purely parliamentary modus 
operandi, which resulted in their taking up their seats in 1927. In the middle of this 
eventful decade was the Treaty and the resulting Civil War. Add in the War of 
Independence (1919-21) and the result is a continuous entrenching of nationalism as 
the crux of Irish politics. This was a blueprint most forcefully traced out by Whyte 
(1974) in a paper that became the sine qua non of any discussion on Irish class 
voting. Whyte picked up a distinct strand of thinking in the first broad-based survey
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of Irish political attitudes carried out in 196960. Whyte concluded from the responses 
that electoral behaviour was 'exceptionally unstructured' (ibid. 64). Any structuration 
that existed was due to the operation of two 'outlooks': nationalism, which placed the 
bulk of the people on one side and few on the other (that is, there were few non­
nationalists) and religion, which was even more unequal in its partitioning (in such a 
homogeneously Catholic state, no part based on any other religion or on none could 
have hoped to prosper). A cultural aspect did show up, albeit not very strongly. This 
was drawn out by the extent of respondents' support for the re-introduction of Irish 
as the main spoken language of the state.
At the party level as distinct from the voter, Garvin (1974) somewhat agrees 
with this lack of structure, alluding to the lack of orthogonally opposing parties 
within Ireland. In noting that the electoral profile for Labour and Sinn Fein / Fianna 
Fail61 was broadly similar in its appeal to workers and agricultural labourers, Garvin 
claims it is logical to affirm that two parties from three rely on the same 
constituency. Counterintuitively, Garvin reports that Fine Gael / Cumann na 
nGaedhal were not the preserve of the middle and landed classes; instead, Garvin 
asserts that from 1923-44, there was no clear class basis one way or another to the 
Fine Gael vote.
This goes against the 'conventional wisdom' first voiced62 by Moss in 1933 
that Fine Gael was the party of the prosperous businessmen, older priests and 
farmers with substantial holdings. Indeed, it seems probable that this received view, 
not corroborated in the early electoral record, is a misinterpretation of McCracken's 
early study of TDs' occupations, which found that the more affluent deputies were
60 A n  earlier survey, commissioned by  R TE in 1961, focused on attitudes o f  the Irish towards EEC 
membership - O 'Leary, (1979)
61 Fianna Fail was not founded un til 1926.
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likely to be in Fine Gael. From 1923-43, both Fianna Fail and Labour score well 
among poorer voters, but Fianna Fail's catchment also extends to the lower-middle 
classes and even as far as the reformist middle-class proper (O'Leary, 1979). It is 
only in 1943 that Fianna Fail expands on all fronts to become a genuine catch-all 
party (Garvin, 1977) as per  Kirchheimer's prescription. With Fine Gael fitting the 
same description as Fianna Fail, but just being less successful at attracting enough 
votes at all class levels, the two dominant parties were voted in on a whole- 
electorate basis.
Survey a nalysis byRose (1974)c onfirmed t his b road-based t endency w as 
alive 30 years later. The three structural variables of occupation, religion and region 
explained 26.7 per cent of the variance (on average) in West European voting; 
Ireland is the dramatic outlier, with a corresponding figure of 3.1 per cent. Whyte's 
case was not overstated, at least in terms of occupation and thus class.63 Knowing 
the socioeconomic status of an Irish voter was of little worth in predicting how they 
would cast their ballot. Even as recently as 1981, Carty felt justified in claiming that 
‘social characteristics do not structure voting in Ireland’ (1981: 74). The new 
'conventional wisdom' based on the work begun in the 1970s was that segmenting 
party appeal on the basis of class was a misguided venture. There are election- 
specific factors that cannot be discounted and militate against a purely class-shift 
argument in voting behaviour. Let us look at the 1977 elections, for which we have 
a reasonable amount of good-quality survey data. Sinnott (1978) notes that if one 
looks at the breakdown of their 1977 electoral performance, then one could 
summarise ‘...that Fine Gael is moving towards a more balanced social-class
62 O 'Leary (1979) perform s a fine  service in  presenting the early scholarship here, some o f  w h ich  has 
been misrepresented over tim e.
63 D e fin itions o f  class incorporate one or more o f  education, income, job , and parents' income - see 
Crouch (1999) fo r d iffe ring  conceptions and uses o f  the term.
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support profile.’ (ibid. 53). A closer look at the figures used by Sinnott is helpful. 
He draws on party identification surveys carried out in 1976 compared with the 
combined profile derived from three separate voting intention surveys taken from 
May-June 1977. Fianna Fail goes from attracting 38 per cent of the large farmers' 
votes to 48 per cent; while Fine Gael's appeal to this constituency drops by four per 
cent (from 46 to 42 per cent). The Fine Gael attrition results in the more broadly 
based catchment described by Sinnott. Instead of looking at how Fine Gael 
'succeeds' in  broadening their appeal, one could invertthe question and ask how 
they lost their lead among large farmers. If one considers that Fine Gael was 
embarked on a course of modernisation through 'Europeanisation', then one detects 
here one reason as to why conservative-minded farmers might fall away from the 
party. Additionally, the Fine Gael / Labour coalition of 1973-7 was notable for a 
type of politician less likely to appeal to rural constituents; the FG Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Garret FitzGerald, had written64 about how backward Ireland had been and 
how it must modernise; he clearly predicted and desired a whole raft of liberalising 
legislation that would confront the Catholic traditions of the state. Rural 
constituents, especially farmers, have long been looked on as traditionalist 
(O'Connell, 2001).
4.4.1.1: Summary o f early work on class voting
Most of the early work reinforced the notion that Ireland did not fit into Lipset and 
Rokkan’s (1967) left / right cleavage pattern. However, the studies in the main look 
at constituency-level performance and also how the parties put forward different 
programmes and how they fared over time. As we note in the Conclusion, making
64 Towards a New Ireland, 1972.
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inferences on class voting on the basis of party performance is a weak substitute for 
survey analysis and other individualised types of data. It was not until the mid- 
1970s that reasonably rigorous work appeared with surveys as the base data. This 
work placed farmers and the self-employed apart from other classes, but aside from 
this, could do little more than restate that party politics was indeed notable for its 
lack of differentiated class appeal. Hi is only partly supported, as Inglehart’s model 
is not backed up by a weakening of the class - vote link; it had always been weak.
4.4.2: A reassessment of Ireland’s position
More systematic work on a series of Irish elections appeared in the 1980s, when a 
flurry of papers and chapters written by academics based in Irish universities 
challenged this depiction of Irish voting as socially baseless. Marsh's (1985) chapter 
actually agrees with Whyte insofar as he detects no real class alignment pattern 
from 1969-82, but that the three elections in 18 months (1981-82) presages a shift 
towards some form of class voting that mimics the European trend, albeit in dilute 
form. On the basis of the political tumult of this year-and-a half, it does seem 
plausible now to propose that some process was emerging that was disturbing the 
electoral equilibrium. It is reasonable to argue that the parlous economy and 
politically volatile climate65 promoted a new type of voter, splitting along quasi-left 
and right lines. Marsh notes in particular the rise in the strength o f the Workers' 
Party, mainly in Dublin; this finding stirs Marsh to hypothesis that ongoing 
urbanisation was serving to remould Irish voting (ibid. 180). A separate argument 
adduced by Marsh is that a generally higher level of education and social mobility 
was impeding the intergenerational voting transfer pattern.
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Simultaneously, Gallagher (1985) refers to the notion of an altered 
electorate. Like Marsh, Gallagher was swayed by the eventful 1981-2 period. The 
research here was based on elections up to 1982; Gallagher's book concluded with a 
speculative prediction on how further voting change might manifest itself. The 
section itself amounted to a passing mention.66 However, a left-right division was 
‘...on balance, unlikely’ and ‘Instead, the trend is likely to be...towards increasing 
volatility and unpredictability in voting behaviour.’ (1985: 155). The overall tenor is 
that class was becoming more of a feature in Irish voting, but that it was rising from 
a very low baseline.
Three papers published in 1986-7 by Michael Laver were concerned with the 
notion that a manual / non-manual class dichotomy was an insufficiently sensitive 
device for detecting class patterns in Irish voting. Interestingly enough, Whyte's data 
referred to earlier was presented along a six-category class breakdown, while Laver's 
work is a five-category modification of a four-category system as devised by Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice (19 8 5).67 Laver's results may be seen below (Table 4.4) in the 
following table:
65 The hunger strikes in  Northern Ireland and the phone tapping scandal in  the Republic were new 
departures fo r po litica l life  here.
66 This is no t a critic ism  - Gallagher's book had a much w ider rem it than the examination o f  one 
so lita ry aspect o f  Ir ish  po litics.
67 Laver's papers do not include the orig ina l 1969 survey data analysed b y  W hyte as a baseline 
measure.
135
% share of 
party support
Fianna Fail Fine Gael Labour Progressive
Democrats
Salariat 20 30 8 41
Bourgeoisie 34 18 4 44
Routine non- 
manual
38 28 9 24
Working class 45 21 9 24
P. Bourgeoisie 59 20 0 20
Table 4.4: The political distinctiveness o f  social classes in Galway West at November
1986 - taken from Laver, 1987: 99.
This PD profile is not surprising - as the PDs presented themselves to the 
electorate as a niche party, with strong neo-liberal economic credentials and an 
avowal to move beyond Civil War politics, it follows that on the last point, the voter 
characteristics should not be expected not logically match those of Fine Gael or 
Fianna Fail. However, the profile is given on the basis of one constituency, Galway 
West, where the PD candidate, Bobby Molloy, had been a notable Fianna Fail TD 
who went over to the PDS. As a result, we may have a profile of a Molloy loyalist 
vote rather than a typical PD supporter. An election-wide analysis by Laver, Marsh 
and Sinnott (1987: 109-11) noted that most PD voters at the 1987 election had been 
Fine Gael voters. Laver found a pattern following a similar trend, but not to the 
same extent, in his eponymous 1986 paper: Ireland: Politics with some Social 
Bases. Using a dataset of 67 polls, Laver found that non-manual workers were more 
likely to support Labour than another party; Fine Gael had the largest support base 
among farmers with large holdings (those with more than 50 acres) and the middle 
class; while their non-manual workers figure was typically 10-15 per cent higher 
than for manual workers. Fianna Fail fitted a catch-all description.
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In attempting to get a firmer grasp of the data, it is helpful to turn to 
Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999), who give us log odds ratio. Their chapter is a 
longitudinal study of twenty post-war societies, all wealthy democracies. Inglehart 
approvingly cites their point that there is a decline in the class -  vote link but as 
Evans (1999) contends, this is a disingenuous reading of their findings. Nieuwbeerta 
and De Graaf begin their investigation by acknowledging that the Alford Index is 
nowhere near as informative as log odds ratios / log linear modelling -  something 
Inglehart does not incorporate into his research. Instead, they use the log odds- 
ratios68 data in c onjunction with the Erikson-Goldthorpe scheme. This system of 
class categorisation is much more sensitive to class structure and changes therein 
than the binary Alford Index.69 The authors rely on a combined dataset of published 
tables (aggregated country data) and individual level data from national 
representative surveys and consequently their study is more rigorous than one 
reliant on the Alford index alone. Unfortunately, they only report on one case in 
their French dataset (ibid. 38) so we can only refer to them for Ireland.
In terms of the Alford Index, the class pattern does indeed decline - from a 
base of 14.1 in 1961-70, to 8.7 in 1971-80 and 7.3 in 1981-90. This trend is backed 
up by scores of a similar magnitude for the Thomsen Index.70 There is a trend, but it 
is not pronounced and is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Evans (1999) 
comments that most of the 'weight' for Ireland's decline is attributable to one 
election - the 1989 contest. Either this election embodied a sweeping change in the 
relationship of class and vote, or more likely, there is highly significant error and
68 The log odds method is preferable to the odds ratio as the form er adjusts fo r f lo o r effects, so th is is 
better fo r avo id ing a large skew due to  a small change.
69 See Evans (2000) fo r a very  concise account o f  the benefits o f  using the ir model.
70 This datum is s im ilar to the A lfo rd  figure; its advantage is that i t  is less affected b y  changes in  to 
popu larity  o f  parties.
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instability in the data (ibid. 325-6). One other problem is the dispersal of cases - the 
data cited here represent patterns over the course of 18 elections, but there is only 
one case for the first period, 1961-70. If one has a result to start with that is in any 
way deviant or atypical, then it can serve as a skewed baseline and thus distort the 
resulting 'trend'. Transforming the data to take account of different respondent 
numbers, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf produce a table that exempts Ireland, as there 
are only two cases - one cannot construe a trend from this. Consequently, further 
investigation is needed. However, the authors also provide revealing log odds-ratios 
(see Table 4.5):
Unskilled manual (ref.) 0
Skilled manual 0.09
Agri. labourers 0.07
Routine non-manual -0.20
Service class 0.94
Petty bourgeois 2.24
Farmers 2.30
Table 4.5: Mathematical differences in voting behaviour between the 
unskilled manual class and the five other Erikson-Goldthorpe classes at five general 
elections, 1981-90; after Nieuwbeerta andDe Graaf, 1999: 36.
The logic is plain: there is a sizable difference in how the classes voted from 
1981-1990, with the petty bourgeoisie and farmers diverging from the other four 
classes. Their log-odds values are more than twice as large as the other comparison 
classes. Admittedly, the difference between the service class and the unskilled 
manual worker is not quite 1.0, the level of a marked distinction, but it is sufficiently 
large to suggest a distinction all the same. Similarly, the service-class vote may be
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seen to go elsewhere than the vote of the farmers and the petty bourgeoisie (0.94 vs. 
2.30 and 2.24 respectively), with the log-odds ratios being more than doubled in each 
case. Unfortunately, Weakliem and Heath do not list the parties which attract these 
differentiated support profiles. On the basis of contemporaneous research, it is 
probable that the PDs and Fine Gael were more successful among the farmers and the 
petty bourgeoisie, although Fianna Fail also does well amongst the latter.
4.4.2.1: Summary o f non-Alford measures
The impression given by reading the work produced on the Irish elections of the 
1980s is consistent with Laver’s assertion that class was a weak-to-moderate 
structuring force. However, the reader’s attention is drawn again to the mix of party 
performance and survey analysis. Marsh’s work (and with Sinnott) is similar to 
Gallagher’s in its emphases on party performance and geographical support, 
suggesting that working-class voters will opt for left-wing parties. On the other hand, 
Laver’s study adopts a variation of the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema, and, as with the 
Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf study, this individual-level analysis indicates that there are 
strong and enduring differences in how the self-employed vote. Hi is not supported.
4.4.3: Still some social bases?
Unfortunately, the data for the 1992 election period onwards are much less 
systematic than what we have for 1981-1990. In fact, the academic coverage of the 
debate moves away from the mathematics of class and its impact on the vote, back to 
more theoretical work on the nature of class voting in Ireland. Peter Mair's (1992) 
paper concerned itself with the issue of a class element to Irish politics, and so it was 
much broader than a mere voting behaviour question. As such, it does not present
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Alford or Thomsen Index figures for each party over a series of elections. Mair 
instead tries to explain how class politics and the materialist clash in particular had 
not occurred in Irish politics. Contemporaneous events influenced Mair. For the first 
time ever, Fianna Fail entered coalition (with the Progressive Democrats) in 1989. 
There had been no single party government since the end of Haughey's 1979-81 
administration. Corroborating this was the altered electoral landscape of 1989 to 
1992 (see Table 4.6):
Year Labour WP DL
1987 6.4 3 -
1989 9.5 5 -
1992 19.3 0.7 2.8
Table 4.6: Percentage o f first preference votes obtained by leftist parties, Dail 
elections, 1987-92. After Coakley and Gallagher (eds.), 1999: 367.
The weakening of Fianna Fail’s position of dominant strength, allied to the 
rise in the left-wing vote, induced Mair (1992: 4 09) to forecast, much like Marsh 
(1985), an ‘ eventual realignment towards a modem version o f class politics’. It is 
crucial to point out that Mair's paper conflates elements of the class voting debate 
with the arguments surrounding class politics. It is arguable that a party system 
alignment was in the process of taking place, pitting Labour and the then Workers' 
Party on one side and the big two of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael on the other. Based on 
their 1992 seat gains, Labour's status as a viable challenger to the Civil War parties 
was seemingly becoming attainable. This is in no way the same proposition as 
contending that one or more classes were behaving at the ballot box in a uniform 
way, as t he f olio wing makes c lear. I n t erms o f Labour b eing t he party c apable o f 
bringing about class voting, 1992 does not advance the party's proprietorial claim to 
the working-class vote. Labour had attracted new votes from all classes, but
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particularly from the middle-class electorate. Exit polls for this election (Marsh and 
Sinnott 1999: 170) reveal that Labour got 22.6 per cent of the combined middle class 
(upper and lower middle) vote. Whilst this tally falls considerably short either Fianna 
Fail's or Fine Gael's respective middle class shares, it is most interesting when 
compared with Labour's support from the working classes (skilled and unskilled). At 
26.5 per cent o f the votes cast by this group, it is evident that Labour's ability to 
recruit votes from this ‘loyal’ base is very much in doubt.
The 1997 election result further underlined the observation that Labour's large 
1992 gains were not predominantly among working-class voters. Its sharp fall in 
seats can be taken as a vote of dissatisfaction from more Fine Gael-inclined floating 
voters who punished Labour for entering the 1992-4 coalition with Fianna Fail. A 
close analysis of vote transfers in the previous election throws light on the roots of 
the floating voters' unease: where both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail candidates were 
available to pick up Labour transfers, the latter were twice as successful at doing so 
(Mitchell, 2000: 133).
Regarding the 2002 general election, we have three forms of data -  the 
Lansdowne exit poll; a close-grained analysis of constituency results, and preliminary 
findings of the 2002 National Election Study. The 2002 election represents a great 
opportunity to test the hypothesis as for the first time, we can cross-reference three 
different types of data against each other. Let us look at each in turn.
The Lansdowne exit poll shows up three clear results -  that both Labour and 
the Greens are predominantly middle class in their support, while Sinn Fein is more 
successful among working-class voters. Labour performed better among the middle 
class than among the working class, picking up 14 per cent of the middle class vote
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as against its overall tally of 12 per cent (The Labour Party, 2002: 16).71Transfer 
analysis of Labour’s performance in the 2002 election shows that surpluses and 
eliminations benefited the Greens more than any other party, while the same applied 
in the opposite direction. As noted earlier, the typical Green voter is likely to be 
educated and middle class. The exit polls show that a Sinn Fein voter is two-and-a 
half times more likely to be working- than middle class. Interestingly, there is not 
much that is distinctive about the sociology of the support of the other parties. For 
more information, we turn to our second source, the constituency-level analysis. The 
performance at the polls offers an insight into the class basis of the main parties, with 
the exception of Fianna Fail. At first glance, one detects a clear differentiation -  in 
the capital, the Greens attract a more prosperous voter, while Sinn Fein targets the 
disenfranchised. Broadly speaking, the Greens' Dublin seats are based on votes of an 
affluent portion of the electorate; their seven per cent share of the middle-class vote 
when compared with their four per cent overall score is illustrative of this (The 
Labour Party, op. cit.). They did not gain seats in the poorer constituencies nor in the 
less prosperous wards of those constituencies in which they did manage to win seats. 
They picked up three seats out of their total of six, one each in the well-to-do 
constituencies of Dublin South, Dublin South-East and Dun Laoghaire. Sinn Fein 
scored two notable successes in Dublin South-Central and Dublin Mid-West; the 
former is classified by Kavanagh (2002) in his study of the social geography of the
• ■ 79 • •electorate in the south-west inner city as being disadvantaged. Dublin Mid-West, 
which includes the poor housing estates of Killinarden, Jobstown and Kilnamanagh, 
returned another Sinn Fein deputy. Towards the other end of the spectrum, there is a
71 The document cited is a confidentia l internal memorandum and as such was expressly not made 
available to the public, to the media, or to libraries.
72 12 o f  the 14 D iv isonal electoral districts studied in  the SW Inner C ity  b y  Kavangh fa ll in to  D ub lin  
South-Central.
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generally accepted view that the typical Progressive Democrat and Fine Gael voter is 
‘urban, middle class, socially liberal and economically right-wing’ (Gallagher, 2003: 
95). Gallagher supports this claim by pointing out that all four Progressive Democrat 
seat gains in the 2002 election were won from Fine Gael.
For the NES breakdown of the impact of class on the vote of each of the main 
parties, we look to Marsh (2003). Of the five dimensions included by the NES team 
(‘church’, ‘manual’, ‘rural’, ‘not union’ and ‘GAA’), only two are relevant to this 
chapter. Table 4.7 is a selection of some of his findings. Note that ‘Independents’ are 
given here as a bloc, which is a most unlikely reflection of the support of each of the 
assorted non-party candidates; however, it is the best one can obtain on the basis of 
an NES:
FF FG Labour Green PD SF Ind.
Manual 4.4% -0.8% -1.5% -1.5% -1.9% 1.0% 0.6%
Not
union
1.5% 0.2% -1.5% -1.5% 1.2% -1.4% -1.0%
Table 4.7: The effect on party support o f class and trade union membership; after
Marsh, 2003: 31.
Gallagher’s description of the typical class profile of a PD and FG voter 
presented earlier may be extended on the basis of this table to include Labour and the 
Greens. Strikingly, both the Greens and Labour have an identical pattern of support 
in terms of class and trade union membership - their voters are more likely to be 
middle-class and not in a union. We also note that the profile of the supporters of 
both Sinn Fein and Independent candidates are more likely to be working class. 
There is an undeniable class pattern in the 2002 election, albeit weak, and this
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contradicts Inglehart’s hypothesis when taken in conjunction with the profile we 
obtained for 1981-1990.
4.4.3.1: Summary o f class voting for the last decade
For the 1992 election, there is a case to be made of a party-political realignment, as 
the left-wing vote share goes up. However, the analysis of exit polls and transfer 
patterns reveal that most of this leftist vote gain was due to switching by middle-class 
voters; this is supportive of Inglehart’s claim. Extending the analysis on to the 1997 
and 2002 elections demonstrates why it is poor practice to base too m uch on the 
outcome of any one election. Although we note that Inglehart’s hypothesis of a leftist 
middle class is backed up by the data on the Labour vote, it is striking that the same 
class breakdown is reasonably applicable to the largest four of the main six parties. 
Conversely, the votes of the unskilled working -class are increasingly likely to go to 
Sinn Féin and the independent candidates. There is a muted form of class voting in 
Ireland, but as we have repeatedly noted, we cannot argue that this a mounts to a 
decline since pre-1968 periods, as the longitudinal data are simply not there. Hi is not 
supported.
4.4.4: Overall summary of the data for Ireland
To begin with, the reader is reminded that there was no real pattern of class voting in 
Ireland since 1922. Alford Index data do show a longitudinal decline, but this is a 
most inappropriate instrument precisely because there has never been a strong or 
dominant left-wing party in the state. For Ireland, Gallagher's prediction (1985) of 
trendless fluctuation still retains some validity, while Laver's (1986) claim of a muted 
class base has garnered support. Tellingly, both of the above contradict Inglehart's 
claim. The new comparative research of Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999) also
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discounts a claim of a simple progressively downward trend, with consistent 
differences between the petty bourgeois and farmers on one side, and a less cohesive 
set of ‘others’. It is disingenuous to argue that a greater likelihood of the middle-class 
support for the leftist party is sufficient to claim that PM has led to an alteration in 
the role of class in Irish politics. The 2002 NES indicates a reasonably clear 
dichotomy between working- and middle-class voters. As the latest elections are the 
ones where it is most likely that generational replacement will have its greatest 
impact, these findings are not in line with Inglehart’s model. Hi is rejected.
4.5: Conclusion
Inglehart’s early work presaged a rise in what Dalton (1996) termed the ‘new 
conventional wisdom’ of comparative politics research - that there was indeed a 
secular decline in class voting across the industrialised states. Franklin et al. (1992) 
studied 14 Western democracies and found the drop to be near-omnipresent. Kriesi
(1998) argued that the class cleavage a s had b een conceived was on the verge of 
extinction. According to Kriesi, a new value cleavage, the one painstakingly 
documented by Inglehart, emerged to fill the gap. We have not found equivalent 
outcomes in our study of France and Ireland. A similar lack of thoroughness is found 
in his lack of discussion on how class voting may have changed in form over time. 
In continually underlining the fact that the age of the manual worker has come and 
gone and so has the concomitant political cleavage, he neglects a vitally relevant 
contribution to the debate: what the relatively poor or relatively disenfranchised now 
do with their vote and whether they cluster together for one type of party. As 
Sassoon (1997: 651-7) comments, the label 'non-manual'is invariably attached to
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those working in the tertiary sector. Crucially, Sassoon argues, this field of labour is 
so stratified by salary and skill levels as to be theoretically useless in predicting 
political behaviour.
One key problem for this chapter is the diversity of data; we have good 
quality odds ratios for the most recent election in France, but we only have the best 
data, log odds ratios, for the earlier series. In Ireland, we have a marked reliance on 
simple cross-tabulations and not enough analysable data, barring 1981-1990 large-n 
material from Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999). This necessarily hampers our ability 
to draw firm conclusions. Nevertheless, we are confronted with a series of points 
which serve to disconfirm Inglchart’s hypothesis. We conclude that class voting still 
exists, albeit in a modified form. The case for a secular decline in class voting is not 
corroborated by the body of Irish research on the phenomenon, nor by the 
quantitative work on France. The following points are addressed towards Inglehart’s 
work on class voting, but all of them have some relevance for how we need to better 
operationalise the link between socio-economic status and voting.
Firstly, it would be rash to predict a change in the electoral allegiance o f 
classes if one does not take into account the fact that the composition and relative 
size of classes also changes. As Dargent (2003: 50) points out, there was a decline 
of 12 per cent (from 3 7 to 25) in  the workers’ share o f the economically-active 
population since the 1970s, while the educated liberal professionals have grown 
from 7 to 13 per cent, intermediate professionals have gone up from 16 to 23 per 
cent. In this sense, Inglehart's claim that the left is no longer the party of the manual 
labourer is an instance of his knocking down a straw man; no party could win power 
in the wealthy west if it had to rely on an ever-shrinking pool of citizens identifiable 
as old working class. French work in particular has tried to take account of the
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changing nature of class, whilst acknowledging that relative socio-economic 
positions affect people’s votes. Work by Boy and Mayer on France (1997) in 
particular counters Inglehart’s rather facile point: one can see from their figures that 
the wealthier one is, the less likely one is to vote left. Job classifications may change 
but the re-ordering of wealth distribution still entrains poorer people voting left, 
although the rise of the FN among the poorest white French blurs this picture.
The above is part of a broader problem with Inglehart’s methodology on 
conceptualising the class-vote link. Firstly, in using the Alford Index on a Time 1 -  
Time 2 basis, Inglehart is less than thorough. As we have seen, the Alford Index only 
captures fluctuations in the votes of the working class, defined as such by a method 
that is outdated. Inglehart does not factor in the premise that the manifestation of 
class, with its corollaries of advantaged or disadvantaged positions, is not 
immutable. He also neglects to check if other classes behave uniformly or not.
Secondly, Inglehart's lack of political context in The Silent Revolution is 
exposed in the French case. There is no account of whether or not parties were able to 
mobilise votes on a cross-class basis prior to 1968. Gaffney (1991: 23) spots some 
resemblance to de Gaulle's catch-all appeal in Mitterrand's breaking beyond the 
traditional core constituencies of the Socialists. As Brechon (1995:82) describes, the 
pre-1968 Gaullists were most capable of commanding support from all 
socioeconomic divisions. The 1962 election was the first where IFOP ran pre- 
electoral polls and at this juncture, the party was well able to attract a very large 
proportion of working-class support.73 It is surprising that Inglehart is content for the 
reader to take his word that class was a stronger predictor of voting prior to 1968; he 
does not give systematic data to back up this claim. It is not as if such data could not
73 The Gaullists attracted 29 per cent o f  workers, who made up 32 per cent o f the voting-age 
population.
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have been located in 1977.74 This compares unfavourably to Weakliem and Heath’s
(1999) comparative study of France, the USA and Britain, which includes data on 
class voting that go back as far as the 1930s. As for Ireland, Inglehart is silent on how 
his model may be applied to states where the influence of the ‘heavy variables’ of 
class, religion and urban/rural divide has historically been low. We cannot criticise 
him much here, though, as he has not written substantially on Ireland. It makes for an 
interesting digression, though, to note that in updating Rose (op. cit.), we see that the 
weight of these structural factors has in fact gone from 3.1 per cent to 16 per cent. 
This increase is likely to be related to methodological differences and arguably the 
decline of the church as a result of various scandals. We simply do not know enough 
about how class affected the vote in Ireland prior to the 2002 NES study. Class voting 
is unlikely to have been strong to begin with from the late 1960s but the most recent 
evidence indicates that it certainly exists.
Thirdly, there is a danger in attaching too much importance to the individual 
election results, particularly for with regard to the 1989 election for Ireland. 
Inglehart arguably does the same with the 1968 French legislative election.
Finally, we rely too much on party electoral performances and make 
insufficiently grounded inferences about the typical voter from these. It is difficult to 
avoid this type of error in the Irish case because we do not have enough systematic 
data on class voting over a longitudinal basis. For this reason, work should remain 
focused on the degree of behavioural cohesiveness among all classes as the 
explanandum.
In this chapter, we examined Inglehart’s claims on class voting. We used 
more sophisticated methods than the Alford Index to check if there has been a
74 Year that The Silent Revolution  was published.
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secular decline in the predictive power of class for voting. As the data permitted us 
to do so only for France, we specifically tested Inglehart’s claim that the working- 
class would be increasingly less leftist. We did not find this to be the case, other than 
from a trend from 1995. Using mathematical methods that allow us to assess the 
behaviour of all classes, we find that there has been no decline in the class- vote link 
in either state, and consequently, we rejected Hi, We now go on to test our second 
hypothesis, that there has been a secular rise in the levels of voter discontent.
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Chapter 5: Indicators of_disaffection
Introduction
In Chapter Four, we tested the implications of the first consequence of a shift to new 
politics -  how it would first manifest itself in  the shape of a fall in class voting. 
Chapter Five is concerned with the second hypothesis of the thesis; if Inglehart is 
right in proposing that the parties that depended on a class-based mobilisation will 
exert less of a hold over voters, then we expect to see rising levels of disaffection. 
Inglehart’s entire theory is built on the premise that there is a political realignment 
taking place that has already partially undermined the old politics system which 
divided parties, policies and voters along survivalist lines. In his view, the increasing 
number of people socialised in affluent periods lessens the primacy of old politics, as 
the new voters are instead compelled by lifestyle politics. The process is an 
incremental one, however. As there is no ‘overnight’ changeover in the 
preponderance of materialists and postmaterialists, the replacement is graduated. In 
the same vein, younger citizens will still have experienced the culturally pervasive 
reach of old politics, one that reasserts its hold via party identification and familial 
transfer of opinions and political stances. The postmaterialist model stipulates that 
the entire old politics structure is necessarily slower to respond to value shifts than 
the c itizens who constitute one of its parts; logically, then, the newer voters will 
become increasingly disenchanted with the issues and relevance of ‘old politics’ 
actors and institutions.
This chapter is structured according to the following lay-out. To more fully 
judge the merits of this second hypothesis, we detail how we derive our hypothesis
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from a reading of Inglehart’s work in the area of system support (Part One). There is 
one significant problem in testing how true it is that old politics is losing its hold -  
that is, how one adequately measures political disaffection. In Part Two, we look at 
how we may rigorously test Inglehart’s general hypothesis of rising disaffection and 
what specific processes we should expect to change. We do this by setting out a 
series of measures that are synonymous with political disaffection. Parts Three 
(France) and Four (Ireland) look at how of the hypothesis explains trends in these 
measures in the two cases. Finally, in the Conclusion (Part Five), we judge the 
validity of Inglehart’s claim of a secular rise in disaffection.
5.1 Inglehart’s main claims
In the book Value Change in Global Perspective (1995), Inglehart and Abramson 
cite work by Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) and Inglehart himself (1990) which 
‘...argue that weakening party loyalties and low rate of voter turnout partly reflect 
the established parties’ failure to offer meaningful choices about the New Politics 
issues”75 (1995: 2). Our hypothesis is as follows:
PI2: That drops in party loyalty and turnout are
progressively increasing as voters become disaffected by 
what the established parties have to offer.
We can now document how Inglehart’s dual argument is constructed by more 
closely examining the most relevant work, his 1999 chapter, Postmodemization 
Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support fo r  Democracy. In this chapter, 
Inglehart proffers a more theoretically coherent explanation of value change and the 
concomitant weakening of a set of political indicators:
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Well-educated publics are turning their backs on established 
systems of organisation...the same publics that are increasingly 
critical of hierarchical authority...are more apt to play an active 
role in politics ... hierarchical political parties are losing control 
over their electorates, and elite-directed forms of participation such 
as voting are stagnant or declining...
Inglehart, 1999a: 236.
If this were so, then postmaterialists would be reasonably expected to abstain 
from voting more consistently than materialists, as new politics issues are not 
adequately aired at election time. Yet eight pages later, Inglehart’s one-tailed 
hypothesis opens up to become a two-tailed one: ‘...Europeans who choose 
Postmaterialist values are more likely to be politically active in conventional politics 
as well as to approve of and engage in unconventional political protest’76 (ibid. 244). 
It would seem, then, that as a postmaterialist is generally more educated and 
presumably in possession of a more activist mindset, that they would try to remake 
party politics from within, through their votes. Where this fails, these postmaterialist 
citizens are more likely to cease to adhere to conventional political activity, 
gravitating instead to extraparliamentary politics.77
Lower turnouts are classified by Inglehart as a symptom of a syndrome of 
distrust: ‘Pointing to declining rates of voter turnout they [some observers] argue 
that the American public has become disenchanted with the entire system and
75 A  verbatim  repetition o f  Ing lehart and A bram son’s summary jou rna l article (1994: 336).
76 A no ther exact repetition o f  a po in t raised in  Inglehart and Abram son (1992: 184).
77 This is suffic ient ju s tifica tio n  fo r look ing  at New  Social Movements and po litica l protest in  Chapter 
Seven.
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withdrawn from politics completely. Though voter turnout has stagnated (largely 
because of weakening party loyalties...’ (1999a: 242). Here Inglehart gives us a 
consequence and its antecedent: the researcher is now in a position to link party 
loyalty with turnout and see if any drop in the former entrains a drop in the latter.
According to Inglehart, party politics and its most defining feature, the 
general election, suffer attacks on their legitimacy precisely because
The rise of Postmodern values is bringing a move away from 
acceptance of both traditional authority and state authority. It 
reflects a declining emphasis on authority in general - regardless of 
whether it is legitimated by societal or state formulae. This leads to 
declining confidence in hierarchical institutions. For the past 
several years, political leaders throughout the industrialised world 
have been experiencing some of the lowest levels of support ever 
recorded. This is not simply because they are less competent than 
previous leaders. It reflects a systematic decline in deference to 
authority, and a shift of focus toward individual concerns...In 
virtually all advanced industrial societies, Postmaterialists are less 
likely to consider more respect for authority desirable, than are 
materialists in the same society.
Inglehart, 1999a: 242
Consequently, the indicators of democratic support become even more 
important; it is not just a particular election or election cycle that is marked by low 
turnout, but politics as it has been practiced. A crucial test of whether realignment is 
occurring is to analyse the trend pertaining to party loyalty: if people switch
allegiances en masse, then a realignment is in process. If, however, they merely stop 
supporting a party, then this constitutes dealignment. As Inglehart acknowledges, it 
takes time for disaffection to result in alterations in the figures for as ‘...major 
political parties represent great psychological and institutional investments; 
established voting patterns are not lightly discarded’ (Inglehart, 1984: 26). In this 
sense, Inglehart’s work on regime endorsement among western publics is critical for 
determining whether or not a postmaterialist realignment has occurred or is in the 
process of occurring.
Having outlined the claims made by Inglehart regarding PM and how it 
impacts on partisan attachment, turnout and party membership, we now detail how 
we may test Inglehart’s hypothesis. There is much scholarly work and consequently 
much discussion on system discontent; the challenge is to use the right set of 
indicators that allow us to examine trends in both the cases over the time period.
5.2 Testing the derived hypothesis
Inglehart's explanation for falling turnout is radical in political science terms because 
it is a clean break with the canonical works. His tabulation is a psychopolitical 
account of how estrangement from electoral democracy first appears, then 
strengthens and eventually yields a non-voter. To understand how Inglehart’s values- 
based explanation is markedly different to that offered by the established works, we 
note that models of turnout have consistently stressed the place of socio-economic 
factors. Since Lipset's Political Man (1960) onwards, most of the significant 
literature in the filed starts from this assumption. Standard treatments o f  political 
disaffection invariably take survey measures of confidence and trust in parties, 
politicians and institutions, and then correlate these findings with the electoral record
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through checking turnout 1 evels. T wo representative examples o f this strategy are 
Dalton's (1999) chapter Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies and 
Bentley, Jupp and Stedman Jones' paper Getting to grips with depoliticisation
(2000).78 The latter paper in particular departs from Inglehart's methodology, as it 
explicitly tries to link up attitudinal variations with actual political outcomes, namely 
turnout levels. Both works are broad-ranging, with the latter including party 
membership and participation rates in unconventional politics, thus illustrating if 
people are becoming depoliticised or are merely not voting. We have systematic data 
on turnout and party loyalty for both cases; however, the Demos paper suggests to us 
that there is more to measuring disaffection than merely tracking changes in  two 
indicators. Moreover, according to Reiter (1989), any analysis of disaffection is 
incomplete if we rely on only two independent variables. We thus extend the number 
of measures to give a better test of the hypothesis. From the full list of twelve 
indicators given by Reiter, five are fully applicable to both cases in terms of having 
systematic data available. Let us now outline the full set of indicators by which we 
test the hypothesis.
Closeness to a party acts as our first measure. The partisanship or party 
identification measure's merit lies not just in its ability to track any one party's 
fortunes, but also its capacity to act as a device calibrating the institution of party 
democracy itself (Weisberg and Grofman, 1981). As Inglehart proposes that voters 
are becoming more consumerist and less partisan, we look at volatility scores in both 
states as our second measure. Inglehart’s shift would have the logical outcome that 
as politics then retrenches itself and does not succeed in subsuming the concerns of
78 W ritten  fo r the U K  th in k  tank, Demos, www.dem os.eo.uk/depol.htm . Accessed N ovem ber 10,
2000.
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the voter, it becomes an ever more elite-driven pursuit. A sustained drop in party 
membership should have occurred over the course of the timeframe and is our third 
measure. Although Abramson and Inglehart (1994) do not specifically argue that this 
is a corollary of growing disaffection, it is a strong candidate for our third measure.
Our fourth indicator, turnout, is more complex than the rest. Inglehart and 
Abramson (1994) cite a paper by Crepaz (1990), which assesses how the presence or 
absence of a postmaterialist party affects turnout. Crepaz looks at turnout rates for 16 
industrial democracies from 1945-87 and shows that turnout rises when there is a 
postmaterialist party contesting an election. Specifically, ‘the presence of a 
postmaterialist party increases voter turnout by 13.45 per cent’ (op. cit. 196). His 
reasoning is as follows:
These ' new' parties o ffer m any individuals n ew opportunities for s elf- 
expression and therefore go to the polls for a cause they thought 
worthwhile: before, these individuals who were dissatisfied and 
disillusioned with the established 'old' parties only had the option of 
abstaining.
Crepaz, 1990:185.
One point worth underlining is that as both France and Ireland have 
proportional elections to a greater or lesser extent, one should expect higher turnouts 
than where simple plurality system elections are held. We refine the case made on 
the trends in our turnout by stipulating that turnout should actually have risen when 
new parties have contested the elections.
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We also check for trends in the number o f  purposely spoilt ballots cast at 
each election; these should be seen to have increased over time as discontentment 
grows. If the ballot is knowingly defaced, then this indicates that the 'voter' i s so 
disgruntled with the state of play that they are physically moved to attend the poll 
but opt for a plague on all the parties' houses (cf. Bréchon, 1995 and Reiter, 1989). 
Concerning spoilt ballots, one immediately visible (and possibly insuperable 
obstacle) in using this number as an indicator is that we have no reliable way of 
determining those that were purposefully versus accidentally spoilt. For the purpose 
of this test, let us assume that they are divided equally. If there is an increase in the 
number of spoiled ballots, then it follows that the number of deliberately defaced 
papers also rises. One is now in a position to check for any trend in this datum and it 
becomes our fifth indicator. We now look at how these indicators have fared over the 
course of the timeframe in Ireland and France.
5.3: France
5.3.1: Closeness to party
We have systematic data on closeness to party in France that come from the 
Eurobarometer (Table 5.1). France's party identification scores decline steadily from 
1978 through to 1994; this trend occurred for both types of partisans ('closely 
attached' and 'all attached plus sympathisers'; using the Eurobarometer data, the 
following emerges:
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Year France -
Closely
attached
France
-A ll .
EC 9 average 
- closely 
attached
E C  9 
average - 
A ll.
1978 28 69 37 68
1979 29 69 34 69
1980 19 59 32 66
1981 19 58 30 60
1982 20 59 30 62
1983 19 57 32 65
1984 18 57 30 64
1985 18 55 30 61
1986 18 58 28 59
1987 18 55 31 60
1988 24 64 31 63
1989 19 57 28 58
1990 17 52 27 57
1991 18 45 27 51
1992 16 52 29 57
1993 23 60 24 57
1994 18 56 28 60
Table 5.1: French partisanship versus the European Community average as collated 
in the Eurobarometer series, 1978-94. After Knapp and Wright, 2002: 117.
It is noteworthy that the level of attachment in France has always been below 
that of the (then) EC - 9 average. The table clearly shows that the low point of 
French partisanship is from 1980-7. In fact, only in 1988 and 1993 is the continuous 
decline arrested. The Bentley, Jupp, Stedman-Jones study cited earlier goes back and 
forward a little further (1975-96) than the Eurobarometer, 59 per cent identified with 
a party in 1975 but by 1996, only 45 per cent did so. Generally, then, the trend is as 
per Inglehart’s prediction. We draw on SOFRES data analysed by Knapp (Table 5.2) 
to bring us up to 2000. Excluding the widely-disliked Front National, more people 
generally thought all parties to be bad rather than good. The balance figures are as 
follows:
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Year Balance (bad 
over good).
1981 -6
1982 -8
1983 -10
1984 -14
1985 -17
1986 -8
1987 -9
1988 -7
1989 -9
1990 -15
1991 -18
1992 -20
1993 -15
1994 -15
1995 -9
Feb. 2000 -14
Table 5.2: The negative view o f French parties - time series data collated by 
SOFRES. After Knapp and Wright, 2002: 121.
Only the Socialists escape this judgement and then only intermittently, with a 
positive balance of public opinion from 1981-3 and again from 1986-91 (op. cit. 
119).
5.3.1.1: Summary o f the evidence on closeness to party
Evidently, parties are not popular in France - instead, they have provoked antipathy.
The fall-off in closeness to party has accelerated from 1990 onwards -  again, further
support for Inglehart’s claim that party loyalty is in decline. H2 is supported.
5.3.2: Volatility and fragmentation
In using the measure of volatility, we can better gauge if parties are indeed becoming
less p opular. This value a llows u s t o s e e i f t  otal 1 evels of p artisanship within t he 
system are low enough that all parties cannot rely on a core vote at successive 
elections. The main problems with assessing volatility in France are the two-ballot 
run-off system which, coupled with two first-order elections, certainly muddies the
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waters in comparison with Ireland. Additionally, long time series data on volatility in 
French elections are difficult to collect precisely because of the frequent eruptions on 
and disappearances of parties from the political scene. The standard measure would 
be to track changes in  the Total N et Volatility (TNV) figure over time. Grunberg 
(1985) cautions against this, arguing that the fluidity in French politics waters down 
the conclusions one can make with this information. He itemises 15 reasons why the 
TNV figure is thus not that instructive, this large number of reasons may be roughly 
categorised in to three main groups:
(a) The arrival and departure of individual parties. During the life of the 
Fourth Republic, two movements appeared that challenged the legitimacy 
of the regime itself. Further complications arise even recently, with the 
splits suffered by all of the three main parties.
(b) The mere fact the one regime gave way to another poses a problem -  
should o ne only include time series data from the lifespan o f the F ifth 
Republic?
(c) A decision to only measure volatility from the inception of the Fifth 
Republic must be tempered by the fact that direct election to the 
presidency became a feature from 1962 -  one thus has two separable 
datasets, referring to legislative and presidential elections respectively. 
One way of negotiating this problem is to see if the extant TNV scores 
are corroborated by the surface indicators of ‘novel’ election outcomes, 
where observers agree that a shift has occurred.
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Grunberg does not give any volatility figures at all; instead, he looks at vote 
swings across the right and the left79. To obtain the TNV values for both the 
legislative and presidential contests from 1958, we turn to Knapp (2002). Let us look 
at the legislative elections first in Table 5.3:
1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997
TNV - 8.8 1.2 5.3 6.4 1.1 12.0 12.0 6.5 19.8 12.7
Table 5.3: Total net volatility (TNV) in French legislative elections, 1958-1997.
Op cit. 112.
There is a clear rising trend, as Inglehart’s hypothesis predicts; mean 
volatility rises from 5.1 in the 1960s, to 7.05 in the 1970s; 10.1 in the 1980s, and 
16.25 in the 1990s. The point of departure may be best located in 1981, where for 
the first time in the Fifth Republic, the Socialists controlled both the presidency and 
parliament. An additional problem is the lack of panel data, which means that there 
is no accurate way of following an individual voter’s decisions across two or more 
separate elections. One way around this problem is provided by Subileau and Toinet 
(1984)80, who summarise the listes d'émargement (official checklists) of voters and 
abstainers over five ballots -  the 1979 European elections and two rounds each of 
the 1981 Presidential and Legislative elections. Forty-six per cent of voters abstained 
at least once and only eleven per cent of the sample voted at all five ballots, so 
Grunberg seems on steady ground in assuming that voting records must have varied 
substantially, boosting TNV. The relevant figures for 1981 are indeed the largest 
from the 1958-81 period. The record adds strong additional evidence to Inglehart’s 
hypothesis that parties are less able to retain loyalty.
79 This method is analogous to  that used b y  S innott (1995: 110) in  his referra l to the b lock  v o la tility  
measure to  chart changes across the C iv il W ar divide.
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For presidential elections, the evidence is more mixed. 1974 is the high water 
mark and it declines quite steadily since then. In its relationship to Inglehart’s case, 
one is obliged to note that the run-off system in this election skews the contest in 
favour of the candidates of established parties; in a two-player competition, volatility 
is less insightful than it is in a legislative election, where more parties can have 
candidates. For this reason, we look in Table 5.4 at the first round of the presidential 
contests, where one has more than two candidates.
Year TNV
1965 -
1969 29.4
1974 36.8
1981 17.5
1988 19.1
1995 11.0
Table 5.4: Total net volatility in the first ballot French presidential elections, 1965-
95. After Knapp, 2002:113.
We have no rising trend; in fact, we have the opposite. Inglehart’s hypothesis 
neatly fits in with the evidence of the legislative record, but not for the presidentials. 
However, it is reasonable to propose that TNV is a better measure in legislative 
elections due to the number of parties; therefore, the volatility indicator follows the 
trend predicted by Inglehart.
The figures for volatility suggest rising voter consumerism in that parties can 
rely less and 1 ess on large c ore v otes. A s Grunberg observes, fluctuations i n v ote 
share are due to increased fragmentation within the party system, affecting both first- 
order elections. With substantially more parties (itself a proxy indicator of volatility) 
competing for an electorate that is expanding at a slower rate, one consequence of
80 Cited in  G runberg (op. cit).
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this trend is that governments have been changed by smaller numbers of voters than 
in earlier decades. This is particularly valid for the period from 1993 to the present 
day in contrast to earlier. In 1993, the huge parliamentary majority of the Centre- 
Right was won with a smaller share of first ballot votes than that which those parties 
had held in 1981 when the Left massively defeated them. Furthermore, in 1995, the 
total vote share of centre-right candidates at the first ballot -  Chirac's winning 
coalition for the second ballot -  was significantly less than that for similar 
candidates in 1981, when Mitterrand had won for the Left. Even slight variations in 
vote numbers can bring about significant change - Bell and Criddle’s comment on 
the 2002 presidential election is insightful: ‘Here was an earthquake without 
movement: a slight rise in the vote for the extreme right and a fall in the Socialist 
vote combining to push Le Pen rather than Jospin into the second ballot...’ (2002: 
643). This trend could well serve as support for Inglehart’s hypothesis.
Increased party system fragmentation supports Inglehart’s hypothesis, and 
such a pattern seems to apply to the French legislative elections since 1993. In 2002, 
there was a 32 per cent increase in the number of small candidates (outside the 
established large parties) as against 1997 (Libération, July 19, 2002). Overall, the 
2002 legislatives had 20 per cent more candidates than 1997 and 45 per cent more 
candidates than 1993. If this were so, however, it is hard to explain why the 2002 
election produced such an effusion of candidates; why no secular increase from, say 
1978 or 1981? However, being fair to Inglehart, he could argue that the increased 
fragmentation is now gathering pace. Inglehart could point to the range of choices 
available in the 2002 presidential election as an illustration of the impact of PM81 
(Miguet, 2002:211).
81 In  the previous tw o elections, there were nine.
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However, such a reading neglects the more parsimonious explanation for 
candidate profusion provided by Cole (2002: 336), who attributes this increase to 
changes in campaign finance legislation which guarantees state subvention to any 
party that fields 50 candidates in at least 30 départements. This helps to account for 
why Chevènement, who signally failed in the 2002 presidential first round, went on 
to head a team of 408 candidates at the subsequent legislative elections. We can also 
add in the changes in legislation which reduced the number of signatures needed in 
order to stand for the office of president from 1974 on. One consequence of this was 
the entry into the race of candidates such as Laguiller, who are not allied to major 
parties and are unlikely to win through to the second round. As French parties are 
less able to retain voter loyalty, we may now examine if their ability to attract 
members has been similarly lessened.
5.3.2.1: Summary o f the evidence for volatility
Inglehart’s hypothesis is backed up by the TNV figures for the legislative contests, 
but not for the presidential elections. This mixed result is not damaging for 
Inglehart’s case, though, as TNV is more suited to multiparty elections than for 
presidential elections. H2 is supported.
5.3.3: Party membership
French party membership figures have been assessed in many diverse ways
(Billordo, 2003: 136) and are the source of much confusion, largely due to a practice 
of inflating membership rolls (op. cit., 140). In the past, they were typically
82
M igue t (2002: 216) reports that the campaign reform s o f  1988 resulted in  a 1.68 Euro payment 
per vote from  the state.
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exaggerated to suggest two things -  (i) that the party was indeed representative of 
French society and (ii) the larger numbers and resulting subscriptions served as an 
alternative and genuine source of otherwise illicit funds. Bearing in mind these 
caveats, let us try to ascertain a trend. In support of I nglehart’s model, there is a 
clearly accelerating fall-off, as Table 5.5 shows:
% in parties in 1990s 1960s to 1990s 1980s to 1990s
1.5 -0.7 -1.4
Table 5.5: Rate o f decline o f membership o f French parties; after Bentley, Jupp and
Stedman Jones (2000): 7.
On party membership, most scholars, Inglehart including, rely on the 
Members /  Electorate ratio, which allows one to see how successfully parties 
appealed to interested citizens over a long time period. There has been a 
considerable debate, though, about exactly how and when one should measure party 
membership; for the review on the figures for France, see Billordo (2003).
As we see in Table 5.6, the historical backdrop complicates things:
Year
Estimated
numbers M/E ratio
Late 1940s 1,675,000 6.7
Late 1950s 430,000 1.7
Early 1960s 498,500 1.8
Late 1960s 615,000 2.2
Early 1970s 724,000 2.4
Late 1970s 906,900 2.6
Early 1980s 792,500 2.8
Late 1980s 771.113 2.1
Early 1990s 578,500 1.5
Late 1990s 464,200 1.3
Table 5.6: Estimated party membership in France since 1945 in numbers and as a 
percentage o f the registered electorate; after Knapp, 2002: 121.
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The late 1940s figure is clearly the high point and supports Duverger’s 
(1951) claim that the ‘mass party’ would come to typify France as it would any 
wealthy western state. However, the figures for the rest of the time series indicate 
that far from setting precedent, the 1940s M / E value was the peak and a sudden 
collapse set in from which there has been no real recovery. Mitterrand’s 
professionalisation of the Socialists in the late 1 970s apart, it is apparent that the 
French have never been party foot soldiers. The trend from the early 1980s is 
downward, but Inglehart’s case depends on a linear decline: as the table shows, there 
are two peaks and an ascending period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. In 
itself, this time of growth is hardly such, as the rise in membership numbers starts 
from a very low base in the late 1950s. Knapp cites Cambadelis (op. cit. 122) who 
argues that the middle of the century was comprised of three great mobilising events 
for the French -  the Resistance; the Algerian crisis, and May 1968. As there has been 
nothing of this rank since, it follows that membership could not be expected to be as 
high as it was for these three periods. This conjectured explanation nonetheless 
misses the mark -  the M / E ratio and the raw numbers tell us that even these three 
‘mobilising events’ did not yield any mass influx in party numbers. They may well 
have politicised the French electorate and younger voters especially, but this did not 
translate into thicker registries of party members in the respective parties’ 
headquarters.
5.3.3.1: Summary o f  the evidence for party membership
Although Inglehart’s hypothesis is not built on solid longitudinal data which would
question the notion of a golden age for mass parties, the trend since the late 1970s is
discemibly downwards, and so H2 is supported.
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The litmus test of turnout levels examines if the French are increasingly 
disenchanted with electoral contests and also determines if both the legislative and 
presidential elections are equally affected. Inglehart's argument rests on the claim 
that old parties are not attractive to new voters. We see if the presence of new parties 
at elections has boosted turnout as per Inglehart’s model.
The Fifth Republic's turnout rates must of course be compared with those of 
the Third and Fourth Republics so that we may have some idea as to whether or not 
there has been a secular fall in participation. From 1885 right through to the end of 
the Fourth Republic, turnout rates never dipped below 71 per cent (Schain, 2003: 
237). Falling turnout affects France much like most other industrialised states. An 
additional and possibly key factor in explaining why lower turnout may well be a 
congenital problem for Fifth Republic Franee is the run-off system. I f  at the first 
round of a presidential election, a voter's preferred candidate is eliminated, then only 
three possible alternatives present themselves to this 'thwarted voter'83 - loyalty to 
the basic orientation (typically left or right), abstention or defection. This notion of 
understanding the thwarted voter gains importance when one notes that at the 1995 
presidential election, more than half of the tour décisifs voters had not voted for 
either of the combatants in the first round. From 1965-95, there is a mean of 40 per 
cent thwarted voters for the presidential elections. One could reasonably extrapolate 
that in 2002, this figure rose to 63 per cent, as Chirac (19. 9 per cent) and Le Pen 
(16.9 per cent) polled a combined total of 36.8 per cent between them.
What is required is longitudinal data which will enable us to see what 
happens to turnout at each election. Type of election is also pivotal (see context
83 This phrase and the theory originate from  Pierce's article o f the same name (in  press).
5.3.4: Turnout
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effects above). Although France has two first-order elections, the presidential contest 
has traditionally been viewed by politicians, academics and voters as being more 
important. As Chiche and Dupoirier put it, ‘Celui-ci pose comme première règle que 
le degré de mobilisation électorale dépend de l'importance attachée par les électeurs 
aux différents types de consultation. ’ (1998: 142). Turnout has invariably been 
higher for the presidential contest.
Subileau (2002) tabulates the rate of abstention for all legislative and 
presidential elections since the inception of the Fifth Republic; let us first look in 
Table 5.7 at the presidential record.
First round Second round
1965 15% 16%
1969 22% 31%
1974 17% 13%
1981 19% 14%
1988 19% 16%
1995 22% 19%
2002 28% 19%
Table 5.7: Abstention rates fo r  the first and second round o f the French Presidential
elections; after Subileau, 2002: 11.
Given the considerable level of debate about the declining legitimacy of 
French elections, we note the existence of a dual institutional approach to 
understanding turnout variations in France which has nothing to do with PM -  the 
model consists of (aj context and (b) conjuncture effects (Subileau, 2002: 10). These 
may be invoked to explain the low tallies of the second round of the 1969 and the 
first round of the 2002 presidential elections. The context model predicts that turnout 
drops when there is no run-off between a right and a left candidate. In 1969, there 
was no leftist candidate and the predicted winner, Georges Pompidou, was
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challenged by another right-of-centre politician, Alain Poher. Not surprisingly, the 
Communists lamented this run-off and urged its voters not to choose between bonnet 
blanc et blanc bonnet,84 The only other presidential tour décisif where there was no 
left / right contest was 2002, where Chirac faced the FN's Le Pen. Vote 
fragmentation, low turnout and weak appeal resulted in Chirac becoming President 
with the lowest number of first round preferences recorded (Miguet, 2002: 210). For 
the 2002 presidential election, a Louis Harris pre-election poll found that a 
remarkable 74 per cent of respondents thought the programmes of Chirac and Jospin 
to be similar (Cole, 2002: 320). A British variation of the context model is provided 
by Pattie and Johnston (2002), whose analysis of turnout in Britain found that if 
competitors present similar programmes, turnout will be lower.
Both the 1969 and 2002 elections are thus theoretically amenable to an 
analysis grounded in the context effect, but the higher turnout of the 2002 election is 
at odds with the model, due to the formation of an anti-Le Pen movement. 
Abstainers were in fact the largest group of the first round (at 28 per cent of 
registered voters). Abstention on the second round is much lower in this case, largely 
because the PS, other components of the gauche plurielle and a majority of France’s 
civic society (including third sector spokespeople, sports stars, musicians, trade 
unionists and media figures) came out strongly against the idea of a far-right 
candidate gaining a chance to win the Elysée. In the face of this 'legitimacy crisis' for 
the political system, Chirac won by the largest margin of any Fifth Republic 
election. If conjuncture effects apply, then value change in no way relates to falling 
turnout. Instead, more parsimonious reasons such as electoral fatigue or the timing of 
an individual election are invoked. In the French case, the sequence of the
14 Colloqu ia l expression, meaning "tweedledum and tweedledee".
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presidential and parliamentary elections is deemed to be influential. If the 
presidential contest precedes the legislative one, then one sees from the depressed 
turnout in the latter that voters view the decisive election to have occurred. In this 
sense, the case put forward is that the legislative contest becomes something of a 
second-order election. (Cole, 2002: 320). These are competing claims to Inglehart’s 
model, but again, all Inglehart’s hypothesis needs is for the trends to go in his 
direction, which, as we have seen, is true in both the legislative and presidential 
series.
Table 5.8 demonstrates that the record for the legislative elections indicates a 
rise in apathy that, on one level, is supportive of Inglehart’s hypothesis:
1958 23% 1981 29%
1962 31% 1986 21%
1967 19% 1988 34%
1968 20% 1993 31%
1973 19% 1997 31%
1978 17% 2002 36%
Table 5.8: Fifth Republic first round abstention rates fo r  the Assemblée Nationale
elections; after Subileau (op. cit.).
The 1980s s eems t o mark a n ew higher 1 evel o f abstention ( Schain, 2 003 : 
237) and so serves to bolster the case for accepting the hypothesis. There is a strong 
‘second-half trend, with this rising abstention a feature right through to 2002, where 
the elections saw the highest level of abstention since the inception of the Fifth 
Republic. The three previous elections all had abstention rates in excess of 30 per 
cent. The note of caution is that turnout has still fallen in spite of the presence of 
postmaterialist parties, such as the Greens. Crepaz (op. cit) found that where such 
parties contested elections, turnout rose. This pattern does not fit France, where the
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advent of parties from outside of the main established blocs has not boosted turnout. 
So Inglehart’s explanation that falling turnout is due to a lack o f choice for new 
voters does not seem a well-grounded one. H2 is not supported.
5.3.4.2: Summary o f the evidence for turnout
The trends in both the legislative and presidential elections support Inglehart’s 
hypothesis of increasing decline but contradict his accompanying argument that new 
politics parties can arrest drops in turnout. As for the demographic profile of those 
more likely to abstain, the hypothesis is confirmed by the data on age -  young 
people are less likely to vote. Due to the lack of clarity on whether recent elections 
should be accompanied by higher or lower turnout, however, H2 is not supported.
5.3.5: Spoilt ballots
Inglehart argues that voters turn away from electoral politics when they are 
confronted with what they view effectively as Hobson's choice. Let us assume that 
the ratio of accidentally to deliberately spoilt ballots is constant over time; if this is 
true, then any notable rise in the figures indicates a rise in the number of the latter 
category and thus is suggestive of rising disaffection. There is one large obstacle -  
the percentages of spoiled ballots are only ever a fraction of the total, and so it is 
wrong to expect very visible deviations. Instead, we should attend to fluctuations in 
the order of a half or less.
There is an established corpus of work on spoiled ballots in France. Bréchon 
(1995) invokes the well-worn explanation that they go hand-in-hand with abstention 
per se. Noting that the percentage ratio of spoiled votes is typically higher in rural 
départements, he states that social pressure to vote is higher in these less anonymous
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communities. Faced with a lack of what they perceive to be an effective choice, 
these 'constrained' voters spoil their ballots: 'Selon les terroirs, on préférera 
manifester son incapacité à choisir ou son opposition politique de manière passive 
(en s'abstenant) ou par une attitude civique (par un vote blanc et nul). ' (op, cit. 37). 
In this, he is supported by Subileau (2002) ‘...d'autrepart, le contrôle social sur les 
comportments électoraux y  est moindre que celui qui existe dans les groupes d'inter- 
connaissance où le vote blanc et nul peut exprimer quelquefois une abstention 
contrainte. ’ (op. cit. 8).
In the 1995 presidential second ballot, spoiled votes reached a Fifth Republic 
record tally of six per cent. We again present separately the data for the legislative 
(Table 5.10) and presidential (Table 5.11) elections; Bréchon contends that it is 
impossible to calculate exactly what proportion of votes are deliberately spoiled, but 
that an average level of approximately two per cent pertains:
1958 2.0 1981 1.0
1962 2.1 1986 3.4
1967 1.9 1988 1.4
1968 1.4 1993 3.7
1973 1.8 1997 3.4
1978 1.6 2002 4.3
Table 5.9: Spoiled ballots as a percentage o f  votes cast at the first round o f 
legislative elections in the Fifth Republic; after Knapp, 2002: 112 and 
http://www. assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats. asp85
The 1986 figure marks a new trend, with a tally of 3.4 per cent; this drops to
1.4 per cent two years later only to rise above the average in 1993 and in 1997. The
presidential data are of the same order (Table 5.11):
85 Accessed 23 M ay, 2004.
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1965 0.9
1969 1.0
1974 0.8
1981 1.3
1988 1.6
1995 2.2
2002 2.4
Table 5.10: Spoiled ballots as a percentage o f votes cast at the first round o f 
presidential elections in the Fifth Republic; after Knapp, 2002: 113; and Bell and
Criddle, 2002: 651
For the presidential contests, 1995 and 2002 have the highest percentage of 
spoiled ballots, with figures above two per cent. There is a continuous rising trend 
from 1974 onwards. Second-round spoiled ballots are an informative statistic in the 
case of the presidential elections also. We saw earlier that Subileau (2002) affirms 
that frustrated voters may well heed their party's message not to vote for either of the 
second round candidates. This interpretation certainly seems to hold for 1969, where 
the spoiled ballot figure grows from one per cent to four-and-a-half per cent (Cole 
and Campbell, 1989: 106) when voters were faced with two centre-right candidates. 
A similarly high percentage (4.3 per cent) spoiled their votes at the second round of 
the 2002 presidential election, a clear case of thwarted voters venting their 
frustration at having to choose between what many viewed as unpalatable choices.86 
The impact of both Besancenot and Laguiller not advising their supporters to vote 
for Chirac at the second round is in all likelihood unknowable, as neither polled 
substantially in the first round, but still finished in the top half of the poll. The 
loyalty of their voters has not been ascertained.
5.3.5.1: Summary o f the evidence for spoilt ballots
86 Both Le Pen and Chirac came in  fo r m uch personal critic ism  during the campaign, w ith  newspapers 
reporting that m any voters believed accusations that Chirac had m isappropriated funds as leader o f 
the G aullists and as M ayor o f  Paris.
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From the 1980s onwards, there is a higher level of spoilt ballots at both contests; this 
is supportive of Inglehart’s hypothesis. For the presidential elections, there has been 
an increase in the percentage of spoilt ballots at every election since 1974. For the 
legislatives, the increase is both sharper and more recent, beginning to rise markedly 
from 1993 onwards. H2 is supported.
5.3.6: Overall summary of the data for France
On four of the five indicators -  closeness to party, electoral volatility, party 
membership, and spoilt ballots -  Inglehart’s hypothesis is supported. This amounts 
to an impressive sweep of support for his argument of a secular rise in electoral 
disaffection. There is large question mark against turnout, where Inglehart’s case is 
ambiguous. Firstly, Inglehart has argued that turnout will continue to fall where old 
parties are left to themselves and, by extension, that that it will rise when new parties 
serve to increase the range of options to the new voter. Contemporary French 
elections show that this is not the case -  turnout has continued to fall. Inglehart is not 
sufficiently specific on this basic issue, and so we do not accept that PM predicts 
turnout in France.
Precisely because four of the five indicators follow the direction predicted by 
Inglehart’s model, we accept H2 for France.
87 Fringe le ft-w in g  candidates who polled a to ta l o f  ten per cent between them.
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5.4.1: Closeness to party
To begin on a cautious note, Sinnott (1995: 149-50)88 comments on a lack of directly 
relevant data that are needed in order to assess where Ireland falls regarding 
de/realignment. This applies to partisanship as much as it does to the other measures 
of volatility, turnout, spoilt ballots and party membership. The comparative 
weakness of attachment in Ireland was noted in Inglehart and Klingemann's analysis 
of partisanship in the EC-9 in 1973; where Ireland came bottom of the table for 
levels of same. Schmitt (1988) comments on elections up to the 1987 and notes that 
if dealignment was to be found anywhere in the EC, it was in Ireland, with a 60 per 
cent level of identification in the mid-1970s dropping to 40 per cent by the mid- to 
late 1980s. Most interestingly for the purposes of this thesis, Mair and Marsh (1999) 
report that the decline in party attachment features in all age groups. One possible fly 
in the ointment is the inconsistency of question format - in its deployment in Ireland, 
four different types of question purporting to interrogate attachment have been used.
A study of 19 industrialised democracies places Ireland joint sixth from 
bottom in terms of party identification. In reference to the weakening of affections of 
strong identifiers, then Ireland is part of a near-ubiquitous trend89 (Dalton, 1999: 
166). However, the drop in Ireland's values is the largest of all over the time period 
of the survey,90 from 61 per cent of respondents being classified as ‘identifiers’ in 
1978, to 30 per cent in 1996.
The most recent data concur with the above. In Table 5.12, we reproduce the 
Eurobarometer figures, which cover the period from 1978 to 1994, and add the
88 M uch o f  th is  section draws on Sinnott's comprehensive (1995) account o f  vo ting  behaviour in 
Ireland.
89 O n ly  B e lg ium  is exempt.
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update provided by Marsh (2003: 26), which includes the 1999 European Election 
Study and the 2002 Irish Election Study:
Year % ‘very 
close’
% ‘fairly 
close ’
% ‘merely a 
sympathiser '
% ‘Not close 
at all’
1978 13.7 28.7 22.1 35.5
1979 9.6 26.3 26.6 37.5
1980 9.0 26.4 25.9 38.6
1981 8.7 23.4 28.3 39.7
1982 8.0 21.4 24.2 46.4
1983 7.5 22.3 23.8 46.4
1984 5.7 19.5 22.3 52.6
1985 7.8 18.9 21.0 52.3
1986 4.8 17.6 20.4 57.2
1987 7.7 19.1 17.9 55.3
1988 6.1 19.0 20.1 54.7
1989 6.0 16.4 18.8 58.8
1990 8.0 19.3 13.1 59.6
1991 8.0 15.3 11.9 64.8
1992 7.2 17.1 12.0 63.7
1993 6.3 14.6 15.5 63.6
1994 5.7 18.2 15.5 60.7
1999 10.7 13.2 5.2 70.8
2002 8.6 14.2 2.2 73.9
Table 5.11: A longitudinal summary o f trends in party identification in Ireland, 
1978-2202; after Marsh (2003: 26).
In the absence of an Irish National Election Study series, one unfortunately 
only has systematic data up until 1994. The year-by-year breakdown shows that 
1991 was a low-point, with some slight pick-up in the remaining three years. A 
European Elections study (1999) reveals a renewal of a sharp downturn. The trend 
for 'very strong' identifiers matches the overall magnitude of decline but starts off 
with a swift and sudden drop from 1978-9; the 1986 figure is the joint lowest, along 
with the 1999 European elections findings (Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 221). The 
strongest support for Inglehart’s hypothesis is on the column furthest to the right -
90 One should take note that there are d iffe rent starting points fo r some nations in  th is study.
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there is a steady and uninterrupted growth in the percentage of people who classify 
themselves as ‘not very close at all’.
5.4.1.1: Summary o f the evidence for closeness to party
Although there is no demographic profile suggesting that people who fit the
postmaterialist description are more likely to feel alienated from parties, it is
apparent that the distance between parties and the electorate has grown. H2 is
supported.
5.4.2: Volatility and fragmentation
Superficially, increased Irish electoral volatility would appear to be a probable 
correlate of PM, as it seems to dovetail with the timeframe of new politics. 2002 was 
the first election since 1969, ten ballots in all, that an outgoing administration was 
returned to power. Additionally, the vote share of the two main parties has 
decreased, indicating increased party competition and thus both opportunity and 
motive for vote switching. As recently as 1982, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail polled 84 
per cent of the vote between them; 20 years later and they could only muster a 
fraction less than 64 per cent jointly (Nealon’s Guides, various election years). More 
scientific work is of course required.
Sinnott (1995: 110) recommends that one should also invoke the concept of 
block volatility when chronologically comparing Irish elections. This form of 
volatility involves vote switching across the bifurcation of an established cleavage 
and was coined by Bartolini and Mair (1990). However, for reasons of 
comparability, the Pedersen Index is used.
The longitudinal data do not back up Inglehart’s hypothesis. Marsh (1985: 
178) tells us that there is a decline in net volatility in the final third of the last
century as picked up by the Pedersen Index: ‘At five of the six elections between 
1948 and 1965 net volatility was higher than at any of the six subsequent elections’. 
Acknowledging that the three elections of 1973, 1977 and 1981 exhibit an upswing 
that is not carried on by the two 1982 elections, it is apparent that turbulent elections 
are not a peculiarly contemporary aspect of Irish politics. Multiple time-point series 
data show a 70 per cent-plus level of voting consistency and the little vote switching 
that does take place has ‘...predominantly been between (sic) the three major 
parties’ (ibid: 179). So convinced was Marsh by this impression of muted volatility 
based on both the ballot and survey records that he writes that instead we should 
discuss the ‘considerable stability’ of Irish voting patterns up until the mid-1980s
We now examine the pattern of electoral volatility in Ireland from the 1969 
to 2002 elections. Table 5.13 contains the figures.
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 Feb.
1982
Nov.
1982
1987 1989 1992 1997
8.2 9.0 2.4 3.0 6.9 7.5 4.0 2.8 11.1 7.0 13.0 9.0
Table 5.12: Percentage volatility in Irish general elections, 1961-1997; after 
Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 219.
The 1977 election is marked by a sharp upward swing; 1977 was the first 
election since 1932 that Fianna Fail registered two consecutive gains in vote take 
(Chubb, 1977: 129). The 1981 election, where Fine Gael scored a notable success, is 
also accompanied by an upswing in volatility. There is a large rise in comparing the 
two elections of November 1982 and 1987, then an accentuated fall in 1989 followed 
by another large increase in 1992 only to be succeeded by yet another drop. This 
concertina-like unfolding of volatility makes it difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions, but the recent pattern is as per Inglehart’s predictions, In Table 5.14, we
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note that the averages for the decades show that volatility for each election has risen 
from the 1980s to the 1990s:
1960s 6.5
1970s 4.9
1980s 4.4
1990s 11
Table 5.13: Mean electoral volatility fo r each decade from the 1960s-1990s; based
on Murphy and Farrell, idem.
Unfortunately, the 2002 figures for volatility were unavailable at the time of 
writing. One adjunct to the measure of volatility is the leakage figure; this sums up 
how effective a party is in keeping transfers within its ranks. In Table 5.15, we focus 
on the last two elections as this gives us some insight into how volatility has 
unfolded up to 2002. The more reliable data are for the big three parties, as the 
smaller parties do not run enough candidates for a transfer datum to make sense.
Party % to own 
party
+ /  -from  
1997
FF 62.70 -0.43
FG 63.02 -1.44
Lab. 49.43 +1.34
Table 5.14: Leakage figures for the three largest Irish parties at the 2002 election. 
From Nealon’s Guide to the 29‘ Dail.
The numbers for 1997 and 2002 are near-identical for the big three (FF, FG 
and Labour). This suggests that volatility may well have settled at a plateau.
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H2 is only partially supported, as the longitudinal record tells us that volatility has 
actually lessened in the final third o f the last century. Additionally, the downward 
trend is only apparent when comparing the 1980s to the 1990s, and not for any 
earlier pairing.
5.4.3: Party membership
Kavanagh (2002: 53) includes a comment from an interview that parties are 
increasingly m uch 1 ess able to  re ly  on  members to engage in canvassing. This i s 
linked by the interviewee to a lack o f  coverage o f  and visibility in a constituency and 
depresses turnout. Members o f  parties are also described as being much less willing 
to volunteer to put up posters and stuff envelopes, small but essential acts in winning 
voter attention.
Similar to France, party membership figures are notoriously unreliable 
(Murphy and Farrell, 2002). In  the Irish case, the inveterate la ck  o f  a centralised 
register ensured that any head count was an estimate at best, while the ‘paper 
branches’ phenomenon resulted in wildly inflated numbers that only seemed to be 
important in intraparty decision-making processes.91 Changes in the party roll 
numbers in the Irish case are at times untraceable. Party HQ - dictated revisions to 
branch structures can reduce the incidence o f  paper and dormant branches, while any 
increases seem to correspond with an electorally-successful, newly combative party.
A s in France, Irish parties will also massage figures to present an image o f  a 
party that adequately reflects the demographics o f  its society and to testify to their 
ability to energise people to band together to aid the cause
5.4.2.1: Summary o f  the evidence fo r  volatility
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Bentley, Jupp and Stedman-Jones’s overview (op. cit.) o f  democratic 
legitimacy shows across-the-board falls in the members / electorate (M / E) 
percentage ratios in 12 EU states and in the US. The M  / E ratio is the more 
comparable measure over simple head count, as it at least parallels fluctuations in the 
size o f  the electoral register. Ireland’s M  / E ratio value is mid-ranking, with an 
approximate attrition o f  30 per cent during the time period. This decline in the 
1980s-1990s is the explanandum, not the low absolute level o f  membership. As 
adduced above, systematic membership details are rare for Irish parties and even 
more so prior to the 1980s. W e thus have corroboration for Inglehart’ s prediction 
that parties will lose some o f their prominence in contemporary politics.
Ireland’ s figures lack the longitudinal aspect applicable to the other states -  
reliable data only obtain for the 1980s -  1990s. Going back earlier than the 1980s, 
we have a problem in both the availability and reliability o f  data. The information 
from centrally-maintained registers goes as far back as 1976 but not for all parties -  
note that ten years’ worth o f  figure for Fianna Fáil are unavailable, while presumably 
an eagerness to avoid the prospect o f  state surveillance induced the Workers Party to 
obviate keeping a central list. In Table 5.16, we have figures on party membership 
that span 13 years:
91 This usually has its effect in an influx of new members who are allowed to nominate delegates with 
voting powers. It is a practice used to wield influence on behalf of the party candidate.
Year M/E (%)
1986 5.65
1987 5.65
1988 5.52
1989 5.40
1990 4.57
1991 4.55
1992 4.62
1993 4.52
1994 4.43
1995 3.99
1996 3.76
1997 3.79
1998 3.49
Table 5.15: Irish party membership measured using the M/E ratio, 1986- 
1998. After Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 225.
Some individual party figures from which this table is drawn up require 
comment and elucidation. Fianna Fail reports a gain o f  9,000 members, or in excess 
o f  eleven per cent in one year alone, from 1986-7, the year o f  an election build-up 
and campaign proper. Were the PDs in error when they recorded 7,000 members in 
1997 and then a near-halving to 4,000 just one year later? Fine G ael’s membership 
high o f  1979-1981 is contemporaneous with their best electoral performance since 
1922: a neat symbiosis between membership effort, canvassing and appeal o f 
membership to interested voters. Regarding Democratic Left, there is no agreed 
figure on how many o f  the 1,400 members listed as o f  1997 transferred to Labour in 
1999: any increase in Labour numbers is thus attributable to merger rather than 
increased party appeal.
Overall, absolute party membership numbers drop for ten years out o f 
thirteen (only 1991, 1992 and 1997 are exempt), matching the overall trend for the 
M  / E ratios. Admittedly there are two increases in the latter here, but as they are
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only 0.07 and 0.03 per cent respectively, they certainly cannot be construed as proof 
o f  bucking the trend. On this evidence, a decline is unequivocal.
5.4.3.1: Summary for party membership
Notwithstanding the lack o f  systematic sources needed for a longitudinal view, the 
trend is slightly downward for every year, and is thus supportive o f  H2.
5.4.4: Turnout
In proportional systems, the classical reasoning is to expect higher turnout compared 
with majority systems as a voter's choice is more resonant - vote wastage in one- 
horse race constituencies is considerably less likely. Norris' (1997) comparative 
overview o f average turnout as a function o f  electoral system is reproduced in Table 
5.17; it registers this effect quite tangibly:
Majoritarian 65.4%
Semi-proportional 71.2%
Proportional 75.7%
Table 5.16: Mean turnout levels as a function of different electoral systems; 
after Norris, 1997: 9.
Interestingly, unlike France, the academic work on Ireland gives figures on 
turnout rather than abstention -  for the reader, the result is still the same.
Sinnott (1995: 84) covers all elections from 1922 to 1992. Putting some flesh 
on the bones, we see that the 1933 turnout figure o f  81 per cent was the peak - in 
1937, there was a five per cent drop and from then on, turnout never exceeded 77 per 
cent. The 1944 and 1948 elections had lower turnouts than for any contest from 1969
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to 1989.92 The figures on turnout for the 12 elections from 1961-2002 are given in 
Table 5.18:
Election year Percentage o f  
those registered
1961 70.6%
1965 75.1%
1969 76.93%
1973 76.61%
1977 76.31%
1981 76.2%
Feb. 1982 73.81%
Nov. 1982 72.86%
1987 73.33%
1989 68.51%
1992 68.49%
1997 65.92%
2 0 0 2 62.73%
Table 5.17: Turnout variations in Irish general elections, 1961-2002. After Nealon's 
Guide to the 29th Dail and Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 219.
The figures from 1969 up to 1982 are broadly in line with the mean predicted 
by Norris (op. cit). Inglehart's postmaterialist trend is end-loaded. The usefulness o f 
baseline turnout measures may be gauged from the following. Turnout from 1969-77 
is higher than for 1961-5, and only from then on is the general trend slightly 
downwards. Notwithstanding, 1989 onwards would seem to herald a new period o f 
substantially reduced turnout. From this election, Ireland's turnout record fares 
compares unfavourably: its fall o f  10 per cent from 1989-2002 is twice that half 
times that o f  the European average (O ’Malley, 2001: 215). Even allowing for 
inadequacies in the keeping o f  the electoral register (removing the deceased and 
emigrants, for example) there is still a loss. Both official turnout and estimated
92 Sinnott does comment that the wartime rationing of fuel and newsprint, and the fact of censorship 
depressed turnout; he could have added that the lack of any viable political alternatives in the face of 
the war and rationing surely detracted from the motivation to go to the polls.
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turnout93 decline. This pattern again supports Inglehart's case on one level - there is a 
process o f  voter disaffection that manifests itself in the last third o f  the period 
studied, but one should note that this does not amount to a secular collapse in turnout 
over the whole time span under investigation. However, as with France, i f  Crepaz 
(1990) is correct, then as the number o f  parties increases, so should turnout. As 
Crepaz’s w ork  is  a c orollary to Inglehart’ s m odel, w e  are thus able to j udge that 
Inglehart is wrong in proposing that as more new parties appear, turnout will rise. 
The emergence o f the PDs, the Greens and Sinn Fein in the past 15 years o f Irish 
elections are the new inputs, while the migration o f  the biggest part Workers' Party 
to become Democratic Left may act as both a new input and its eventual 
disappearance (after the merger o f  Democratic Left with Labour in 1999). The 
impact o f  the Greens is thus most relevant as they are clearly postmaterialist 
(Inglehart, 1984) and have contested all four elections from 1989-2002. Turnout has 
fallen, not risen -  new politics parties have not succeeded in arresting turnout 
decline, let alone boost it.
A  rival explanation which has some applicability to Ireland may be found in 
a reading o f  Pattie and Johnston (2001); their point, in turn, approximates Subileau’s 
(2002) account o f context-based turnout predictions. They argue that the specific set 
o f  circumstances accompanying each election serves to explain much variance in 
falling turnout. Pattie and Johnston propose that the closeness o f  electoral 
competition i s a good indicator o f  h ow  high abstention w ill be. The Irish general 
election o f  2002 is a graphic illustration o f this - Fine Gael as main opposition party 
was not in a position to offer an alternative administration to the Irish electorate and 
so voters were left with little prospect o f  a change in power. The result was the
93 Based on electoral register anomalies as above which mean that 107 per cent of the eligible 
population was on the register.
lowest turnout in the history o f  the state. Understanding why the third election in the 
18-month period o f  February 1981-November 1982 also produced a markedly low 
turnout, one may reasonably propose electoral fatigue as the overriding explanation, 
not value change. The 1989 election set the new lower mark for turnout in Ireland 
and one may view  this as the outcome o f  voters not being persuaded to vote by 
Haughey's peremptory (as it was viewed at the time) decision to call another general 
election, only two years into his term o f office. This, then, is tangential to a secular 
‘ generational replacement’ explanation o f  turnout decline. On balance, as the recent 
trend o f  new parties has not boosted turnout, H2 is not supported.
5.4.4.2: Summary o f  turnout
H2 is not supported. N ew  parties have not boosted turnout and, in contrast to 
Inglehart’s notion o f  values-driven disaffection, it is the poor and less educated who 
are consistently less likely to vote.
5.4.5: Spoilt ballots
The figures for elections from 1969 to 2002 are given in Table 5.19. The numbers 
are indeed small, so the reader cannot detect changes o f  any large magnitude. 
However, we again should look for fluctuations in the range o f  a 50-200 per cent o f 
the baseline figures:
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1969 1 .2 %
1973 1.17%
1977 0.85%
1981 0.93%
Feb. 1982 0 .8 6 %
Nov. 1982 0.74%
1987 0.91%
1989 1.24%
1992 1.51%
1997 1 %
2002 1.08%
Table 5.18: Percentage of spoiled ballots in eleven general elections; after various
Nealon's Guides.
It is apparent that there is no trend, apart from a four-election increase over 
the period 1982-1992, but this fades away in the last two elections. The two most 
recent elections have a lower spoiled ballot percentage than the two earliest ones. No 
definitive conclusions can be drawn, which impairs Inglehart's case that there should 
be swelling numbers o f disaffected voters.
5.4.5.1: Summary o f spoilt ballots.
This indicator does not follow  Inglehart’ s prediction, and so H2 is not supported.
5.4.6: Overall summary of the evidence for Ireland
On two o f  the five indicators, we find that Inglehart’ s hypothesis is supported, while 
it is partly supported on a third. Absolute figures on partisan attachment, irrespective 
o f  what question is asked, indicate that the claim o f a drop in party loyalty holds. 
The volatility figures do not equate to a progressive decline; leakage figures suggest 
a steady state over the past two elections, indicating that the erosion o f  attachment 
may w ell have gone as far as it is likely to do. There is incontrovertible evidence o f a 
fall-off in party members, one that has accelerated as time has gone on, leading us to
187
accept this indicator as supportive o f Inglehart’ s hypothesis. The hypothesis is not 
supported on turnout - there is a negative trend in from 1989 onwards, suggesting 
that new parties are not the missing ingredient in enticing voters to the polls. Spoiled 
ballots a re n ot a c ritical i ndicator i n d eciding w  hether t o a ccept H 2, a s they h ave 
maintained a consistent level since they were systematically documented. On 
balance, then, H2 is supported.
5.5: Conclusion
Inglehart’s model is impressively accurate on the general question o f  growing 
disaffection. Leaving to one side his inadequate operationalisation o f  how we can 
measure this, we have seen that the hypothesis is confirmed. Even on indicators that 
Inglehart does not detail, such as the number o f spoiled ballots and the MJ E ratio, 
we have seen that Inglehart’ s predicted trends are in the right direction. The sharp 
falls in partisan attachment make this the strongest evidence for his hypothesis. It is 
apparent that there is a growing bloc o f  floating voters who decide elections on a 
more short-term basis than party identification. Decline in party membership is in 
some ways a red herring - it has never been particularly high in either state, but it is 
clear that there has been a fall-off within the past 15 years.
The quibble remains as to his view o f turnout. Firstly, his argument is 
lopsided -  turnout is falling because new parties are not contesting elections, but he 
does not point to cases where new parties have merged and turnout has still dropped. 
W e have found this latter pattern applies to France and Ireland. The context and 
conjuncture models do not explain a prolonged series o f elections in France, but are 
still useful in understanding the 1969 presidential and both the 2002 presidential and 
legislative elections. Pattie and Johnston’ s related account o f  British turnout patterns
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is quite useful for explaining the four elections -  the two in 1982; 1989, and 2002, 
and so cannot be immediately dismissed. Thirdly, there is his neglect o f  the 
longitudinal record; Time One-Time Two data for the period in question are 
insufficient grounds for making a case. This problem also hampers how his theory 
applies to class voting.
Inglehart’ s work in arguing his case is not carried out by him, though. A ll he 
supplies is the evidence from the Eurobarometer on levels o f attachment. Missing 
from the equation is the behavioural correlate o f  the surveyed attitude, namely, vote- 
switching data. W e have had to supply additional information in the shape o f 
established indicators that surprisingly, Inglehart does not use. A s a result, his own 
works on electoral disaffection are reliant on attitudinal measures.
Overall, the large parties in both states have proven increasingly less able to 
maintain their dominant positions; volatility has risen and vote fragmentation has fed 
and is fed by an increasing number o f  candidates. This is particularly true for recent 
French presidential elections. The survey work o f  Inglehart is used by many 
scholars, most notably Dalton (cf. 1999), to explain the growing levels o f 
disaffection in wealthy democracies.
In this chapter, we have looked for specific evidence o f  the general claim that 
electoral discontentment is rising. W e have looked at party, survey, and electoral 
data and found that H2 is supported, but not on perhaps the key indicator, turnout. 
How established parties have responded to this disaffection and whether new parties 
have emerged to profit from it is now examined in Chapter Six.
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Chapter 6: New Parties
Introduction
Whereas Chapters Four and Five have the voter as the dependent variable, this 
chapter takes parties as the dependent variable. It tracks new politics developments 
as they affect parties, examining their origins, policies and electoral performances.
Inglehart’s model is dependent on both structural and attitudinal change. It 
assumes that with the decline o f  the monolithic working class, materialist politics 
becomes less relevant; in Chapter Five, we looked at the evidence o f  a rise in the 
various indicators o f  disaffection. Inglehart argues that the positive evidence backs 
his claim that old politics is losing its position. In response to the new priorities o f 
lifestyle politics, Inglehart proposes that new parties w ill emerge. He is not clear as 
to the exact sequence o f  these changes and how dependent they are on each other. 
We do not find in his writings, for example, any claim that the Alford Index must 
drop to such a level or turnout must fall below a threshold before new parties will 
gain in prominence. Instead, there is a general argument that lifestyle politics will 
gain a greater foothold in contemporary politics. I f  Inglehart is correct, we would 
expect to have witnessed the emergence o f  some new parties.
Nor does Inglehart write precisely on what types o f  new parties will emerge. 
In the works cited above, Inglehart traces the emergence o f  the Greens and a new left 
and new right. In this chapter, we are only concerned with the new left and the 
Greens -  the new right is discounted for reasons given in 6.1 and 6.2.
This chapter aims to see i f  new parties have come to the fore that have 
articulated lifestyle issues and whether they amount to some form o f a realignment. 
The chapter is structured in five parts. In Part One, we look at Inglehart’ s main
claims. Part Two is concerned with how we may operationalise his arguments. The 
evidence for France and Ireland is presented in Parts Three and Four respectively, 
while in Part Five, we conclude that Inglehart’s hypothesis is not supported.
6.1: Inglehart’s main claims
Inglehart’s fullest accounts o f how these parties appear are found in The Silent 
Revolution (1977); The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western 
Society (1984); and Neo-Conservatism, and Value Change in the USA (with 
Minkenberg, 1989). His co-authored paper Economic Security and Value Change 
(Inglehart and Abramson, 1994) offers a very concise summary o f  the combined 
party system changes (ibid. 336). However, it is the 1984 paper that allows for the 
clearest testing o f  hypotheses that have a bearing on party systems; the rest are, in 
the main, preoccupied with tracking value change in the independent variable (the 
electorate). Additionally, we can discount the 1989 paper as it is concerned with the 
‘new right’ , a topic which we rule out o f this chapter (see section 6.3, this chapter). 
Although Inglehart does comment on the form  o f the new right and the thinking 
behind it (Inglehart and Minkenberg, 1989), he is at times bafflingly unclear as to 
whether or not ‘new right’ refers to old established parties who reinvent themselves 
after a period in opposition (Inglehart and Minkenberg, 1989); new groupings which 
espouse a belief in neo-liberal economics (Inglehart, 1977, 1990); or extreme right 
parties (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994: 336). Three competing definitions are 
derivable from reading the above works.
According to  Inglehart (1984), the n ew  party forms arise as a response to 
changing voters and changing concerns o f  these voters -  the Greens focused on the 
environment and more participatory form s o f  rule; while the n ew  left emphasised
191
that class conflict could no longer be the sole structure o f  politics and shared with 
the Greens the notion that democracy had to be reinvigorated.
Paying attention to France, Inglehart (1971) devoted a considerable amount 
o f  detail to the PSU electorate, viewing it as the exemplar o f  the new voter. 
Although it only polled four per cent nationally in the 1968 legislatives, 30 per cent 
o f  its electorate was ‘post-bourgeois’ .94 Inglehart measured this by administering the 
four-item test to a sample o f  the French electorate and noted the size o f  the 
imbalance. He has written more generally about the profile o f  a new parties’ 
supporter and how it corresponds with their keynote policies. Unfortunately, there is 
not much o f  detail in his works on this linkage. Concerning demographics, the 
typical profile is repeated -  the supporter o f  new parties is likely to be young and 
w ell educated (Inglehart, 2003: 1). A s  he has written before (1985, 1997 and 
passim), postmaterialists are more likely to reside in cities than in rural areas.95 
Based on the above, w e derive our hypothesis:
Hi; That the new issues and the new voters have resulted in a 
greater prominence for ‘new politics ’parties.
In terms o f  specific policies that new parties are likely to focus on, we have 
the list o f  concerns that Inglehart (1984: 26) provides us with, detailing how 
feminism, environmentalism, pacifism, and movements such as the anti-nuclear 
campaign, consumer advocacy and ‘ limits to growth’ activists, are all expressing 
themselves ‘at the centre stage o f  contemporary politics’ (idem). For us, one problem 
is that this list is more indicative o f  what people w ill protest about rather than what 
new parties w ill offer as their key policies. W e are thus obliged to make inferences
94 His earlier term for postmaterialist.
95 See Sellers, 1998, for an interesting extrapolation of this.
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about what new parties w ill offer at election time. Inglehart mounts a weak case in 
favour o f  viewing taxation as a postmaterialist issue. Postmaterialists are slightly96 
more inclined towards tax policies being used with the aim o f maximizing 
"redistribution for the sake o f  human solidarity" (Inglehart, 1984: 55-6). W e can thus 
conclude that postmaterialist parties would logically commit themselves to a 
redistributionist strategy. A s regards attitudes on moral authority, Inglehart (1997) 
asserts that postmaterialists are much less likely to believe in a higher power and 
consequently, are more amenable to question hierarchies as a whole .97 This attribute 
helps to explain why postmaterialists are more likely to seek a fuller expression o f 
democracy and to press for greater accountability and representativeness in politics. 
The new politics parties should therefore be likely to attach importance to 
democratic and constitutional reform.
6.2: Testing the derived hypothesis
The above works make three substantive points. Collectively, they state that there 
w ill be new parties; that they are likely to be disproportionately supported by 
postmaterialists; and that they should have made an increasingly large impact over 
time.
Our first task is to select our cases. The idea o f  new parties encompasses both 
the new left and the new right, as w ell as a competing definition which would argue 
that new parties are neither right nor left in the typical senses o f the words. There is 
much work on the new right that draws on Inglehart’ s thinking, but significantly
96 And therefore, statistically not significantly.
97 The reader is directed to note how Inglehart weaves together an account of the linkages between 
rationality, postmodemisation, and religion in his chapter, Postmodernization Erodes Respect for  
Authority, but Increases Support fo r  Democracy (1999); see Chapter One.
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extends it. Supporting Inglehart, Gunther and Diamond (2003: 168) note that 
postmaterialist conflicts had begun to impact on party politics by the end o f  the 2 0 th 
century. Interestingly, though, they attach more weight to the extreme right 
‘backlash’ party, as described by Ignazi (1996), and not to ‘ quality o f  life parties’ . 
Gunther and Diamond describe this type as being a ‘movement party’ (op. cit. 188- 
9), but do not cite any one named party as being illustrative o f  this category. 
Kitschelt (1995) drew on Inglehart’ s work to encompass the authoritarian-Right, but 
the taxonomy given is markedly different from Inglehart’ s. W e noted earlier that 
Inglehart’s writing on the new right is too vague to allow for a fair testing in this 
chapter. I f  we want to look at the new right on Inglehart’ s terms, then, we are not in 
a position to use his definitions and sparse examples, nor are we able to rely on other 
works as they are either too distal (Kitschelt) or do not give enough cross-referenced 
examples o f  actual parties (Gunther and Diamond). Consequently, we do not 
examine the new right in this chapter.
Unfortunately, Inglehart’s imprecision in his usage o f  the new right category 
spreads to his understanding o f  the new left. Esman (2002: 378) outlines a basket o f 
five policies by which the European new left defines itself. Taking the modified
programmes o f  established parties such as Germany’ s SPD and Britain’s Labour
party, Esman outlines five markers:
1. A  lauding o f  entrepreneurship.
2. The desire to lessen the interference o f  the state.
3. Boost flexibility in labour markets.
4. Cut taxes, especially on corporations.
5. Deregulation.
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Items two and five could arguably fit into Inglehart’s new politics category, 
but only after the individual has done the mental work; Inglehart does not expound 
on the specifics o f how parties try to lessen state intervention and generally adapt it 
to modem society, nor on which sectors are good candidates for deregulation and 
which ones are not. The strength o f  Esman’s analysis is its referral to the real world. 
In reading Inglehart and how the left may be said to have modified itself, one has a 
surfeit o f  survey data and a lack o f  information on actual parties and actual policies. 
Again, as we are testing Inglehart, we cannot use Esman’s structure.
One other obstacle is the nature o f  how durable and successful must a group 
be in order for it to qualify as a new party. Janda’ s (1980) book on new political 
parties set a five per cent electoral threshold; i f  a party did not reach this, then Janda 
excluded it. His book contains only 14 parties in 16 democracies from 1950-78. 
W illey (1998) discounts the threshold qualifier, and consequently, lists 24 new98 
parties in Ireland and 17 in France (op. cit. 658). Surprisingly, none o f  these is listed 
in the appendix.
To circumvent Inglehart’s inexactitude whilst still ostensibly testing his 
hypothesis, we turn to Kitschelt’s (1994) model o f  party system change. In this, three 
levels o f  change are specified. W e now detail how this scheme allows us to select the 
parties to be assessed in this chapter.
Level O n e  change is where parties modify their message and structure in 
response to new voter expectations. A t its simplest, the new left is operationalisable 
as those leftist parties who emerged in the 1960s and after; this gives a small, readily 
agreed number o f parties. Additionally, a second category is provided by Inglehart 
(passim) and is examined here, namely old leftist parties who recognised from the
98 That is, post-1945.
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late 1960s onwards the electoral imperative o f  moving beyond a workerist agenda. 
This could incorporate the major leftist parties in Ireland (Labour) and France (the 
PS; the PCF and Lutte Ouvrière). Labour is not included here, for two reasons. The 
first is that Ireland is usually deemed to have never had a large old democratic 
socialist party in the first place (Sassoon, 1997: xxv). Secondly, nowhere in the 
literature is Labour regarded to have undergone a programmatic renewal involving 
an increased emphasis on quality o f  life issues. W e also exclude the PCF and Lutte 
Ouvrière, as their ideology is not at all in the left-libertarian category that both 
Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) and Kitschelt (1997) use. Neither group’ s 
core philosophy advances on the purely historical-materialist conception o f  society, 
and as Inglehart’ s theory explicitly sets out to account for how quality o f  life issues 
are gradually eclipsing the old politics agenda over time, they do not qualify as 
parties who have remodelled themselves. The PS is included as it emerged in 1969 
from the old Section Française de l ’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), and thus neatly 
fits Inglehart’ s chronology.
Level Two change entails the formation o f  new parties along existing 
ideological lines -  this only meets Inglehart’ s argument halfway, as he affirms that 
‘new politics’ parties arise on a new axis or axes. The new left could also simply be 
those parties which were not present at the S econd Intemational in  Paris in 1889 
either in original name or later re-branded form -  this would rule out the Irish 
Labour party which was not founded until 1913 and also the SFIO, forerunner to the 
PS, as the parent party originated in 1905. Two other criteria to account for such 
variation would be parties defined by expert judgment (The Comparative Manifestos 
Project is the strongest body o f  work here) to be left-wing, and as for new parties on 
the left, splinter groups from larger parent parties are good candidates for the title o f
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‘new left’ -  the SDP in Britain is exemplary. These two definitions are not suitable 
for both Ireland and France. Our benchmark, as defined by Kitschelt, allows us to 
select from  four n ew  parties that emerge from the old axis: Democratic L eft, the 
Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU), and the French Trotskyist party, the Ligue 
Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR). The L C R  is excluded for the same reasons we 
gave for omitting the PCF and Lutte Ouvrière. There are additional left-wing 
groupuscules, but these are also excluded as they have not passed a minimal 
electoral threshold and are more concerned with a Marxist view  o f  society and 
politics quality o f  life issues than. This leaves us with the PSU and DL. Inglehart 
(1971, 1977) described the PSU as a ‘new politics party’ , whether a new axis results 
is a separate question that this chapter tries to answer. D L explicitly cast itself as a 
new type o f  party, with an increased emphasis on bringing new ways o f  thinking to 
bear on a broad range o f  political problems.
In Level Three change, new parties appear which articulate new interests -  
the variegated green parties are the likely contenders for both Kitschelt and 
Inglehart’ s templates. Consequently, we examine the Green Party in Ireland and the 
largest French environmentalist party, Les Verts.
Having selected the cases, the next step is to outline how we assess whether 
their existence is indeed indicative o f  a new prominence for lifestyle politics. We do 
this by examining them on three dimensions (a) the importance they attach to quality 
o f  life issues in their manifestos; (b) the extent to which their electorate may be 
described as postmaterialist; (c) and whether the parties have become increasingly 
successful in first-order elections. Let us look at how carry out each o f  these 
assessments.
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Firstly, a policy audit is carried out. B y  means o f  expert judgments, 
manifesto analysis, and acts performed in office where applicable, we assess whether 
‘new politics’ has indeed altered parties by looking at how prominently quality o f  
life issues are c ited in their electoral p rogrammes. F or parties w  ho h ave not held 
office, one measure o f  policy influence would be the extent to which a party’s 
programme has affected the political debate in a country.
Secondly, to measure the cohesiveness and distinctiveness o f  the 
postmaterialist voter category, the demographics and attitudinal profile o f each 
party’ s supporters are presented. To do this, we use Bartolini and Mair’ s (1990:215) 
framework for assessing the social structure o f a party’s electorate. This specifies 
that in order for a group or category to have a valid meaning in psephology, it must 
satisfy three criteria: 1 ) it must have a distinctive social structure; 2 ) it must be 
composed o f  members who are aware o f  their membership and as a result, are not 
part o f  another electoral constituency and 3), the party must explicitly tailor its 
agenda with the aim o f commanding the support o f  said group.
Finally, we judge whether the new parties are increasingly successful or not. 
The neatest qualification here would be the gaining and holding o f  seats in 
legislative elections; this would set an unfairly high barrier to the PSU, for example, 
as it may reasonably be said to have coloured French politics but still had a risible 
record o f  winning seats. A  second measure, a threshold o f  five per cent o f  the 
national vote in more than one election in the period studied would rule out the 
Greens in Ireland, inter alia, so this is evidently unsatisfactory. To set a level playing 
field, therefore, the set o f  electoral performances in the first-order elections o f each 
party’s country is presented here.
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6.3.1: Level One change - The Parti Socialiste (PS)
There are four suggested reasons for w h y  the P S  m akes a good candidate for an 
Inglehart-type party. The first is their date o f  birth -  their emergence in 1969 from 
the old SFIO. The second is the rhetorical presentation o f  their core philosophy. In 
1974, Mitterrand’s presidential election challenge was based on the slogan "la seule 
idée de la droite est de garder le pouvoir, mon premier projet est de vous le rendre" 
(Duhamel, 1980: 305). This pledge is entirely in keeping with the tenor o f  the 
Inglehart item ‘giving more say to people in important government decisions’ . 
Thirdly, there is its success in changing its image is the self-description o f  its 
supporters. The capacity o f  a party to move beyond the parameters o f  its established 
class base is a key indicator o f  its becoming postmaterialist. In 1966, 50 per cent o f 
the SFIO’ s voters, declared themselves to be either ‘ extreme left’ or ‘ left’ (five per 
cent and 45 per cent respectively), with only 20 per cent on the centre-left. B y  1977, 
a sea change had occurred, with 60 per cent o f  the new PS voters placing themselves 
on the centre-left, and only 1 2 - and five per cent respectively on the left and extreme 
left. B y  1978, the PS was distinguishable from the PCF by its near catch-all appeal; 
it was a better vote winner among the higher managerial class than either o f  the big 
two centre right parties, for example, and was more evenly spread in its catchments 
than ever before. The renovation o f  the party in the eyes o f  its supporters is support 
for this hypothesis o f  Inglehart. The fourth marker is the success o f  the PS in forging 
links with new political movements such as SOS Racisme and ecologists’ groups. 
Under Rocard’ s stewardship in the 1990s, the party held a series o f  meetings and 
policy workshops with diverse new social movements in order to see how new ideas 
could be introduced into mainstream French politics to benefit both these groups and
6.3: France
the PS. The PS was able to maintain its position as the biggest single party because 
the party proved able ‘ through social and political "networking", to adapt to 
changing ideological and social conditions within the electorate and to adopt to new 
social movements’ as Machin (1994: 51) puts it.
The section on the PS is slightly different than that for other parties in this 
chapter. Firstly, the policies discussed here are necessarily only a subset o f  all PS 
‘quality o f  life ’ legislation. There is simply not enough room to go into each and 
every aspect o f  the PS’ s policies from 1969-2002, and attempting to do so would 
only submerge the reader and not facilitate a clear test o f  the hypothesis. Secondly, 
there is no section on the party’ s electoral impact; as the PS held office for a 
considerable number o f  years within the timeframe o f  this thesis, it is acknowledged 
right from the outset that the party was successful. Let us begin with a policy audit 
o f  the PS.
6.3.1.1: The policies o f the PS
For reasons o f  space, this chapter only deals with the legislative record o f  the PS 
whilst in power and only under one administration -  that o f  Lionel Jospin, from 
1997-2002. In looking at this administration, the reader is reminded that it was a PS- 
led coalition o f  five parties, and then four, with the departure o f  Chevènement’ s 
M DC. Consequently, we must differentiate between the legislative initiatives carried 
out by the PS itself as distinct from those carried out by other members o f  the 
coalition that held office from 1997-2002.
Our reason for examining only the Jospin government is both practical and 
theoretical. It would be impossible to adequately cover all o f  the quality o f  life issues 
mentioned in manifestos or legislated for from 1968-2002. In terms o f  Inglehart’ s
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theory, the 1997-2002 government is a valid test case o f  the impact o f  postmaterialist 
values on parties, as the PS inherited a strong economy. By Spring 1997, just before 
the PS won power, inflation and interest rates were low, the franc was both 
competitive and stable, the budget deficit was dropping and there was a considerable 
trade surplus (Hainsworth, 1998: 72). It may be reasonably argued that i f  
postmaterialist values cannot exert a real influence over party policy in this 
favourable climate, then they cannot be expected to have an impact at any other 
time.
Even in the context o f  restricting our case to the Jospin administration, there 
is the problem o f scope -  should every non-economic quality o f  life piece o f 
legislation implemented by the Jospin cabinet be treated as pertinent? The scale o f  
the thesis and this chapter do not permit for this. As a result, the central parts o f  the 
legislative record o f  the PS are assessed with regard to how they fit a new politics 
agenda, loosely defined. O f course, for reasons o f  space and focus, we cannot hope 
to provide a compendium o f all the policy initiatives in each o f these areas. Instead, 
we demonstrate that that the main foci o f  the PS were the economy and crime, 
classic ‘materialist’ measures, but also show that a reasonable amount o f  the 
legislation o f  the PS from 1997-2002 may be described as postmaterialist.
The record o f the Jospin administration leads us to view  them as a party with 
a ceaseless zeal for economic issues. On economic reform, the Jospin cabinet 
implemented privatizations that outstripped the total financial volume o f the Chirac, 
Balladur and Juppé administrations put together (Knapp and Wright, 2001: 187). 
Jospin’ s manifesto for the 2002 presidential election committed him to introduce tax 
cuts o f  more than €13 billion and to balance the budget within two years
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Its employment policies mark them out a s more old than new left. Right 
from the beginning o f  the Jospin administration, the party w as keen to  stress its 
divergence from the Balladur and Juppé periods by its two policies o f the 35-hour 
week and the youth employment programme (Elgie, 2002: 305). Employment was 
placed as his government’s number one priority by Jospin in his investiture 
speech." The Plan Aubry aimed to create 700,000 jobs, equally apportioned 
between the private- and public sectors. Finance Minister, Laurent Fabius legislated 
to introduce a ‘prime pour l ’emploi’ or job bonus, to anyone earning less than 140 
per cent o f  the minimum wage, assessed and paid for by the tax authorities (The 
Economist, January 20, 2001). The appointment o f Laurent Fabius in March 2000 as 
Minister o f  Finance and Economic Affairs is itself an indication o f  the paramount 
importance the PS attached to the economy. Fabius had long since established 
him self as a key PS figure, emphasizing that the left should focus on financial 
issues, such as maintaining middle-class support by not having high levels o f 
personal taxation. His appointment to the cabinet in 2000 effectively made him 
second only to Jospin (Leruez, 2000: 311). Still on employment legislation, Law no 
2002-73 aimed to address job insecurity, workplace conditions, and training needs; 
originally, the PS had aimed to restrict the use o f dismissals for economic reasons, 
but this was vetoed by the Conseil constitutionnel (Le Blan-Delannoy and Douay, 
2002, 23). The c entrepiece p o licy  o f  the PS was the introduction o f  the 35-hour 
week. The PS emphasised to businesses that expected reductions in levels o f  worker 
fatigue and absenteeism would help competitiveness. This was window-dressing, as 
the measure aimed specifically to reduce unemployment and to redistribute wealth
" http://www.archives.premierministre.gouv.fr/jospin_version2/PM/D190697.HTM
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(Clift, 2000: 491). It was intended as a response to the need to try and restrain the 
market without hurting fiscal health, company competitiveness or the balance o f 
payments (Clift, 2002, 476-477).
The foregoing demonstrates that the PS does not neatly fit the description o f 
a new politics party, as so much o f  its resources were devoted to the economy, jobs, 
and taxes. On another ‘ survivalist’ concern, crime, the evidence is more ambiguous, 
for we note that the PS acted in both liberal and illiberal ways. Jospin’ s investiture 
speech pledged his government to tackle crime as a top priority, guaranteeing the 
deployment 35,000 extra national police. This old politics slant was stressed again at 
the Villepinte forum in October o f  that year., leading commentators to judge the 
discourse o f  the PS to be moving towards one o f punishment: ‘A partir de 1998...la 
politique du gouvernement en matière de securité est influencée par des discours 
politiques d ’une tonalité plus repressive que preventive’ .10° Running counter to this 
assessment is the more liberal measures announced by the PS, such as in M ay 1998, 
when the then Justice Minister, Elisabeth Guigou, stated that the president was open 
to investigation by the tribunal in order to answer allegations o f  financial 
wrongdoing (Elgie, 2 002: 3 07). In  stressing the equality o f  all citizens before the 
law, the party demonstrated their zeal for reform o f legal precedent in political 
affairs, but the political capital to be gained from implicating the president cannot be 
discounted as a motive. Another liberal act o f the administration was their passing o f 
the law reinforcing the presumption o f  innocence and victims’ rights two years later 
(Law number 2000-516). The intention was to increase the suspect’s protection by 
introducing audiovisual recordings o f  young interviewees, 101 restate the right to
100 www.vie-publique.fr/dossier_polpablic/ securite_mterieure/index.shtml. Accessed 1 August 2003.
101 The PS government had originally wanted to introduce sound recordings in all interviews; much 
hostility forced it to back down.
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silence and restrict the range o f  people who may be interviewed (witnesses could no 
longer be detained for interview), tighten up the regulations on the usage o f  remand, 
and remove the state’s right o f  appeal against acquittal. A ll in all, the package o f 
measures amounted to the biggest reform o f criminal procedural law since 1958 
(Bédier, 2001: 3). Notwithstanding the comparatively repressive system o f French 
pre-trial law, the attempts by the PS to legislate in the area are clearly driven by a 
desire to  lessen the likelihood o f  injustice, and in  this way, may be described as 
postmaterialist.
In three other policy domains, there is a reasonable case to be made that the 
PS implemented more quality o f  life legislation than they probably had to, and, in 
this way, demonstrated some new politics tendencies. We now look at some policies 
in the area o f  (a) démocratisation; (b) immigration, and (c) civil rights to further test 
this case.
6.3.1.1. (a) Démocratisation
One repeated theme o f the PS manifestos when in opposition was the stress on how 
on assuming office they would empower people and make the state more responsive 
to the needs o f  ordinary citizens. In this regard, two policy areas are relevant. The 
first concerns decentralisation, a process motivated by the recognition that too much 
o f  France was controlled by Paris and that there was a lack o f  vitality in the political 
life o f  the regions. The second policy area is autonomy, and specifically for this 
section, how the Jospin administration dealt with an upsurge in nationalist violence 
in Corsica.
More sceptical commentators have claimed that in granting greater powers to 
the sub-national level, the PS were only doing what favoured their own traditional
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stronger base; at national elections, the PS underperformed. In the expectation that 
they w ere more lik ely  to  gain and retain power at the lower level, the party was 
hoping to initiate a process that would act as a counterbalance to the Right’s 
hegemony at first-order elections. Either way, the push for decentralisation 
necessarily results in a restricted manoeuvrability for national government and 
theoretically at least, should increase the contact o f  the government with the 
governed. The central aim o f the PS reforms o f  local government was to make it 
more efficient and effective. Michel (1998: 165-6) argues that the move towards 
greater integration o f the different layers o f  sub-national government was making it 
more systematic and reducing internal squabbling. The case is less clear when we 
come to the work o f  the Mauroy Commission, a body set up to look at how the states 
should reconfigure its system o f sub-national government. Under Jospin’s 
leadership, there was a perceived dilution o f  decentralisation. The work o f the 
commission was hampered by walk-outs from both government and opposition 
parliamentarians frustrated by what they saw as a creeping recentralisation. This 
was cited with special reference to the gradual rises in the size o f  the central 
government block grant at the expense o f  restrictions on the amount and number o f  
taxes that could be levied by the local authority. Law 2002-276 concerned 
‘ démocratie de proximité’ had as its m ain aim the deepening o f  local democracy 
(Garroy, 2 002: 15). Its 1 67 articles covered a vast range o f  regulations, from the 
conduct o f  the census to reform o f public utility management and environmental 
measures. The PS were obviously restricted in what they could hope to implement as 
they 1 ost p ower within a matter o f  m onths o f  formulating the 1 aw, but a gain, the 
intent was to increases subsidiarity.
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The Jospin cahinet’ s handling o f  the Corsican problem is further evidence o f 
a shift towards a new way o f  thinking about centralisation o f  decision-making. Low- 
level disturbances in the form o f sporadic bombings and assaults on government 
officials, their homes and places o f  work, had been simmering for some time. Talks 
began under the Jospin government to square the demands in some quarters for total 
independence with the Republican imperative o f territorial integrity. A  protracted 
series o f  discussions culminated in sizeable parcels o f  autonomy being signed over 
by Paris. These included the setting up o f  a single legislative body for the island, the 
right for instruction in the Corsican language to be made available in schools and the 
right to modify (within certain parameters) national legislation. The ‘rotten borough’ 
argument was used by opponents o f  the outcome, most notably the M D C ’s Interior 
Minister Chevènement, 102 who depicted Corsica as an increasingly corrupt and 
lawless island (Levy, 2001: 113). He resigned, but his PS successor, Vaillant, took a 
different tack and suggested that the Corsican arrangement could serve in the future 
as a model o f  for subsidiarity in all French regions (Regards sur l ’actualité, 2001, 
no. 271: 3). The willingness o f  the PS to update the state’ s w ay o f  thinking where 
feasible is indicative o f  a flexible party that was keen to respond to the agenda o f the 
citizens concerned.
6.3.1.1. (b) Immigration
The ebb and flow  o f French immigration policy must be set against the broader 
context o f  the republican state. Typically, the predilection in France has always been 
to favour assimilation rather than accommodation (Schnapper, 1991) so as to make 
immigrants French rather than leave them to their own national-cultural identity. In
102 Chevènement was the leader of a a coalition partner in the 1997 coalition government, the 
Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC). He left the government over the handling of the Corsican problem.
this sense, the French approach is  indicative o f  a residual colonial perspective on 
how to deal with immigration, as the majority o f  applicants come from France’s 
former African colonies, be they predominantly Islamic (Maghreb) or not (West 
Africa).
There was a swing back towards a more immigrant-tolerant stance during the 
Jospin years. The Pasqua law s103 had led to a curbing o f  the rights to stay based on 
marriage to a French citizen and also tightened up the regulations governing family 
reunions where the immigrant’ s immediate family could join the person in France. A  
much more forensic vetting process applied to immigration generally. On assuming 
office, Jospin commissioned the W eil Report, 104 which set out to accomplish the 
seemingly impossible task o f  reconciling the demands o f  the pro- and anti­
immigration lobbies. The 1998 law granted legal status to many o f  the sans-papiers 
(im m igrants already residing in France but without full legal papers and protection) 
and lessened the intrusiveness o f  state interference in assessing the credibility o f 
marriages between immigrants and French citizens (Weil, 2001: 219).
6.3.1.1. (c): Civil rights
In three areas, the Jospin administration may be said to have acted on a new politics 
agenda. These areas are gender equality; reform o f the state’ s view  on marriage; and 
religious tolerance.
From the moment o f  assuming office in 1997, the PS acted to address gender 
and issues. In an acknowledgement o f the imbalance at top-level politics, Jospin had
103 Named after the Gaullist Minister for the Interior, Charles Pasqua, who in the 1993-5 Balladur 
government, at first aimed for a quota of immigrants but then crept towards a policy of zero 
immigration.
104 According to Knapp (2004: 157-8) Jospin’s cabinet was divided on the sans-papiers issue and so 
they commissioned Weil to get them out of the fix.
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backed a 30 per cent quota for women candidates at the 1997 election, with a third o f 
his first Cabinet being women (three times their level o f representation in the 
parliament (Hainsworth, 1998: 82). Also, his investiture speech stated that they 
would introduce a section in the constitution that affirmed the equal status o f 
women.
On marriage and the place o f  the family, as recently as 1994, Jospin, as 
leader o f  the PS in opposition, dismissed a motion sponsored by 15 leftist figures in 
favour o f  a type o f civil union. B y  1997, he had changed tack, referring in campaign 
interviews to the need to act in favour o f  unmarried couples and included gay 
couples in his references. P A C S 105 (Pacte Civile de Solidarité) was a measure 
undertaken by the Jospin government that aimed to offer rights to unmarried couples 
in same- or different- sex households. Anomalies in the areas o f  tax, insurance and 
inheritance were addressed by this law, granting a greater degree o f  rights to both 
gay and unmarried heterosexual couples (ibid). In terms o f  its ability to adequately 
deal with the realities o f  cohabitation in all forms, the P A C S specifically leaves out 
any reference to the imperative o f  fidelity (Regards sur l ’actualité, 1999: 69). Once 
in power, the party did not commit anything like its full resources to getting the 
measure through parliament106 -  instead, two PS deputies were tasked by an 
Assem bly Law Committee t o consider the arguments and return with a proposal. 
However, the eventual piece o f legislation suggests that the PS was aware o f how 
French society and morality had changed. PACS would appear to be a strong case o f 
a party acting in a postmaterialist fashion to update the law with respect to new 
lifestyles. The law was criticised by some as not being sufficiently far-reaching: the 
wording and thus the remit were carefully designed so as to be silent on the family
105 See Borrillo and Fassin (2002) L ’aventure ambiguë du pacs.
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law aspects o f  couples -  there is nothing in the law referring to IVF, medically 
assisted conceptions generally, or adoption rights (Borillo and Fassin, 2002: 48). In 
this sense, the policy was a true compromise, as neither the traditionalists nor the 
libertarians were entirely happy with the outcome. In sum, the policy can only be 
described as an attempt to modernise legislation in response to altered lifestyles and 
is thus classifiable as an Inglehartian measure.
The fact that there are no state-fimded Islamic schools in metropolitan France 
is illustrative o f  the avowedly secular slant to French republicanism. Such an 
absence would be unthinkable in say, Britain (Soper and Fetzer, 2003: 49). The 
heated exchanges between the secularists, pluralists and Islamists on religious 
expression in education were instigated by the foulard affair o f  1989, when a 
Muslim schoolgirl was expelled from a school in the Paris suburbs for wearing her 
headscarf in class. The 1993-5 RPR / UDF government issued a circular which 
outlawed the wearing o f  ‘ostentatious’ signs o f  religious affiliation in schools. The 
Jospin government did not legislate to remove this, but instead relied on a 
Constitutional Court decree that deemed such ‘ signs’ acceptable unless a teacher had 
reason to believe they were being worn ‘provocatively’ . The PS acted in a less 
illiberal manner than the Balladur administration, but they could hardly be said to 
have been agitators for a new cultural-religious tolerance (Soper and Fetzer, 2003: 
49). The PS behaved more like a postmaterialist party when they opened up a 
consultation in January 2000 to grant state acknowledgement o f  Islam and features 
such as its cemeteries and feast days. Although initiated by the M D C ’ s 
Chevènement, 107 the new policy o f  accommodation was continued by Vaillant o f the
106 Reasons of space mean that the full account of how the PACS was first rejected by the Assembly 
and blocked by the Senate cannot be given -  see Regards sur l ’Actualité, 1999: 64.
107 See Al Istichâra, Le journal de la Consultation des Musulmans de France, N °l, Paris: Mars 2000. 
Ministère de l’Intérieur.
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PS when he became minister in August 2000. The intention was to move away from 
the republican view  towards a more liberal conception o f  how people should be 
allowed to practise their own religion as they see fit.
6.3.1.1 (dV Summary o f  the policies o f  the PS
It would be too high a threshold o f proof to demand that each and every PS policy in 
the areas listed above fits a postmaterialist description. The process o f government 
necessarily entails a steady focus o n issues such as the economy, unemployment, 
health and education, none o f  which could reasonably be classified as postmaterialist 
concerns. However, during the period o f  the Jospin administration, there is a 
discernible increase in prominence for lifestyle politics. On crime, the party was 
ambitious in one area (detainee’ s rights), but adopted an old-fashioned rhetoric when 
they talked about crime generally. The level o f  self-interest o f the PS in pushing for 
greater decentralisation has been oft-remarked on, and the impact o f a new corpus o f 
legislation on the quality o f  decision-making is o f  course a separate topic; 
notwithstanding these caveats, the party did devolve some powers aw ay from  the 
direct purview o f  ministers in Paris. Interestingly, they expressly set out here to tidy 
up an ever-more ramified area o f  administration. The reform o f  the laws on the 
family in the shape o f  the PACS is perhaps the most postmaterialist o f all the 
measures enacted that are discussed here, while on the question o f  the place o f Islam 
in French life, the moderateness o f  what PS proposed must be weighed against the 
strongly secular nature o f  France and its system o f  rule. On the basis o f the policy 
initiatives noted above, the PS may be described as acting like a new politics party in 
many substantial ways from 1997-2002. Against this, the party was clearly focused 
on the economy to a very large degree, and its ‘ centrepiece’ (Cole, 2002: 319) was
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the old politics measure o f  a reduction in the working week w ith  n o  loss o f  pay. 
Clearly, both the PS and Jospin felt that the economy was always their overriding 
focus, and the quality o f  life issues were not o f paramount importance to them. 
Unfortunately, Inglehart gives no adequate operationalisation o f  how one may rule a 
party in or out in terms o f the relative importance it attaches to specific policy 
outcomes. The hypothesis is partially supported on the basis o f  the evidence for this 
section.
6.3.1.2: The profile o f the PS electorate
In this section, we map the sociology o f  the PS electorate. The intention is threefold 
-  to see i f  the PS vote was (a) less working-class; (b) disproportionately made up o f 
a youth vote over the course o f  the timeframe and (c), held distinctive ‘new politics’ 
values. I f these descriptions are valid, then its electorate may be said to have become 
increasingly more ‘new political’ as time has passed, thus supporting Inglehart’s 
claim.
Table 6.1 illustrates clearly just where the PS made gains as it sought to 
reinvent itself during the course o f  the 1970s. The party’s popularity rose sharply 
among white-collar workers, with significant gains among clerical workers and 
technicians. It was able to attract support from the traditional working class, too, as 
the PCF began to fall away as a major political party:
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Men Women
Socio-
occunational
category
PCF Non-PCF left PCF Non-PCF left
Self-employed -7 -2 -2 +7
Farmers -6 -6 0 +1
Small
shopkeepers
-2 -5 -7 +15
Artisans -9 +9 0 +11
Bourceois 
(includine senior 
manasement)
0 +2 0 +10
Salaried middle 0 +17 +3 +14
class
Secondary and 
liielter education 
teachers
-2 +3 +11 +16
Primary teachers
+5 0 +2 +3
Administrative
sta ff
-2 +22 -1 +10
Office employees +2 +16 -2 +21
Technicians -4 +22 +8 +14
Workers +6 +12 +4 +15
Foremen +12 +9 -12 +26
Skilled +5 +9 +6 +13
Unskilled +4 +19 +6 +13
Shop workers and 
domestics
-1 +14 -1 +7
All +2 +10 +3 +12
Table 6.1: Changes in the class base of the PS, 1967-78; after Capdevielle et al.,
1981: 255.
From 1978 onwards, the party’ s credentials as a genuinely cross-class party 
begin to establish themselves. Note that the party makes bigger strides among 
women voters than among men, which is oblique support for an Inglehart-type party 
that is able to maximise its appeal on the basis o f women’s issues. Furthermore, its 
biggest increases were among the salaried middle class, which is specifically the 
catchment amongst which Inglehart predicted the new left would have most success.
Let us continue with a longer series o f  data, culled from the election studies 
and exit polls for the legislative and presidential elections from 1978 to 2002 (Table 
6 .2):
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Profession 1978
(L)
1981
(P)
1986
(L)
1988
(P)
1993
(L)
1995
(P )
1997
(L)
2002
(P)
2002
(P)
Farmer 2 23 2 1 13 1 2 16 29 13 14
Petit
bourgeois
1 14 17 28 9 1 2 15 6 18
Higher 
mgmt /  prof.
6 19 32* 39 27 25 29 16 31
Intermediate
mgmt
10 29 45 27 2 2 29 14 31
White collar 13 29 42 40 17 2 1 32 1 2 26
Blue collar 20 33 34 43 18 2 1 28 13 31
Retired 16 28 29 37 19 24 23 19 2 2
Table 6.2: The occupational status of the PS electorate at legislative (L) and 
presidential (P) elections, 1978-2002; after Capdevielle et al., 198: 246; Penniman, 
1988: 226; Goldey, 1998: 546; Knapp, 2004: 140. *NB -  the data used by Penniman do not
distinguish between Higher and Intermediate management.
The gains made among the higher managerial class are consolidated and 
advanced upon, and it is only in the 2 0 0 2  presidential election that its strong 
showing fades away, only to recover at the legislative elections immediately 
afterwards. The party does particularly well among white-collar workers in the 
1980s, and its support is stronger here than it was in 1978, even with the poor 
performance at the 2002 presidential election. It is a lot less successful among the 
petty bourgeois, and performs erratically among farmers. However, the relative size 
o f  these classes has shrunk in comparison with the salariat, so the party still makes 
gains beyond the working-class core v ote. Instead o f  being reliant o n the manual 
working classes, it may be seen from the table below that the party’ s most faithful 
voting group is teachers. The anecdotal view  o f the PS as ‘the teacher’ s party’ is 
corroborated by the national election studies o f  1978, 1988 and 1995, where the PS 
obtained the votes o f 67, 6 6  and 65 per cent respectively (Boy and Mayer, 1997:
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129). This capacity to extend one’s appeal beyond the parameters o f class voting is a 
hallmark o f  a postmaterialist party.
A  central part o f  Inglehart’ s hypothesis o f  a new voter bloc is the age profile: 
as societies became increasingly more affluent over time, a levelling-off o f the 
imbalance between the number o f  materialist and postmaterialist cohorts would 
occur. Younger voters, socialised in times o f  affluence, would be more likely to 
choose parties that articulated their lifestyle concerns. Working backwards, the logic 
here, according to Inglehart, is that postmaterialist parties are those parties that 
disproportionately attract the youth vote. The new left was likely to be the greatest 
recipient o f  this vote migration. W e detail the performance o f  the PS among young 
voters (18-24 and 25-34) in Table 6.3:
Age 1981
(P)
1986
(L)
1988
(P)
1993
(L)
1995
(P)
1997
(L)
2002
(P)
2002
(L)
18-24 2 2 40 40 18 2 1 28 13 34
25-34 27 41 45 2 0 19 28 14 27
35-49 27 33 36 18 25 29 15 27
50-64 26 25 36 19 25 23 17 30
65 + 28 23 32 2 0 25 2 2 2 0 18
Table 6.3: The age profile of the PS voter at legislative (L) and presidential (P) 
elections, 1981-2002; after Penniman, 1988: 226; Goldey, 1998: 546, and Knapp,
2004: 140.
In the 1980s, Mitterrand had been remarkably strong at attracting the youth 
vote (18-34 years). W e note that the ‘ Mitterrand effect’ is highlighted by examining 
the second round run-offs. Mitterrand had been able to easily outperform his rivals at 
the second round run-offs o f  1981 and 1988, but Jospin failed to so in the right 
amounts in 1995 (see Table 6.4). Jospin’s performance among the 18-34 age group 
at the first round o f  the 2 0 0 2  presidential elections represented a loss o f  two-thirds o f 
the party’ s 1980s average among this category.
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Election Left Right
1981 (Mvs. GE) 63 37
1988 (Mvs. C) 69 31
1995 ('J vs. C) 47 53
Table 6.4: Second round run-offs at three presidential elections and the percentage 
of the 18-25 vote; after Muxel, 2002, p. 33. M=Mitterrand; GE=Giscard D ’Estaing;
C=Chirac. J=Jospin.
The PS had begun the 1980s as an increasingly postmaterialist party in terms 
o f  the age distribution o f  its voters, but by the mid-1990s, had begun to resemble the 
other mainstream parties in their demographic indistinctiveness.
The 1960s and 1970s had witnessed a dramatic migration o f  the youth vote 
towards the left and anti-system parties, but the situation o f  the left as the natural 
home o f the youth vote no longer applies, according to Muxel:
Contrairement aux années 1960 et 1970, le vote des jeunes ne se 
démarque guère de c elui d e leurs a înés. Il n ’est traversé ni par le 
désir de changer radicalement la société ni par des visées 
anticonformistes. H porte la marque des effets de l ’alternance et s ’est 
peu à peu rallié, à quelques nuances près, aux choix de l ’ensemble du 
corps électoral.
Muxel, 2002: 33.
In fact, by 1993, the Front National was matching the P S ’ appeal amongst 
18-24 year olds and did so again in the 1995 presidential election; by the 2002 
Elysée contest, it had overtaken the PS (Habert, Perrineau and Ysmal, 1993; 
Buffotot and Hanley, 1996; and Muxel, 2002).
215
Concerning the values o f the PS voter, the most recent systematic work we 
have is on the attitudinal make-up o f  the PS. This survey formed part o f  an all-party 
post- electoral study, carried out by a team108 examining the responses o f a 
representative sample o f just under 3,000 citizens in May 1997 (Chiche et al., 2000). 
The 20 items tapped Ethnocentrism, Authoritarianism, Social issues, Politics 
generally, Economics and Supranational bodies. A  four-point Likert scale was used 
to measure the attitudes’ intensity. The survey’ s worth lies in its integration o f 
‘timeless’ items such as ‘ The death penalty should be brought back’ to more topical 
issues such as the degree o f  solidarity one felt with the striking public sector workers 
o f  1995. In this sense, it is an improvement on Inglehart’ s unchanging value 
index. 109
The PS electorate was broadly similar to that o f the mainstream right and the 
PCF in terms o f  how it viewed supranational bodies and the place o f  immigrants in 
society; intuitively, PS voters were mid-way between the mainstream right and the 
PCF on ‘old politics’ questions o f  strikes and economic liberalism. In fact, what was 
striking was how similar to the other main parties were the PS voters’ interpretations 
o f  political issues. Attitudinally, there was a greater likelihood o f  differentiation 
within a party’ s electorate than when compared with another party’ s support 
(intraparty variation was twice that o f interparty variation -op. cit. 481). In short, as 
with the other major parties, there is little distinctive about the attitude base o f the PS 
electorate. This disconfirms Inglehart’s hypothesis that a new politics party would 
act as the home o f people who were like-minded on the salient issues, be they new or
108 The project’s full title is the SOFRES/Liberation/CEVIPOF/CIDSP-Grcnoble/CRAPS-Lille 
postelectoral survey.
109 The authors specifically refer to the utility of the construct of postmaterialism in understanding the 
results of the survey -  op. cit. 475.
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On the occupation measure, the PS behaves as an Inglehart-type party, able to stay to 
the left in terms o f  policies while attracting new votes, and largely keeping them, 
among the salaried classes. W hile in 1981 and to a lesser extent, 1988, Mitterrand 
had attracted a larger share o f  the youth vote, w e  note that there i s no longer an 
overarching tendency for young people to vote PS. In terms o f attitudes, we further 
note that there is little to distinguish the PS electorate from those o f  other parties. We 
can thus conclude that the PS electorate is not distinctively postmaterialist in terms 
o f  age or values / attitudes.
6.3.1.3: Summary o f the PS
On the question o f the place o f PM  within the PS, we have seen that the party was 
probably more postmaterialist than it had to be. However, it is apparent that old 
politics issues were its main concerns at all times. Apart from the question o f 
immigration, none o f  their quality o f life issues were signalled at Jospin’ s investiture 
with anything like the emphasis attached to the jobs and crime. On the profile o f 
their electorate, we have noted the party’ s ability to attract a broad range o f  support 
across the socio-economic categories, but have not detected a consistent tendency for 
younger voters to support them. In short, the PS partially supports H3.
6.3.1.2 (V): Summary of the vote profile for the PS
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6.3.2: Level Two change - The Parti Socialiste Unifié (P SU )110
The PSU arrived on the national stage at the same time as other new left parties in 
Europe such as the Socialist Peoples’ Parties in Norway (SPP) and Denmark (SFP) 
in the mid- to late 1960s. This type o f  party is distinctive in two ways by Sassoon 
(1997: 401-2) - their date o f  birth and their divergence from  their nations’ larger 
socialist parties on the key issue o f  foreign policy, be it EEC or N A TO  membership 
(the SPP in Norway and the SFP in Denmark) or colonial policy (PSU). In this 
sense, the PSU could reasonably be said to have arisen as part o f  an internationalist, 
pacifist bloc o f  parties, a quintessential postmaterialist phenomenon. Even though, as 
R eif (1987) acknowledges, the party rarely won seats in the National Assembly, the 
PSU merits analysis in this thesis for two reasons. The stronger justification for 
studying the party is that in Inglehart’s view  (1971, 1977), the PSU behaved as a 
simulacrum o f  postmaterialist politics. Its supporters were young and w ell educated, 
its programme had ambitious targets for including the agendas o f  single-issue groups 
in policy formation, and its analysis o f  society was one that moved beyond a class- 
antagonistic one alone. The party thus acts as a test case in itself: i f  PM  is anything 
more than a sideline trend in French politics, then it follows that the PSU should be 
in a healthy state and / or have succeeded in implementing quality o f  life policies 
while in government or have shifted debate away from the materialistic purview. We 
look in considerable detail at the context in which the PSU formulated and 
propounded their loose strategy o f  autogestion, taken by most scholars as the 
‘badge’ o f  the party (Touchard, 1977). It is an important identification, as it allows 
one to note how a theoretical value may be translated (or not) into a political idea
110 This section draws extensively from the Archives Nationales.
www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/chan/ fonds/xml_inv/EtatsdesfondsAP/5 8 lAP.html and 
works by Touchard (1977) and Reif (1987)
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and thence into a policy; this is crucial to giving us an insight as to how the 
Weltanschauung o f  PM was viewed by some scholars, notably Inglehart, as having 
percolated downwards into the political arena. A s a smaller party, the literature is 
necessarily less abundant than that for the PS.
The PSU sprang from the fusion o f three leftist splinter groupings in 1960. 
The years 1956-66 witnessed a profusion o f new thinking and organizations on the 
left in France, as the country was forced to re-examine its position as a colonial 
power abroad and respond to demographic and societal changes at home. The 
earliest noteworthy grouping is the Union de la Gauche Socialiste (UGS), founded 
in 1957. Within the SFIO, France’ s main left wing party, opposition had been 
mounting to M ollet’ s decision to take commit France to the invasion and occupation 
o f  the Suez canal; furthermore, the administration’s handling o f  the Algerian 
problem was a cause o f  great discontent within some o f  the party’s key figures. A  
domestic issue that also roused the left-wingers’ ire  w as the SFIO’s inertia when 
faced with de Gaulle’ s constitutional proposals to found the Fifth Republic. What 
began as a study group within the SFIO, the Comité Socialiste d ’étude et d ’action 
pour la paix en Algérie, led to a fully-fledged split, with the dissidents forming the 
Parti Socialiste Autonome in 1958. Mendès France’s departure from the Radicals to 
form the Centre d ’Action Démocratique had not been much o f a success and so he 
merged his party with the PSA in 1959. In 1960, the picture was complete when the 
P SA  / C A D  joined with the UGS to result in the PSU.
The PSU ’s apogee was in 1968-9, when the party seemed more in tune than 
any other with the rebellious mood and in the 1969 presidential election, the party’ s 
young leader, Michel Rocard, performed creditably on a shoestring budget (Bell, 
2000: 194), leading many commentators to predict great things for Rocard. The
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party’s fortunes slumped irrevocably in 1975, when Rocard and a sizeable 
proportion o f  the party’s most talented personnel and members left to join the PS. 
Despite its period as a junior partner in the PS-led government from 1981-4, with its 
leader, Huguette Bouchardeau, as Minister for the Environment, the PSU never 
recovered electorally and passed into history when it voted for its own dissolution at 
its conference in 1989. In terms o f  durability, the record o f  30 years is sufficient to 
dismiss the argument that the party was a transient entity. Let us now look at their 
policies.
6.3.2.1: The policies o f the PSU
The party’ s credentials to be ‘new’ (read ‘radical’) are indirectly supported by the 
attitude o f  the French intelligence community. The Renseignements Généraux, akin 
to a political police force was in 1973 divided in nine sections, w ith  one section 
having two sub-units which compiled intelligence on (i) the PCF and the PSU and 
(ii) on revolutionary movements and activists in general (Hayward, 1983: 151). This 
is indicative either o f  paranoia or that the PSU was genuinely subversive. Although 
the early years o f  the party and its precursors were marked by an anti-colonial and 
pacifist outlook, the imperative for the PSU was to develop other keynote policies 
from 1963, when the Algerian question was settled in the eyes o f  the French. This 
posed a significant challenge, as the glue o f  their anti-colonialist perspective could 
no longer serve to hold the party’ s strands together. What emerged in its place was 
an emphasis on democratization, both in terms o f  government and in the 
organization o f  work. This m otif o f  the PSU may be subsumed under the Inglehart 
item ‘more say in government’ .
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I f  there is one worldview that defined the PSU, then it is reasonable to 
propose that it was the imperative o f societal reform. This train o f  thought was very 
prevalent among French intellectuals from the 1950s to the 1970s. André Philip 
wrote two tracts, Le Socialisme Trahi (1957) and Les Socialistes (1967) that 
propounded these views. He was expelled from the SFIO for not toeing the party line 
and founded the P SA  in 1957-8 (Sassoon, 1997: 271)111. One corollary o f  this 
approach was the view that decisions a t  governmental level were best left not to 
politicians intent on short-term electoral gain; instead, dispassionate experts should 
use the finest statistical models to inform each government ministry’ s remit to gauge 
and meet the country’s needs, a concept that became increasingly popular in 
politicians’ views on best practice in administration in both Britain and America in 
the 1960s.112 Hubert Prévôt, a PSU strategist and advisor to Rocard who served in 
the Finance M inistry’s Forecasting Division from  1 961-74 (Hayward, 1 983: 200), 
was a key thinker in looking at how the philosophy could be shown to operate in 
practice.
In terms o f  specific polices, it was on the subject o f  industrial relations that 
the PSU had most to say. Autogestion (self-management) was the PSU ’s concept o f 
devising novel ways o f  organizing work as a necessary and inevitable consequence 
o f  a re-ordering o f  society. People should not have to work in demeaning or boring 
jobs to pay bills; work should move away from the Taylorist straitjacket and allow a 
person’ s potential to be fulfilled. Such an argument had a rich and tangled 
provenance in sociology and philosophy and thus had extensive ramifications. The 
very notion o f  hierarchy within society should be entirely reworked. Consequently,
111 Which itself eventually merged with other small leftist groups to form the PSU.
112 See Jacoby (1995), for an account of how techno-bureacracy influenced Edward Heath’s economic 
and industrial policies in the 1970s, and also Shapley’s (1992) biography of Robert McNamara for 
how the idea of technocracy gained sway in the Pentagon.
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the idea o f  an elected parliament implementing laws on the basis o f  an intermittent 
mandate, operating many leagues removed from the individual citizen’s life, was 
flawed. Democracy must pervade all aspects o f  life -  in politics, work and education. 
Given the chance, people could construct more responsive, flatter structures in these 
domains (Mallet, 1965). It is because o f  its heritage that the concept o f  autogestion 
should be regarded as a PSU policy that came to be taken up by the PS, most clearly 
through the policy documents o f the CERES faction led by Chevènement. 113
Autogestion was predicated on moving France to a climate o f  high value 
work, with skills, wages and productivity exceeding the European average. This 
would entail in some instances the replacement o f conveyor-belt industry with small 
autonomous work groups. It also envisaged the abolition o f the ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
distinction in labour by bringing both workers and management together to realise 
that they could achieve more in the long run by working together and not against 
each other. Antiquated working practices and industrial action that hindered 
productivity would be replaced in exchange for non-hygienic114 benefits such as 
family-friendly workplaces and on-the-job training. Many o f  the interpretations and 
implications o f  autogestion were taken up by the PS at their 1975 conference 
(Quinze thèses sur l ’autogestion). It was no coincidence that 1975 was the year o f 
entry o f  Rocard and his P SU  dissidents into the PS. The P S U  never obtained the 
power to carry out autogestion, but the concept influenced the PS’ s handling o f 
industrial relations policy in the early nineteen eighties in the formulation o f  the ill- 
fated Auroux laws . 115
113 Projet socialiste, p. 32. PS: Paris, 1980.
114 The term is used here as a loan from Herzberg’s theory of work motivation; non-hygienic factors 
are those not based on pay and basic conditions.
115 The account of these laws comes from Gallie, 1985. The reader’s attention is drawn to Gallie’s 
previous work (also cited in this theses -  Chapter Three) on the embourgeoisement thesis and the 
sociotechnics view in politics.
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From M ay 1968 when the PSU appeared as the only viable vehicle for the 
activists o f  the M ay events, the party sought to forge alliances with single issue- and 
new politics groups. In its environmentalism, the party was undoubtedly acting out a 
sense o f  zeal — it was heavily involved in the setting up and running o f the 
Mouvement pour une alternative non violente (MAN) in 1974, which peacefully 
protested against the extension o f France’ s nuclear energy policies. On April 26 
1975, the PSU joined together with Amis de la Terre and the Mouvement Ecologique 
to mount an  anti-nuclear day o f  marching, the first one to  have a national reach. 
(Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 43). It was also a major component o f the Réseau 
des Amis de la Terre, which ran a joint list in the 1978 legislative elections. The PSU 
banner, Front autogestionnaire, a structure set up by the PSU in collaboration with 
M AN , feminists and regionalists, was a truly postmaterialist movement, albeit an 
unsuccessful one (op. cit.). A s noted earlier, a PSU representative was Minister for 
the Environment in the 1981-4 PS-led government. Even as late as 1989, when the 
PSU had ceased to exist, a remnant o f  the party tried to stay in politics and bring 
together a new left -  it chose the name Alternative Rouge et Verte (AReV).116 A t the 
Dijon Congress o f  1969 and the 1 7 Theses adopted summed up  the PSU ’s value 
system: capitalism was in crisis and universal suffrage was poor imitation o f 
participatory democracy; the Left’s structures and ideology were bankrupt (Rocard, 
1969), with the PCF in particular drawing the PSU ’ s fire.
In terms o f  increasing the responsiveness o f  government to new forces within 
society, the PSU was distinctive to both the PS and the PCF. Anti-communism had 
always been a feature o f  the PSU, but it became a leitmotif under Rocard’s 
leadership. He refused to sign the Programme Commun in 1972 because he thought
116 www. Igu. ac. uk/langstud/politics/psu. htm
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its analysis o f  the problems and proposals to amend them were obsolete. He also did 
not want to be a party to any agreement that would revive the P C F ’s fortunes. 117
B y the mid-1970s, the party had exhausted its appeal to voters, and 
consequently, there are n o other policies to analyse. I t  continued its emphasis on 
remaking democracy in the state, helping fringe groups, and urged the adoption o f 
measures to protect the environment.
6.3.2.1 fa): Summary o f  the policies o f  the PSU
W e concur with Inglehart (1971, 1977) that the PSU offered a new politics platform. 
Its radicalism may be seen in its desire to change the terms o f politics away from 
class-antagonism and to concentrate on improving the quality o f  life, most especially 
at work. The party’s willingness to forge new alliances marked it out as a new 
politics vehicle, able to link up the wider arena o f  protest politics. H3 is supported.
6.3.2.2: The profile o f the PSU electorate
We do not have any good quality data on the age profile o f  the PSU electorate, as its 
vote was so low that surveys and exit polls could not adequately discern it. 
Consequently, we only have ‘ snapshot’ data o f  the PSU when it comes to depicting 
their electorate and even this holds for only two dimensions - (a) the occupational 
profile, and (b) their views on religion.
W e use the 1978 legislative election study to graph the occupational profile 
o f  the PSU voter in Table 6.5:
117 Of course, it can now be seen that the Programme Commun hampered the PCF at the polls by 
allowing Mitterrand’s PS to secure everything to the left whilst targeting his message at centrist and 
disillusioned right-wing voters. The resurgent PS left the PCF in its wake in the 1981 elections.
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Farmer 2
Petit bourgeois 4
Higher mgmt and prof. 9
Mid. mgmt. 19
Employee 14
Worker 16
Other employed 3
Student 1 1
Housewives 17
Retired 5
Table 6.5: The occupational status of the PSU electorate at the 1978 
legislative elections; after Capdevielle et al., 1981: 246.
It is apparent that the PSU vote was disproportionately drawn from the 
managerial and educated classes. N o party scored higher than them in their 
percentage base in the middle managerial cluster and white-collar sectors, and only 
the Environmentalists exceeded their vote share o f  the students (Capdevielle et al, 
idem). The PSU was w ell placed to exploit the M ay 1968 events to its benefit among 
young voters as it was strongly represented in the main students’ union, the Union 
Nationale des Etudiants Français orU N EF (Knapp, 2004: 121-2).
This is an exact match with Inglehart’s categorization o f  the postmaterialist 
electorate as one that is predominantly better educated and middle class (Inglehart, 
1977, 1985, 1990 and passim).
In Table 6 .6 , we have the figures for the religious beliefs o f  party blocs taken 
at a 1977 survey:
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Catholic
practice
PSU PCF PS and 
allies
Right
Regularly O 4 15 81
Irregularly 2 1 1 28 59
Non-practising 3 24 33 40
Non-religious 9 36 34 2 1
Table 6.6: The secular nature of the PSU voter in 1977: after Hayward, 1983: 80. 
The disproportionate number o f PSU supporters who described themselves as 
o f  no religion tallies with Inglehart’ s description that new voters are more likely to 
reject religion. (Inglehart, 2003: 2).
6.3.2.2 fa): Summary o f  the PSU voter profile
W e have such little information here that it is difficult to come to any reliable 
judgment; however, what evidence there is indicates that the typical PSU voter was 
likely to be salaried and to hold secular views on religion. In short, this description 
supports H3.
6.3.2.3: The party’s impact at the polls
A s an avowedly pro-student party that had a strong anti-system bias, the PSU was 
the only force in the late 1960s on both sides in France that was not out o f  kilter with 
the newly-turbulent France. The poor performance o f  both the SFIO and the PCF at 
the 1969 presidential elections and Rocard’ s creditable tally o f  3.6 per cent induced 
commentators to predict great things for him and his party (Bell, 2000: 22). W e note 
the party’ s performance in Table 6.7:
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1968 (L) 1969 (P) 1973 (L) 1978 (L) 1981 (L)
4 3.6 1.98 1.15 0.75
Table 6.7: The PSU’s percentage share of the vote at five elections, 1968-1981; after
Inglehart, 1971 and Bell, 2000: 22.
The electoral record proves that these commentators were wrong. The PSU 
could not in any w ay be said to have been electorally successful -  they never reached 
a five per cent threshold and only returned three and four deputies in the 1978 and 
1981 legislative elections. The PSU won four seats in the 1967 parliamentary 
elections (Bell, 2000: 20) and despite being able to attract a disproportionate share o f 
the rebel’ s votes in the contest held in June 1968 due to the party’ s pro-student 
stance, they could still only poll four per cent nationally (Inglehart, 1971) and did 
not win any seats (Sassoon, 1997: 402). The party hovered around this level at their 
next contest where Rocard polled 3.6 per cent in the first round o f the 1969 
presidential election. Rocard’ s refusal to sign the Programme Commun in 1972 
ensured that it came to be viewed as a fringe force on a uniting left, as the party 
polled very badly at the 1973 legislatives. These results were so bad that Rocard felt 
it behoved him to leave the party. Without its main personnel, the party could not 
hope to make the vital breakthrough by itself and tried a policy o f  alliances. A t the 
1978 legislative elections, the party ran a joint list with regionalists, feminists, and 
anti-nuclear protestors. W ith 201 candidates in the field, they polled only 1.15 per 
cent o f  the national vote. The results were at floor level and remained so for the rest 
o f  the party’ s existence -  in the first round o f  1981 legislative elections, for example, 
the party ran 132 candidates but only obtained 0.75 per cent o f the vote nationally 
and did not have a presence in any second-round run-off. It voted for its own 
dissolution at its 1989 conference. H3 is not supported.
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The PSU is a crucial case for H3; Inglehart describes it as a party that defines new 
politics. We have seen that in its policies; demographics; and in one value 
(secularism) o f  its supporters, that this is valid. However, the fact that the party never 
made an electoral breakthrough suggests that new politics has not become 
increasingly popular. I f  anything, the opposite applies. From a creditable 
performance in the 1969 presidential, the party performed at floor level. It may be 
said to have effectively vanished with the departure o f  M ichel Rocard, and from 
1978 until 1989, it had ceased to be a party worth examining. In fact, it could be 
argued that the party’ s biggest impact is indirect, when its former leader, Rocard, 
served as the PS prime minister from 1988-1991. The tenet o f  Inglehart’s argument 
is that the new politics parties w ill grow; i f  not, then there is no party-system 
indication o f  any values-based revolution. A s we have seen, the PSU failed to secure 
its place in French politics. H3 is only partly supported by the PSU.
6.3.3: Level Three change -  Les Verts
Richardson (1995: 14), in a survey o f  Green parties in Europe, repeats the oft-stated 
hypothesis that ecological concerns can only be elevated to become political ones in 
states with a high standard o f  living. Such states are post-industrial in their economic 
activity and likely to be postmaterialist in their value structure. This line o f 
argument, proposed by, inter alia, Marien (1977) and Inglehart (1977, 1990) would 
result in all Green parties being deemed axiomatically postmaterialist. Kitschelt 
(1990) gives a related account but it diverges in concentrating on the political
63.2.4: Summary o f  the PSU
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opportunities framework and is thus less theoretically Inglehartian. What Kitschelt 
proposes is that as the established left underwent retrenchment and moved right in 
the 1970s, a space emerged on the left that the Greens filled. A  second factor behind 
the Greens’ development occurred within the same time frame, namely the nuclear 
power issue. A s a  result o f  these tw o ‘opportunities’ , the Greens became a fully- 
fledged party in much o f  Western Europe. Richardson (ibid) is not convinced by this 
argument, writing that Kitschelt relies excessively on the West German and Belgian 
parties and not at all on southern Europe. A  second lacuna is Kitschelt’s 
unwillingness to adequately record just how divergent from the rhetoric o f the 
modified N ew Left much o f the ecology movement’ s pronouncements were.
In France, the formal recognition that the environment deserved its own 
political domain may be traced to 1972, when the first Minister for the Environment 
was appointed in Messmer’s first government (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 
1993). One obstacle is that, unlike the Irish case, one does not have a single party to 
analyse, but two (with assorted splinter groups). One must bear in mind that there 
was no uniform manifesto or environmental programme commun for the Green 
parties: Lalonde’ s Génération Ecologie (GE) was in favour o f  both a nuclear defence 
strategy and the maintenance o f  France’ s nuclear power industry (Richardson, 1995: 
17). These are stark divergences from the thinking o f les Verts and, in Richardson’ s 
view, disqualify GE as a Green party. The student should note that it is more 
profitable to think o f  the environmentalists’ policies and ideas rather than the 
platform o f any one party. This section focuses in the main on les Verts due to their 
comparative longevity and success in winning votes and gaining cabinet seats.
Variegated ecological movements in France supported the campaign o f  René 
Dumont in the 1974 presidential election, but as a party proper, the history o f the
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Greens118 is less amenable to track. Ecologie 78 was formed as the result o f  a 
meeting o f  the Rhône-Alpes ecological movement (M ERA) with the intention o f 
competing as an autonomous party in the 1978 legislative campaign. The next major 
mutation was in 1981, when at a joint convention which brought together Amis de la 
Terre, the Fédération écologiste and some members o f  the Mouvement d Ecologie 
Politique (MEP), the Confédération écologiste (CE) was established; the party was 
officially founded at a meeting in Rennes in 1982 (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 
6 6 ). Alm ost simultaneously, the reminder o f  the MEP launched a separate party, 
while the Communists sponsored a spin-off group, the Mouvement national de lutte 
pour l ’environnement (MNLE). The Green parties fought on an internecine level as 
w ell as trying to establish themselves as creditable electoral machines and during the 
period from 1986-93, three reasonably discrete strands o f  Green thinking and politics 
result which try to gain the upper hand over each other, respectively headed by: the 
moderate reformist Waechter; an ‘alternative left’ group with Cochet and Anger at 
the helm, and Les Verts au pluriel faction with Dominque Voynet in command (Cole 
and Doherty, 1995: 52). Under Dominique Voynet, Les Verts formed part o f  the 
gauche plurielle coalition o f  1997-2002 with the PS, the PCF and (initially) the 
M DC. W e now turn to the policies o f  les Verts.
6.3.3.1: The policies o f les Verts
The key question is the extent to which the ‘Green parties’ offer a distinctively new 
policy package. Even in 1974, though, the range o f  Dumont’s policies was broad and 
evidently something o f  a repackaging o f  extant ideas -  self-control for workers, 
students and teachers; tackling the degrading quality o f  life and changing overnight
118 Throughout this section, an upper case ‘G’ refers to the collective of environmentalist parties, 
voters and policies. The French term is used to describe the specific party and associated details.
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France’s policies regarding the Third World (Dumont, 1974). The first idea was 
borrowed from the PSU ’ s ideal o f  autogestion, while the second had a heritage 
reaching back even further than the Second International. Only the ecology element 
was ‘new’ . B y the time o f  the 1981 presidential election, the ecologists’ manifesto 
had five themes that broadly resembled Dumont’s: make the economy more 
responsive to people’s needs, limit the activities o f  the state, lessen the sense o f 
isolation in society, protect the environment and develop a feeling o f  world 
solidarity (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 62).
In the early 1990s, les Verts were decidedly split over the Maastricht Treaty, 
with Waechter campaigning for it and Voynet and other prominent figures such as 
Blandin opposing it at the hustings (Cole and Doherty, 1995: 56). B y 1997, the party 
had increasingly made room for non-environmental concerns - their 1997 manifesto 
wanted to  introduce a 32-hour week ( Hainsworth, 1998: 77). Their 1997 national 
assembly manifesto specifically mentioned that mad cow disease was a pressing 
worry and should be acted on by the next government. Other salient policy 
commitments included the aim to cut the working week to 32 hours by the year 2000 
and rebuilding the social security system to better aid the unemployed and the under- 
25s. They also stressed the need for a level o f  political control o f  the European 
Central Bank (ECB) (Les Verts, 1997) in addition to the repeated demands to halt 
further construction o f  nuclear power plants and to impose a carbon tax.
In government, the party commented loudly on the need to change laws in 
immigration, namely to liberalise immigration policies, to grant the vote at 
municipal and European elections to non-French residents, and to give residence 
permits to all sans-papiers119 The party has always favoured proportional
119 Drawn fom Rnapp, 2004: 196.
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representation. A s minister, Voynet introduced the ‘precautionary principle’ , which 
banned the importation o f British beef as the BSE crisis broke, deemed by Hayward 
(2002: 257) to be a good example o f  where the protection o f  consumers as citizens 
via the attempt to raise food production standards was championed by les Verts. It is 
not surprising that the party acted in true postmaterialist fashion on the question o f 
nuclear power. They had come out strongly against the construction o f the 
Superphénix installation, but diverged from the PS on their reasons. The PS 
terminated the project only when cost overruns threatened to burden the state with a 
massive bill, and when technical problems led advisors to question its viability. Les 
Verts, on the other hand, opposed it on first principles. 120
Once in office, however, the party had to learn the tough lessons o f 
compromise, most especially over nuclear power where it is improbable that France 
w ill abandon its investment in this area. The road hauliers’ protest over fuel taxes 
were defused by Jospin’s pledge to give some leeway to this lobby and in doing so, 
the policy o f  taking steps wherever possible to lessen ozone damage was inevitably 
compromised (op. cit.). The party supported the PS on bills to reform Corsica’s 
status; to establish the principle o f  gender parity; and backed reform o f  detainee’ s 
rights (Knapp, 2004: 195). This shift towards political moderation may also be 
traced in their views on military action. GE supported the G ulf War while les Verts 
argued loudly against it. A s a strong tradition o f  pacifism veins les Verts, Boy notes 
how striking i t  then was to  see Voynet and her colleagues supporting the French 
armed forces’ deployment in Kosovo (Boy, 1999: 677). This marks a subtle shift in 
the overall pacifist strain within les Verts -  they had opposed the first G ulf War, but 
by the late 1990s, had moved away from an absolutist ‘no war’ stance to one
120 See Jospin’s investiture speech for his reasons for abandoning the project.
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predicated on a case-by-case basis. The principled aspect o f  the Greens manifesto 
had to give way to the pragmatism o f holding office. It was against this backdrop o f 
a clash between expediency and ideological purity that the party chose their 
candidate for the presidential elections o f  2002. Their hitherto reformist platform 
altered with the nomination o f  Alain Lipietz as the party’ s candidate in 2001. Lipietz 
is a very notable thinker in les Verts, a former Maoist who is trenchantly set against 
globalisation. As economic spokesman for the party, he was in favour o f a reduction 
o f  the working week to 35 hours with no loss in pay (a policy taken up by Minister 
for Employment, Martine Aubry in the 1997-2002 administration) and 
controversially argued that France should increase its intake o f immigrants to meet 
labour shortages and provide a tax base to adequately finance the pensions o f  those 
about to retire, a volatile proposition in France. 121 His main publication, Towards a 
New Economic Order: PostFordism, Ecology and Democracy (1992), indicates the 
expansiveness o f his policy concerns and shares the voguish language o f Inglehart’ s 
writings. He was forced to pull out before the campaign proper because he opposed 
outright the coalition’ s handling o f  the Corsican issue. His replacement, Mamère, 
had a raft o f measures in his manifesto that can only be described as 
postmaterialist.122 Four policy pledges stand out in particular -(i) the legalisation o f 
cannabis; (ii) lowering the voting age to 17; (iii) emphasising that policing was not 
the answer to crime in the suburbs -  he advocated recruiting 10 ,0 0 0  workers for the 
700 ‘ sensitive urban areas’ .123, and (iv) reducing France’ s reliance on nuclear power. 
This last policy  pledge was perhaps the most postmaterialist, as there has always 
been a marked unwillingness among all established parties to reduce the proportion 
o f  France’ s power needs that is generated by nuclear installations. Mamère’s pledge
121 www.web.net/32hours/lipietz.htm
122 Drawn from Knapp, idem.
was to scale nuclear energy’ s input from 80 per cent to 60 per cent, in direct 
contravention to the coalition government’ s stance. The announcement was 
controversially made outside a chemical plant in Toulouse where there had been a 
major accident (Bell, 2003: 31).
6.3.3.1 iaV Summary o f  the policies o f  Les Verts
The policies o f Les Verts have consistently been postmaterialist. Even in 
government, when the hard realities o f  office would have forced them to 
compromise, most notably on the fuel protests o f  2 0 0 0 , where they had to row in 
behind Jospin, the party tried more often than not to implement a raft o f quality o f 
life measures. The evidence here supports Inglehart’s hypothesis.
6.3.3.2: The profile o f the Green electorate
Unlike the situation with the PSU, we have sufficient data to enable us to give a pen 
picture o f  the Greens’ electorate in terms o f (a) their class (b) their age and (c) their 
value profile. A s before, in order for Inglehart’ s hypothesis to be supported, the 
electorate o f  this party must be more middle class, younger, and more liberal on a 
range o f  issues -  i f  these markers apply to the Green voter, then Inglehart’ s 
hypothesis is supported.
There is a reasonable amount o f  material on the characteristics o f  the Green 
voter that are based on second-order elections. W e look at that later in this section, 
but begin  in Table 6 .8  by detailing the occupational profile o f  the Green voter at 
first-order elections:
123 This is a euphemism for the disadavntaged banlieues.
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1988 (P) 1995 (P) 1997 (L) 2002 (P) 2002 (L)
Farmer 6 4 0 0 0
Petit
bourgeois
3 2 3 2 6
Mgmt and 
professions
7 8 8 7 6
Intermediate 7 6 6 9 6
White-collar 5 4 4 4 4
Blue-collar 2 2 2 4 5
Retired 2 1 1 1 2
Table 6.8: The occupational profile of the Green electorate at five legislative (L) and 
presidential (P) elections, 1988-2002; after Knapp, 2004:186.
W e note that the party performs best amongst the middle to higher salaried
classes and worst amongst the farmers and petit bourgeois; this is as per Inglehart’ s
description o f  a new politics party relying disproportionately on the middle classes.
On age, we use the same source and the results are given in Table 6.9:
1988 (P) 1995 (P) 1997 (L) 2002 (P) 2002 (L)
18-24 4 3 4 14 9
25-34 1 6 5 10 6
35-49 4 5 5 6 4
50-64 2 2 3 2 2
65 + 2 1 3 1 2
Table 6.9: The age profile of the Green electorate, 1988-2002; after Knapp, op. cit.
The party does much better amongst the two young voter cohorts in the two 
elections o f  2 0 0 2  than before, but this is a divergence from earlier contests.
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Manière’s score amongst the 18-24 group was the best o f  all the candidates at the 
first round o f  the 2002 presidential contest, and second only to le Pen among the 25- 
34 year-old c ohort (Muxel, 2003, p. 34). It is unwise to read too much in to the 
party’ s performances in 2002. In fact, the only sure thing that may be said about the 
age profile o f the party’s electorate from 1988-2002 is that it is old people are least 
likely to vote for it - oblique support for Inglehart’ s hypothesis.
There is further support for the view  that the party does best among young 
voters in the shape o f the European election surveys for 1989 and 1999. The 
SOFRES election-day survey for the 1 999 Europeans r eveals that the Greens had 
disproportionate support among the young -  19 per cent o f  18-24 year olds said they 
would vote Green compared to the actual national vote share won by the Greens o f 
ten per cent (Boy, 1999: 677).
One additional way o f  categorising the typical voter is by means o f 
geography. A  combined analysis o f  the 1992 regional and 1999 European elections 
brings together the profile o f the GE electorate in 1992 and that o f  Cohn-Bendit’ s - 
led Verts in 1999. It clearly demonstrates that the central arrondissements o f  Paris 
were the most likely localities o f  Cohn-Bendit voters (Boy, op. cit. 683). Boy argues 
that the fashionable arrondissements II-V, X  and X I have a disproportionate number 
o f inhabitants w orking in  the cultural and knowledge sectors o f  the economy and 
that these people are classically more likely to be Green voters. Cohn-Bendit’ s list 
performed very creditably in the more outlying X V III-X X  arrondissements, which 
B oy explains by attributing the migration o f creative professionals from the central 
areas o f  Paris due to rising property prices to these quarters. Rural voters are 
markedly unlikely to vote Green: the CPNT list headed by Saint Josse had a 
contradictory demographic profile (-0.60 correlation between the lists) at the 1999
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European elections (op. cit.). In the 2002 presidential election, the attractiveness o f 
the Green candidate, Mamère, is evidenced by his showing among young voters. His 
score o f  14 per cent in the 18-24 group is a trebling o f  his overall vote share o f five 
per cent (Muxel, 2002: 55).
This line o f  thinking is extended by Sellers (1998), who pays great attention 
to locale. Sellers claims that university towns are a strong source o f  Green votes and 
a likely milieu for environmentally friendly policies at the local level. He examines 
the voting record and subsequent incumbency record for local councils in Germany 
and France from 1982-95. The university factor is, Sellers proposes, responsible for 
the typical demographic o f  the Green voter: university towns ‘ ...occupy a position 
analogous to  that o f factory towns in  the emergence o f the o ld  workerist L e ft . . . ’ 
(ibid. 191) in that young, Green, postmaterialist voters are far more likely to reside 
in such towns than in very large cities or rural areas. This interpretation is bome out 
by an assessment o f the local election results which reveals that in France, the Green 
parties did  better w hen the size o f  the population involved in the university grew 
disproportionately to the size o f  the town overall and where the absolute number o f 
students increased. Sellers is patently arguing that it is not just students, but those 
who work in the creative and liberal setting o f  universities per se who are more 
likely to vote Green. This amounts to an advance on Inglehart’ s original 
demographic analysis.
In terms o f  values and beliefs, 124 the Green electorate is manifestly 
postmaterialist -  76 per cent were either atheist or non-practising Catholic (20 and 
56 per cent respectively) and were the least likely o f  all parties’ supporters to 
condemn pre-marital cohabitation, marital infidelity and homosexuality. Only the far
124 Based on Bennahmias and Roche, 1992
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left voters had a more modem view on the role o f  women, and in terms o f  cultural 
tolerance, the Green voter was the most likely to disagree with the statements (a) that 
they were proud to be French (b) that there were too many immigrants in France and 
(c) that Jews have too much power. They were also the least desirous o f  seeing the 
return o f  the death penalty (Bennahmias and Roche, 1992: 168-74). On one point 
alone are they similar to the far right voter -  both classes are more likely than not to 
distrust the political classes, a similarity noted by Inglehart (1977). Bennahmias and 
Roche (1992: 177) propose that four main motives for voting Green emerge from the 
survey data:
1 •
1. A  critical, even disgusted view  o f politics.
2. A  sense that the PS has betrayed voters and the 
progressive cause.
3. An interest in the environment and quality o f  life.
4. A  desire to promote a third way o f managing society.
A ll o f  these correspond quite neatly to how Inglehart explains the emergence 
o f  a new axis electorate (Inglehart, 1984): the old left is seen as unsatisfactory in 
what it does and irrelevant to new pressing concerns.
The 2002 French electoral panel study brings out the distinctiveness o f the 
green electorate. Mamere’ s voters were not significantly different from the rest o f 
the electorate on economic questions such as the need to reduce the gap between rich
and poor, but as we see in Table 6.10, they are typically postmaterialist:
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Not very- or
Somewhat
important
Very important Extremely
important
R e s p e c t  t r a d i t i o n s  a n d  
c u s to m s
73 17 10
D e fe n c e  /  p r o t e c t  
a g a in s t  e n e m ie s
58 26 16
A m b i t i o n  /  w o r k  h a r d  
t o  s u c c e e d
59 27
R e d u c e  t h e  g a p  
b e tw e e n  r i c h  a n d  p o o r
23 40 36
E u r o p e a n  o r  F r e n c h  
i d e n t i t y
S o le lv  F r e n c h  1 7 More French 32 Eaual 52
Completely agree 
or agree 
somewhat
Completely 
disagree or 
somewhat 
disagree.
M o r e  f r e e d o m  f o r  
b u s in e s s
46 54
T o o  m a n y  im m ig r a n t s 2 0 80
C u t  n u m b e r  o f  c i v i l  
s e r v a n t s
32 69
S u s p e n d  t r a n s f e r s  t o  
f a m i l i e s  o f  d e l in q u e n t s
30 70
B r i n g  b a c k  t h e  d e a th  
p e n a l t y
19 81
Table 6.10: The values and attitudes ofMamère ’s supporters at the first round of the 
2002 presidential election; after the preliminary results of the 2002 French electoral
panel.126
The typical Green voter is the least likely to be nationalist, as measured by 
the items on immigration and sense o f  identity; the most liberal on law and order 
issues as tapped by the death penalty and social welfare / delinquency items., and the 
least traditional in terms o f  how they view  the respect due to customs and established 
ways o f  living. A ll o f  the above is congruent with Inglehart’ s description o f  a new 
voter.
6.3.3.2. fa): Summary o f  the Green voter profile
Most o f  the available data on the Green voter shows them to be young and centred in 
urban areas, with some (less strong) evidence that they are more educated as well.
125 The author’s own term, directly translated.
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B y  the time o f  the 1989 European elections, the Green127 electorate was, along with 
that o f  the Centrists, the most educated (34 per cent had a university education) and 
also had a greater household income (40 per cent placed themselves in the top two 
monthly income categories). After 1989, however, both les Verts and GE were able 
to move a little beyond these parameters and attract a cross-section o f  the electorate 
(Libération, 23 March, 1992; cited ibid. 61). However, their strength still lies 
primarily in the younger and more educated sections o f  the electorate and thus tallies 
with Inglehart’ s hypothesis. Based on the 2002 panel study, they are clearly 
postmaterialist in their values and attitudes. The evidence in this section supports 
Inglehart’ s hypothesis.
6.3.3.3: The party’s impact at the polls
In Table 6.11, we present results for all ‘ecology’ parties at both legislative (L) and 
presidential (P) elections from 1974-2002
1974 (P) 1.32
1978 (L) 2.18
1981 (P) 3.88
1981 (L) 1.07
1986 (L) 1 .2 1
1988 (P) 3.78
1988 (L) 0.35
1993 (L) 1 1 . 1
1995 (P) 3.3
1997 (L) 6.9
2002 (P) 5.3
2002 (L) 4.5
Table 6.11: The percentage share of the ecology parties at twelve first-order
elections, 1974-200212 .
126 solcidsp.upmf-grenoble.fr/cidsp/Desordre_electoral/ PEF2002_lersResultats_presse.pdf. Accessed 
2 Febraury, 2004.
127 For all this section, the term ‘Green’ refers to the list headed by Waechter at the 1989 European 
elections.
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The ecology movement increases its vote share, albeit from a very low base, 
in 1978 and 1981, and is then up and down until its very creditable showing in 1993, 
which came at the end o f  a sharp rise at he 1989 European and 1992 regional 
elections. One key reason for why the Greens perform so poorly in the 1981 and 
1988 legislative elections is their lack o f  funds due to having fought expensive 
presidential campaigns immediately preceding. Consequently, they were not able to 
finance a large number o f  candidates (cf. Goldey, 1998, idem, and Knapp, 2004, p. 
183). The party stayed above the five per cent threshold from 1997 through to the 
two contests o f  2 0 0 2 , but ends up with only two seats in the legislative elections. 
This result is indicative o f  their inability to insert themselves into the running as a 
major political party. Once again, a clearly postmaterialist party is unable to make an 
electoral impact.
6.3.3.4: Summary ofLes Verts
In terms o f policies, we have seen that les Verts have been much more inclined 
towards quality o f  life issues than not. B y  definition, environmental concerns have 
been looked on by political scientists (cf. Richardson, 1995) as being indicative o f  a 
non-materialist outlook. In terms o f  party support, on both demographics and 
attitudes, the French Greens may be described as postmaterialists. The party’ s failure 
to consolidate its electoral position having seen o ff  rival ecology groups is a finding 
which goes against Inglehart’s prediction that new parties would be able to draw on 
the shift in preponderance o f  postmaterialists among the electorate. Taking into 
account their traditionally sm all number o f  seats, their longevity and their acts in  
office, H3 is supported by the case o f  Les Verts.
128 See Goldey, 1998, p. 544, for a full listing of the numbers and type of each candidate running 
under the broad ecology/ green label.
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Of the three parties surveyed in this section, not one fully supports H3. The PS has 
undeniably been electorally successful, but nowhere does Inglehart’s case include 
evidence to suggest that people voted for them because of their stance on new 
politics issues. It is clear that from 1997-2002, they prioritised old issues. Inglehart’s 
exemplary ‘new politics’ party, the PSU, never achieved any real electoral gain, and 
did not succeed in substantially affecting France politics. It is not surprising that 
Inglehart did not update his readers on the fate of the PSU and what this tells us 
about PM and new parties. Les Verts is a different case; they are undeniably 
postmaterialist, b ut n ot very successful. I f  PM is correct, then there should be an 
ever-larger bloc of voter cohorts who would endorse their policies. Their electoral 
performances tell us otherwise.
On voter profiles, all three parties again combine to yield a mixed outcome 
for Inglehart’s hypothesis. The surest conclusion we have for Les Verts is that they 
are not attractive to old voters; the evidence for young voters is that there is a slight 
overrepresentation. On attitudes, the party is distinctively more liberal, and thus 
Inglehart would argue, more postmaterialist. We cannot even make these weak 
arguments for the PS, who resembles all the main parties in the indistinctiveness of 
their typical supporter. There is so little evidence for the PSU that all we can say is 
that their average supporter was more likely than not to be secular.
We may thus conclude that H3 is partly supported, in spite of Inglehart’s lack 
of a case for the PS (he barely mentions them) and his model’s patchy performance 
on the PSU.
6.3.4: Summary of the evidence for France
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6.4.1: Level Two change - Democratic Left (DL)
Like the PSU, DL also fit a first reading of Flanagan’s definition of left-libertarian 
parties (1987). DL’s vote share in the two elections it contested was below the 
threshold figure of five per cent mentioned as a competing criterion at the beginning 
of this chapter, but as it was a party of government it may be argued that the 
justification for assessing the party in this thesis is clear and reasonable. According 
to its first leader, Proinsias De Rossa, DL would focus right from the beginning on 
articulating policy preferences built around a new set of issues. Internally, the party 
would depart from the established top-down organization -  ordinary members would 
be seen as more than mere party workers and would be encouraged to help influence 
the direction of the party (Holmes, 1994: 151).129 In short, DL attempted to increase 
participation in  its own internal structure and to widen its b ase interest b eyond a 
purely class-based one — two measures that any left-libertarian (Flanagan, 1987) 
party should endorse if they wish to be regarded as such.
Democratic Left (DL) was founded in 1992 as the result of a failed Workers’ 
Party (WP) EGM motion by the leader, De Rossa, to radically alter both the 
organisation and policy content of the WP. Of the seven WP TDs, six left (including 
De Rossa) to form DL, and the bulk of the membership went in the same direction. 
From the outset, the nascent party was keen to stress its novelty and how it was a 
new force for change in Irish politics -  even its provisional (and aspirationally 
eponymous) name, New Agenda, explicitly aimed to convey this. The party was to 
remain in existence for only seven years; for nearly half its life, it was a
6.4: Ireland
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governmental party, holding one ministry and two ministries of state in the 1994-7 
Rainbow coalition. In 1999, having continued to fare poorly in the opinion polls 
after their disappointing 1997 general election returns, the party voted to merge with 
Labour.
The section on DL is inevitably shorter than that of its French homologue for 
two reasons -  it existed for a shorter period of time, so there is simply less to 
describe and juxtapose. Secondly, the PSU’s outlook was tinged by new 
philosophical trends that animated the French intelligentsia f or much of the mid­
century period; this does not apply to DL.
6.4.1.1: The policies ofDL
Quite apart from the organisational reform that De Rossa and his supporters wanted 
to conduct, the split from the WP came about as the consequence of an ever- 
deepening division on policy emphasis in the party, with the old guard stressing that 
the party should remain a class-antagonistic one while the modernisers sought to 
appeal to voters interested in ‘women’s rights.. .the environment... [and] consumer’s 
rights’ (Farrell, 1999: 41-2), about as Inglehartian a formula as one could hope to
Laver’s (1994, 1998) expert policy judgment articles are the only systematic 
attempt to gauge the policy positions of DL. The exercises focused on the manifesto 
content of all the main parties for the 1992 and 1997 elections. Only the axes most 
relevant to Inglehart’s quality of life / new politics issues are referred to here. 
Starting with the 1 992 manifesto, DL was deemed the most anti-clerical and was
129 Marxist scholars would argue that a politburo system, properly run, maximized the involvement of 
the ordinary card-carrying member. The Trotskyist- influenced operation of the WP would thus be 
seen as internally democratic. See Jakubowski (1990).
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judged to be the most permissive of all on abortion and homosexuality legislation, 
which tallies with Inglehart’s assertion that new left parties aimed to build a society 
comparatively free of moral intervention in people’s private lives. However, on 
another key new politics issue, the environment, DL broadly resembled every party 
bar the Greens in its position - that is, DL was not much concerned with 
environmental protection. Furthermore, on decentralization, DL was more against 
than in favour of this goal; Inglehart and Flanagan (1987) were both of the view that 
new left parties would do all in  their power to promote greater and more diffuse 
political participation at the most localized level possible.
By the time the 1997 manifesto was analysed, Laver had included a separate 
‘new politics’ category and although neither Inglehart nor PM is cited, it is evident 
that Inglehartian concerns are catered for by the axes of Decentralisation, Freedom 
of Information, and the Environment (Laver, 1998: 161). The credentials for DL in 
this area are not strong -  like the other parties but excepting the Greens, they give 
nothing more than a cursory mention of them in their manifesto. On the three new 
politics items, DL hovers around ten and eleven on the 2 0 -point scale -  hardly a 
radical stance for a party with new left pretensions (ibid. 166-170). DL’s emphases 
mirror those of the established parties: Northern Ireland attracts their greatest 
interest (frequency of references amounting to a salience measure), while they were 
most distinguishable from other parties on Tax, in Inglehart’s eyes, as ‘old’ a 
political issue imaginable. On the topic of Europe, DL does indeed diverge from the 
established parties. Leaving Laver’s expert judgments to one side, we note that in 
1992, DL was opposed to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on the grounds 
that it contained an incipient threat to Ireland’s neutrality and that the economic 
strictures necessary for monetary union were likely to damage the economy
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(Holmes, 1993: 107). On the first point, it may be argued that neutrality is in general 
a new politics issue, as it runs counter to the idea of power blocs exercising a 
military control over individual states and equates to the support of an international 
peace movement, listed by Inglehart (1984) as a postmaterialist concern. 
Complicating things a little is the fact that a nominal policy of neutrality has been 
followed by every Irish party right from the state’s inception. The balanced judgment 
would be, though, to credit this as a new politics issue that DL endorsed. It is not so 
simple to do the same, however, in the case of European integration, for reasons that 
stay well outside the parameters of this thesis.
Regarding the Social dimension, defined by Laver as a party’s views on 
abortion and homosexuality, DL is again in 1997 more liberal than any other. A 
problem here is that Laver does not classify this ‘sexual politics’ composite as a new 
politics entity, but it is reasonable to add this as a fourth element to the list. As may 
be seen from the foregoing, on only one issue out of four is DL distinctively 
different from the other parties, either in term s of salience or position.
In terms of specific policies, DL’s 1997 manifesto stressed the need to adopt 
the typical Keynesian130 measure of using the public sector to fight unemployment 
and increase the rate of welfare benefit to the poorest recipients (Democratic Left, 
1997). Unemployment and poverty are in no way congruent to new politics issues. 
One other new politics issue is the notion of a basic income -  the first governmental 
mention of this was made in the 2002 Green Paper on the topic. The literature review 
referred several times to the non-economic benefits such a move would bring, for 
example, facilitating volunteer work. The very notion of a basic income evidently 
has strong implications of an overall anti-poverty strategy, but it also has an
130 Such a term was not used in the manifesto.
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additional quality of life aspect in that it is not a simple redistributionist measure. 
The party balked at pressing for a basic income and in doing so, resisted some 
internal party pressure (Dunphy, 1998: 61) to propose the policy in both the 
manifesto and any subsequent government negotiations. With this omission, the 
solidity of the party’s new leftist classification is again eroded. The leftist position of 
DL is further corroborated by Laver, Benoit and Garry’s (2002) 131 computerised 
content analysis of Irish party manifestos which puts DL to the left of all the major 
parties.
The Strategy 2000: a radical agenda for change (Democratic Left, 1993) 
document is another confusing piece of evidence in that it expresses old leftist 
aspirations then proceeds to contradict itself: ‘Democratic Left recognises that 
capitalism does not have the answers to the world’s problems and that answer lies in 
the democratic transformation of society’, and urged the party to take on ‘vested 
interests and power structures’ by means of implementing ‘forms of public or social 
control of key means of production and distribution’ (quoted in Dunphy, 1998: 58), 
yet simultaneously stated that public ownership and planning were obsolete. The 
first three clauses are resoundingly socialist, almost anachronistically so, while the 
last retracts the ideological prescriptiveness of them all. In a new leftist vein, DL 
also acknowledged that a workerist party was ill-fated if it hoped to capture the 
institutions of the state as power was now ‘diffused with (sic) a number of 
competing sources of power: state institutions, capital, trade unions, media, public 
opinion, social movements and single issue groups, etc.’ (op. cit. my italics).
131 http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/kbenoit/wordscores/papers/WordscoresAPSR2_paper.pdf. 
Accessed 6 June 2003.
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Although the party was more liberal than the main Irish parties on sexual rights, the 
party was clearly and typically old left on its central policies. H3 is not supported.
6.4.1.2: The profile o f the DL electorate
We do not have much evidence to go on in describing the typical DL voter. In fact, 
we have nothing at all on the attitudes of its voters. There was no distinctive age or 
educational profile for DL voters (see Marsh and Mitchell, 1999: 170) -  Inglehart 
has repeatedly averred that postmaterialists are more likely to be young and well 
educated. A further piece of evidence contradicts Inglehart’s modeling of the support 
base of a new left party - the WP had primarily been a Dublin party and this 
remained a feature of the DL electorate (Holmes, 1994: 152). DL’s best 
performances were among workers in the Dublin suburbs (Nealon’s Guides, 1992, 
1997). This is shown in its 1997 election performance, where the party’s share of the 
vote in Dublin was twice that of its overall national percentage (five- versus two- 
and-a-half per cent).
We noted earlier in this chapter Sellers’ emphasis on the geography of new 
left support. He argued that the city is more likely to give rise to new parties than the 
more traditional rural setting. Interestingly, DL’s standing was consistently higher in 
Dublin than anywhere else. In two elections, a total of seven TDs were elected to the 
Dail and only one, Liz McManus, was from a non-Dublin constituency (and even 
here, she was disproportionately stronger in the urban areas of Wicklow adjoining 
Dublin). In a by-election in the course of the 28th Dail, one other non-Dublin TD was 
returned (Kathleen Lynch from Cork North-Central). Tellingly, no candidate from a 
rural constituency was successful in either of the two elections that DL contested.
6.4.1.1 fa") Summary of New Politics and DL
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When confronted with such a lack of evidence, it is difficult to reach a definitive 
assessment. On what we know, the party’s electorate was probably not 
postmaterialist, as on two of the three core demographic criteria, the evidence runs 
counter to Inglehart’s template and even on the third, the geographic location, the 
findings are inconclusive. H3 is not supported.
6.4.1.3: The party s impact at the polls
The poor performance of the party in the 1997 election served as a precursor to the 
demise of DL. In 1999, the decision to join Labour was presented as a merger, when 
surely the appropriate term was takeover, as the name remained that of the larger 
party. Whilst it could have been (and indeed was) argued by the more optimistic of 
the party supporters that the 1992 vote share of 2.8 per cent was due to the infant 
status of DL, the same could not be said for their 1997 performance. Certainly, the 
1992 election was a difficult start for the party -  they had already spent a 
considerable amount of their scarce resources on their anti-Maastricht campaign and 
they were left in the wake of a resurgent Labour, even after having tried to match 
their policies with Labour’s in advance of the poll (Dunphy, 1998: 56) in an attempt 
to maximize the left-wing vote. Their planning did not help the party. The same 
defence could not be used in 1997, where having completed three reasonably well- 
received years in office, its tally fell to 2.5 per cent (Murphy, 1998).
6.4.1.2 fa): Summary of the DL voter profile
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H3 is not supported, as the party only contested one election and then, when faced 
with a poor outcome, merged with Labour.
6.4.1.4: Summary ofDL
The party does not fit model of a postmaterialist party. Its rhetoric was clearly left- 
wing and it did not make any significant statements on modernization. Against, this, 
on Northern Ireland DL set itself apart in its self-depiction as a party that wanted to 
leave the struggles of the past behind. Similarly, its stance on sexual morality (read 
‘abortion and divorce’) marks it out as more liberal than either FF or FG. In its 
overriding emphasis on the economy, the party fits an old politics category. In terms 
of its support, we note that it was not disproportionately young or well educated, and 
we have no reliable information on its attitudinal base. Its inability to make any real 
headway at elections marks it out as another party that failed to attract support based 
on a platform that had a modicum of postmaterialist influence. H3 is not supported.
6.4.2: Level 3 change - The Green Party / An Comhaontas Glas
The Irish Greens would prima facie qualify as a new party, as the issue they have 
been so closely identified with, the environment, was for long absent from the list of 
priorities of the Irish state. Indeed, the first Irish Minister for the Environment, 
Sylvester B arrett, was only appointed as recently as 1977 by the then Taoiseach, 
Jack Lynch132. Another ex-Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, writes that the advent of the 
Greens in the 1980s was a specific tropism to the failure of the existing parties to
6.4.1.3 (a): Summary of the performance of DL
132 In terms of recognizing the worth of environmental protection policies, even this may be 
considered as a trompe I ’oeil, as transport and local government were the foci of this brief.
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take account of concerns other than the economy (2003: 61). On the basis of this 
assertion, then, the Greens in Ireland would corroborate Inglehart’s hypothesis o f 
how a new politics axis would first appear and how a party would derive from this 
new division.
6.4.2.1: The policies o f the Greens
Again, the most systematic work on party positioning in Ireland is that of Laver 
(1994, 1998) and his expert judgment studies. These indicate that the Greens have 
retained environment as their raison d ’etre but have also gone on to secure a 
consistent position for themselves in Irish politics that is distinctively different. On 
the two fiscal measures from the original study (‘raising taxes’ and ‘public 
ownership’), the Greens were placed to the left; they were deemed ambivalent on 
Europe and in favour of decentralisation. The Greens were the party with the greatest 
emphasis on two of Laver’s ten policy dimensions (Laver, 1994) -  those of 
environment and decentralisation ( ibid. 164). Continuing the reforming of politics 
theme as highlighted in their emphasis on decentralisation in the 1992 manifesto, the 
party adopted the most open-minded and democratic stance of all the parties on the 
‘freedom of information’ dimension (Laver, 1998: 170) and also gave it the greatest 
prominence. These distinctions also applied again to their stance on decentralisation 
in 1997. By the 1997 election, the experts judged the Greens to be an anti­
establishment party in terms of their opposition to the consensus politics surrounding 
Europe and foreign affairs. 133 Sinn Fein joined them on this anti-mainstream front. 
The fact that the Greens’ 1997 manifesto positions on these two issues placed them 
away from the established parties explains their involvement in the 2001-2 Nice
133 In the 1992 survey (published in 1994), ‘foreign affairs’ measured the extent to which a party 
supported close ties and political agreement with America
referendums. The ‘foreign’ affairs dimension tapped by the 1997 expert survey 
refers to whether or not the party favours a close relationship with NATO and / or 
the Western European Union.134
In the 2002 election, the party took pains to underline decentralisation and 
the twin concerns of political ethics and accountability. According to Bomberg 
(2002: 331), the latter two policy co-ordinates are the logical result of recognising 
that cross-European action is necessary to safeguard natural resources, but the 
imperative to grant greater subsidiarity in all aspects of decision-making runs against 
this grain. The anti-Maastricht campaigning of the Greens (they were a founder 
member o f  the National Platform for Employment, Democracy and N eutrality, an 
umbrella group for organising opposition to the main parties’ pro-acceptance push - 
Holmes, 1993: 107) was no once-off affair; in the two Nice referendums of 2001-2, 
the party was firmly anchored in the ‘no’ camp. Nice One and Two entailed 
considerable debate on how Ireland’s neutrality would be affected by the terns of the 
treaty; so much so that a coda, the Seville Protocol, was formulated which 
specifically ruled out Irish involvement in any military venture mounted by the EU 
without explicit provision for this by recourse to the Irish people in a referendum. 
The Greens (and specifically John Gormley) argued that this alteration did not in any 
way hinder any prospective Irish involvement in a NATO-led military project and so 
they urged a second ‘no’ vote.
In terms of the secular / moral factor, as Sinnott (1995) describes it, the 
Greens have moved from an unclear position (Whiteman, 1990) to a liberal one; 
their leader called for a ‘no’ vote in the abortion referendum of 2 0 0 2 , an amendment
134 Laver does not explain why this does not amount to a ‘defence’ dimension.
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of much debated complexity and in doing so, sided with the liberal, pro-choice, 
activist groupings.
Academic work on the 2002 manifesto is in abeyance at the time of writing, 
but in a pre-election newspaper interview (The Irish Times, March 30, 2002), 
Sargent reiterated his party’s commitment to setting a higher ethical standard for 
politicians. This is clearly a subject close to the Greens’ heart; Sargent himself was a 
prominent whistleblower on corruption of local politicians regarding the rezoning of 
land in Dublin in the early 1990s and his party remains untouched by allegations of 
impropriety. Their 2 002 manifesto maintained the overriding e nvironmental focus 
with, inter alia, proposals to restrict vehicular access to the cities at certain times, to 
spend less on roads and to increase petrol tax, and to levy a type of a carbon fuel tax. 
Their repeated bargaining position in the event of any coalition talks was the ‘non- 
negotiable’ control of the Department of Environment and less trenchantly, the 
desire to gain a ’super junior’135 position in Finance to influence infrastructural 
spending.
6.4.2.1 (a): Summary of new politics and the Greens
The Green Party is not as distinctively postmaterialist as its French counterpart, but 
its stance on decentralisation and an emphasis on ethics in power are of a piece with 
a new values party. These policy strands are presented in conjunction with a clear set 
of measures to enforce environmental protection and a willingness to give people
135 This office and the term first appeared in the Rainbow coalition of 1994-7, where the smallest 
party, Democratic Left, obtained the concession that their Minister of State, Pat Rabbitte, could sit at 
the cabinet table for discussions even though he was constitutionally prohibited from casting a vote. 
Since then, the phrase has referred to the idea of any enhanced junior ministerial position with cabinet 
access privileges.
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more say in how major political projects, such as European integration, affect them. 
In short, the Greens’ policies are those of a new politics party. H3 is supported.
6.4.2.2: The profile o f the Greens ’ electorate
There is little work of systematic rigour here. The 2002 National Election Study 
casts some new light on the Green voter. The relevant findings are presented in 
Table 6.12:
Manual Non-
manual
Reg.
Att.
Not
reg.
Att.
GAA Not
GAA
Union
member
Not
union
member
Rural Urban
1.9 6 .0 1 .8 6 .6 1.9 4.5 3.1 4.6 6 .0 2.5
Table 6.12: The profile o f the Green voter at the 2002 general election; after Marsh,
2003: 24.
We note that the Greens are much more successful outside the traditional 
working class and that their typical voter is less likely to be a trade union member. 
Furthermore, the Greens do better amongst those who verge towards secularism. On 
these three markers, the Green supporter fits Inglehart’s definition of a new politics 
voter. Moreover, statistical analysis of the profile of all voters at election time and of 
Eurobarometer surveys has consistently found the Green supporter to be more likely 
to be younger and better educated (Whitman, 1990: 55; Marsh and Sinnott, 1997: 
171). Green candidates do better in affluent urban constituencies than elsewhere -  
with five TDs from Dublin (three from the most affluent constituencies in the 
country) and one from another urban base in Cork, the Greens are predominantly 
reliant on city voters for their support. This runs against the NES finding that the 
party did better among voters located in rural areas, but geographical dispersal
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probably militates against the Greens actually gaining enough votes to take a seat 
outside of the cities.
6.4.2.2 (a): Summary of the profile of the Green voter
Based on the scant evidence we have, the party fits the description of one that acts 
as a vehicle for the Inglehart’s new type of voters. H3 is supported.
6.4.2.3: The party’s impact at the polls
The Greens’ emergence on the Irish political map may be traced to the 1989 General 
Election, when Roger Garland won their first Dail seat in Dublin South. The Green 
Party / Comhaontas Glas was not formed until 1988, but it had previously existed in 
two guises -  as the Ecology Party of Ireland (from 1981-3) and as the Green 
Alliance (from 1983-8). They first contested a general election in 1982. Table 6.13 
depicts their electoral record:
Year 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997 2002
Constituencies
contested
7 9 11 19 26 31
Percentage o f 
national vote
0 .2 0.4 1.5 1.4 2.76 3.85
Number o f 
seats
0 0 1 1 2 6
Table 6.13: The Greens ’ performance in Dail elections, 1982-2002; after the 
correspondingNealon’s Guides (1987, 1993, 1997, and2002).
Starting off from a tiny base, the Greens have shown steady if marginal 
improvement. On the three indices covered here, the party has incrementally grown 
in all of them. The curve took off sharply upwards in 2002 when they tripled their
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Dail representation. The two election successes for the Greens in 1997, Sargent and 
Gormley, topped the poll in 2002 in their respective Dublin constituencies, whereas 
in 1997, Gormley obtained the last seat by 27 votes. To attach too much weight to 
the results of the last election would be a mistake -  judging from the full time series, 
the prospects for the Greens for the next ten to fifteen years are probably healthy if 
unspectacular.136 One hindrance is the size of the party and the reduced scale of its 
resources -  it does not receive any large corporate donations and relies on its elected 
members to campaign and generally contribute on a continuous basis. It needs to be 
able to obtain the finance and the local network - the party is estimated to have only 
600 members - on the ground to contest more seats.
6.4.2.3 (a) Summary of the Greens’ performance
H3 is partly supported, as the party has not made a lasting breakthrough at the polls. 
Their 2002 seat tally was by far their best, but with a lack of widespread support, 
may well represent a peak for the party.
6.4.2.4: Summary - the Greens
The party’s policies are identifiably postmaterialist, as we would expect those of any 
environmentalist party to be (cf. Toke, 2000). Its electorate is more likely to be 
affluent, better educated, young, and urban, all of which match the postmaterialist 
demographics. Interestingly, it is the only party studied in this chapter, the PS apart, 
which could be said to have steadily increased its vote share and to have 
consolidated its position in the electoral landscape. Nevertheless, it is sincerely 
doubtful that it can become a major party.
136 However, the success of the Progressive Democrats as a governmental party, in spite of their size, 
suggests how the Greens could exert influence at executive level.
256
6.4.3: Summary of the evidence for Ireland
Inglehart could claim that Ireland was always going to be a difficult case for H3, as
there has never been a large left-wing party. It is precisely for this reason that Ireland 
qualifies as a deviant case for a small-n comparative study. H3 i s not supported for 
the following reasons. Firstly, the Greens did well in the 2002 election, but this was 
the first time they have won more than two seats. Unlike in France, the party has not 
gained office, but that is something that in some respects is outside a party’s control. 
Future coalitions may well include the Greens. We do not have a strong body of 
evidence to conclude that the Greens are particularly attractive to younger voters, but 
what evidence we do have suggests that they are more Tnglehartian’ in their 
demographic than not. There is no evidence - opinion poll, exit poll, or NES - that 
voters are attaching more decisive significance at election time to environmental 
issues. In short, the Greens hold up their side of Inglehart’s case, but only just.
The same cannot be said for DL. Their truncated existence and lack of a 
distinctive and broad new politics stamp weakens Inglehart’s case. Their work in 
cabinet does not merit a new politics label, as the portfolios their minister and junior 
ministers held did not fit a quality of life agenda. The single biggest difficulty for 
Inglehart’s case is the voter profile -  there is nothing to suggest that the party’s 
electorate fits the PM demographic. If there had been stronger support for H3 across 
the board from the Greens, then the hypothesis would have been partly supported, 
but the patchiness of the evidence for the Greens allied to the complete absence of 
support from DL lead us to reject the hypothesis.
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The hypothesis is not supported, and one’s overriding impression is that even the 
evidence that favours Inglehart’s case is quite weak. Individually, the new politics 
parties have not made a progressively greater impact in general elections. Two of the 
parties in the sample of five have faded into history, while the 2 0 0 2  election seems 
to have effaced les Verts as an effective electoral party. Only the Irish Green Party 
finished the period stronger than it had ever been during the course of its history, and 
here with only six seats out of 166. The PS is undeniably different; a party of 
government for much of the 1980s and 1990s, there is at present little cause for 
doubting its future. On electoral performance, the PS is a stand-alone case. Their 
successes from 1981 indicate that a new type of left-wing politics found favour with 
the French; it is reasonable to propose that many of their policies were 
postmaterialist in emphasis.
If a new politics party is judged by how successfully it taps into the 
burgeoning support for new politics, then one is faced with two conclusions -  neither 
DL nor the PSU were new politics parties or the new politics constituency is 
virtually non-existent in  general elections. As Inglehart repeats, the PSU were an 
archetypal new politics party; interestingly, he never mentions them in any of his 
writings after the late 1970s. At least the Green parties looked at in this chapter in do 
fit the ‘common sense’ argument by Inglehart -  they are electorally recent and they 
are likely to have a younger, more educated vote base.
In terms of the demographics and attitudinal base of the new parties, though, 
H3 performs better. The pattern fits for the Greens, both in France and Ireland, and 
for the PSU. It works less well for the PS and not at all for DL. According to Hug 
(2001) this is an intuitive outcome, as only the Green parties are categorically ‘new’,
6.5: Conclusion
258
both in terms of their age and issue base. Hug appends a caveat, though -  even the 
high levels of affluence as pertain in the Netherlands are no guarantee of a quick
137growing, viable Green Party.
The reader is confronted by four flaws in Inglehart’s model. Firstly, there is 
the methodological fault that he is inclined to rely on one-shot case studies. His 
enthusiastic coverage o f  the PSU (Inglehart, 1971, 1977) links the party with the 
emergent anti-system attitudes of the 1970s. He omits to mention the party’s 
negligible ability to win seats, even at its so-called high tide of 1968-73. Democratic 
Left fought two elections and never really advanced on the territory they marked out 
as the Workers’ Party. There is no measured attempt to look at the seedbed for 
previous new parties and how they fared. Inglehart is seduced by the new without 
adequately documenting the lessons gleaned from the old. To assume that the PSU 
could benefit from the wave of discontentment and rejection of the established 
parties is to assume a reliable linkage exists between attitudes and voting behaviour. 
Inglehart nowhere proves this and even worse, does not document the available 
literature on attitudes and voting intention. Inglehart would probably invoke the 
defence that it takes time for disaffection to result in alterations in the figures for as 
party support as '...major political parties represent great psychological and 
institutional investments; established voting patterns are not lightly discarded.' 
(Inglehart, 1984: 26). All well and good, but he should give the reader more specific 
figures as to what constitutes a breakthrough; how long does a party have to perform 
at this level not to be dismissed as an aberration, and when and where will such a 
party make this quantum leap.
137 In fact, the Harmel and Robertson study found no correlation between levels of postmaterialism 
and the emergnce of a Green party.
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Secondly, something not mentioned by Inglehart is that the large-n 
comparative work finds no strong correlation between the level of PM in a country 
as recorded in surveys and the presence of new politics parties. An analysis of post­
war elections in 15 western democracies found the relationship between PM and the 
number of new parties to be ‘very weak’ (Hug, op. cit. 91). This finding is thus of a 
piece with an earlier study by Harmel and Robertson (1985: 516) which found no 
correlation at all. Todosijevic and Enyedi (2003) find that the link between the 
percentage of postmaterialists in a country and that country’s degree of support for 
new politics attitudes was also weak. PM only attained significance as a predictor for 
three out of 16 ‘new politics’ variables. Strikingly, though, one of these is the exact 
opposite of Inglehart’s hypothesis; the vote share of new left parties in the 1990s was 
inversely related to the percentage of postmaterialists. The PM variable performed 
better in predicting individual behaviours, specifically, belonging to the peace 
movement and voting green in the 1990s (see Table 6.1)
Green 80s 0.39
Green 90s 0.65*
New left 90s -0.77*
New parties 
90s
0.16
Member of 
Env. group
0.51*
Two-tailed hypotheses; *significant at 0.05.
Table 6.14: How PM relates to new politics -  structures, attitudes and behaviours. 
After Todosejivic and Enyedi, 2003: 638
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♦ • • • 138In a similar vein, postmaterialists are slightly more inclined towards tax
policies being used with the aim of maximizing ‘redistribution for the sake of human 
solidarity’ (Inglehart, 1984: 55-6). The motives for tax redistribution are difficult to 
probe, but Inglehart is poor at explaining why old left supporters have different 
views on redistribution when compared with new left supporters. It appears that 
Inglehart’s work is applicable to some degree at the individual level, but not at the 
party system level. His best party ‘result’ is the success, durability and policy set of 
the PS, with the performance of the Greens coming in second place as they have not 
achieved consistently solid results in general elections. Even in the case of the PS, 
Inglehart does not attempt any such policy audit for any new politics party, other 
than at the most general level.
This brings us to our third criticism, that he leaves hanging the question as to 
how many new politics issues must a party take up in order for it to be gauged as 
postmaterialist. Although a raft of measures were enacted by the PS that could be 
reasonably said to be postmaterialist, this is an entirely different thing to saying that 
the fims et origo of such policies is PM.
Fourthly, his work pays scant attention to institutional factors. How the 
Greens fit into the ‘new party’ system is not fully explained by Inglehart. Callaghan 
(2000) documents how the Greens related to the left as a whole in the 1970s in 
Britain, Sweden, Norway and Germany. His article alone contains a more patiently 
arrived at description of possible points of policy divergence and endeavours to 
juxtapose how a renovated left tried to cope with the electoral presence of the 
Greens. Callaghan thus provides a more nuanced account of how environmentalism 
interacted with the new left across Europe, whereas Inglehart is remiss with regard to
138 And therefore, statistically not significantly.
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providing instances of specific new parties and how they related to each other. The 
above leads us on to questioning how Level One Change distinguishes itself from 
that occurring at Level Two. This chapter’s case selection was restricted from 
looking at a two instances of Level One party change as Ireland does not have any 
party that fits this bill. One obvious point not raised by Inglehart is that if there is a 
new political axis, then it follows that the constituent parties of the old axis must 
have either disappeared or be in the process of doing so. Let us take one fixed pole, 
the west European left. If Inglehart (1977; and Abramson, 1994) is correct, then 
these parties, originating in a class-antagonistic setting, will decline as new types of 
voter and issues emerge. Merkel (1992: 141), in his survey of European social 
democracy from 1945-90, records a remarkably consistent vote performance by 
socialist, social-democratic and labour parties. Taking the period from 1945-73, the 
left’s combined vote share was 31.7 per cent. From 1974-90, it was 31.5 per cent. 
There is no decline in vote share from the late 1960s. Whether the socioeconomic 
composition o f this percentage o f the e lectorate changes i s unknowable f rom this 
statistic, but Inglehart does not provide any evidence that it has, apart from the crude 
Alford Index.
This chapter set out to test whether new politics parties are becoming more 
prominent due to the presence of new voters and their associated new issues. We laid 
out three dimensions - presence of new politics issues in their manifesto; their ability 
to attract new voters, and their electoral success - along which we judged the 
performance of five parties, three French and two Irish. We found that Inglehart’s 
case was partly supported by the evidence for France, and not by the evidence for 
Ireland. There are two lessons to be taken from this chapter. The first one is that 
Kitschelt is more likely to be correct than Inglehart in predicting the formation and
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fate of new parties - he states that new parties can only succeed where ‘the 
unresponsiveness of existing political institutions coincides with favourable 
opportunities to displace existing parties’ (1994: 12). The mechanical rules of 
elections affect political actors, both voters and parties. This argument is ignored by 
Inglehart. The second lesson leads us on to our final chapter. Willey (1998: 656) 
notes that when the likelihood of success in forming a new party appears to be small, 
the potential instigators are most likely to turn to interest group-type activity. In 
Chapter Seven, we examine Inglehart’s argument that frustrated postmaterialist 
citizens resort to unconventional political behaviour.
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Chapter 7: Unconventional political
behaviour and New Social 
Movements
Introduction
All of Inglehart’s key works on PM pivot on two things: citizen-level political 
disaffection and what the citizen does about it. In Chapter Six we looked at what 
happens when new politics voters interact with an unresponsive electoral system. 
Inglehart has consistently argued that new parties will emerge to meet their needs, 
but, as we saw in the coda provided by Willey (1998), the institutional backdrop is 
critical. In  this chapter, we look at what the disaffected voter has done when the 
parliamentary avenue has proven to be a dead end; according to Inglehart, they will 
act unconventionally. Inglehart makes numerous claims on the nature and focus of 
unconventional political behaviour in Values, Ideology and Cognitive Mobilization 
in New Social Movements (1990). Let us begin this chapter by recapitulating 
Inglehart’s central points on this topic. Inglehart distinguishes postmaterialists from 
materialists in terms of education and propensity for political action. Instead of 
pressing for political change through the ballot box, the postmaterialist generations 
are more likely to opt for direct action. Inglehart reiterates the claim that while old 
politics issues are the currency of general elections, there is a discernible lessening 
of importance of such elections and their issue base in the eyes of younger citizens. 
New concerns based on, inter alia, the environment and citizen’s rights are more 
likely to be articulated outside parliamentary politics. The unconventional style of
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action which extraparliamentary politics implies has greater appeal to more educated 
and younger people.
This chapter’s focus is on unconventional political behaviour. As most of the 
recent literature in the field treats this form of activity as a subset of New Social 
Movements (NSMs), it may be said that in studying one, the other is included. We 
ask three questions in this chapter -  (i) are NSMs postmaterialist in their motives and 
do they use new tactics to achieve them? (ii) do their members have a distinctive 
values profile?, and (iii) have they had a progressively greater impact? In Part One, 
we look at Inglehart’s main claims in detail and derive our hypothesis. We outline 
our case selection criteria in Part Two to enable us to fairly test the hypothesis. Parts 
Three and Four are taken up with delineating how the hypothesis fits the cases of 
France and Ireland respectively. In detailing the following NSMs and instances of 
unconventional political activity, no attempt is made to pass off this selection of 
evidence as a comprehensive one; rather, what follows are instances and data that 
undoubtedly have a bearing on how we should appraise the fourth and final 
hypothesis. Finally, in Part Five, we discuss how tenable Inglehart’s claims are in the 
light of the evidence.
7,1: Inglehart’s main claims
Inglehart has written one very concise paper on the topic of New Social Movements 
(NSMs), Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements 
(Inglehart, 1990): 43-66. It takes up themes first articulated in his 1970 paper, 
Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity (1970) and enlarged upon in The 
Changing Structure o f Political Cleavages in Western Society (1984). The assertion 
common to all three is that younger publics are more educated and the concomitant
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increase in intellectual skills predisposes these more recent cohorts to involvement in 
extraparliamentary activity. Due to the length and comparative specificity of the 
1990 paper, this chapter is mainly concerned with the 1990 paper, but draws on his 
1984 chapter as well, even though it is somewhat oblique on the question of NSMs.
The 1990 chapter appeared in Dalton and Kuechler’s Challenging the 
Political Order. The work serves as a concise summary of the thrust of his theory of 
postmaterialism. In it, he stresses the link between cognitive mobilisation and values, 
namely that the more educated one is, the more likely one is to hold postmaterialist 
values: ‘Effective political action requires the presence of certain skills among the 
relevant individuals; even severe problems or a superb organization would be
139unlikely to mobilize a population consisting of illiterate and apolitical people’ (op. 
cit. 44). In alluding to previous research that Inglehart cites in support of the finding 
that the German Greens supporters are disproportionately postmaterialist, he extends 
the premise: ‘Postmaterialist values underlie many o f the new social movements’ 
(1990:45) -  namely, the anti-nuclear, peace, and ecology campaigns. In his 1984 
paper, Inglehart refers to how these issue bases are involved in protests against 
military installations, hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants, among others 
(1984: 29). By adding the two papers together, one has a seemingly straightforward 
argument -  postmaterialists are not likely to protest against ‘unemployment or 
declining real income’ (1984: 29) but instead take up cudgels against the problems 
of pollution a nd militarisation, f  or example. However, as the party system in the 
west is still, in the main, reflective of old politics issues, there arises a disjuncture. 
The parties campaign on issues that the new electoral cohorts find anachronistic 
(1990: 46, 63). The new cohorts have to resort to other means to articulate their
139 It would be fascinating to see how Inglehart would defend this assertion against the contradictory 
evidence presented in the form of, say, the Russian Revolution.
concerns. He writes that the western publics have become far more likely in the past 
two decades to engage in elite-challenging activities. (1997: 295-6). In Inglehart’s 
view, NSMs are a soi-disant indicator of changed political cleavage structure 
because of two distinctions -  their issue base and the tactics employed by their 
supporters: ‘The new social movements are new not only in their goals, but also in 
their political style and in the factors that mobilize their activists’. (1990: 63). The 
above points lead to the formulation of our fourth and final hypothesis:
H4: That due to system disaffection, there has been a rise 
in extraparliamentary activity, most notably in the form o f 
increases in the profile o f New Social Movement (NSMs).
In Part Two, we look at how we lay out our case selection for this hypothesis.
7.2: Testing the derived hypothesis
Unlike the situation for political parties, there is no one unambiguous definition we 
may use in order to rule groups in or out of our analysis of NSMs. As Inglehart’s 
work avoids a scientific definition of a new politics movement (we only have his 
definition of lifestyle politics), we draw on Rucht and Neidhardt’s (2002) guidelines 
as detailed below. These distinguish between ‘political change movements’, which 
set out to affect policy, and ‘personal change movements’, which do not (op. cit. 8 ). 
This cuts down on the universe of NSMs one has to contend with initially. We 
ignore ‘personal change movements’, which is a term both too broad and vague, 140 
and look instead only at those movements which set out to explicitly affect 
legislation.
140 For example, it could include skinheads and new age travellers,
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The question that then springs to mind is whether we can track similar 
numbers and types of NSMs in both states. Plainly, we cannot hope to document 
every group in both states that has had some element of a political agenda. All we 
can do is allow for a set of cases that reflect contemporary unconventional political 
behaviour within the specific context of each state’s political system. Ideally, this 
selection should allow us to juxtapose the tactics and results of a postmaterialist 
issue group (say, the women’s movement) with one that does not fit a new politics 
motivation (say, the rights and standard of living of the unemployed).
We assess the NSMs in three areas (a) whether they use new tactics to 
achieve postmaterialist goals; (b) whether their activists and supporters exhibit the 
classic postmaterialist profile, and (c) whether they are increasingly successful. The 
first part is difficult to operationalise. The first consideration is tactics -  we should 
find a clear difference in NSMs versus previous forms of political organisation in 
types of activity. The Dalton and Kuechler (1990) view is that NSMs differ in terms 
of tactics (Appleton, 2000: 58). Tarrow’s (1999) list of collective actions is a good 
one - strikes, marches, occupations of public and private buildings, rallies, blocking 
of thoroughfares and sit-ins. In other words, previous extraparliamentary movements 
should be found to have deployed a different repertoire of tactics. If this is not the 
case, then Inglehart’s hypothesis is not supported. The second point concerns the 
relative novelty of extraparliamentary activity. If Inglehart is correct, we should 
expect to see that unconventional activity was much less common pre-1968 because 
the postmaterialist value shift had not occurred. We now detail the NSM setting for 
France.
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Unlike Ireland, France has an established record of unconventional protest -  as 
Keeler and Hall (2001: 64) note, ‘what might be seen as outrageous elsewhere is 
treated as more normal in France’. They stress that a key theme in the understanding 
of groups in France, especially political ones, is the intrusiveness of the state in their 
affairs. They go on to observe that it is difficult to conceive of many governments in 
Europe who would act as the French did when a group of employees dumped 
sulphuric a cid in the Meuse river in protest at redundancy plan a t their chemical 
factory in 2 0 0 0  -  the government stepped in with a deal on a better package (idem). 
France has not been uniformly revolutionary, though - there has never been much of 
a peace movement, for example (see Hazareesingh, 1994, for an account of why this 
has been the case). Let us now begin with the first of our three questions -  whether 
NSMs are postmaterialist or not.
7.3.1: Issues and tactics o f NSMs
Kriesi (1995) writes that NSMs normally have one of three goals (a) instrumental, 
(b) counter-cultural and (c) sub-cultural. The first is self-explanatory, while the 
second is about the identity of external society and the third deals with within-group 
identity. The literature treats NSM activity in France as being classifiable according 
to a first or second wave of protest (see Duyvendak, 1995: 109-49). Appleton 
proposes that there are two waves of NSMs in France -  the first has its origin in May 
1968 and lasts until 1974,141 not surging again until the 1980s, and was mainly based 
on anti-racism, AIDS, gay rights and social solidarity: ‘Rather than macro-societal 
concerns, these movements appear to be predominantly focused on sub-cultural
7.3: France
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goals. They have tended to be less prescriptive in orientation than their first-wave 
counterparts and more defensively oriented.’ (op. cit: 62).142 ‘Second wave’ 
movements are more likely to act in terms of the second and third of Kriesi’s 
classifications, that is, counter-culturally and sub-culturally (op. cit: 65). Duyvendak 
brackets the periods differently, claiming that NSM activity levels were consistent 
from 1968 to the end of the 1970s, then there is a marked drop in NSM activity in 
France from 1980-84. Despite the small chronological differences in their 
arguments, both of these authors support H4i as they locate the qualitative shift to 
NSM activity post-1968.
The case of the women’s movement supports H4. The radical feminists were 
the first new politics group to attain status after the 1968 events. They wanted the 
abolition of the family and marriage and also strove to abolish sex roles entirely, and 
have it so that one’s life outcomes are dictated by neither gender nor sexual identity. 
The first explicitly feminist movement was Politique et Psychoanalyse, formed in 
1968 by a Lacanian psychoanalyst, Antoinette Fouque. Their activities mirrored 
those of the early PCF -  they set up a newspaper, a bookshop and a publishing 
house. Kriesi (1988: 3 6 6 ) describes ‘movement milieus’, where bars, newspapers, 
and communes set up by a group, literally amount to another way of life. These, 
though, are old tactics, as adopted by the Spartacists, among others. The movement 
did move on to adopt new tactics in the early 1970s. In August 1970, a small group 
of women, including writers, placed a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier, 
and dedicated the wreath ‘to the unknown wife of the soldier’ (ibid: 215). This was 
the act which ‘baptised’ the movement. The media and nation were shocked, to use
141 Duyvendak sees a second wave emerging from 1975-80, but Appleton thinks the data are not 
strong enough to support this.
142 Appleton does not enlarge on the relative solidaristic and welfare components of a public health 
concern like AIDS.
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Hirsh’s (1981) term, and the women dubbed themselves the Mouvement de 
Libération des Femmes. In 1971, a much attention was paid to the ‘Manifesto of the 
343’, a list of women who publicly declared they had had abortions as an attempt to 
lessen the stigma and change the law (Hirsh, op. cit. 218).
Appleton’s (2000: 73) view is that the women’s movement had a broad 
agenda for change at first, but in 1990s and onwards, it became more concerned with 
specifics such as violence, prostitution and sexual harassment. Their agenda is a mix 
of sustenance or materialist concerns (divorce law reform, protection against 
physical assault, equal opportunity and pay), to more ‘lifestyle’ issues such as access 
to birth control, abortion, and childcare. The movement qualifies as an NSM, with 
the tactics of the French groups being more diverse than those of the Irish ones. 
More specifically, their issue base and their date of origin are supportive of 
Inglehart’s claim.
Two movements appeared in the 1980s that also used a wide range of 
tactics. The blood transfusion crisis143 fuelled the AIDS movement, which lobbied 
for better medical care and enquiries into how the scandal happened. It is a trivial 
truth that AIDS is a new politics issue, as the disease was only documented in the 
1980s. The Comité d ’Urgence Anti Répression Homosexuelle de Paris (CUARH) 
movement lobbied Mitterrand in the run-up to the presidential election of 1981, 
offering to canvass support for him within the gay community if the PS acted 
positively towards gay rights on assuming office.144 Both groups used marches, 
petitions, concerts and media contacts to force politicians to attend to their concerns. 
The gay movement’s most significant joint stance was when it combined with SOS- 
Racisme and the LDH in protest at Chirac’s banning of the magazine Gai pied in
143 This was due to a policy of not adequately testing or treating donated blood which was later used 
in transfusaions.
1986 (Duyvendak, 1995: 194). In terms of tactics, there is a split between those 
groups who favoured lobbying and more traditional methods generally to get their 
message across, and Act-Up Paris, which was concerned both with gay rights and 
the government’s handling of AIDS. Tactics used by Act-Up included ‘zaps’, where 
activists would confront a politician while s/he was being interviewed for television 
in a public space, and ‘die-ins’, where activists would lie on the ground in a public 
space. Banners placed alongside them would criticise government policy on AIDS 
(Waters, 2003: 132). One oversight on Inglehart’s part is that it is trivially true that 
AIDS is a new politics issue, as the disease was not documented and acknowledged 
to be a public health problem until the 1980s.
There is a significant theoretical obstacle for Inglehart in that the PM model 
does not tell us how to classify a movement with materialist goals that uses new 
tactics. Such a movement could be classified as an ‘old’ NSM. Contemporary French 
politics may well be marked by this kind of movement rather than classical NSM 
activity. According to Desbos and Royall (2002: 116), two principal themes mark 
the course of social conflicts in France since the end of the 1980s -  those based on 
jobs, in their fullest sense of maintaining job security, and those who stressed their 
right to socially participate, in terms of being acknowledged by society and 
government and gaining the concomitant resources. The advocates for these two 
broad clusters occasionally went so far as to directly question the social and political 
order. The cases of the AIDS and anti-globalisation movements embody these two 
motivations, with many constituent parts in the latter striving for job security, while 
the entirety of the former tried to remove the stigmata of the disease and increase the 
range of sufferers’ entitlements. These are not typical Inglehartian NSMs, in that
144 www.France.grd/org/texts/cuarh 1980.html
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they are contemporary, but they are concerned with the question of survival. This 
causes problems for the PM model of NSM, and the anti-globalisation movement is 
the most discrepant, as the Nice Summit protests were the biggest in France since the 
1995 strikes. We continue our discussion of tactics in NSMs with the unemployed 
advocacy movement in France in the 1980s and 1990s.
The movement had four member groups. These were the Comités de 
chômeurs; the Mouvement national de chômeurs et précaires (MNCP); the 
Association pour l ’emploi, l ’information et la solidarité (APEIS); and Agir ensemble 
contre le chômage! (AC!). The groups were set up from the 1970s through to the 
1993 (AC!). The tactics deployed by the unemployed advocacy groups drew 
attention in France between 1982-5, when they used petitions, demonstrations, 
media contacts, occupation of buildings both public and private, and hunger strikes. 
Interestingly, although less implicated in political structures than the others, the 
MNCP and the AC! sought to make greater use of political contacts. In the 1990s, 
the use of novel actions became more sporadic -  there was a flurry of activity in 
1997/8, targeting the attraction of high-profile media coverage. The events ranged 
from occupations of unemployment offices (1997), excursions to famous restaurants 
(1998) and sit-ins of landmark buildings such as the elite third-level institution, the 
Ecole Normale Supérieure (1998); the headquarters of the PS (1998) as well as 
supermarket trips in the same year, where they brought attention to the fact that they 
couldnot affordto maintain themselves and their families (ibid. 93). The mix of 
tactics is testament to the unemployed’s disaffection with standard channels of 
representation and thus tactically, marks these groups out as NSMs. Inglehart does
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not explain whether or not a group primarily driven by an old politics concern but 
deploying new tactics is a postmaterialist phenomenon.145
We may now test to see if there is a qualitative difference between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ periods in France. If Inglehart is correct, we should find that post-1968 France 
is more marked by unconventional activity than pre-1968 France. Lane and Ersson 
(2003) assess the relative stability of Fourth and Fifth Republic France and describe 
the protest levels in both periods. They rely on a study of 12 nations (eleven 
European and the USA), and report an above-average ranking in inclination to 
protest for post-war France as a whole. Specifically, the French rank fourth on the 
list of lawful demonstrations and second in readiness to occupy buildings. Their 
overall figures are given in Table 7.1:
TV V V:1 V:2
Riots 2.5 1.7 2 .8 0.9
Anti-government 0.9 2 .1 1 .8 2.3
General strikes 1.5 0 .8 0.9 0.7
Work days lost 36.5 21.3 40.9 8.3
Table 7.1: Comparing the fractiousness o f the Fourth and Fifth Republics; after
Lane and Ersson, 2003: 124146
Chronologically, only on one of the four measures (anti-government 
demonstrations) does the Fifth Republic outstrip the Fourth in terms of protest. The 
new era of French politics is not as disrupted as the old. Cross-nationally, for a 
country that according to Waters and Touraine, has an entire class of movements 
particular to it (the second wave of NSMs), France is surprisingly quiescent. 
Therefore, Inglehart’s argument that contemporary politics is less conventional in
145 The inverse also applies.
146 Definitions found in Lane and Ersson, 2003: 133. VI refers to the period 
1958-74.
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how it expresses itself is deficient in that there is no indication that there are 
progressively more incidents where unconventional tactics are used.
7.3.3.1: Summary o f issues and tactics ofNSMs
His model is inadequate in accounting for movements driven by materialist goals, 
such as some anti-globalisation groups and the unemployed advocacy movement. 
PM performs better on one aspect of the question of tactics, as the width of the 
tactical repertoire increased, but does not do well on its prediction that contemporary 
France should have more instances of unconventional political activity. Inglehart 
fails to point to any record that can prove that, numerically, France post-1968 is 
more ‘unconventional’ than France pre-1968. As a result, H4 is only partly 
supported.
7.3.2: The profile of an NSM supporter/activist
There is simply not enough information for us to build a profile of the typical 
member of the any individual NSM. There are no systematic data on the 
demographics of NSM activists in France. For want of anything better, we focus on 
Inglehart’s own datasets which examine the entirety of NSM-type activity. The 
values aspect is key here -  NSM activists in  general shouldbe postmaterialist as 
measured by surveys. In Table 7.2, we reproduce the original 1986 data collected by 
Inglehart:
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Values Ecology
movement
Anti-
nuclear
Anti-war
Materialist 8 5 5
Mixed 11 6 10
Postmaterialist 23 13 28
Total 12 6 11
Table 7.2: EC 12 sample in April 1986 ofpercentage membership or likelihood o f a 
respondent becoming a member o f any or all o f the ecology, anti-nuclear power and 
anti-war movements. After Inglehart, 1990: 53.
The pattern supports Inglehart’s claims -  postmaterialists are much more 
likely to either support or be a member of an NSM.
7.3.3: Has the relative impact of NSMs increased over time?
As with the preceding section on the values profile of NSM supporters/activists, we 
do not focus solely on the women’s movement and unemployed advocacy groups, 
but broaden our account to give an insight into how NSMs have affected French 
politics. We can operationalise this in two ways -  their ability to affect change at the 
legislative level through applying pressure on the government and the number of 
activists the movements attracted and retained. In the latter, as we lack high quality 
data on membership, we are obliged to use more oblique indicators such as the 
durability of the movements and their capacity to mobilise large-scale events.
For the women’ movement, the political record is supportive of the claim that 
they became increasingly important in French legislation, but not electoral politics. 
From 1974-86 and 1988-93, ministries for women’s rights were in existence, a signal 
indicator of how effective the main women’s movements, MLF and Choisir, had 
been. Choisir also helped secure a change in the abortion law in 1974. After Chirac’s 
victory in 1986, feminist bodies that had been subsidised by the Ministry of 
Women’s Rights had their funding cut (Keeler and Hall, 2001: 60). The personalities
associated with the women’s movement in France may partly explain its inability to 
entrench itself in the political system there. Its protagonists were disproportionately 
composed of literary critics, academics and psychoanalysts (Hirsh, 1981: 219). 
These are hardly representative of women generally in France and so may well have 
come across as removed from the average French citizen, male or female.
The overall judgment given by Mazur (1995) is that the movement has not 
gained a proportionate say in national politics. She states that the women’s 
movement has not made significant advances on women’s conditions and quality of 
life in France for three main reasons -  there was no clear programme after abortion 
reform; the groups could not present a united front; and it is argued that there 
cultural resistance to feminism, something which is hard to test. More recently, 
though, the global goal of having more women involved in politics was addressed by 
the PS, who rolled out the gender parity law.
For groups with limited, specific goals, the picture is one of eventual success, 
albeit in terms of legal modifications rather than sweeping changes to the status of 
the groups involved. The combined efforts of the unemployed representative groups 
contributed to the modification of financial assistance laws in 1998 and 1999 and 
also to the eventual shape of anti-social exclusion policy of 1998 (Royall, 2000: 97). 
In early 1998, unemployed organisations protested in 78 departments. A billion 
francs of additional aid was given (Keeler and Hall, 2001: 64). The movement of the 
unemployed succeeded on two fronts - getting limited material concessions from the 
state and some policy input. The gay rights movement which gained two notable 
successes -  repeal of the criminal status of homosexual acts and in contributing to 
the eventual PACS legislation. The PACS legislation147 first proposed in 1998 was
147 See Chapter Six of this thesis.
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partially moulded by lobbying from the movement. However, the gay rights 
movement was not successful on other fronts in the 1980s and up to the mid-1990s 
that hampered its efforts to exert influence. The PS did not offer state aid to 
CUARH, unlike say, the women’s movement, and so it found itself with meagre 
backing and dissolved (ibid: 69). The PS went on to found its own division, 
Homosexualité et Socialisme, in 1983, thus undermining the existing gay rights 
groups. The inability of the remaining ‘independent’ groups to effect change led to 
the setting up of more confrontational groups such as Act Up. This, though, had the 
concomitant problem of alienating support from moderates. Duyvendak’s view (op. 
cit: 193) is that the government was cool about consulting with the two main bodies 
and the satellite gay rights advocacy movement as the groups did not act in a unified 
way.
There was a more positive outcome for the sans-papiers movement, which 
succeeded in getting Jospin to set up the Weil commission to look at immigration 
and the régularisation of illegally residing foreigners in France (Wihtol de Wenden, 
2002). Large numbers of them were granted legal residence, but the movement’s 
more enduring achievement was to set the parameters for a debate on French 
identity, citizenship, and the human effects of globalisation.
On legislation, we see that NSM activity has had some keynote successes. 
They have not been as successful, though, at promoting their issues to the status of 
having an impact at elections -  the women’s movement is the best illustration. It was 
a different story, though, when the women’s movement tried to expand its sphere of 
influence in to elections. In the 1978 general election, Choisir, an offshoot of the 
‘343’ group, 148 jointly contested constituencies with the PSU, but performed at floor
148 Simone de Beauvoir wasa signatory to the Manifesto of the 343, and was also head of both Choisir 
and the Ligue du droit des femmes.
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level and won no seats. There are two reasons given for why NSMs were on the 
whole unable to translate their grassroots support into a greater number of tangible 
political outcomes; both are institutional. According to Hirsh (1981: 209), a political 
vacuum occurred with the collapse of the united left policy at the 1978 legislatives. 
The gap from 1978-1981, when the PS gained control of both parliament and the 
presidency, was there to be filled by any bloc that could mobilise significant left- 
wing support. This explains the timing of the emergence of the NSMs. From 1981 
onwards, though, the PS was in a position to attempt to co-opt any major offshoot. 
Such a process is best illustrated by the case of SOS-Racisme, a group which came to 
be ‘allied’ to the PS. It was effectively co-opted into the PS as it was secretly funded 
and generally aided by Mitterrand’s office. The established left saw how they could 
use the cachet SOS-Racisme had with disaffected groups of young and black voters.
The second reason is based on a reading Waters’ (1998) outline of French 
NSM structures. She writes that many of the groups resembled ‘flash’ organisations, 
appearing and disappearing suddenly and without trace. As a result, it is reasonable 
to conclude that such ephemeral organisations were unlikely to have a durable and 
significant impact at the polls or on legislation.
In terms of mobilising people, the picture is again a mixed one -  the use of 
protest tactics increased for a substantial part of the period, but the causes were not 
postmaterialist. From 1975-89, more participants were involved in racist-based 
demos than any other (44 per cent), with the ecology movement being the next most 
significant (at 14 per cent) (Duyvendak, 1995: 103). Comparative analysis indicates 
that protest politics in France in  the main were not due to N SM-type a ction. The 
most cited study is Kriesi et al.’s tabulation of per capita rates for unconventional
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political activity in four European states (1995); they take the 15-year period in West 
Germany, Holland, France and Switzerland between 1975 and 1989. Numbers 
involved in unconventional protest are small by international standards (see 
Duyvendak, 1995: 103). France was the least affected by NSMs of the four: only
36.1 per cent o f  any protests in  France had NSM influences, whereas the figures 
were 61 per cent in Switzerland, 65.4 per cent in Holland, and 73.2 in West 
Germany. Koopmans (1996) extended the number of cases, adding Britain and 
Spain. Here, Spain is the country with the lowest proportion of NSM protest, with 
Britain and France second- and third from bottom respectively. Duyvendak devotes a 
considerable amount of space to the further analysis of this database, and finds that 
France is first overall for protest on more traditional groups (my italics); it has the 
highest incidence of education-, racist-, trade union- and farmer- based disputes. In 
addition, the disputes were more likely to entail injury and serious unrest, with 
France finishing top of the list for ‘heavy violence’ in percentage terms (Duyvendak, 
1995: 65, 101).
7.3.3.1: Summary o f the impact o f NSMs
In terms of legislative outcomes, NSMs have had a reasonable effect, but not at all 
when it comes to turning their goals into electorally-important ones. Although the 
numbers of people involved in protest pick up in the 1990s, it would be disingenuous 
to claim that they did so in support of postmaterialist causes. H4 is partly supported.
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In terms of the scholarly literature, the late 1980s onwards appears as a period when 
new groups fought for legitimacy by means of high-profile actions. Overall, the 
number and range of the groups detailed that emerged in the 1980s give credence to 
Inglehart’s argument that new politics organisations are more characteristic of the 
period post-1968. However, his case is weakened in that he does not present any data 
to show that p re-1968 F ranee w as indeed m ore c onventional i n terms o f  political 
activity. Political protest was actually more a feature here than for contemporary 
France. On balance, H4 is supported.
7.4: Ireland
Unfortunately, we do not have anything like the wealth of data, comparative or 
single case, that we have for France when it comes to assessing unconventional 
political activity in Ireland. The one noteworthy exception is Regan and Wilson’s 
(1986) comparative paper on pressure group activity in Ireland and France, but as 
Inglehart simply disregards a corporatist influence in the emergence of new politics 
movements, it is of little use here. We automatically disqualify any events linked to 
the Northern Ireland question on the grounds that the nation-state problem is neither 
materialist nor postmaterialist. This means that protests such as the burning of the 
British Embassy in 1972 are omitted. Prior to the foundation of the state, 
extraparliamentary activity was by definition the only avenue available to the Irish 
who protested against the British presence.
7.3.4: Summary of the evidence for France
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As with France, we look for indications that groups are using a distinctively new 
range of tactics, and that post-1968 Ireland is more marked by unconventional 
activity than prior to this baseline.
The sense that a ‘modernisation’ was taking place in Irish affairs was 
strengthened in December 1972, when the electorate voted for two constitutional 
changes by referendum -  the lowering of the voting age from 2 1  to 18 and the 
removal of the special status of the Catholic Church as referred to in the constitution. 
The increase in the numbers of the educated population would also serve to fuel a 
new trend of youth political involvement. Between 1960-2000, the secondary school 
retention rate increased by 70 per cent (Smith, 2002: 130). The figures for third- 
level are given below in Table 7.3:
7.4.1: Issues and tactics in NSMs
1971 1981 1991 1996
13,800 19,900 39,000 62,400
Table 7.3: Number o f fulltime students in Ireland aged 20-24. From the Central
Statistics Office, 2000: 46.
It would seem, then, that the basic ingredients for a new type and rate o f 
political activity were at hand; a linear increase in the proportion of the population 
with the technical capacity to engage in political information processing to a greater 
extent and a student-led series of confrontations with the authorities.
Inglehart’s fundamental claim that a shift towards protest takes place in 
Western Europe from the late 1960s is applicable to some ‘flashpoint’ events in 
Ireland. In 1970, there were marches and sit-down protests outside US embassy as 
President Nixon toured Ireland, voicing the people’s (mainly students) disagreement 
with the USA’s continued involvement in Vietnam. Also in the same year, there
were attempted blockades and marches outside Lansdowne Road in Dublin in protest 
at the South African rugby team’s match against Ireland. In spite of this, the record 
of extraparliamentary protest in Ireland is scant, and more motivated by old politics 
concerns than new. The anti-nuclear power movement has only been prominent for a 
brief period in Ireland at the end of the 1970s, when the government was less than 
clear as to its future energy. The largest mobilisation in Ireland in the nineteen 
seventies was sparked by indubitably ‘old politics’ concerns. On March 20 1979, in 
what was at the time the largest mobilisation of protesters since the founding of the 
state, 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  people took to the streets in protest at the punitive levels of taxation 
and its unequal burden of distribution.149 This seminal protest could hardly be 
classified as postmaterialist either in character. In Ireland, sympathetic strike level 
1972-81 as proportion of days lost was 0.1, comparable to Britain (Walsh, 1983: 21).
It was unlikely that the Irish worker was going to take part in any industrial unrest 
that was not directly related to their own pay and conditions.
Inglehart (1977, 1990 and passim) views the women’s movement as the 
exemplary NSM -  a new group adopting new tactics to effect legislative change. In 
terms of organisational structures and tactics, the late 1960s is a key period for the 
emergence o f second wave feminist groups (Galligan, 1 998: 4 9). In 1 968, the Irish 
Housewives ’ Association and the Business and Professional Women’s Club organised 
a meeting of all the active women’s groups in response to a UN call for investigations 
into the status of women. The resulting memorandum delivered to government was the 
impetus for the setting up of the Commission for the Status of Women in 1970 by the 
Fianna Fáil in order to investigate discrimination and make policy recommendations. 
The Council for the Status of Women (CSW) grew out of this function, forming in
149 http://www.rte.ie/tv/reelingintheyears/1979.html
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1973 (Smyth, 1993: 247). The group renamed itself the National Women’s Council of 
Ireland (NWCI) in 1995. From 1973, the group, was quite reformist in tactics, running 
seminars and conferences, information and referral service, and lobbying government. 
It collaborated with The Women's Political Association, co-founded in  1971 by the 
eventual Irish President, Mary Robinson, to set up a National Women’s talent bank of 
women willing to serve on public bodies and thus directly affect the legislative process 
at the top end -  an entirely entreeist way of functioning which does not fit into the 
postmaterialist rubric.
In 1971, a more militant organisation came to public attention. The Irish 
Women’s Liberation Movement (IWLM) used contacts in the media to gain no small 
measure of notoriety for its t actics, m ost notably in the Case o f  the ‘Contraceptive 
train’, which brought contraceptives illegally through customs at the border with 
Northern Ireland (Connolly, 1997: 556). However, a tension emerged between the 
more conventional gropus as embodied in the shape of the CSW, and the more radical 
IWLM and its ilk. The lack of anything approaching a broad membership of the more 
radical groups led to a pronounced decline in their ability to mobilise attention 
(Connolly, op. cit. 557-59).
Girvin’s (1996) observation on the tactics of the women’s groups in the 1995 
divorce referendum leads one to conclude that the tried and trusted conventional 
means that won out in the mid-1970s were to endure. The repertoire of press releases, 
conferences, lobbying TDs, and granting interviews to the media is similar to that used 
by the early groups of professional women to bring about changes in pay and equality 
(Galligan, op. cit. 50) Looking at the recurrent range of activity of women’s groups, it 
is striking to see exactly how ‘conventional’ their tactics have been.
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Inglehart’s account of the timeframe and political context of women’s rights 
simply does not square with the unfolding of women’s politics in Ireland. 150 The Irish 
Women’s Suffrage and Local Government Association (IWSLGA) existed from 1876 
to 1948. It succeeded in having women participate in local government by 1898. This 
group was preoccupied with securing an outlet for women at the local level, and 
unsurprisingly, more militant bodies superseded it after the turn of the century. The 
group maintained a role as a monitor of legislation that affected women and children 
and later became the Irish Housewives’ Association. The Irish Women’s Franchise 
League was set up in 1908 and aimed to ensure women’s suffrage was included in any 
pending Home Rule Bill. It also sought independence from Britain. Some time after 
this (1915) the Irish Women’s International League came into being. This group was 
preoccupied with two Inglehartian goals -  the pacifist opposition to the Great War and 
the securing of the right to vote for women. Clearly, the suffragettes, in both motive 
and tactics, could not be termed old politics if one uses a postmaterialist vocabulary, 
yet their chronology clearly locates them in the old politics era. Interestingly, Inglehart 
never refers to the international suffragette movement at all, so this is not simply an 
Irish exception. It is true that scholars make a working distinction between first and 
second wave feminism, with the former subsuming the suffragette movement 
(Connolly, op. cit. 552), but Inglehart does not. He does not explain why the campaign 
for equal pay, for example, that was waged by the Commission for the Status of 
Women qualifies as a postmaterialist issue, when pay is ostensibly a materialist 
concern.
150 The data are obtained from Connolly (1997) and Smyth (1993).
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There is a possible case for including the unemployed movement in Ireland 
as an NSM According to Royall, organisations for the unemployed had existed in 
Ireland as far back as the early 1950s (Royall, 2000: 87)151 but the INOU did not 
emerge until 1987. The socio-economic context of both timeframes was consistent: 
high unemployment leading to mass emigration. In fact, the origins of the movement 
go back even further and are clearly ‘old political’ in motive, as the Irish National 
Unemployed Workers’ Movement existed from 1929-30. The INUWM took up 
where the previous Larkin and Connolly-led worker revolts of 1913 left off, in 
striving for revolution. Unlike the earlier movement, the INUWM was avidly 
communist in its thinking and agenda.
According to Royall, the INOU shirked the use of unconventional tactics. ‘In 
Ireland, direct action has not been used to the same extent as in France. This is more 
a result of cultural differences than of a lack of organisational know-how on the part 
of the INOU.’ (2000: 93). The new forms of protest amounted to a rally in front of 
the Central Bank in 1992. Allen concurs that the leadership specifically moved away 
from direct action and even went so far as to actively discourage it (1998: 278-88), 
largely because members doubted themselves and were afraid of the state’s reaction. 
From 1985-93, the INOU was more likely to use seminars and their own 
newspapers, summer schools, pamphlets in order to convey their messages and 
educate their membership (Royall, 2000: 93). The INOU’s output at this time was 
varied -  it campaigned for cheaper power and transport and greater access to 
retraining; issued annual pre-budget statements and specific reactions to named 
government initiatives (Royall, 2000: 95)
151 Royall (2000) and Allen (1998) are the main sources for the information on the INOU; Royall 
misses out entirely on the 1930s movement for the unemployed -  see this chapter.
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In dealing with new political tactics, one has to move forward to the 1990s 
when Patricia McKenna, Green Party MEP came out against the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties of 1992 and 1998.152 Her involvement had centred on the 
unequal aspect of government funding for one side only in referendums. The action 
centred on a High Court case against the state, which she won, thereby ensuring that 
the government had to fund the opposing camp to the same extent as the state in any 
further referendum campaign (Irish Times, May 15, 1998). In a similar vein, 
Anthony Coughlan took a High Court case against the state broadcaster, RTE, over
* • •  ♦ ♦ ■ 153perceived unfairness of airtime for the opposing camp in previous referendums. 
Although these legal actions may well constitute novel tactics (Inglehart does not 
provide a definitive list), they are both diminished in their standing as NSM markers 
precisely because they were mounted by individuals. Even though Anthony 
Coughlan has been long identified with the anti-EEC/EC/ factions in Ireland, it is 
worth noting that he took that action in his own name and not of any group. 
Likewise, Patricia McKenna’s court case was taken when she was a Green Party 
MEP -  neither her party nor any one NSM group was discernible in the decision to 
go to court.
There has been a rise in activity in Ireland with a focus on international 
politics. The direction of US policy towards Iraq was cited as the reason for the 
setting up of a peace camp outside Shannon Airport and a small group damaged a 
US jet there in September 2002. One other feature of the anti-US protests in 2002 
was its insight into the profile of the organisers. The main spokesman for Irish Anti- 
War movement was Richard Boyd Barrett, a leading figure in the tiny Socialist 
Workers’ Party. The Peace and Neutrality Alliance shared the platform, as did a
152 See Gilland, 1999: 430-8.
153 See JR 209 (1997: Coughlan, Broadcasts Complaints Commission and RTE, p. 431).
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Green TD, John Gormley -  both these groups were involved in running the 
campaign opposing Ireland’s ratification of the Nice Treaty of 2001. The fringe 
Palestine S olidarity c ampaign had speakers on the p latforms o f  at many marches. 
This is a good fit for the new politics category. We have a fluid organisational 
structure behind a movement that is disproportionately attractive to younger 
citizens, 154 campaigning on anon-material issue.
As we have stressed throughout, there is a need to go back further than 1968 
in order to test if Inglehart is correct in affirming that old politics was conventional 
in its tactics and materialist in its issues. Here we find evidence of groups who are 
arguably identifiable with lifestyle politics, but crucially for Inglehart’s case and the 
fourth hypothesis in particular, they predate the lifestyle politics era.155
In terms of tactics, the key point would seem to be the willingness of groups 
to bypass the electoral process and appeal directly to people via marches and street 
protests. This is not a phenomenon peculiar to the late 1960s and onwards. As far 
back as the 1930s, political movements sought to gain influence and gather support 
by organising demonstrations. A key example is the Irish Christian Front (1936-9), 
set up by elements within Fine Gael and the National Guard in support of Franco’s 
coup in Spain. It organised mass rallies across the state.
One group that does fit into Inglehart’s schedule is the Irish Sovereignty 
Movement. It was founded in the early 1970s in opposition to Ireland’s entry to the 
EEC. The EEC was interpreted as a threat to Irish neutrality and so the movement 
may be seen to have articulated two lifestyle goals -  more say in government and 
international peace. However, there is nothing distinctively of a new politics nature
154 This is not to say that the anti-war movement found it difficult to recruit support from older 
cohorts.
155 The data are again obtained from the Encyclopaedia of British and Irish Political Organizations 
(2000).
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about the Irish pacifist movement as a whole; three precursors of contemporary 
pacifism disconfirm Inglehart’s claim that the late 1960s was the tipping point in the 
emergence of new politics. The Irish Pacifist Movement emerged in 1936 and lasted 
until 1969. Dominated initially by Quakers, it supported the arrival of Jewish 
refugees and opposed any alliance between Ireland and Britain in the war. The group 
campaigned against conscription and organised a peace march in 1939. It adapted its 
focus after the war in moving on to campaign against the hydrogen bomb. The 
Fellowship o f Reconciliation in Ireland was formed in 1949 and still in existence. Its 
signal goals are an anti-nuclear Europe and for peace in Northern Ireland. It held 
joint conferences in North and South of the island between 1950-69 with the Irish 
Pacifist Council. The Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was set up in the 
1950s and is still in existence. It has a charitable focus (it organises the Chernobyl 
Children’s project) and is active against the processing of nuclear waste at Sellafield. 
As time has gone on, it is not at all surprising that this group uses high-profile media 
events and celebrity appeals to publicise their message.
Indeed, the origins of lifestyle politics may reasonably be argues to lie in the 
late 1 920s, when Blind Men’s Party existed. 11 was the electoral vehicle156 o f  the 
Irish National Association for the Blind and embodied the concept of a ‘parallel 
movement’. Rucht and Neidhardt (2002: 240 define this as a group that has a loose 
structure approximating that of a social movement, but one that is willing to compete 
in elections. This category of movement allows for greater insight into contemporary 
Irish politics than the typical NSM / party dichotomy. Interestingly, in the late 1990s 
and the present day, it is the Socialist Party, and not an NSM per se that is most 
associated with new forms of protest activity. The Socialists are not structurally
156 It unsuccessfully fought two seats at the 1927 general election.
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different157 from previous class-based parties; they depend on a kadar158 for the 
initial stages of policy development and are formed in geographical branches. New 
members are expected to familiarise themselves with both classic and contemporary 
Marxist-Leninist readings, and members are only admitted into the party’s formal 
structure having completed a ‘training period’. In the early 1990s, it led a campaign 
in a Dublin suburb against the paying of water rates and it has consistently been to 
the fore in organising meetings and marches against referendums on European 
integration. The party urged people to vote no in the Amsterdam Treaty if they did 
not want an EU army, an EU arms industry and an EU nuclear threat (Gilland, 1999: 
433). The party targets young recruits by means of meetings centred on the topics of 
racism, low pay and rights for women, sensing that all three resonate with young, 
disaffected voters (interview material). It has also organised extensively against the 
introduction water rates and bin collection charges and led the movement against the 
local authority’s attempts not to introduce the charges. Their next step in this 
campaign was to blockade bin lorries and thus stop them from collecting unless the 
crews agreed to collect the bins of everyone, irrespective of whether they paid the 
charge or not. In September 2003, its sole TD and one of its councillors were 
imprisoned for one month for refusing to obey a court injunction not to interfere with 
the collection of rubbish. The party thus embodies the NSM concerns of anti­
militarism and unresponsiveness of the state to the citizen’s needs, coupled with its 
class-based complaint about regressive taxation, and expressed through an ‘old 
politics’ organisation which frequently resorts to ‘new’ tactics. This, then, hardly 
amounts to an Inglehartian NSM. The Socialist Party displays a willingness to
157 The information on the Socialist Party’s structure was obtained on the basis of access to its internal 
regulations in its Dublin headquarters. To my mind, there is no published work in this area.
158 Named after a former Hungarian Communist leader, a kadar is charged with giving a Marxist 
analysis of phenomena that Marx did not comment on or could not have foreseen.
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modify its tactics as it sees fit and in this sense slots into the category of parallel 
movement. Its tactics support H4, but not its goals.
7.4.1.1: Summary o f issues and tactics in NSMs
There is a clear history of political groups which have resorted to unconventional 
tactics and have had non-material motives at their base; whether Inglehart’s model 
can successfully categorise them as postmaterialist is moot point. There is an upward 
shift from the early 1990s in terms of tactics deployed, but the group most associated 
with these is a new ‘old politics’ party, the Socialists. The hypothesis is not 
supported.
7.4.2: The profile o f an NSM supporter/activist
We have a comparable paucity of data on the profile of Irish NSM activists as for 
France. Inglehart provides us with aggregate data collated on an EC-12 basis. The 
relevant figures for Ireland are presented in Table 7.4. This is fortuitous for us as 
Inglehart rarely writes anything which lends itself to testing on Ireland; at least here, 
though, we have usable data:
E c o lo g y A n ti-n u c le a r A n ti-w a r
M a te r ia lis t 27 30 30
M ix e d 32 40 40
P o s tm a te r ia l is t 43 51 53
T o ta l 31 38 38
T a b le  7 .4: E C  1 2  s a m p le  in  A p r i l  1 9 8 6  o f p e r c e n ta g e  m e m b e rsh ip  o r  lik e lih o o d  o f  a  
re s p o n d e n t b e c o m in g  a  m e m b e r  o f  a n y  o r  a ll  o f  th e  e c o lo g y , a n ti-n u c le a r  p o w e r  a n d  
a n ti-w a r  m o v em e n ts . A f te r  In g leh a rt, 1 9 9 0 :  53.
The trend mirrors that for France -  the more postmaterialist one is, the more 
likely one is to endorse the goals of a new politics movement. The tendency is
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impressively unidirectional; as one goes from materialist through mixed and on to 
postmaterialist, the likelihood of becoming a member of the aforementioned NSMs 
increases. This supports the hypothesis, in that prospective members and activists of 
NSMs are more likely to have postmaterialist values. There is one conundrum, 
though. Taking the samples from the other ten countries into consideration, France is 
third from bottom on first measure and second from bottom on other two, with 
Ireland middle (6 th) on the first measure, second on the second and third on the third. 
In short, the Irish report themselves to be more ‘active’ than the French. The reader 
is referred back to the historiography chapter of this thesis where we note that 
Inglehart (1987) claims that Ireland is unlikely to be ranked high on the list of 
postmaterialist indicators because traditionally, it has primarily been an agricultural 
country. How, then, does Ireland outrank France on such a crucial indicator of 
postmaterialist politics as membership of and affinity to NSMs? Inglehart does not 
give an answer. In itself, this is not much of an error, as it would be disingenuous to 
expect Inglehart to explain the relationship of one state with every other on any one 
marker of postmaterialism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain away using 
Inglehart’s model.
7.4.3: Has the relative impact o f NSMs increased over time?
The legislative record for the later women’s groups in Irish life evidently impacts on 
the divorce and abortion debates that animated the country throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s, in addition to the changes secured in pay and employment legislation.159 
To detail every piece of legislation in these and linked areas (such as contraception) 
would amount to a digression from the chapter’s aim. What follows is a brief
159 See Galligan, 1998, chs. 3-4, fo r a concise accout o f  the workplace changes.
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account of some key changes. At the 1991 Fianna Fail Ard Fheis, the party pledged 
to release a white paper on divorce. FF had trenchantly remained ‘neutral’ on the 
question for much of the 1980s. A white paper on marital breakdown was published 
in September 1992. Under the terms of the 1993-7 partnership agreement, in the 
section dealing with women’s rights, there was a pledge to introduce sweeping 
changes to family law with a specific commitment to a divorce referendum in 1994. 
The Rainbow government programme, A Government o f Renewal, issued in 
December 1994, was more radical in its plans, stressing that it would have a whole 
raft of legislation on taxation, inheritance rights, family law courts, protection of 
spouse and children from the first marriage and mediation services (Girvin, 1996: 
174).
The INOU stressed how it was affecting policy -  it secured more money for 
Community Employment programmes in 1 995 and 1 999, the National Agreement 
review on unemployment (1996) (Royall, 2000: 96). They were also involved in 
increasing the range of social partners to be consulted for the partnership agreements 
of the late 1990s onwards. Economic improvements leading to sustained falls in 
joblessness have clearly lessened the need for and visibility of an INOU-type body. 
The INOU recognised that the policy arena had changed in the 1990s, and so it 
devoted resources to drawing up EU policy documents. In the policy papers on the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the group criticised what it saw as the 
unwillingness of the European Union to take on board the concerns of the 
unemployed, ranging from increased minimum cash transfers to the maintenance of 
low interest rates to aid manufacturing industry. This shift of emphasis is 
noteworthy, as it indicates that the remit of the national parliament is shrinking as
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sovereignty i s pooled in theEU. This has some implications forNSM activity in  
general, and where they are likely to target their future efforts.
The women’s movement is a class apart from the other lifestyle groups that 
fought for political space throughout the 1970s and up to the present day. What is 
striking is the lack of impact these assorted others had on policy-making and their 
seeming inability to mobilise significant numbers of people. Groups such as the 
Peace Alliance have two decades of protest activity behind them, dating from their 
protests against Reagan’s policy in El Salvador, but are still very small in 
organisational terms or active supporters. It is arguable that a minor blip in 
unconventional activity is discernible in the late 1970s- early 1980s, in the form of 
protests against t he p roposed s iting o f a nuclear power p lant a t C amsore P oint in 
Wexford, that could have induced commentators to predict a new type of political 
involvement in Ireland. This, though, did not lead to a surge in protest politics 
generally.
The Irish Social Forum (ISF) is another case in point. It was invigorated by 
the anti-war demonstrations of 2 0 0 2 , and sets out ‘to offer alternatives to the 
implications of corporate-led globalisation or neo-liberalism. ’160 Interestingly in that 
it has a broad organisational membership but few actual activists. It lists more than 
36 constituent groups, ranging from the Debt and Development Coalition to 
Indymedia. Although the list is large and diverse, the actual number of people 
regularly involved in unconventional protest would appear to be low, judging by 
newspaper reports and general attendance of events. It would appear quite possible 
that one can have many new politics organisations without attaining the participation 
(and maybe even awareness) of a sizable mass of the public.
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The women’s movement aside, new politics groups have not succeeded in altering 
the political landscape. It would seem to be the case that there are not many people 
who campaign outside the conventional political channels. One cannot have a 
definitive tally of who does get involved, but it would seem fair to argue that many if 
not most of these groups are tiny in terms of membership and thus are hampered in 
any attempts to exert leverage on government policy. They do not seem to strike a 
chord with the public. The lack of any reliable set of performance indicators on 
Inglehart’s part means that one has to rely on the groups’ ability to raise their 
concerns to the prominence of an electoral issue or how they have managed to 
influence government through mobilisation of the public. They have been short-lived 
or inconsequential, or both.
7.4.4: Summary of the evidence for Ireland
On the profile of supporters of NSM-type activity, we report than Inglehart’s own 
survey data support his hypothesis, but Inglehart’s analysis does not fit the Irish 
case. Tactics have been and are currently mainly conventional. There is no numerical 
difference between Ireland 1922-1968 and Ireland 1968- 2002 in the number of 
groups who tried to raise ‘minority’ concerns (for example, the rights of blind 
people), nor is there any clear distinction between the age of formation of a group 
and whether it resorted to protest politics or not. While the INOU is noteworthy for 
its departure from the organisational-structural norms of Irish affairs, the Socialists 
are illustrative of a continuing emphasis, albeit electorally small, on improving the 
lot of the disadvantaged. It may well be more useful to think in terms of parallel
160 From  the website: w w w .IrishSocia lForum .org. Accessed September 10, 2003.
7.4.3.1: Summary o f the impact ofNSMs
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movements rather than NSMs when it comes to Irish political groupings. H4 is 
rejected.
7.5: Conclusion
The hypothesis is only partly supported, as NSMs are neither increasingly effective 
nor peculiar to contemporary politics in either state. There is a clear history of 
groups who have tried to make a breakthrough into electoral politics. On the 
question o f attitudinal or value profiling, the only aspect which strongly supports 
Inglehart’s hypothesis, we are confronted with a dearth of data. Inglehart’s own 
surveys are all that we can rely on for comparative analysis. As these surveys are 
based on a single sampling point, it is difficult to build them up to the extent needed 
to give strong support to his hypothesis. There are no direct measures of value or 
attitudinal profile of political protesters prior to the 1970s, so nothing can be said 
with respect to the likelihood of a values change being responsible fora shift to 
unconventional protest politics. I t may well be that any political activist, whether 
driven by or a new or old concern, has a qualitatively different set of values to a 
typical voter or non-voter; it is moot point whether such a differentiation must 
necessarily be classified as postmaterialist/ materialist.
In terms of his conceptualisation of PM’s influence on unconventional 
political behaviour, Inglehart’s case is weak in four areas. Firstly, he does not detail 
how new movements can emerge that are explicable under a materialist account. 
Diani (2000: 388) stresses the material aspect of the new movements which focus on 
material redistribution and citizenship rights in post-Fordist society. In this sense, the
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quintessentially ‘new’ debate on global capitalism is just a geographical extension of 
this (Smith, 2001: 16).161 The French strikes162 of 1995 were notable both for their 
disruption and for the diversity of support they attracted. As the strikers’ slogans 
were ‘defence’, ‘maintenance’, protection’, it is evident that the strikes were a 
reaction to perceived threats to their incomes and pensions. Waters (1998) claims 
that the current batch of N SMs are the result of a fundamental split between the 
haves and the have-nots in post-industrial France and are indicative that a new 
interaction between citizenship and political expression is being constructed, (op. cit. 
61); Hérault and Lapeyronnie (1998: 199-209) make a similar argument. The case of 
the Socialist Party is a good illustration of an Irish equivalent, but in parallel 
movement form.
Secondly, his work is patchy on what earlier forms of protest looked like and 
which issues motivated them - he makes no reference to the international women’s 
suffragette movement, for example, and when it emerged; or how women came to 
obtain the vote after World War II and whether the debates at the time were 
influenced by extraparliamentary events. Doing so would shed some light on 
whether unconventional tactics and quality of life issues are features more reliably 
indicative of post-196 8 France, or rather they are phenomena that have been present 
in French affairs for longer than this, and thus the ‘old - new’ dichotomy has little 
classificatory power. Poujadism is a case in point. By 1955, the movement claimed it 
had more than 200,000 members. In  its aim to fight the spread new management 
techniques and protect small firms from predators, the poujadistes would qualify as 
an anti-modernist and thus a lifestyle politics party. Inglehart does not adequately 
differentiate between an anti-modernist and an anti-postmodernist party as a lifestyle
161 Interestingly, Inglehart has not w ritten  on the subject o f  globalisation. In  its tactics, it  m ay w e ll be 
new, but how new is the struggle fo r basic economic rights?
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politics party.163 By extension, Inglehart’s model does notallow usto distinguish 
between J osé B ové and his followers (anti-postmodernist?) from Poujadism (anti- 
modernist?). Protest is not typically new, nor are lifestyle movements, as we note 
again here.
This flaw is repeated in the case of the women’s movement in Ireland. As 
the following demonstrates, this misunderstanding of history is not just confined to 
the women’s movement:
The social movements of the 1970s and 1980s are not the same as 
those of the 1840s or of 1900. The emergence of postmaterialist 
values among a substantial segment of Western publics, together with 
the process of cognitive mobilization, give new scope and new 
impetus to movements that earlier history foreshadowed only faintly.
Inglehart, 1990b: 65.
This is questionable logic on Inglehart’s part. Is he looking for a carbon copy 
of the past to serve as a model for contemporary events? What events is he referring 
to? Would ‘the hot year’ of 1848 and its revolutions be an appropriate precursor for 
unconventional political protest? The same line of argument may be pursued for 
each of the granting of suffrage, the right to organise in a trade union, or the right to 
access a welfare state. The precursors of such lifestyle concerns as anti-racism, drug 
usage and women’s rights can be traced in the US to the first half of the 19th century.
162 See Howard (1998).
163 See Chapter Tw o fo r  instances o f  where Ing lehart’ s research is concerning its e lf  w ith  postmodern 
po litics.
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Abolitionism emanated from the Second Great Awakening, an evangelical 
movement that swept across the northeast o f  the US and lasted from 1800-40. In 
addition to the Mormons, it also gave rise to the temperance and women’s rights 
movements. In its anti-institutionalism, ‘ Abolitionism was a party for people who 
did not believe in parties...’ (Menand: 2001: 13). Here, then, we have a cultural 
politics that vitiated the US a full century prior to Inglehart’s proposed starting point.
Thirdly, Inglehart does not specify which aspects of the study of NSMs are 
explicable and relevant to postmaterialism and which are not; as a result, his work 
often suffers from the same criticisms that have been levelled against NSMs. The 
strongest of these is that many of the defining features of NSM theory are not new at 
all.164 His postmaterialist model is built on the basis that cultural or lifestyle politics 
is superseding material politics. This is worth examining from its first principles. In 
a laconic summary, Martin proposes that both NSMs and the study of same have 
switched focus from large citizenship rights struggles on to the ‘analysis of symbolic 
challenges, collective identity and cultural politics’ (Martin, 2002: 74). This raises 
more questions than it answers on the general notion of NSMs, irrespective of the 
country concerned. Touraine (2002: 92) observes that during the 1980s, the typical 
NSMs were also quite Marxist or even Leninist in their influences; the moot 
question is how postmaterialist can these philosophies be? Similarly to Inglehart, 
Nash (2001: 89-90) argues that ‘the conflicts in which social movements engage are 
always, at the most general level, conflicts over cultural meanings’. Whilst 
impressive in terms of rhetoric, such an analysis is weak; how ‘general’ is this level 
and is an economically-driven struggle not also one imbued with cultural meaning? 
The latter point bears on the case of the organisations of the unemployed. By
164 See M artin , 2002: 81,
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definition, they can hardly be vehicles for the educated affluent to express their sense 
of disaffection with the quality of democracy in a state.
Fourthly, Inglehart’s model is not very useful for explaining how existing 
institutions affect the development of movements. This becomes important when one 
notes that Inglehart does not invoke the degree of corporatism or division of powers 
in order to contextualise the emergence, growth and activity of NSMs. In reading 
Rucht and Neidhardt, we can see how damaging an oversight this is:
.. .we consider it improbable that the relations between these factors 
and their effects on social movements can be expressed as linear 
functions (the more x, the more y). Rather, we often find curvilinear 
relationships; for example, high responsiveness as well as high 
intransigence or repression by political elites make the emergence of 
protest movements unlikely, while mediate or mixed responses tend 
to promote movements, as demonstrated by Eisinger (1973),
Koopmans (1993) and others.
R u c h t a n d  N e id h a rd t, 2 0 0 2 :  13.
Rucht and Neidhardt acknowledge a growing prominence of NSMs but do 
not reckon that this presages a new type of politics in general. They doubt that new 
politics movements will usurp parties in office-holding or vote-winning functions 
(ibid: 21). Their reasoning is illuminating, not just because Inglehart does not 
mention any associated material in his arguments. In their view, parties have to 
absorb new and important issues without alienating voters while also keeping their 
hierarchical structure. This causes tension. For these two reasons, it is difficult for
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movements to be absorbed in to parties (ibid: 23) and for the movement’s original 
goals to be kept. A high degree of co-opting, as was the policy of the PS with the gay 
rights and anti-racist movements, serves to take the wind out of the sails of much 
NSM activity. Rucht and Neidhardt also comment on the likely emergence of hybrid 
or parallel organisations -  movement-parties, but are quite modest in their prediction 
of how effective NSMs will go on to become:
But it is impossible to predict whether such actors will actually 
appear and become effective. In light of these crucial dimensions of 
action, any efforts at prediction will remain mere speculation, except 
for the prediction that there will be social movements and protest.
Ib id :  24 .
Precisely because their prediction is much more modest and is backed up by 
a clear modelling of the state-level factors implicated in the emergence of NSMs, 
Rucht and Neidhart’s work is much more insightful and scientific than Inglehart’s.
Overall, then, it is creditable to take Inglehart’s model and note the diversity 
of issues that new, relatively loosely-structured organisations bring to politics. 
Inglehart may well be on solid ground when he claims that NSM activists are 
disproportionately postmaterialist, but the electoral and legislative implications of 
such a linkage must remain conjectural.
With the end of this chapter, we have completed our empirical testing of PM. 
In our concluding chapter, we recapitulate the findings and what they tell us about 
PM, and outline possible future lines of research.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
Introduction
This thesis adopted a small-n comparative cases approach in order to test Inglehart’s 
model of PM. Previous studies had mainly tested PM only indirectly, and even then, 
only on a large-n basis. There was a complete absence of small-n comparative work. 
No We thematically documented his work, collated existing criticisms, and added 
new points that questioned the theoretical basis of his model. Four hypotheses were 
derived from his work and formed the basis of the empirical testing of PM. We then 
used a mixed most / least different cases methodology to result in our selection of 
France and Ireland as comparators. Both cases were assessed separately from 1968- 
2002 on each of the four hypotheses. If Inglehart’s PM is correct, we would have 
expected to see support for the following hypotheses -  that there has been a 
weakening of the class — vote link; that voter disaffection has grown; that there are 
more postmaterialist parties that are electorally successful, and that there is an 
increased prominence of NSM-type activity that is driven by PM. If the evidence 
does not support PM, then we may reject the model for the cases in the thesis, but 
not disconfirm it in general.
This concluding chapter is laid out in four parts. In Part One, we return to our 
findings for each hypothesis and give a final assessment of how the evidence squares 
with PM. Part Two is concerned with how well PM explains key areas in 
contemporary politics, while Part Three looks at what Inglehart’s model tells us 
about attempts by political science to explain the notion of value shift. We highlight 
some possible areas for further research by other scholars in Part Four. Let us now 
begin by looking again at our findings.
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8.1: What this thesis tells us about PM
We recapitulate the findings in Table 8.1; as may be seen from the table 
below, Inglehart’s model is only partly supported:
France Ireland
Hypothesis Accepted Partly
supported
Rejected Accepted Partly
supported
Rejected
H i; D r o p  
in  c la s s  
v o t in g
X X
h 2:
G ro w in g
d isa ffe c tio n
X X
H i; G r e a te r  
r o le  f o r  
n e w  p a r t i e s
X X
H 4:
In c r e a s e  in
N S M
a c t iv i ty
X X
T a b le  8 .1 :  S u m m a ry  o f  h o w  ea c h  h y p o th e s is  p e r fo r m e d  in th e  c a s e s  o f  I r e la n d  a n d
F ra n ce .
Only one hypothesis, ‘g r o w in g  d isa ffec tio n  ’, is accepted in both cases. The 
first hypothesis is rejected outright in both cases, while the balance for the third and 
fourth hypotheses leads us to reject the third and accept the fourth with reservation. 
Let us now again briefly summarise our findings for each of the four hypotheses, 
offering judgments in each instance on Inglehart’s model.
On c la s s  vo tin g , we can still use standard socio-economic classifications to 
predict who votes for the right in France; this works less well for the PS, but the 
public sector salariat seems to be solidly PS. Votes of the marginalized have been 
increasingly moving to the far right. The situation is considerably different for 
Ireland, as there have never been very high levels of class voting to begin with.
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Again, though, there are tendencies, notably for the middle classes to support the 
right of centre parties. The very fact that Irish voting patterns have not been strongly 
structured by class does not mean that Inglehart’s model cannot be tested in this 
state; we have no indication that the situation is becoming even more fluid or 
classless, though, which is what Inglehart’s case would need. To assert that 
traditional industries have been in decline and so the traditional form of class voting 
has also declined is to leave out the question as to what we may know about the 
political preferences of the disadvantaged in contemporary societies. Moreover, the 
rise of the tertiary sector does not make the job of predicting how service workers 
will vote any easier, as Wilensky (2002 :190) writes:
“Services” embrace a computer scientist and an urban dog walker; 
the full-time, stably employed office supervisor in the 
headquarters of a drugstore chain and a part-time temporary 
worker at the checkout counter in the supermarket whose wages 
place him or her among the working poor; a high-tech consultant 
in a firm selling software for financial managers and a no-tech 
salesperson in a local dress shop ... In practically every routine of 
life that is important to people ... these pairs are in different 
worlds.
It is probable that Inglehart has continuously overestimated the strength of 
the link between class and vote in the past, and he does not cite the requisite data to 
support his case. Another problem was his crude use of the Alford Index, when 
methods in political science have long since moved on from it.
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Inglehart’s model performs best on voter disaffection, but even here, there is a 
significant problem. On perhaps the single most important element, turnout, 
Inglehart’s hypothesis is untenable: turnout has not risen where postmaterialist parties 
have contested elections. Important implications flow from this shortcoming. 
Interestingly, the most disadvantaged are the least likely to vote, which could be a 
variant of class voting. His model is very strong on another aspect of disaffection, 
party membership, and this leads us to conclude that the role of the party is in doubt 
as a structure that can draw on its supporters for continued behind-the-scenes 
activities. Party loyalty has followed Inglehart’s downward prediction, but volatility 
figures have not served to indicate that one party or group of parties is benefiting at 
the expense of others. This suggests that there is a functional partisan attachment at 
election time; again, illustrating that the party is progressively less effective in 
bringing like-minded people together.
New politics is an empty concept without new parties', the most noteworthy 
aspect of the parties studied in Chapter six is their collective inability to entrench 
themselves in the choices of voters and in cabinet seats. The PS is evidently exempt 
from this assessment, but of the five parties presented, it is the most atypical ‘new 
party’. It followed a hierarchical structure, formed alliances with the PCF where 
necessary, has periodically resorted to ‘old’ Keynesian policies, both in its 
manifestos and in office. Of course, elements of renewal must be detectable in all 
established parties, or else they fail. Where it has manoeuvred itself to take account 
of new political currents, it has often done so by means of co-opting leftist offshoots, 
most clearly in the cases of SOS-Racisme and Homosexualité et Socialisme. One 
point that cannot be resolved in this thesis is to judge how many new policies must a 
party have and in which areas in order for it to be classified as a new politics party.
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For although the PS introduced a raft of quality of life measures from 1997-2002, we 
saw that its unceasing targets were the economy and law and order. The Greens are 
ipso facto ‘new politics’, but have not succeeded in pushing quality of life issues up 
to, say, the top three issues in deciding elections. Inglehart has remained silent since 
the late 1970s on the disappearance of his exemplary new politics party, the PSU; its 
Irish ‘homologue’ DL, lasted for an even shorter period, but at least held office. 
Strikingly, there have been very few new parties over time, postmaterialist or 
otherwise, in both Ireland and France. It is apparent that Inglehart’s model falls 
down in that he does not consider how the institutional matrix which can help or 
hinder new party formation and consolidation. For example, the demands people 
place on parties and the shape of their political wants are affected by what Duverger 
(1951) called the mechanical and psychological laws. Inglehart addresses the 
psychological side inadequately, and the mechanical side not at all. This latter 
oversight goes some way to explaining why he does not modify his model to take 
account of how the referendum device can serve as a pressure valve for non­
materialist concerns, thus insulating parties against any fall-out at first-order 
elections. Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s illustrates this principle perfectly.
In the case of NSMs, Inglehart’s hypothesis is, on balance, supported by 
France, where there has been a widening in the range of groups who press for 
legislative change via unconventional tactics. What he fails to include, however, is 
that clear examples of NSM-type activity have long been a feature of French politics, 
even if academics had not by then invented this category of political actor. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Ireland has probably been a case where there was a richer tradition of 
unconventional activity than in the present; consequently, Inglehart’s hypothesis was 
rejected here. It is apparent that Irish NSMs have fared very badly in terms of
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mobilising a reasonably durable support base. Regarding the profile o f  the NSMs 
activist, the scene is a mixed one for Inglehart. Using his own method and data, we 
find some support for the claim that NSMs activists are younger than the average 
and also more liberal. However, we simply do not know the value profile of 
protesters from the ‘old politics’ period, and what little we do know is usually in the 
more qualitative shape of diaries and biographies, not survey data. One confounding 
factor is that probably all politically-active people have been ‘different’ from the 
typical person; would Inglehart argue that these were always and everywhere 
precursors of postmaterialist citizens?
8.2: What this thesis tells us about PM in Politics
Inglehart’s work is of prime importance to us as a way of understanding political 
change. He makes grand claims about the political world -  how it has changed and 
how it will change. Ultimately, his work has pressing implications for politics, both 
as an activity in its descriptive side, and as a science in its attempts to arrive at an 
overarching cause. It is for these reasons that we tested Inglehart in a comparative 
political science context, and not as a survey artefact. We may now draw some final 
points as to the implications of PM for (a) understanding contemporary politics and
(b) understanding how political science tries to incorporate the factor of the 
individual citizen in explaining political contemporary politics. We deal with (a) 
here and (b) in the next section
Overall, it appears that Inglehart’s work is applicable to some degree at the 
individual level, but not at the system level, when we try to understand 
contemporary p olitics. It is  in his handling of parties and polities that Inglehart’s 
work is most flawed. Two general points are made here to illustrate the problematic
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nature of Inglehart’s rationale of PM. The first concerns the impact of a new politics 
realignment, while the second questions the assumptions inherent in Inglehart’s 
writings about the nature of old politics.
Firstly, Inglehart claims that dealignment has occurred and that an 
incremental realignment is ongoing (1971, 1977, 1992, 1994, 1995). In The Silent 
Revolution, Inglehart is quite precise that McGovern’s defeat in the 1972 US 
Presidential election was on a scale that suggested realignment had occurred in that 
country. Running counter to this, Niemi and Weisberg (1993) base their 
understanding of political realignment on historical US cases and conclude that there 
have been one plausible and three undoubted contenders for such upheavals. 
Realignments occurred (less certainly) in 1828, 1860, 1896 and 1932. This pattern 
‘suggests a striking periodicity of 32-36 years. Simple extrapolation led researchers 
to expect a realignment in the 1960s’ (op. cit. 321). Similarly, Mayhew’s work on 
political realignment in the US takes great pains to differentiate between democratic 
systems on numerous dimensions: key elections versus key election periods; sea- 
changes in policymaking; and the periodicity of realignments, among others things, 
In all, he documents eleven distinguishing features of realignments (Mayhew, 2000: 
452-456), leaving the reader with an entirely different conception of realignment 
than Inglehart’s. Mayhew concludes that the American body of realignment 
literature, the strongest in the field, ‘do[es] not hold up well, and the genre’s 
illuminative power has not proven to be great. At an analytic level, the genre has 
proven vulnerable to at least three counterposing ideas: contingency, strategy, and 
valence issues’ (op. cit., 471). This negative conclusion is o f  prime relevance, as 
Inglehart (and Abramson, 1972; 1977, Chapter Ten and passim) builds his 
realignment case on the notion that the US was undergoing such a change in the
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1960s and early 1970s. He relies on specific elections, most notably the 1972 US 
presidential contest, without admitting, as Mayhew does, that each election is 
accompanied by election-specific factors. The realignment concept that Inglehart 
refers to throughout has rarely been identified in Europe and is really an American 
idea.
In fact, it is arguable that Inglehart’s notion of a politics increasingly 
structured on a clash between orthogonal value systems is probably more tenable in 
the US than in Europe, and that he has been subtly influenced by trends in US affairs 
that have skewed his extrapolations from European survey data. Alan Ware has 
written of a battle that has been occurring within the Republican Party since the late 
1970s that pits Moralists against Civicists. He goes on to comment that this is itself 
the recasting of clash between ‘pieticals’ and liturgicals’ in the 1890s (1998: 367), 
where 1 iteral religious v alues were the divisive i ssue. The diversity o f  p olitically- 
active groups within the two US parties leads me to conclude that Inglehart’s model 
may work better there than in Europe. An incomplete set of issues which divide 
Americans along values dimensions would include those groups on both sides of the 
following issues: abortion; gun law reform; affirmative action; the death penalty, and 
stem cell research. There are few similar debates of equivalent magnitude in Europe.
Secondly, Inglehart has an idiosyncratic view of the old left and materialist 
politics. Sassoon (1997: 670-4 and 730-778) proffers an entirely different view of 
how materialist politics have been articulated and their place in the world today. He 
contends that the assumption that there was a monolithic, class-antagonistic left, 
exclusively able to draw on the votes of the working class, is erroneous. The left 
would have been in power all over Europe in the 1930s, when poverty was at its 
height and class divisions were accepted as being stronger than now. In fact, the left
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was out of power in many European states and Alford-style class voting was not a 
given. Worldwide, the left has always been interested in more than just ‘survivalist’ 
concerns, and has more consistently been in favour of universal suffrage; women’s 
liberation; equal pay; minority rights; ceding a degree of sovereignty to international 
organizations; and pacifism. Most of these issues are historically distant, yet 
Inglehart’s model has to deem them as ‘new’. The left-wing share of the vote has 
been stubbornly consistent since 1945. From the above, Sassoon argues it is a trivial 
truth to proposes that politics changes, for no-one could claim it has ever been 
impervious to time and events. Issue bases change and parties survive by co-opting 
them; the militarism of the pre-1914 social democratic left contrasts with the 
pacifism of the mid- to late-193 Os social democratic left. Sassoon keenly underlines 
how parties must co-opt new important groups and issues; but one does not need a 
time-bound, culture-specific theory like PM in order to understand this imperative.
Moreover, Inglehart’s model does not tell us how dominant new politics can 
be and whether it can eventually overtake the old issues at first-order elections. 
There may well be more diverse issues that break through to public consciousness 
as time goes by, but that is  not the same as arguing that they will have durable 
effects at either the legislative or the psephological level. As party theorists have 
invariably pointed out, the political party is necessarily a broad church -  the idea of 
winning and retaining power on the back of a set of lifestyle issues seems 
misguided. The voters' focus on material concerns is traced in a more contemporary 
setting by Chappell and Gonijalves-Veiga (2000). In their large database, based on 
national economic performance and 136 election outcomes in 13 Western Europe 
states from 1960-97, they sum up that inflation is the most important variable in
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explaining the incumbent's vote share165; interestingly, this is heightened when the 
voter compares their nation's fiscal management with the prevailing European 
average. It is apparent that political parties have always prospered or fallen in terms 
of their handling of the macroeconomy and not lifestyles; strikingly, this is an 
argument that Inglehart never addresses throughout his work. These political 
priorities (sound money and a reliable safety net) are not new - they are as old as the 
franchise. Lloyd George's 1909 budget is deemed epochal (Jenkins, 1998) precisely 
because it expressed a popular concern about the lack of state-backed provision and 
progressiveness in taxation. The rational response of political elites to this 
continuous public demand for a well-managed economy is to keep focusing on old 
politics. All of the EU polities have found it expedient to maintain fiscal prudence in 
conjunction with widespread protection against the social ills of unemployment and 
its corollaries166. Politicians (quite rightly, affirms Castles) reckon that an electorate 
left exposed to hardship will desert them, as will an electorate tied to a worthless 
currency. Survivalism would appear to be alive and well, or as Pierson's assessment 
of the 1974-90 period puts it:
165 The incumbent is punished for being on watch when inflation rose higher than for comparable 
cases. The obverse - reward for being in charge when inflation has been perceived to be low - is 
dramatically less prevalent.
166 See Crouch (1999: 482-487) for data on the scale o f increased social provision as a function of 
GDP from 1960-1995.
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...economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an 
image of welfare states under siege...if one turns from abstract 
discussions of social transformation to an examination of actual 
policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that these 
strains have generated fundamental shifts.
Pierson, 1996: 173.
Inglehart’s rhetoric of the end of the mid-century compromise does not 
square with the evidence. All things being equal, citizens are more likely to attend to 
quality of life concerns when the economic side of things is going well; this is 
probably most true for Inglehart at a cultural level o f  politics, where respondents 
from the world’s poorest states score lowest on the PMI. The body of work on 
sociotropic versus pocketbook voting suggests that a similar process operates for 
individuals, but not to the same extent. Unfortunately for Inglehart, there is a clear 
lifecycle effect, with sociotropic liberalism falling off as one ages and family welfare 
comes to the fore (cf. Renwick Monroe, Hankin and Bukovchik Van Vechten, 2000; 
and Roberts and delVecchio, 2000).
Where Inglehart may well be on track is in his tracing of what Bennett (1998) 
terms changing civicism-, people’s views of what they expect their public sphere to 
contain may well have shifted from the views of people socialised in earlier times. 
This point is made by Lance Bennett (1998), who comments that people are still 
concerned about ‘public’ matters ranging from the content of their children’s 
education to pension b enefits, and a more personalised view o f  how taxation and 
spending affects them. If party politics is less compelling (whatever this may mean) 
now than 45 years ago, it may well be that this waning is due to a diffusion of power.
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Bennett refers to Pool (1983) and Putnam (1995), who both affirm that people view 
national legislatures as comparatively shrunken in their remit. In this way, Inglehart 
would appear to be accurately predicting a shift is in the lessening importance of 
nation-state level issues among citizens. Rucht and Neidhardt (2002) refer to the 
globalization of the economy and culture, the latter more driven by the media, 
leading to a weakening of state autonomy and its symbols. The immigrant problem is 
an exemplary outcome. Identity formation requirements are rarely sated by the 
mishmash of a global identity and so the individual is obliged to think about 
constructing their own identity (Beck, 1983: 58). The postmaterialist badge may well 
be one of these identities, but we do not have any high-quality instruments to depict 
identities. Disappointingly, Inglehart is, as noted earlier, empirically silent on 
globalisation.
8.3 What this thesis tells us about PM as Political 
Science
At its heart, PM is an attempt by a political scientist to understand the links between 
values and political actions. Political science has long incorporated psychology, 
whether in the shape of rational voter or the prisoner’s dilemma. It is curious, 
though, that political science rarely incorporates current, ecologically valid 
psychology research into its models (Kuklinski, 2001). Inglehart’s willingness to 
bring in classic psychology theory is laudable, but his unwillingness to update PM as 
a result of more recent psychological findings is not. In reading the full range of 
works on PM, we are no nearer understanding how values are refracted through 
attitudes, and then link up with observable behaviour.
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...economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an 
image of welfare states under siege...if one turns from abstract 
discussions of social transformation to an examination of actual 
policy, it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that these 
strains have generated fundamental shifts.
Pierson, 1996:173.
Inglehart’s rhetoric of the end of the mid-century compromise does not 
square with the evidence. All things being equal, citizens are more likely to attend to 
quality of life concerns when the economic side of things is going well; this is 
probably most true for Inglehart at a cultural level o f  politics, where respondents 
from the world’s poorest states score lowest on the PMI. The body of work on 
sociotropic versus pocketbook voting suggests that a similar process operates for 
individuals, but not to the same extent. Unfortunately for Inglehart, there is a clear 
lifecycle effect, with sociotropic liberalism falling off as one ages and family welfare 
comes to the fore (cf. Renwick Monroe, Hankin and Bukovchik Van Vechten, 2000; 
and Roberts and delVecchio, 2000).
Where Inglehart may well be on track is in his tracing of what Bennett (1998) 
terms changing civicism', people’s views of what they expect their public sphere to 
contain may well have shifted from the views of people socialised in earlier times. 
This point is made by Lance Bennett (1998), who comments that people are still 
concerned about ‘public’ matters ranging from the content of their children’s 
education to pension b enefits, and a more personalised view o f  how taxation and 
spending affects them. If party politics is less compelling (whatever this may mean) 
now than 45 years ago, it may well be that this waning is due to a diffusion of power.
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It is interesting that the strongest criticism of Inglehart’s methods is to be 
found for his surveys. He relies on these excessively, and it is plainly wrong to stay 
within the confines of running, re-running and re-examining survey data. Inglehart 
has made sweeping claims about the political consequences of value change, but 
does not ground them with rigorous case studies. This may well be due to the level 
that Inglehart’s work is supposed to operate on. As a general theory of western 
politics, PM is always likely to be susceptible when it comes to detail over grand 
design. It is surprising that no consistent body of work has previously tried to trace 
the results of the ‘postmaterialist shift’.
On balance, this test of Inglehart’s model brings to mind Lewis-Beck a nd 
Eulau’s (unrelated) comment of ‘a good hypothesis facing resistant data’ (1985: 4). 
Inglehart’s model is both durable and widely invoked. It offers a simple bifactorial 
explanation - cognitive mobilisation and generational replacement - for a whole raft 
of political phenomena. Modelling value shift and its associated political 
developments is a harder task than straightforward survey research would have us 
believe. It is wrong to carry out recursive research, that is, where we assume that PM 
is gathering pace because the measure we use to assess PM tends slightly upwards. 
Instead, political science would be better served by looking at the mediating factors 
between values, attitudes and behaviours, and try to take account of the meaning 
people attach to specific political acts. For example, one reason why European voters 
may attach r educed s ignificance t o f  iscal policy m ay b e b ecause p arties recognize 
that a national parliament no longer has oversight of this area. This attitude may be 
implicitly picked up by voters, and it is  therefore not surprising that inflation, for 
example, would drop down the list of priorities. This is not due to PM, but rather due 
to voters recognising where they can and cannot influence policy. On the basis of the
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test carried out in this thesis, we may conclude that the political implications of value 
change need to be traced much more thoroughly than Inglehart has done. In the last 
section, we outline possible directions for further research.
8.4: Suggested research directions
Although Inglehart5s list of publications is impressively long, it should not 
intimidate researchers from tacking its implications. As we stressed throughout 
Chapter Two, his work entails repetition of two basic concepts -  the socialisation 
and scarcity hypotheses.
There are three main ways in which we can add to the knowledge of the link 
between political values and political change. The first is to strengthen the survey 
method by adopting a longitudinal design to support his cross-sectional one,167 and 
moving to regular updates of aPMI-type instrument would enable us to keep the 
stimuli topical and meaningful. This would allow us to see if people’s expressed 
preferences are indeed affected by the stage of life they are at and their current 
political context. Such an approach would enable us to judge the relative merits of 
Inglehart’s early socialisation hypothesis against that of the lifecycle effect. The 
latter has been extensively looked at in psychology, but not by political scientists.
The second suggested procedure is to run a quasi-experiment or a series of 
them. Political scientists have not been very willing to test their models in this way, 
but Inglehart’s work on preferences could be tested by using a ranking assessment in 
a citizens’ jury exercise, for example (cf. Kinder and Palfrey, 1993, for a set of 
chapters that justify and demonstrate experiments in political science).
167 See Brady (2000) for a strong case for these modifications for much survey work in political 
science.
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The third suggestion is the most complicated. Although the model may 
perform better in predicting individual political attitudes, this is not the same as 
arguing that attitudinal change in the person necessarily results in a system-level 
change to new politics. It would be desirable to design a method that lends itself to 
regression modelling of how short-, medium- and long-term new politics goals 
interact with the political structure of the state in which the citizen lives. Ultimately, 
we need some figures that would allow us to estimate timeframes and likely 
prominence of new politics phenomena, and such an exercise can only be speculative 
without regression modelling.
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